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PETITIONER: PARADISE PRINTERS AND ORS. A

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION TERRITORY OF CHANDIGARH AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT04/12/1987

BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) BENCH: SHETTY, K.J. (J) RAY, B.C. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR  354            1988 SCR  (2) 157  1988 SCC  (1) 440        JT 1987 (4)   553  1987 SCALE  (2)1235

ACT:      Reversion of  policy of  allotment of  industrial sites for establishment  of printing presses, under the Chandigarh (Development and  Regulation) Act.  1952, and the Chandigarh Lease Hold of Sites and Building Rules, 1973, challenged.

HEADNOTE: %      The  Chandigarh   administration  wanted  the  printing presses, scattered  all over  Chandigarh in  the residential premises or  small shops,  to be  located in  an  industrial area. For  that purpose,  the administration earmarked forty three sites  in the  industrial area  Phase-lI, and  invited applications for  allotment of  the sites.  Several  persons submitted the applications with deposits of earnest money of Rs.1,000 in  each. That  was ten  per cent  of  the  premium payable for  each site. The appellants in the C.A. No. 97 of 1981, who  were among  the said applicants, were called upon to deposit 25 per cent of the premium calculated at the rate of Rs.15  per square yard. The appellants complied with that demand.  The   authorities  decided  to  draw  lots  as  the applicants were more than the number of the sites available. In October 1977, lots were drawn and the appellants won. But the authorities did not issue the letters of allotments. The authorities had  a second  thought about  the scheme  of the allotment of  the sites.  They wanted to accommodate as many applicants as possible, which, however, could not be done in the industrial  area phase  II. The authorities also came to hold the  view that  for setting  up the  printing industry, larger sites as earmarked earlier would not be necessary and smaller sites would meet the requirements. Consequently, the sites proposed  in the industrial phase II were given up and a lay-out  of smaller  sites in  the industrial area phase I was prepared,  wherein about  131 sites  were  reserved  for allotment to the printing press owners.      The  appellants  as  also  the  other  applicants  were intimated by  letters that  the said sites would be allotted at the rate of Rs.35 per square yard, and that the allotment would be  made by  draw of  lots on  October  3,  1979.  The appellants did  not participate  in  the  proceedings.  They moved the High Court by a writ petition, challenging the

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158 revised policy  of the allotment of the smaller sites on the ground inter  alia that  they had a right to take possession of bigger  plots in respect which lots were earlier drawn in their favour. The High Court did not give substantial relief to the appellants, holding that there was nothing illegal in the said revised policy since the appellants did not acquire right to  get bigger sites in the phase II, it directed that the appellants  would be  liable to pay at the rate of Rs.15 and not  Rs.35 per  square yard.  The appellants appealed to this Court by special leave against the decision of the High Court (C.A  97 of  1981).  The  respondents  the  Chandigarh Administration-also moved  this Court by special leave (C.A. No. 98  of 1981)  against the direction of the High Court as to the reduced premium to be recovered from the appellants.      Dismissing both the appeals, the Court, ^      HELD: There  was no  substance in  the  appeal  by  the respondents. If  the applicants  had been  allotted sites as per the  original plan  and as  per the  first draw in 1977, they would  have been liable to pay at the rate of Rs.15 per square yard.  In fact,  the  other  enterpreneurs  who  were allotted sites  in the industrial area phase II paid premium only at  the rate  of Rs.15 per square yard. Why then should there be  a higher  rate payable by the appellants? They had not asked  for the  sites in  the industrial  area phase  I. Secondly, the  applicants were not responsible for the delay in the  allotment of  sites. Thirdly,  there was no evidence that  the   Chandigarh  Administration  had  to  incur  more expenditure in  forming the  new sites  in the  phase I. The High Court was right in directing the authorities to recover only at the rate of Rs.15 per square yard. [161H; 162A-C]      In the  case of  the appeal by the appellants/owners of the printing  presses, admittedly,  at the  relevant  stage, there was no intimation of the allotment of the sites to the appellants. There  was no official communication to them, as required under  sub-rule (3)  of Rule  8 of  the  Chandigarh Lease  Hold   Sites  and   Building  Rules,  1973.  Such  an intimation alone could confer the right on the appellants to obtain possession  of the  sites. In the absence of any such communication, the  appellants could not be held to have the right to get the sites. [163F-G]      Emphasis was  laid on the word "shall" used in sub-rule (3) of  Rule 8,  which provides that when 10 per cent of the premium has been tendered, the Estate officer shall, subject to  such   directions  as   may  be   issued  by  the  Chief Administrator in that behalf, allot a site of the size 159 applied for.  There is  not much  force in  this contention. Generally, the use of the word "shall" prima facie indicates that the particular provision is imperative, but that is not so always.  The meaning  to be  given to a word depends upon the context  in  which  it  is  used.  The  right  of  every applicant under  sub-rule (3)  of Rule  8 is only a right to have his  application  considered.  The  acceptance  of  the application does not create a right for allotment of a site. The word  "shall" used in the sub-rule must be considered as not mandatory.  The .  imperative meaning  would defeat  the purpose of the rule. [163H; 164A-B, F]      It is  not known  under what  provision the authorities asked the  appellants to  pay 25  per cent  of  the  premium payable in respect of the sites even before allotment. There was no  specific assurance  or representation  made  by  the authorities, promising  to allot the sites applied for. Even if there  was any  such assurance,  the Court  did not think

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that it  would give  rise  to  the  doctrine  of  promissory estoppel in  the case. The authorities cannot give assurance contrary to  the statutory rules. They are bound by the rule of procedure  and cannot  make any representation or promise to allot  particular sites  to the  applicants. Even if they make such a promise or assurance, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot  be invoked  to compel them to carry out the promise or assurance which is contrary to law. [166B-D]      If there  were enough  plots  to  accommodate  all  the applicants in  the industrial area Phase II, it would not be proper for  the authorities  to revise  the policy and allot smaller sites  in phase I. But no material was placed before the Court  to come  to the conclusion that there were enough industrial  plots   to  accommodate,   possibly,   all   the applicants. The  authorities formed another lay-out in phase I for  want  of  plots  in  phase  II.  The  action  of  the authorities was  bona fide  and there was no reason to doubt it. [166F-G]      The revised policy of the Chandigarh Administration did not  suffer   from  any   act  of  arbitrariness  either  in classifying  the  appellants  as  a  separate  group  or  in considering them  for allotment of smaller sites in phase I. All the  persons, who  had applied  for industrial sites for establishing printing  presses were  grouped together.  They were considered  together. They could not be accommodated in phase II  for want  of enough sites. So, another lay-out was formed in phase I. The grievance of the appellants about the revised policy  of the  Chandigarh Administration  to  allot smaller  sites   to  them,  being  discriminatory,  was  not justified. [168H; t69A-C] 160      Delhi Cloth  & General  Mills Ltd.  v. Union  of India, Civil Appeal  No. 223  of 1974, disposed of by this Court on October 8,  1987 and Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and Ors,.  [1959] SC R 279, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 97 & 98 of 1981.      From the  Judgment and  order dated  25.4.1980  of  the Punjab and Haryana High Court in C.W. No. 2512 of 1979.      V.M. Tarkunde and N.S. Das Behl for the Appellants.      Kapil Sibal,  P.  Gaur  and  Jitendra  Sharma  for  the Respondents.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      JAGANNATHA SHETTY,  J. These  appeals by  special leave are directed  against the  judgment dated  April 25, 1980 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in civil writ no. 3512 of 1979.      The revised policy of allotment of industrial sites for the establishment of printing presses in Chandigarh has been called into  question in  the aforesaid  writ petition.  The printing presses are now scattered all over Chandigarh. They are situated  either in  residential premises  or  in  small shops in different localities. The Chandigarh administration wanted them  to be  located in  an industrial area. For that purpose, they  earmarked forty three sites in the industrial area  phase-II.   The  sites  are  comparatively  of  bigger dimensions. In  1975, the  authorities invited  applications for allotment  of those  sites.  Several  persons  submitted applications. The  appellants in  Appeal No. 97 of 1981 were some of  them. They applied with deposit of earnest money of Rs.1000 each.  That would  be ten  per cent  of the  premium

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payable for  the site.  All the  applications were processed for final  allotment. In  the meantime,  it is said that the appellants were  called upon  to deposit  25 per cent of the premium calculated  at the  rate of  Rs. 15 per square yard. The appellants  appear to  have complied  with  that  demand also. Since  there  were  more  applicants  than  the  sites available, the  authorities decided  to draw  the  lots.  In October 1977,  the lots  were drawn and the lady luck smiled at the appellants. But the authorities did not issue letters of allotment.  The reason was obvious. The authorities had a second look at the scheme of allotment of sites for printing industries. The authorities wanted to 161 accommodate as  many applicants  as possible. But they could not accommodate  all those  applicants for  want of adequate number of  sites  in  the  industrial  area  phase  II.  The authorities were  also of  the view  that for setting up the printing industry,  larger sites  such  as  those  earmarked earlier, would not be necessary and smaller sites would meet the requirements.  Consequently, the  sites proposed  in the industrial area  phase II  were given  up and  a lay  out of smaller sites  in the  industrial area  phase I  was formed. There about  131 of  sites were  reserved for  allotment  to printing press owners.      The appellants  and other like applicant were intimated by letters that the said sites would be allotted at the rate of RS.35  per square  yard. They were also informed that the allotment would  be made by draw of lots on October 3, 1979. The  appellants   however,  did   not  participate   in  the proceedings. They moved the High Court with a petition under Art. 226  of the Constitution challenging the revised policy for allotment  of smaller sites. It was contended inter alia that they  had a right to take possession of bigger plots in respect of  which the  lots  were  earlier  drawn  in  their favour. The High Court issued rule Nisi in the petition, but allowed the  authorities to  draw the  lots as proposed. The High Court  also permitted  the appellants  to  deposit  the premium demanded  without prejudice  to their  rights in the writ petition.      That is  all at  the preliminary  hearing of  the  writ petition. In  the final  hearing the High Court did not give substantial relief  to the appellants. The High Court was of the view  that there  was nothing  illegal  in  the  revised policy adopted  by the  Chandigarh administration  since the appellants did  not acquire right to get bigger sites in the industrial area  phase II. The High Court however, felt that the appellants  would be liable to pay only at the rate of . Rs. 15  per square  yard and  not  Rs.35  per  square  yard. Accordingly a direction was issued to the authorities.      It is  against this  judgment that  the present appeals have been  preferred. Civil  appeal  No.  97/81  is  by  the printing press  owners. Civil  Appeal No.  98/81 is  by  the Chandigarh administration.  The Chandigarh administration is aggrieved by  the direction  issued by  the High Court as to the premium to be recovered from the allottees.      We may  first dispose  of the  appeal preferred  by the Chandigarh administration.  We do  not find any substance in this appeal.  If the  applicants had  been allotted sites as per the original proposal and as 162 per the  first draw  in 1977, they would have been liable to pay only at the rate of Rs. 15 per square yard. In fact, the other entrepreneurs  who were allotted sites from industrial area phase  II paid  the premium  only at the rate of Rs. 15 per square  yard. Why  then there  should be  a higher  rate

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payable by  these persons. They did not ask for sites in the Industrial area phase I. Their applications for sites in the industrial  area  phase  II  were  not  rejected.  The  same applications appear to have been considered for sites in the industrial area  phase I.  Secondly, the applicants were not responsible for  the delay  in the  allotment of  sites. The delay was  entirely due  to the  change of policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration. Thirdly, there is no evidence that  the   Chandigarh  administration  had  to  incur  more expenditure for  forming  new  sites  in  phase  I.  It  is, therefore, not  proper that these applicants should be asked to pay  the premium at a higher rate. The High Court, in our opinion, was  justified  in  directing  the  authorities  to recover only at rate of Rs. 15 per square yard.      Before considering  the contentions urged in the appeal of printing  press owners,  we  may  briefly  refer  to  the relevant  provisions   of  the   enactment  bearing  on  the contentions. The  disposal of  building sites  in Chandigarh has been regulated by the Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act,  1952 which may be termed as "The Act". The Chandigarh Lease  Hold of Sites and Building Rules, 1973 are the relevant  rules which may be referred to as "The Rules". Section 3  of the  Act provides  power to the authorities to sell, lease  or otherwise  transfer  any  land  or  building belonging to  the Government.  They could  be disposed of by auction,  allotment  or  otherwise.  Rule  4  provides  that Chandigarh Administration  may demise  sites and building on lease for  99 years.  The procedure  for allotment  has been prescribed under  rule 8.  Rule 8  so far  as it is material provides:           "Rule 8. Lease by allotment-Procedure for-                (1)In case  of allotment  of site or building           the intending  lessee shall make an application to           the Estate officer in Form ’A’.                (2)No application under sub-rule (l) shall be           valid unless  it is  accompanied by 10 per cent of           the premium  as earnest  money in  the  prescribed           form of payment.                (3)When 10  per cent  of the premium has been           so tendered  the Estate officer, shall, subject to           such directions 163           as may  be issued  by the  Chief Administrator  in           this behalf,  allot a site of the size applied for           or a  building or  which particulars  are given in           the application  and shall intimate, by registered           post the number, sector, approximate area, premium           and the  rent of  the site or building allotted to           the applicant.                (4)The applicant  shall, unless he refuses to           accept the allotment within 30 days of the date of           the receipt of the allotment order, deposit within           that period and in the prescribed mode of payment,           further 15  per cent of the premium. The remaining           75 per  cent of  the  premium  shall  be  paid  as           provided in Rule 12."      The scheme  provided under these Rules for allotment of sites is  like this:  Sub-rule (1)  of Rule  8 provides  for making an application to the Estate officer for allotment of site. The  application shall be accompanied with 10 per cent of the  premium  as  earnest  money.  That  amount  must  be tendered to  the Estate  officer. The  allotment of  a  site shall be  intimated to  the applicant  by registered  letter giving the  particulars of number, sector, approximate area, premium and the rent of the site or building allotted to the

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applicant. It  would be  open to the applicant to accept the allotment or  not. If  he  accepts  the  allotment  he  must deposit 15  per cent of the premium and the remaining 75 per cent of  the premium  shall be  paid as provided under Rule. 12.      Relying on  these provisions,  it was  urged  that  the appellants had  a right  to  obtain  transfer  of  sites  in respect of  which the lots were first drawn in their favour. We are unable to accept this contention. Admittedly, at that stage, there  was no intimation of allotment of sites to the appellants. There  was no  official communication to them as required under sub-rule (3) of Rule 8. Such intimation alone confers right  on the appellants to obtain possession of the sites. The  intimation must  be sent  by a registered letter giving particulars  of the  sites allotted  and the  premium payable in  respect thereof.  In the  absence  of  any  such communication, the  appellants cannot  be held  to have  the right to get transfer of sites in their favour.      The next  step in  the argument  was  that  the  Estate officer ought to have allotted the sites upon the receipt of applications of  the appellants. The reliance was placed and emphasis was put on the word "shall" used in sub-rule (3) of Rule 8. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 provides 164 that when  10 per cent of the premium has been tendered, the Estate officer  shall, subject  to such directions as may be issued by  the Chief  Administrator in  that behalf, allot a site of  the size applied for. We do not think that there is much force in this contention also. Generally the use of the word "shall"  prima  facie  indicates  that  the  particular provision is  imperative. But  that is  not always  so.  The meaning to  be given  to a  word depends upon the context in which it  is used.  The word takes the colour depending upon the context.  We must  ask what  does the  word mean  in its context? We  must examine  why the Rule making authority has chosen that  word. After  examining the purpose and scope of the rule,  we must  give such  meaning as to render the rule workable in  a fair  manner. We must give that meaning which would promote the purpose and object of the rule. When there is a  choice of  meanings, there  is a  presumption that one which produces  an unjust  or inconvenient  result  was  not intended. Let  us now  take a  brief look at Rule 8. If sub- rule (3)  of Rule  8 is  construed as  mandatory, then every person who  applies for  a site  with earnest  money must be allotted a  site. That means the administration must receive only  equal  number  of  applications  as  there  are  sites available for  allotment. That  would be  impracticable. The administration cannot restrict the number of applications to be received  when the  public are  notified.  Secondly,  the sites are  required to  be disposed by auction or allotment. If it  is by  allotment, it  should be after considering all applications.  The  sites  cannot  be  allotted  by  private arrangement.  All   the  applications   received   must   be considered and  if there  are  more  applications  than  the available sites, some reasonable procedure should be adopted for consideration and elimination. In our opinion, the right of every  applicant under sub-rule (3) of Rule 8 is only the right to  have his application considered. The acceptance of application does not create a right for allotment of a site. The word  "shall" used  in sub-rule  (3) must, therefore, be considered as  not mandatory.  The imperative  meaning would defeat the purpose of the rule.      It was  next urged  that the  Chandigarh administration was estopped  from revising  the policy  of allotment  after taking several steps for allotment of sites. The steps taken

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like demanding  25 per  cent  of  the  premium  payable  and drawing the  lots would lead to an assurance that they would be allotted  bigger plots. It was stated that the appellants upon the assurance of getting bigger plots had placed orders for heavy  machinaries for  their  printing  presses.  These averments were  also made  in the  writ petition  before the High Court.  The High Court rejected the plea of estoppel on the ground that there was no evidence 165 of heavy  investment  on  machinaries.  Mr.  V.M.  Tarkunde, learned counsel  for the  appellants urged  that there is no need to  produce any such evidence to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The counsel is right in this aspect. The party invoking  the doctrine  of estoppel need not prove any detriment as  such. It  may be  sufficient if  he has relied upon the  assurance made  to him.  This court  in the  Delhi Cloth &  General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (Civil Appeal No. 223 of 1974 disposed of on October 8, 1987) to which one of us was a member, said:                "It is true, that in the formative period, it           was generally said that the doctrine of promissory           estoppel cannot  be invoked by the promisee unless           he has suffered ’detriment’ or ’prejudice’. It was           often said  simply, that  the party  asserting the           estoppel must  have been  induced to  act  to  his           detriment. But  this has  now been explained in so           many decisions  all over. All that is now required           is that the party asserting the estoppel must have           acted upon  the assurance  given to  him must have           relied upon  the representation  made to  him.  It           means,  the  party  has  changed  or  altered  the           position  by  relying  on  the  assurance  or  the           representation. The  alteration of position by the           party is the only indispensable requirement of the           doctrine. It is not necessary to prove further any           damage,  detriment   or  prejudice  to  the  party           asserting the  estoppel. The Court, however, would           compel  the   opposite  party  to  adhere  to  the           representation  acted   upon  or   abstained  from           acting.  The   entire  doctrine  proceeds  on  the           promise that  it is  reliance  based  and  nothing           more." And said:                "The  concept   of  detriment   as   we   now           understand   is   whether   it   appears   unjust,           unreasonable  or  inequitable  that  the  promisor           should be  allowed to resile from his assurance or           representation having  regard to what the promisee           has done  or refrained  from doing  in reliance on           the assurance or representation." It was further said:                "It is  however, quite  fundamental that  the           doctrine of promissory estoppel, cannot be used to           compel the 166            public  bodies or the Government to carry out the           rep resentation  or promise  which is  contrary to           law or which is outside their authority of power."       In  the  first  place,  we  do  not  know  under  what provision the authorities asked the appellants to pay 25 per cent of  the premium  payable in  respect of  the sites even before allotment.  Apparently that  procedure appears  to be irregular with  no statutory  sanction. Secondly,  we do not find any  specific assurance  or representation  made by the authorities  promising  to  allot  the  sites  applied  for.

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Thirdly, even  if there  was any  such assurance,  we do not think that  it would give rise to the doctrine of promissory estoppel in  the instance  case. The authorities cannot give assurance contrary  to the  statutory rules.  The sites  are required to  be disposed of by auction, allotment or sale as per the  procedure prescribed. The authorities who are bound by the  rules of procedure cannot make any representation or promise to allot particular sites to the applicants. Even if they  make  such  promise  or  assurance,  the  doctrine  of promissory estoppel  cannot be  invoked to  compel  them  to carry out the promise or assurance which is contrary to law.      The next contention urged for the appellants related to the revised  policy adopted by the Chandigarh administration for allotment  of smaller  sites. It was said that the sites in phase  II ought  to have  been allotted  when there  were enough to go round the appellants. It was also said that the other entrepreneurs  who had  filed applications  along with the appellants had been allotted sites in phase II and there was no  good reason  to exclude  the  appellants  for  being considered for  smaller sites  in  phase  I.  The  procedure followed by  the authorities  has been assailed as arbitrary and contrary  to Art.  14 of the Constitution. Of course, if there were enough plots to accommodate all the applicants in the industrial area phase II, it would not be proper for the authorities to  revise the policy and allot smaller sites in phase I.  But no  material has been placed before us to come to the conclusion that there were enough industrial plots to accommodate as  far as  possible all  those  applicants.  It appears from  the record  that the  authorities for  want of plots in  phase II  formed another  lay out in phrase I. The action of  the authorities  appears to  be bona  fide and we have no reason to doubt it.      This takes  us to  the  question  whether  the  revised policy adopted  by the  Chandigarh administration  to  allot smaller sites  to these  appellants was  discriminatory  and violative of Art. 14 of the 167 Constitution. The true meaning and scope of Art. 14 has been stated and  restated in a string of decisions of this Court. It is  now well  established  that  Art.  14  forbids  class legislation, but  does not  forbid reasonable classification for the  purpose of  legislation. In order, however, to pass the test  of permissible  classification two conditions must be fulfilled,  namely, (i)  that the  classification must be founded on  an intelligible  differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of  the group; and (ii) that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in  question. The  classification may  be founded on different  basis,   namely,  geographical  or  according  to objects or  occupations or  the like.  What is  necessary is that  there   must  be   a  nexus   between  the   basis  of classification   and   the   object   of   the   Act   under consideration. S.R.  Oas, C.J.  speaking for  this Court  in Shri Ram  Krishna Dalmia  v. Shri  Justice S.R.  Tendolkar & others, [1959] SCR 279 has formulated the various aspects of Art. 14  and out  of them,  we may  refer to  the  following proposition:      (a)  Art.   14  condemns  discrimination  not  only  by      substantive law but by a law of procedure,      (b) Art.  14 forbids  class legislation  but  does  not      forbid classification,      (c) In  permissible classification, mathematical nicety      and perfect equality are not required,      (d) The  classification may  be  founded  on  different

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    basis, namely,  geographical or according to objects or      occupations or the like,      (e) If  a law  deals equally  with members  of  a  well      defined class,  it is  not obnoxious and it is not open      to the  charge of  denial of  equal protection  on  the      ground that it has no application to other persons, and      (f) Even  a single  individual  may  form  a  class  by      himself on  account of  some special  circumstances  or      reason applicable to him and not applicable to others.           This Court speaking through Chandrachud, CJ. in Re      The  Special   Courts   Bill,   1978(19792   SCR   476)      reformulated in detail the propositions on Art. 14. The      following are relevant for the 168      present case and may be extracted:           (i) The  constitutional command  to the  State  to      afford equal  protection of  its law  sets a  goal  not      attainable  by  the  invention  and  application  of  a      precise formula.  Therefore, classification need not be      constituted by  an exact  or  scientific  exclusion  or      inclusion of  persons or  things. The Courts should not      insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests      for determining  the validity  of classification in any      given case.  Classification is  justified if  it is not      palpably arbitrary.           (ii) The  law can  make and  set apart the classes      according to  the needs  and exigencies  of the society      and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even a      degree of  evil, but the classification should never be      arbitrary, artificial or evasive.           (iii) The classification must not be arbitrary but      must be  rational, that  is to say, it must not only be      based on some qualities or characteristics which are to      be found in all the persons grouped together and not in      others  who   are  left  out  but  those  qualities  or      characteristics must  have a reasonable relation to the      object of the legislation.       There  is yet  another facet  of Art.  14. This  Court speaking through  Bhagwati, J.  in E.P.  Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,  [1974] 2 SCR 348-AIR 1974 SC 555) and in Maneka Gandhi case  (AIR 1978 SC 597) held that the basic principle which  informs   both  Arts.  14  and  16  is  equality  and inhibition    against     discrimination.    Equality    and arbitrariness are  sworn enemies, one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other to the whim and caprise of an absolute  monarch. Where  an  act  is  arbitrary,  it  is implicit  in  it  that  it  is  unequal  both  according  to political logic  and constitutional  law and  is, therefore, violative  of   Art.  14.  Articles  14  and  16  strike  at arbitrariness  in  State  action  and  ensure  fairness  and equality  of  treatment.  This,  in  our  opinion,  is  more fundamental. Article 14 unlike other articles in Part III of the Constitution, is an injunction against the State that it shall not discriminate person to person unless the action is supported by well-known principles.      There is thus no doubt or dispute about the principles. The question  is only the application of the principles to a given case.  In the  present case,  however, we  do not find that the  revised policy  of the  Chandigarh  administration suffers from any act of arbitrariness 169 either in  classifying the appellants as a separate group or in considering  them for allotment of smaller sites in phase I. The  appellants formed  a separate class. All the persons who have  applied  for  industrial  sites  for  establishing

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printing presses were grouped together. They were considered together. They  could not have been accommodated in phase II for want  of enough  sites. So another lay out was formed in phase I.  We are  told that  most of the applicants have now been allotted  sites and  they have  since taken possession. The appellants  were also allotted sites in phase I. We are, therefore.  Of   the  opinion  that  the  grievance  of  the appellants about  discrimination is  not  justified  on  the facts and circumstances of the case.      In the result, both the appeals fail and are dismissed, but we make no order as to costs. S.L.                                      Appeals dismissed. 170