PANEERSELVAM Vs STATE OF TAMILNADU
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001167-001167 / 2006
Diary number: 25961 / 2006
Advocates: Vs
V. G. PRAGASAM
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1167 OF 2006
Panneerselvam ..Appellant
Versus
State of Tamil Nadu ..Respondent
And
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1168 OF 2006
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. These two appeals have their matrix in a common
judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court
disposing of three criminal appeals preferred under Section
374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘Cr.PC’),
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against the judgment of the Principal Sessions Judge,
Thanjavur in Sessions case no.65 of 1994 dated 13.5.1997.
Five persons had faced trial for alleged commission of murder
of one Arunbharathi @ Jynarab (hereinafter referred to as the
‘deceased’). They were convicted for offences punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (in short ‘IPC’). So far as A1, A2 and A5 are
concerned, each was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life. A1, A2 and A5 were convicted for offence punishable
under Section 348 IPC and sentenced to one year RI each. A1
was charged for commission of offence punishable under
Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo one year RI and A2
and A5 were convicted for offence punishable under Section
201 read with Section 34 IPC and each was sentenced to
undergo RI for life.
2. A1 was Head Constable, while A2 was a Constable A3
was a Writer, and A4 was a Pere Constable. All of them were
attached to Ammapet Police Station, and they were on duty on
14.12.1992 and 15.12.1992. A5 was a native of Udaiyur Kovil 2
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3. After the case was committed to the Court of Sessions
charges were framed since the accused persons pleaded
innocence they were put to trial. In order to substantiate the
charges 14 witnesses were examined. On consideration of the
material on record the Trial Court recorded the conviction and
imposed sentences as aforesaid.
4. Stand of the appellant before the High Court was that the
deceased had put himself on fire and in fact, all the accused
persons immediately quenched the fire and had taken him to
the Government Primary Health Hospital, Ammapet, where
PW3 doctor was available. The deceased made a voluntary
statement to PW3 wherein he categorically stated that he had
poured petrol on himself and set himself on fire. Thereafter
the deceased with the burn injuries was taken to the Medical
College Hospital where also he made a similar statement to
PW4 the doctor. Subsequently, another doctor PW6 examined
him where also he made a similar statement. Therefore, it 3
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was submitted that the Trial Court was not justified in
convicting them relying on the purported dying declaration
alleged to have been given by the deceased to the Revenue
Divisional Officer (PW14) on 16.12.1992 i.e. four days prior to
his death. The same was nothing but a tutored one. The High
Court held that the so called statements made before the
doctors cannot be accepted in view of the dying declaration
recorded by PW14 the RDO. The High Court did not attach
any importance to the statements purportedly given before
PWs, 3, 4 and 6 and also relied on the dying declaration
purportedly made by the deceased before the PW14. The High
Court found that the allegations against A2, A3 were not
proved beyond reasonable doubt and they were entitled to
acquittal. Accordingly, the appeals filed by these accused
persons were allowed and those filed by the appellants in
these two appeals were dismissed.
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5. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the
appellants submitted that the High Court proceeded on
presumptions that because the statements of the deceased to
PWs, 3, 4 and 6 were made in the presence of a Constable,
therefore, they were not voluntary. On the contrary at the
time when the statements were made, the relatives of the
deceased were present is evident from the evidence of PW1
who took the deceased to the hospital. He had categorically
admitted that he was accompanied by several persons when
the deceased was taken to and was at the hospital. PW1 and
others were there with him. PW1 has categorically admitted
that this was the situation in the Ammapet hospital and
Thanjavur Medical College Hospital. He has categorically
stated that several persons were present at the hospital. It
was, therefore, submitted that the voluntary statement made
right from the beginning should not have been lightly brushed
aside. It is also pointed out that the High Court came to an
erroneous conclusion by misreading dying declaration
purported to be made before RDO that it was either A1 or A5
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(the present appellants) who had poured petrol and set him on
fire.
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State
submitted that the High Court had rightly relied upon the
dying declaration made before the RDO. According to him the
fact that police officials were present when the statements
were made by the deceased before the doctors made the
position clear that the deceased was not speaking the truth.
7. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the
accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a
person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene
and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his
statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath
and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides should the
dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of
justice because the victim being generally the only eye-witness
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in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave
the Court without a scrap of evidence.
8. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it
is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-
examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth
as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the Court
also insists that the dying declaration should be of such
nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its
correctness. The Court has to be on guard that the statement
of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or
prompting or a product of imagination. The Court must be
further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind
after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant.
Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was true and
voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any
further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute
rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole
basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring
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corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid
down in several judgments the principles governing dying
declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated
in Smt. Paniben v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1992 SC 1817):
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that
dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration.
[See Munnu Raja & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
(1976) 2 SCR 764)] (ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is
true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without
corroboration. [See State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Sagar Yadav
and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 416) and Ramavati Devi v. State of
Bihar (AIR 1983 SC 164)] (iii) The Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration
carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the
result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased
had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and
was in a fit state to make the declaration. [See K.
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Ramachandra Reddy and Anr. v. The Public Prosecutor (AIR
1976 SC 1994)]
(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it
should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. [See
Rasheed Beg v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1974 (4) SCC 264)] (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could
never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to
it is to be rejected. [See Kaka Singh v State of M.P. (AIR 1982
SC 1021)] (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity
cannot form the basis of conviction. [See Ram Manorath and
Ors. v. State of U.P. (1981 (2) SCC 654) (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does contain the
details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. [See State
of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu (AIR 1981
SC 617)] (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is
not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the
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statement itself guarantees truth. [See Surajdeo Oza and Ors.
v. State of Bihar (AIR 1979 SC 1505). (ix) Normally the Court in order to satisfy whether the
deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying
declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the
eye-witness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious
state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion
cannot prevail. [See Nanahau Ram and Anr. v. State of
Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1988 SC 912)]. (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the
version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration
cannot be acted upon. [See State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan and
Ors. (AIR 1989 SC 1519)]. (xi) Where there is more than one statement in the
nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be
preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations
could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be
accepted. [See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v.State of
Maharashtra (AIR 1982 SC 839)]
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9. We find that the High Court has erroneously discarded
the statements made by PWs. 3, 4 and 6 to the effect that the
deceased voluntarily told each one of them that he had set
himself on fire. As rightly contended by learned counsel for
the appellant, even though one police official was present
when the statement was made to PWs. 3, 4 and 6, yet large
number of relatives of the deceased, more particularly, PW1
who had taken him to the hospital were present also.
Additionally, the High Court has misconstrued the dying
declaration. The deceased had categorically stated therein that
he did not know who set him on fire. The High Court
observed, as if, the deceased had said that either A1 or A5 did
so. The conclusions have been arrived at by misreading the
evidence. Therefore, the impugned judgment of the High
Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellant in
each case is acquitted of the charges. The appellants be
released from custody forthwith unless required in any other
case. The appeals are allowed.
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...................................J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
..................................J (P. SATHASIVAM)
............. .......................J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA) New Delhi, May 15, 2008
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