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PETITIONER: PANDIT JHANDU LAL & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/11/1960

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) KAPUR, J.L. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SUBBARAO, K. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1961 AIR  343            1961 SCR  (2) 459  CITATOR INFO :  R          1962 SC 764  (5)  RF         1963 SC 151  (34)  R          1965 SC 427  (3)  RF         1965 SC 646  (9,11)  RF         1966 SC1788  (18)  R          1970 SC 984  (6)  F          1977 SC 594  (3)  C          1980 SC 367  (11)

ACT: Land  Acquisition--Constitutional  validity   of  enactment- Construction  of  labour colony for a company, if  a  Public purpose--Test-Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), ss. 4, 6, Part VII--Constitution of India, Arts. 31(2), 31(5)(a).

HEADNOTE: The Punjab Government issued notification under ss. 4 and  6 of  the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and started  proceedings for  acquisition of lands for the construction of  a  labour colony under the Government sponsored Housing Scheme for the workers of the Thapar Industrial Workers’ Co-operative Hous- ing Society Ltd.  The appellants challenged the  acquisition proceedings  under  Art.  226 of  the  Constitution  on  the ground,  inter alia, that the procedure prescribed  by  Part VII  of the said Act had not been admittedly complied  with. The  Division  Bench  in affirming the  order  of  dismissal passed by the trial judge held that although Art. 31 of  the Constitution   by  prohibiting  compulsory  acquisition   of property  except for a public purpose had made Part  VII  of the Act redundant, the present proceedings were saved  since the acquisition was for a public purpose. Held,  that the High Court was in error in holding that  the Constitution  had rendered Part VII of the Land  Acquisition Act, 1894, redundant or null and void, although it was right in dismissing the appeal.  That Act, as an existing Act, was saved by Art. 31(5)(a) from being affected by Art. 31(2)  of the Constitution. Acquisition  of  building sites for residential  houses  for industrial labour is for a public purpose even apart from s.

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17(2) 460 (b)of  the Act as amended by ’:the Land Acquisition  (Punjab Amendment) Act of 1953. Babu  Barkava Thakur v. The State of Bombay [1961] 1  S.C.R. 128, referred to. Although  in  the  case  of an  acquisition  for  a  company simpliciter,  no  declaration under s. 6 of the Act  can  be made  without complying with the provisions of Part  VII  of the Act, it is not correct to say that no acquisition for  a company  for a public purpose can be made except under  Part VII  of  the Act.  If the cost of the acquisition  is  borne either  wholly or partially by the Government,  the  purpose would  be  a public purpose within the meaning of  the  Act. But if the cost is entirely borne by the company it would be an  acquisition  for the company simpliciter  and  Part  VII would apply. Since in the instant case a part of the compensation was  to be  borne by the Government, it was not necessary to  comply with the provisions of Part VII of the Act.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1960. Appeal  by special leave from the Judgment and  Order  dated January 28, 1959 of the Punjab High Court in Letters  Patent Appeal No. 52 of 1958 arising out of the Judgment and  Order dated February 17, 1958 of the said High Court in Civil Writ Application No. 124 of 1957. C.   B.  Aggarwala, Daya Swarup Mehra and R. S.  Gheba,  for the appellants. S.   M.  Sikri,  Advocate General for the State  of  Punjab, N.S. Bindra and D. Gupta, for respondent No. 1. C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and S. N.  Andley, for Respondent No. 2. C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India and T.M. Sen,  for the Attorney-General for India (Intervener). 1960.  November 16.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA,  C.  J.-This appeal, by special leave granted on  May 29,  1959, is directed against the decision of  the  Letters Patent  Bench  (G.  D. Khosla, C. J., and Dulat,  J.)  dated January 28, 1959, affirming that of the learned single Judge (Bishan  Narain,  J.) dated February 17,  1958,  whereby  he dismissed the 461 appellants’   Writ   Petition   under  Art.   226   of   the Constitution. It  appears that the appellants are the owners of,  what  is said  to  be, agricultural land, measuring about  86  bighas odd,  in  village  Munda Majra,  Tehsil  Jagadhari,  in  the district  of  Ambala.  On October 27, 1954,  the  Additional District Magistrate of Ambala ordered the land aforesaid  to be   requisitioned   under  the  Punjab   Requisitioning   & Acquisition of Immoveable Property Act (XI of 1953) for  the construction  of houses by members of the Thapar  Industries Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., Yamuna Nagar.  Possession of the land was taken on November 5, 1954.  The  appellants, at  once,  instituted a suit on November 14,  1954,  in  the Court  of the Subordinate Judge, Jagadhari, challenging  the requisition proceedings.  The suit was ultimately decreed by the  Court  on  June 21, 1955, and  the  possession  of  the property  in question was restored to the  petitioners.   On May  27,  1955, the first respondent, i. e.,  the  State  of

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Punjab,  through the Secretary, Labour Department, issued  a notification  under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act  (1  of 1894)  (which hereinafter will be referred to as  the  Act). The notification, under s. 4 is in these terms. "No. 4850-S-LP-55/14144.  Whereas it appears to the Governor of  Punjab that land in the locality hereunder specified  is likely to be needed by the Government for a public  purpose, namely,  for the construction of a Labour Colony  under  the Government  sponsored  Housing  Scheme  for  the  Industrial Workers  of  the  Thapar  Industrial  Workers’  Co-operative Housing  Society Limited, Jamna Nagar (District Ambala),  it is  hereby notified that the land described in the  specifi- cations  below  is  likely  to be  required  for  the  above purpose. This notification is made under the provisions of Section  4 read  with section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,  as amended  by  the Land Acquisition  (Punjab  Amendment)  Act, 1953, to all to whom it may concern and the Collector  shall cause public notice of the substance of this notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality; 462 In  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  by  the  aforesaid sections, the Governor of the Punjab is pleased to authorise the President of the above said Society with the members and servants  to enter upon and survey any land in the  locality and do all other acts required or permitted by that section. Further  in exercise of the powers conferred by  sub-section (4) of Section 17 of the said Act the Governor of Punjab  is pleased  to  direct  that, on the grounds  of  urgency,  the provisions of Section 5(a) of the said Act, shall not  apply in regard to this Acquisition". Later, the same day, another notification, under s. 6 of the Act, was issued.  This notification, under s. 6, states that it  appeared  to  the Governor of Punjab that  the  land  is required  to  be taken by Government for a  public  purpose, namely,  for the construction of a Labour Colony  under  the Government  sponsored  Housing Scheme  for  the’  Industrial Workers  of  the  Thapar  Industrial  Workers’  Co-operative Housing  Society Limited (which is the second respondent  in this case).  It also says that under the provisions of s.  7 of the Act, the Collector, Ambala, is directed to take order for  the  acquisition  of the land.   The  Patwari  effected delivery  of  possession  of the lands in  question  to  the second  respondent  on  August 21, 1955.   Even  before  the delivery  of  possession had been effected,  the  appellants promptly  instituted their suit on August 20, 1955,  in  the Court  of  the Subordinate Judge Class 1, Jagadhari,  for  a perpetual injunction restraining the second respondent  from entering upon or taking possession of the land in  question, or  making  any  construction  thereon.   The  trial   Court dismissed  the  suit on June 25, 1956,  on  the  preliminary ground  that the suit was not competent in the absence of  a previous  notice  under  s. 59 of  the  Punjab  Co-operative Societies Act, 1955 (XIV of 1955).  The appellants  appealed to the Senior Sub-Judge, Ambala, who dismissed their appeal, upholding  the decision of the trial Court that  the  notice was  a condition precedent to the institution of  the  suit. Their  second appeal was dismissed by the Punjab High  Court on  February  6,1957.   During the  pendency  of  the  civil litigation  aforesaid, in spite of the fact that the  second respondent had 463 obtained  delivery of possession through Government  agency, by an Order of Injunction issued by the Court,  construction had been stayed.  As soon as the High Court decided the suit

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in favour of the respondents, the second respondent "started making  huge constructions on the land in dispute in a  very speedy  manner",  as  alleged by  the  appellants  in  their petition  under  Art. 226 of the  Constitution,  which  they filed on February 13, 1957.  From the High Court also,  they obtained  similar  Stay Orders whereby  building  operations were  stopped.  In their Writ Petition, the  appellants,  as petitioners  in the High Court, challenged  the  acquisition proceedings  on  a number of grounds, of which  it  is  only necessary  to  notice the one which has formed  the  subject matter  of  decision  in the High Court,  namely,  that  the proceedings  were  void  for want  of  compliance  with  the procedure laid down in Chapter VII (mistake for Part VII) of the  Act.   It  is  not necessary  to  refer  to  the  other contentions  raised  in  the Writ Petition,  because  it  is common  ground before us that the whole controversy must  be determined  by the answer to the question, ’whether  or  not the proceedings were vitiated by reason of the admitted fact that no proceedings under Part VII of the Act had been taken in making the acquisition’. The  matter  was  heard, in the first  instance,  by  Bishan Narain, J. The learned Judge dismissed the petition, holding that  the  acquisition was by the Government  for  a  public purpose, namely, of construction of tenements for industrial workers, under a schempeal    against the order to the Collector of the district or such    other officer as may, by notification, be authorised in    this behalf by the State Government.    629     Section 6 imposes a restriction on the transport of    agricultural cattle for slaughter and reads:     "S. 6. No person shall transport or offer for trans    port or cause to be transported any agricultural cattle    from any place within the State to any place outside    the State, for the purpose of its slaughter in contra.    vention of the provisions of this Act or with the    knowledge that it will be or is likely to be, so slaugh-    tered."     Section 7 prohibits the sale, purchase or disposal    otherwise of certain kinds of animals.  It reads-.     "S. 7. No person shall purchase, sell or otherwise    dispose of or offer to purchase, sell or otherwise dis-    pose of or cause to be purchased, sold or otherwise    disposed of cows, calves of cows or calves of she-    buffaloes for slaughter or knowing or having reason    to believe that such cattle shall be slaughtered."     Section 8 relates to possession of flesh of agricultu-    ral cattle and is in these terms:     "S. 8. Notwithstanding anything contained in    any other law for the time being in force, no person    shall have in his possession flesh of any agricultural    cattle slaughtered in contravention of the provisions    of this Act."     Section 10 imposes apenalty for a contravention of    s. 4(l)(a) and s. 11 imposes penalty for a contraven-    tion of any of the other provisions of the Act.     On behalf of the petitioners it has been pointed out,    and rightly in our opinion, that cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of    s. 4 of the Act imposes an unreasonable restriction on    the right of the petitioners.  That clause in its first    part lays down that the cattle (other than cows and    calves) must be over 20 years of age and must also be    unfit for work or breeding; and in the second part it    says, "or has become permanently incapacitated from    work or breeding due to age, injury, deformity or an

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  incurable disease." It is a little difficult to understand    why the two parts are juxtaposed in the section.  In    any view the restriction that the animal must be over    20 years of age and also unfit for work or breeding is    an excessive or unreasonable restriction as we have    80    630    pointed out with regard to a similar provision in the    Uttar Pradesh Act.  The second part of the clause    would not be open to any objection, if it stood by it-    self.  If, however, it has to be combined with the age-    limit mentioned in the first part of the clause, it will    again be open to the same objection; if the animal is    to be over 20 years of age and also permanently in-    capacitated from work or breeding etc.,then the age-    limit is really meaningless.  Then, the expression ’due    to age’ in the second part of the clause also loses its    meaning.  It seems to us that cl. (a) of sub-s. (2) of s. 4    of the Act as drafted is bad because it imposes a dis-    proportionate restriction on the slaughter of bulls,    bullocks and buffaloes it is a restriction excessive in    nature and not in the interests of the general public.    The test laid down is not merely permanent incapa-    city or unfitness for work or breeding but the test is    something more than that, a combination of age and    unfitness’ Learned Counsel for the petitioners has plac-    ed before us an observation contained in a reply made    by the Deputy Minister in the course of the debate    on the Bill in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly (see    Madhya Pradesh Assembly Proceedings, Vol. 5 Serial    no. 34 dated April 14, 1959, page 3201).  He said that    the age fixed was very much higher than the one to    which any animal survived.  This observation has    been placed before us not with a view to an interpre-    tation of the section, but to show what opinion was    held by the Deputy Minister as to the proper age-    limit.  On behalf of the respondent State our atten-    tion has been drawn to a book called The Miracle of    Life (Home Library Club) in which there is a state-    ment that oxen, given good conditions, live about 40    years.  Our attention has also been drawn to certain    extracts from a Hindi book called Godhan by Girish    Chandra Chakravarti in which there are statements    to the effect that cows and bullocks may live up to 20    or 25 years.  This is an aspect of the case with which    we have already dealt.  The question before us is not    the maximum age upto which bulls, bullocks and    buffaloes may live in rare cases.  The question before    us is what is their average longevity and at what age    631     they become useless.  On this question we think that    the opinion is almost unanimous, and the opinion    which the Deputy Minister expressed was not wrong.     Section 5 in so far as it imposes a restriction as to    the time for slaughter is again open to the same ob-    jection as has been discussed by us with regard to a    similar provision in the Uttar Pradesh Act.  A right    of appeal is given to any person aggrieved by the    order.  In other words, a member of the public, if    he feels aggrieved by the order granting a certificate    for slaughter, may prefer an appeal and hold up for    a long time the slaughter of the animal.  We have    pointed out that for all practical purposes such a    restriction will really put an end to the trade of the    petitioners and we are unable to accept a restriction

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  of this kind as a reasonable restriction within the    meaning of cl. (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.     Section 6 standing by itself, we think, is not open    to any serious objection.  It is ancillary in nature    and tries to give effect to the provision of the Act    prohibiting slaughter of cattle in contravention of the    Act.     Section 7 relates to the prohibition of sale, purchase    etc., of cows and calves and inasmuch as a total ban    on the slaughter of cows and calves is valid, no ob-    jection can be taken to s. 7 of the Act.  It merely    seeks to effectuate the total ban on the slaughter of    cows and calves (both of cows and she-buffaloes).  Sec-    tion 8 is also ancillary in character and if the other    provisions are valid no objection can be taken to the    provisions of s. 8. Sections 10 and 11 impose penal-         e subsidised by the Government out  of public funds; that Part VII of the Act had no application to the  present  proceedings, and that,  therefore,  the  noti- fication  under  s.  6  was  not  invalid.   The  appellants preferred an appeal, under the Letters Patent.  The  Letters Patent  Bench  dismissed  the  appeal,  but  for   different reasons.   After  an examination of the  precedents  of  the different  High Courts, bearing on the controversy  in  this case, the Bench came to the conclusion, which may better  be expressed in its own words:- "There is thus considerable authority for the 464 view advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that compliance with the provisions of Part VII is obligatory  in the case of all acquisitions for a company.  In the  present case  the acquisition was undoubtedly for the benefit  of  a company.    I  have  given  this  matter  my  most   anxious consideration,  and,  with  great  respect  to  the  learned Judges, whose decisions have been noted above, I find myself unable  to  subscribe to the views expressed  by  them.   It seems to me that their views were coloured by the background of  the provisions of the Constitution.  Article 31  of  the Constitution  prohibits compulsory acquisition  of  property for   anything   except  a   public   purpose.    Therefore, acquisition  for  anything  which is not  a  public  purpose cannot  now  be  done compulsorily, but it  has  never  been disputed  that before the Constitution came into force  land could  have been acquired compulsorily by Government  for  a purpose which was not public.  There is nothing in the  Land Acquisition  Act to warrant the assumption that the  embargo placed by Article 31 of the Constitution found place in  the Act.   It seems to me that the Land Acquisition Act  contem- plates two categories of acquisitions". After an examination of the provisions of the Act, the  High Court observed that the Land Acquisition Act came into force when there was no bar to compulsory acquisition for  private purposes.  Such a bar was only imposed, for the first  time, by Art. 31 of the Constitution.  After the Constitution came into force, Part VII of the Act became redundant or null and void.  But, in its view, the present acquisition proceedings were saved from all attack based on non-compliance with  the provisions  of  Part VII of the Act.  The  reason  for  this conclusion,  according  to the High Court, was that  as  the land was acquired for a public purpose, there was no need to comply  with  the provisions of Part VII,  even  though  the Company is to bear all the expenses for the acquisition. It is manifest that the main point for determination in this appeal  is: Whether or not the acquisition  proceedings  had been vitiated by reason of the admitted fact that there  was

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no attempt made by the 465 Government  to comply with the requirements of Part  VII  of the Act.  It is equally clear that the Letters Patent  Bench of the High Court was misled in its conclusions, because all the  provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution had not  been brought to their notice.  It is not correct to say that Part VII  of  the Act had become redundant or null and  void,  as suggested by the High Court, because that Part provided  for acquisition for a private purpose.  As held by this Court in a recent decision, in the case of Babu Barkaya Thakur v. The State  of  Bombay  (1),  the Act deals  with  two  kinds  of acquisitions:  (1) for a public purpose, at the cost of  the Government, and (2) for a purpose akin to such a purpose, at the  cost  of  a  Company,  and  to  the  latter  class   of acquisition,  the provisions of Part VII are attracted.   It was further held in that case that acquisition of a site for building  residential  houses for industrial  labour  was  a public purpose, and that the Land Acquisition Act was immune from  attack  based on the provisions of Art. 31(2)  of  the Constitution, in view of the provisions of cl. 5(a) of  that Article,  which saved an existing law of the nature  of  the Act  in question.  As will presently appear, the  conclusion of  the High Court is entirely correct, but the  process  of reasoning  by  which  it  has  reached  that  conclusion  is erroneous.   That  process suffers from  the  initial  error arising  from the fact that the provisions of Art. 31(5)  of the Constitution had not been brought to the notice of  that Bench.   If  the  Bench were cognizant  of  the  true  legal position  that  the Land Acquisition Act, in  its  entirety, including Part VII dealing with the acquisition of Land  for Companies, was not subject to any attack under Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, it would not have based that conclusion on that  ratio.   Otherwise, there would be no  answer  to  the contention in which the appellants had persisted  throughout the long course of litigation in which they have indulged in their  vain effort to save the land from being used for  the public purpose aforesaid.  The Letters Patent Bench has also fallen (1)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128. 59 466 into  another error in assuming that "the  compensation  was paid in its entirety by the Company".  It is better to clear the  ground  by showing that this assumption  is  not  well- founded in fact. In  their  Writ Petition, as originally filed  in  the  High Court,  it  was not categorically stated by  the  appellants that the compensation in respect of the land in question was paid,  or was to be paid, by the Company.  It may be  stated here,  by the way, that it is common ground that the  second respondent is a Company within the meaning of the Act, being a  registered society under the Co-operative Societies  Act. It is also common ground that the purpose for which the land was being acquired was for erecting residential quarters for industrial  labour, which had organised itself into the  Co- operative  Housing Society, the second respondent.   It  was only at a later stage of the proceedings in the High  Court, that  is to say, in the replication filed on behalf  of  the appellants to the Written Statement filed by the Government, in  answer to the appellant’s Writ Petition, that,  for  the first  time,  it  was alleged by the  appellants  that  "the entire  amount  of compensation has been borne by  the  res- pondent  society".   This  allegation has  not  been  either supported  or countered by evidence on either side.  But  it

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has been pointed out by the learned single Judge that it was clear from the Government Housing Scheme that a  substantial amount  to  be  expended on this Scheme  comes  out  of  the Revenues, in the form of subsidies and loans.  It was stated at  the Bar, with reference to the terms and  conditions  of the  Government Housing Scheme, that 25% to 50% of the  cost of  land and structures to be built upon the land was to  be advanced by Government out of public funds, in the shape  of subsidy  and  loan.  It would, thus, appear  that  the  High Court was not right in the assumption made as aforesaid. It  is clear from the statement of facts on record that  the respondent  No. 2 is a ’Company’, within the meaning of  the Act;  that  the  land is acquired for the.  benefit  of  the Company, and at its instance, and that a large proportion of the compensation money was to 467 come  out of public funds, the other portion being  supplied by the Company or its members.  There is also no doubt  that the  structures  to be made on the land  would  benefit  the members  of  the  Co-operative Society.   But,  the  private benefit  of  a large number of  industrial  workers  becomes public  benefit within the meaning of the  Land  Acquisition Act.  In this connection, it may be mentioned that s. 17  of the  Act  was  amended  by  the  Land  Acquisition   (Punjab Amendment) Act (11 of 1954) in these terms- "17(2)(b).   Whenever  in the opinion of  the  Collector  it becomes necessary to acquire the immediate possession of any land   for  the  purpose  of  any  library  or   educational institution   or  for  the  construction,  ex.  tension   or improvement  of  any  building or  other  structure  in  any village  for  the  common use of  the  inhabitants  of  such village, or any godown for any society registered under  the Co-operative  Societies  Act,  1912 (II  of  1912),  or  any dwelling-house  for the poor, or the construction of  labour colonies under a Government-sponsored Housing Scheme, or any irrigation  tank,  irrigation or drainage  channel,  or  any well, or any public road, the Collector may, immediately after the publication of  the notice  mentioned in sub-section (1), and with the  previous sanction  of the appropriate Government enter upon and  take possession   of  such  land,  which  shall  thereupon   vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". It will appear from the (amended) s. 17(2)(b), quoted above, that   the   construction  of  labour  colonies,   under   a Government-sponsored  Housing Scheme, has been  included  in the  category  of  ’works of public  utility’.   As  already indicated,  even  apart  from the indication  given  by  the (amended) section 17, quoted above, this Court has held,  in the  recent  decision  (1)  that  building  of   residential quarters  for industrial labour is public  purpose.   Hence, even apart from the amended provisions of s. 17, it is clear on  the authorities that the purpose for which the land  was being acquired was a public purpose. (1)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 128. 468 Having  cleared the ground, it now remains to  consider  the terms of s. 6, on which great reliance was placed on  behalf of  the appellants.  There is no doubt that, as pointed  out in   the  recent  decision  of  this  Court  (1),  the   Act contemplates  acquisition  for a public purpose  and  for  a Company,  thus  conveying the idea that  acquisition  for  a Company  is not for a public purpose.  It has been  held  by this  Court, in that decision, that the purposes  of  public utility,  referred to in ss. 40-41 of the Act, are  akin  to public purpose.  Hence, acquisition for a public purpose  as

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also   acquisitions   for   a  Company   are   governed   by considerations of public utility.  But the procedure for the two  kinds of acquisitions is different, in so far  as  Part VII has made substantive provisions for acquisitions of land for  Companies.   Where  acquisition is made  for  a  public purpose, the cost of acquisition for payment of compensation has  to be paid wholly or partly out of Public Revenues,  or some  fund controlled or managed by a local  authority.   On the other hand, in the case of an acquisition for a Company, the  compensation  has to be paid by the Company.   But,  in such a case, there has to be an agreement, under s. 41,  for the  transfer of the land acquired by the Government to  the Company on payment of the cost of acquisition, as also other matters not material to our present purpose.  The  agreement contemplated  by  s. 41 is to be entered  into  between  the Company and the Appropriate Government only after the latter is satisfied about the purpose of the proposed  acquisition, and  subject  to the condition precedent that  the  previous consent of the Appropriate Government has been given to  the acquisition.    The  ‘  previous  consent’  itself  of   the Appropriate   Government   is  made  to  depend   upon   the satisfaction  of  that Government that the  purpose  of  the acquisition  was as laid down in s. 40.  It is, thus,  clear that  the  provisions  of  ss.  39-41  lay  down  conditions precedent  to the application of the machinery of  the  Land Acquisition Act, if the acquisition is meant for a  Company. Now,  s. 6 itself contains the prohibition to the making  of the necessary declaration under that section in these terms- (1)  (1961] 1 S.C.R. 128. 469 "Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless  the compensation  to be awarded for such property is to be  paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues  or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority". Section  6 is, in terms, made subject to the  provisions  of Part VII of the Act.  The provisions of Part VII, read  with s.  6 of the Act, lead to this result that  the  declaration for  the acquisition for a Company shall not be made  unless the  compensation  to be awarded for the property is  to  be paid by a company.  The declaration for the acquisition  for a  public  purpose,  similarly, cannot be  made  unless  the compensation, wholly or partly, is to be paid out of  public funds.   Therefore,  in  the case of an  acquisition  for  a Company simpliciter, the declaration cannot be made  without satisfying the requirements of Part VII.  But, that does not necessarily  mean  that an acquisition for a Company  for  a public  purpose  cannot  be made otherwise  than  under  the provisions of Part VII, if the cost or a portion of the cost of the acquisition is to come out of public funds.  In other words, the essential condition for acquisition for a  public purpose is that the cost of the acquisition should be borne, wholly  or  in  part,  out  of  public  funds.   Hence,   an acquisition  for  a Company may also be made  for  a  public purpose,  within  the meaning of the Act, if a part  or  the whole  of  the cost of acquisition is met by  public  funds. If,  on the other hand, the acquisition for a Company is  to be made at the cost entirely of the Company itself, such  an acquisition  comes under the provisions of Part VII.  As  in the  present instance, it appears that part at any  rate  of the  compensation  to be awarded for the acquisition  is  to come eventually from out of public revenues, it must be held that  the acquisition is not for a Company simpliciter.   It was  not, therefore, necessary to go through  the  procedure prescribed  by  Part  VII.  We, therefore,  agree  with  the conclusion  of  the  High Court, though  not  for  the  same

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reasons. The appeal, accordingly, is dismissed with costs.                                       Appeal dismissed. 470