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PETITIONER: PARESH CHANDRA CHATTERJEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/08/1961

BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. BENCH: SUBBARAO, K. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1962 AIR  167            1962 SCR  (3)  88  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC2301  (42)  RF         1977 SC1825  (60)

ACT: Requisition  of  Land-Tea  Estate  land  requisitioned-State Legislation-Constitutionality  of If makes  provisions  for payment   of  compensation--Assam  Land   (Requisition   and Acquisition)  Act, 1948 (Assam 25 of 1948)  ss.  3,6,7,8-Tea Act, 1953(29 of 1953) 2,10,15-Constitution of India, Arts 3. 31  (2), 372, Sch.  VII, List I, Entry  52-Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 23, 24, 25.

HEADNOTE: Certain lands out of the petitioner’s tea estate were requi- sitioned by the State under the Assam Land (Requisition  and Acquisition)  Act,  1948.   The  petitioner  challenged  the constitutionality  of  the Act on the ground-, that  it  was ultra  vires the State Legislature in so far as it  provided for  the requisition and acquisition of tea estates  as  tea industry   was  a  matter  for  exclusive   legislation   by Parliament   and   that  it  offended   Art.31(2)   of   the Constitution   as  it  neither  provided  for   payment   of compensation  for property requisitioned nor  specified  the principles  and the manner in which compensation was  to  be determined. Held, that the Act was not ultra vires the Assam Legislature and  was valid.  The Act was valid when it was made in  1948 and,  would  by  reason of Art.  372  of  the  Constitution, continue in force after the commencement of the Constitution until   altered,   repealed  or  amended  by   a   competent legislature.    The  Act  in  essence  provided   only   for requisition or acquisition of lands in the public  interest; it  had nothing to do with the tea industry.  The  Tea  Act, 1953,  made by Parliament, which was mainly  concerned  with the  development of the tea industry and had nothing  to  do with the requisition and acquisition of land, did not in any way  alter,  repeal or amend the Assam  Act.   Further,  the Assam  Act did not offend Art. 31 (2) of  the  Constitution. There  were provisions in the Act for the payment of  agreed

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compensation and in case of disagreement for a reference  to the  court,  in which reference the provisions of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would mutatis mutandis apply.  Though the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  did  not  provide   for requisition  of land its provisions relating to  payment  of compensation  for  acquisition of land could be  applied  to requisition of land after due alterations. 89

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 236 and 237 of  1960. Petitions  Under Art. 32 of the, Constitution of  India  for enforcement of fundamental rights. K.   B. Bagchi and R. C. Dutta, for- petitioner. A.   V. Viswanatha Sastri and Naunit Lal, for respondents. 1961.  August 9. The Judgment of the Court was deliverd by SUBBA  RAO, J.-The Petitioner owns a tea estate  called  the Urrunabund Tea Estate in village Udarbund in the District of Cachar in the State of Assam.  The extent of the Tea  Estate is about 2682 acres.  Out of the said area, 553.73 acres are under  tea  cultivation  and  the  rest,  according  to  the Petitioner, is utilised for the purpose of tea industry :and for   purposes  connected  with  the  said  industry.    The respondents do not admit this fact and state in the counter- affidavit  that  the  remaining area  is  lying  fellow  and unutilised.  On December 4,1959, the Deputy Commissioner  of Cachar  at Silchar, respondent No. 2 issued  a  notification requisitioning an area of 183 bights of land of the said Tea Estates, and by another notification dated December 5, 1959, he requisitioned another extent of 149 bighas 19 cottahs and 11  chattacks  of    land  of  the  said  Tea  Estate.    The petitioner  filed two petitions in this Court under Art.  32 of  the  Constitution  praying for the  issue  of  writs  of mandamus  directing the respondents to forbear  from  giving effect to the said orders. Learned  counsel appearing for the petitioner raised  before us two contentions, namely, (i) tea industry is a matter for exclusive legislation by the Parliament under Entry 52, List I of the Seventh Schedule to  the     Constitution,,     and therefore, the Assam Land     (Requisition and Acquisition), Act of 1948,   hereinafter called the Act), in so 90 far as it provides for the requisition and acquisition of  a tea  estate or lands appertaining,to it, is  ultravires  the :State  Legislature  ;  and  (ii)  the  said  Act  is   also constitutionally  void  as  it offends  Art.  31(2)  of  the constitution,  inasmuch as it does not. either provide for payment  of compensation’ for the property requisitioned  or specify  the  principles on which and the  manner  in  which compensation is to be determined. To appreciate the first contention, it is necessary to state some  facts.  The Assam Land, (Requisition and  Acquisition) Act,  1948,  was  passed by the  Assam  Legislature  and  it received  the assent of the Governor on November  14,  1948. It is a pre-Constitution Act, presumably made under Entry 9, List  II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of  India Act,  1935,  which related to  "’compulsory  acquisition  of land".   Entry.  34, List I of the Seventh Schedule  to  the said Act was ,’development of industries, where  development under  Federal  control  is declared by Federal  law  to  be expedient  in the public interest".  It is not  stated  that there was any Federal law declaring that the development  of tea   industry  was  expedient  in  the   public   interest.

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Therefore,  at the time when the Act was passed b the  Assam Legislature, even on the assumption that the entry  relating to  development  of industries would  cover  legislation  to prevent acquisition and requisition of land forming part  of a  tea  estate,  there was no  Federal  law  declaring  that development  of  tea industry was expedient in  the  public, interest, with the result the Act was constitutionally valid at  the time it was made.  If so the said law, by reason  of Art. 372 of the Constitution, would continue to be in  force after  the commencement of the Constitution  until  altered, repealed  or  amended by a competent  Legislature  or  other competent authority.  The Tea Act- of 1953 was a Central Act which received the assent of the resident on May 28, 1953. It was passed by 91 the  Parliament in exercise of the power to make laws  with respect  to.matters  enumerated in Entry 52, List I  of  the Seventh-,.Schedule  to the Constitution.  Entry  52.  reads, "industries,  the control of which by the Union is  declared by   Parliament  by  law.to  be  expedient  in  the   public interest"..  Section  2  of the Tea Act  in  specific  terms declares  that it was expedient in the public interest  that the  Union should take under its control the  tea  industry. The question, therefore, is not whether at the time the  Act was  passed  by  the  Legislature of  the  Province  it  had constitutional  competence  to make it-there cannot  be  any doubt  about its competence at- the time it  was  passed-but whether by reason of the passing of the Tea Act, the Act was either altered, repealed or amended within the meaning of Art.372.  of  the  Constitution.   This  leads  us  to   the consideration of the scope of the both the Acts. First taking the Act, the preamble shows that it was  passed to  provide  for the requisition and speedy  acquisition  of premises  and land for certain purposes.  Section 3  confers on the Provincial Government a power to requisition any land for the purpose of maintaining supplies and services  essen- tial  to the life of the community or for providing proper facilities        for       accommodation,        transport, ’communication,irrigation  or drainage.  Section  4  enables the  Government  to  require  the  land  so   requisitioned. Section  6  provides  for  the  release  of  the  land  from requisition.   Sections  7  and  8  prescribe  the  mode  of awarding  compensation  for requisition  or  acquisition  of land, as the case may be.  The Act in essence provides  only for requisition or acquisition of lands in public  interest. It  has  nothing to do with tea industry, and  as  for  that matter any industry. The Tea Act was enacted for a different, purpose altogether. The  long title given in the Act shows that it  was  enacted ""to  provide  for  the  control by the  Union  of  the  tea industry, including 92 the control, in pursuance of the International Agreement now in force, of the cultivation of tea in, and of the export of tea  from,  India and for that purpose to  establish  a  Tea Board  and levy a customs duty on tea exported  from  India" Chapter  II provides for the establishment and  constitution of the Tea Board and a. 10 therein describes its duties  and functions; its functions are mainly intended to promote  the development of the tea industry, to regulate the  production and extent of cultivation of tea, to improve its quality and to regulate the internal and external trade in tea.  Chapter III  prescribes the method of control over the extension  of tea cultivation and Ch.  IV, the control over the export  of tea  and tea seeds.  Chapter V deals with finance,  accounts

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and  audit.  Chapter VI regulates the power of  the  Central Government  to control price and distribution of tea or  tea waste.  Chapter VII provides for miscellaneous matters  such as  licensing of brokers, tea manufacturers etc.,  power  of inspection  and  penalties  for the  commission  of  certain offences  created  by the Act.  It is,  therefore,  manifest that  the Tea Act mainly concerned with the  development  of the tea industry, and it has nothing to do with the requisi- tion or acquisition of lands, though the said lands may from part of a tea estate or used for purposes incidental to  the tea  industry.  Indeed, s.15(1)(b) of the Tea  Act  provides for  the  contingency of a part of a land on  which  tea  is planted being compulsorily acquired under the provisions  of the  Land  Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act 1 of 1894) or  by  any other law for the time being in force and no longer  carries tea.   In  such an event, the said  section  authorises  the owner  of  the tea estate in Which such land is  situate  to apply  to the Board for permission to plant tea on land  not planted with tea.  The Tea Act, therefore, not only does not expressly prohibit the acquisition of any land, but also  in express  terms  provided  for the replacement  of  the  area acquired  by other land for the purpose of  tea  plantation. Though the 93 Tea  Act  does  not in terms visualize  the  contingency  of requisition  as  distinguished from acquisition,  we  cannot come  to  a different conclusion in respect of it,  for  the word  "acquisition" must have been used in  a  comprehensive sense  so as to include requisition also.  That  apart,  the provisions  of  the  Act do not expressly  or  by  necessary implication prohibit requisition of a land used directly  or incidentally  for  the purpose of plantation  of  tea.   The rules made under the Act only provide for the control of tea industry  and  they  have no bearing  on  the  question  of’ requisition or acquisition of land.  A comparative study  of both  the  Acts makes it clear that the two Acts  deal  with different  matters and were passed for  different  purposes. The Tea Act in no sense of the term can be described as  one altering, repealing or amending the Act passed by the  Assam Legislature.  This contention is, therefore, rejected. There  are  no  merits  in  the  second  contention  either. Article 31(2) of the Constitution reads :               "No property shall be compulsorily acquired or               requisitioned  save for a public  purpose  and               save by authority of a law which provides  for               compensation  for the property so acquired  or               requisitioned  and either fixes the amount  of               the  compensation or specifies the  principles               on  which,  and  the  manner  in  which,   the               compensation  is to be determined  and  given;               and no such law shall be called in question in               any court on the ground that the  compensation               provided by that law is not adequate." Under   this  Article,  the  law  made  for   acquiring   or requisitioning   a   property   is   conditioned   by    two circumstances,  namely,  (i)  the  existence  of  a   public purpose,  and (ii) the payment of compensation.  If the  law provides  for  compensation and either fixes the  amount  of compensation  or specifies the principles on which, and  the manner in which 94 the  compensation is to be determined, the. adequacy of  the compensation  is not justiciable, :.The question is  whether the  Act  satisfies  the  said  conditions.   The   relevant provisions of the Act dealing with compensation in the  case

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of requisition of land are as under.               Section  6. (1) Where any  land  requisitioned               under  section 3 is not acquired and is to  be               released  from requisition, it will revert  to               the  owner and the Collecter will deliver  the               possession  of  the  land  to  such  owner  or               interested  person  who was  recognised  under               section 7(3).               Section 7. (3) Where any land is requisitioned               under  section 3 there shall be paid to  every               person interested such compensation as may  be               agreed upon in writing between such person and               the Collector, in respect of               (a)   the requisition of such lands ; an               (b)   any  damage  done during the  period  of               requisition  to such land other than what  may               have been sustained by natural causes.               Section  s. (1) The Collector shall  in  every               case-               x x x x x x               (b)   where  there  is any- disagreement  with               regard  to  the compensation   payable  under               sub-section  (3)  of  section  7  between  the               Collector and the person to whom possession of               any land is delivered under section 6               reefer  the  matter  to the  decision  of  the               Court.               (2)   The  provisions of the Land  Acquisition               Act, 1894, shall mutatis, apply               95               in  respect of an reference made to the  Court               under subsection (1). These   provisions  provide  for  the  payment   of   agreed compensation,  and, in the case of disagreement between  the Collector and the person. to whom possession of any land  is delivered  under  s.6,  for a reference to  the  Court.   In respect of any such reference to the Court, the,  provisions of  the land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall  mutatis  mutandis apply.   The argument is that in the matter of  requisition, the  Land  Acquisition  Act, 1894, does  not  prescribe  any principles  for  awarding compensation  and,  therefore,  in respect  of  requisition, either sub-s. (2) of  s.8  is  not applicable  or becomes otiose with the result that  the  Act does  not  lay down any principles on which  and  manner  in which  the compensation is to be determined.  This  argument ignores  the expression "mutatis mutandis" in  sub-s.(2)  of s.8.  The  said  expression means "with  due  alteration  of details".   The  Land  Acquisition  Act  applies  only,   to acquisition  of  land as distinguished from  requisition  of land.   Acquisition  deprives the owner permanently  of  his land;  and  requisition deprives him only of  his  right  to present. possession.  When the necessity for which the  land was  requisitioned ceased, it may be made to revert to  him. Sub-s.(2)  of  s. 8 of the Act makes the provisions  of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, with due alterations of  details or  appropriate  changes apply in respect of  any  reference made  to the Court.  Part III of the Land  Acquisition’  Act provides  for  a reference to the Court  and  the  procedure thereof.   With appropriate modifications the provisions  of that   Chapter.   apply  to  a  reference  in   respect   of compensation  for requisition.  Sections 23, 24 and  25  lay down the principles for ascertaining the amount of compensa- tion  able to a person whose land has been acquired.  We  do not  see  any difficulty in applying  those  principles  for paying compensation in the

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96 matter  of requisition of land.  While in the case  of  land acquired,  the market value of the land is  ascertained,  in the  case  of requisition of land, the compensation  to  the owner  for  depriving  him of his possession  for  a  stated period  will  be ascertained.  It may  be  that  appropriate changes  in the phraseology used in the said provisions  may have  to  be made to apply the principles  underlying  those provisions.   To illustrate : s.23 of the  Land  Acquisition Act says :               (1)   In   determining  the   amount   of.com-               pensation  to  be awarded  for  land  acquired               under  this  Act, the Court  shall  take  into               consideration-               first,  the  market value of the land  at  the               date  of the publication of  the  notification               under Section 4, subsection (1);               secondly,  the damage sustained by the  person               interested,  by  reason of the taking  of  any               standing  crops or trees which may be  on  the               land  at  the time of the  Collector’s  taking               possession thereof,               thirdly,  the damage if any sustained  by  the               person   interested,  at  the  time   of   the               Collector’s taking possession of the land,  by               reason  of severing such land from  his  other               land;               fourthly, the damage if ally sustained by  the               person interested, at the time of the  Collec-               tor’s taking possession of the land, by reason               of  the acquisition injuriously affecting  his               other  property, movable or immovable, in  any               other manner, or his earnings;               fifthly if, in consequence of the land by  the               Collector, the person interested is  compelled                             to change his residence or place :of business,               the  reasonable expenses if any incidental  to               such change; and               97               sixthly, the damage if any bona fide resulting               from  diminution of the profit s of  the  land               between  the  time of the publication  of  the               declaration  under Section 6 and the  time  of               The the Controller’s taking possession. of the               land.               (2)   In  addition to the market value of  the               land  as above provided, the Court shall  in               every case’ award a sum of fifteen per  centum               on such market value, in consideration of  the               compulsory nature of the acquisition. If instead of the word "acquisition" the word  "requisition" is  read, and instead of the words "the market value of  the land"  the  words "the market value of the interest  in  the land" of which the owner has been deprived are read, the two subsections  of the section can, without any difficulty,  be applied to the determination of compensation for acquisition of  a land.  So too, the other section can be  applied.   If the  argument  of  learned counsel  for  the  petitioner  be accepted,  we  would be attributing to  the  Legislature  an incongruity,  namely, that while it provides  principles  of compensation in the matter of acquisition, it omits to do so in  the  matter of requisition, though in both the  cases  a reference  to  the  Court is provided.   For  the  aforesaid reasons, we reject this contention. No other point is raised.  In the result, the petitions fail

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and are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.