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PETITIONER: PANKAJESH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: TULSI GRAMIN BANK & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       07/05/1997

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIRAHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:  O R D E R      Delay condoned.      Wehave heard learned counsel for the petitioner.      The petitioner  was charge-sheeted for dereliction  of the duty under Section 3 of theRegional Rural Banks Act (21 of 1976). Afterinquiry, the disciplinary authority directed with-holding of three increments with cumulative effect. On appeal,the  appellate authority   stated thus:"[Therefore, in accordance  with the decision  taken  by  the  Board  of Directors, oneincrement is  released and he is warnedthat in future  no such  actor  irregularity will  be  repeated, otherwise serious  disciplinaryactionwill be taken". Wen writ petition was filedby the petitioner, the High Court in the impugned  order dated  December 16, 1996 made  inWrit Petition 12133/93 stated as under:      "We do  not feel  inclinedto quash      the orderpassed by  the appellate      disciplinary  authority   who   has      disciplinary  authority   who   has      disposed  of   the appeal of  the      petitioner by  setting  aside  the      order with-holdingone of the three      increments and   has  warned   the      petition r that in  future no such      act/irregularity will  berepeated      byhim  and if  itis  done in that      event disciplinary actionwill  be      taken against him."      It is   contended by  the  learned  counsel  for the petitioner  that   theHigh  Court  has  misunderstood the operative Dartof theorder of the appellate authority. We find no force in  the contention.  TheWord  "one increment release" would mean that the appellate authority is inclined to confirm  thepenalty of  imposing  two  incrementswith cummulative effect  andthereby,  one incrementwas released from the penalty. The High Court, therefore, isnot right in construing that two increments have been  released and one was retained.  Instead,the  reverse isthe intention. Under the circumstances, while clarifying thefactualposition, we do not find that it is a case warranting interference.

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    The only  legal question sought tobe raised in the SLP is  whether   under  Rule   30(3)  of the  Staff  Service Regulation, the enquiry officer  has to  be higher  inrank than the  delinquent officer. Regulation 30 (3)of the Staff ServiceRegulation postulates thus:      "The enquiry  under this regulation      and   the  procedure   with   the      exception of  the final  order, may      bedelegated  in  case  the  person      against whom  proceedings are taken      isan  officer, toany officer  who      isin  a  grade  higher  than  such      officer  and  in  the  case  of  an      employee,to   any  officer.   For      purpose ofthe enquiry, the officer      oremployee  may not engage a legal      practitioner."      Thus an enquiry, under Regulation may be delegatedto a person higher  in rankthan the  delinquent officer, in the case of an officer.  But in  this case we donot find any substantial  miscarriage  of  justice  preejudicial  to the petitioner for the reason that though it is always desirable that an officer higher in rank than the delinquent officer should be  directed toconductan  enquiry, the  enquiry is conducted as  a delegate  of  the  disciplinary  authority. Therefore, theultimate decision  is to  be  taken  by the disciplinary  authority.  By  mere  delegatingthe  enquiry whetherthe  enquiry officer  is of  the same  cadre  or  of higher grade  than that of thepetitioner, it did not cause any material  irregularity notresulted in anyinjustice to the petitioner. Under these  circumstances, we do notfind any illegality warranting interference.      The special leave petitionis accordingly dismissed.