11 December 1972
Supreme Court
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PANDHARINATH SHRIDHAR RANGNEKAR Vs DY. COMMR. OF POLICE, THE STATE OF MAHRASHTRA

Case number: Appeal (crl.) 14 of 1972


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PETITIONER: PANDHARINATH SHRIDHAR RANGNEKAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DY. COMMR.  OF POLICE, THE STATE OF MAHRASHTRA

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/12/1972

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1973 AIR  630            1973 SCC  (1) 372  CITATOR INFO :  F          1989 SC1304  (4)

ACT: Bombay Police Act (22 of 1951)-Ss. 56, 59-Externment  Order- Duty   to  inform  "the  general  nature  of  the   material allegations"-Full disclosure of particulars if  necessary-If the externing authority and the State government should give reasoned  order-order of externment if should be  restricted to area chosen for unlawful activities.

HEADNOTE: Section  56 of the Bombay Police Act provides that  whenever it shall appear, in Greater Bombay, to the Commissioner  (a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or  are calculated  to  cause  alarm, danger or-harm  to  person  or property  or  (b)  that there  are  reasonable  grounds  for believing  that  such person is engaged or is  about  to  be engaged  in  the commission of offence  involving  force  or violence  or an offence punishable under Chapter 22, 16  and 17 of the Indian Penal Code, and when in the opinion of such officer  witnesses are not willing to come forward  to  give evidence  in  public  against  such  person  by  reason   of apprehension on their part as regards safety of their person or property, the said officer may by order in writing direct such person to remove himself outside the-area districts, or any part thereof contiguous thereto, within such time as the said officer may prescribe and not to enter or return to the said  area,  from which he was directed to  remove  himself. Section  59(1) requires that before an order under s. 56  is passed  against  any person the officer  shall  inform  that person  in  writing "of the general nature of  the  material allegations   against  him"  and  give  him   a   reasonable opportunity  of  tendering an  explanation  regarding  those allegations. The  appellant was served with a notice under s. 56  of  the Act.   The  allegations were that the appellant’s  acts  and movements were causing alarm and danger to the residents  of certain  localities  within the jurisdiction of  Vile  Parle Police  Station, that he was given to assaulting  the  resi- dents  of the localities either because they were  suspected to be police informants or because they failed to accede  to the demands of money, that he had committed robberies in the particular  localities, and that witnesses were not  willing

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to  come  forward  to depose against  him  in  public.   The appellant offered his explanation and examined his witnesses to  refute  the  allegations.  On  a  consideration  of  the explanation  and the evidence tendered by the  appellant  an order  was passed externing him from the limits  of  Greater Bombay and the District of Thana for a period of two  years. The  order was confirmed in appeal by the State  government. A  writ  petition to the High Court was  dismissed.  in  the appeal  to this Court it was contended (i)  the  allegations that  witnesses were not willing to come forward  to  depose against  the appellant in public was falsified by  the  very record  of  the present proceedings;  (ii)  the  particulars contained  in the notice issued under s. 59 of the Act  were so  vague  that the appellant could not  possibly  meet  the allegations  made  against  him  and  thus  he  was   denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself; (iii) the  extern- ing authority had the duty to pass a reasoned order or  else the  right  of appeal would become illusory; and  the  State Government  also ought to have given reasons in  support  of the  order  dismissing the appeal and its failure to  do  so showed non-application of mind; and (iv) the order of 64 externment imposed unreasonable restrictions on the personal liberty  of  the appellant in that, whereas  his  activities were  alleged  to  be  restricted  to  an  area  within  the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police station, the order  of externment  not  only  extended to  the  whole  district  of Greater Bombay but to the district of Thana also. Dismissing the appeal, HELD (1) In order to attract the operation of section 56  of the  Act the officer concerned has to satisfy  himself  that witnesses  are not willing to come forward to give  evidence in  public., But it is not necessary that all the  witnesses must be found unwilling to give evidence.  The circumstance, therefore, that in two criminal cases certain witnesses came forward  to depose against the appellant cannot falsify  the assertion  that  witnesses were unwilling to  give  evidence against the appellant to public. [68C] Dhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District  Magistrate, Thana & Ors. [1956] S.C.R. 533, referred to., (2)The  relevant  provisions  of the  Act  show  that  the reasons  which  necessitate  or justify the  passing  of  an externment  order arise out of extraordinary  circumstances. An order of externment can be passed under Clause (a) or (b) or selection 56 if, and only if, the authority concerned  is satisfied  that witnesses are unwilling to come  forward  to give  evidence  in  public against the  proposed  extend  by reason  of apprehension on their part as regards the  safety of their person or property.  A full and complete disclosure of  particulars such as-is requisite in an open  prosecution will  frustrate the very purpose of externment  proceedings. There  is a brand of lawless element in society which it  is impossible  to  bring  to book  by  established  methods  of judicial  trial,  because, in such trials, there can  be  no conviction  without legal evidence.  And, legal evidence  is impossible  to  obtain  because out  of  fear  of  reprisals witnesses are unwilling to depose in public.  That  explains why  section 59 of the Act imposes but a limited  obligation on  the authorities to inform the proposed externee "of  the general  nature  of the material allegations  against  him". That obligation fixes the limits of the correlative right of the  proposed externee.  He is entitled before an  order  of externment  is  passed  under s. 56  to  know  the  material allegations  against  him and the general  nature  of  those allegations.  He is not entitled to be informed of  specific

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particulars  relating to the material  allegations.   Though the  provisions of s. 56 make a serious inroad  on  personal liberty,  such restraints have to be suffered in the  larger interests of society.  However, care must be taken to ensure that  the terms of sections 56 and 59 are strictly  complied with and that the slender safeguards which those  provisions offer are made available to the proposed externee. [70E] Gurbachan  Singh v. The State of Bombay and another,  [1952] S.C.R. 737; Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhdndari v. The  District Magistrate  Thana  & others [1956] S.C.R.  533;  Hari  Khemu Gawali  v.  The Deputy Commissioner of  Police,  Bombay  and Another  [1956] S.C.R. 506 and State of Gujarat and Anr.  v. Mehboob Khan Usman Khan etc. [1968] 3 S.C.R. View  of the Bombay High Court in Criminal  application  No. 332 of 1971 in judgment dated April 29, 1971 disapproved.  65 (3)Precisely  for  the  reason  for  which  the   proposed externee  is  only entitled to be informed  of  the  general nature  of the material allegations, neither  the  externing authority nor the State government in appeal can be asked to write  a  reasoned order in the nature of  a  judgment.   If those  authorities were to discuss the evidence in the  case it  would be easy to fix the identity of the  witnesses  who were  unwilling  to depose in public  against  the  proposed externee. [72H] (4)It  is primarily for the externing authority to  decide how best the externment order can be made effective so as to subserve   its   real  purpose    An  excessive   order   can undoubtedly  be struck down because no greater restraint  on personal liberty can be premitted than is reasonable in  the circumstances   of  the  case.   An  order   of   externment restricted to the particular area chosen by the externee for his unlawful activities and to a small periphery thereof may in certain circumstances fail of its true purpose.  A larger area  may  conceivably  have  to  be  comprised  within  the externment  order  so as to isolate the  externee  from  his moorings. [73 B, D] Balu Shivling Dombe v. The Divisional Magistrate, Pandharpur s. 71 Bombay Law Reporter, 79, held inapplicable. The High Court of Bombay has, on similar facts, consistently repelled challenges made to externment orders on the  ground that  they  extended  not only to the  district  of  Greater Bombay  but  also to the District of Thana.  In  matters  of such  local colour and conditions, the view so  consistently expressed  by the learned judges of the High Court  must  be accepted as correct. [75C] Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1968, judgment dated  March 17,  1968;  Criminal Application 30 to 93 of  1970  judgment dated  February  23,  1970, 73  Bombay  L.R.  442;  Criminal Application  No.  149  of 1972 decided on  March  3, 1972, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 14  of 1972. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated August   11,  1971  of  the  Bombay  High  Court   in   Crl. Application No. 618 of 1971. S.   B. Wad, for the appellant. M.   C. Bhandare and B. D. Sharma, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD  J.  This appeal by special  leave  is  directed against the judgment dated August 11, 1971 of the High Court

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at  Bombay, dismissing the petition filed by  the  appellant under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to  challenge an order of externment passed by the 1st respondent. On  October 9, 1969 a notice of even date was served on  the appellant  under section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 22  of 1951, asking him to appear before the Assistant Commissioner of  Police, ’M’ Division, Bombay, in answer  to  allegations contained in the notice.  Briefly, the allegations were that the  appellant’s_acts  and movements were causing  harm,  6- L63lSup.CI/73 66 alarm  and  danger to the residents  of  certain  localities within the, jurisdiction of Vile Parle Police Station,  that he was given to assaulting the residents of those localities either because, they were suspected to be, police informants or  because they failed to accede to the demands  of  money, that   he   had  committed  robberies  in   the   particular localities,  that since March 1969 he had committed  several acts  of the above description and that witnesses  were  not willing  to  come forward to depose against him  in  public. The appellant appeared before the Assistant Commissioner  of Police,  offered his explanation and examined 16.  witnesses to   refute  the,  allegations.   He  contended   that   the allegations  were vague and general, that they were made  at the instance of one Damayanti Deshpande who was inimical  to him,  that he was a social worker of some standing, that  he was,  a  member  of the Congress Party  and  that  in  two criminal cases which were filed against him he was acquitted in spite of the evidence led by the prosecution. Later,  the  appellant  was heard by Shri  G.  K.  Nadkarni, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone-IV, Greater Bombay.   On a consideration of the explanation and the evidence tendered by  the  appellant, the Dy.  Commissioner  passed  an  order dated  July 23, 1970 under section 59 of the Act,  externing him  from the limits of Greater Bombay and the  District  of Thana,  for a period of two years.  The order of  externment was directed to take effect within two days of the  decision of  two criminal cases which were then pending  against  the appellant  and  in case he was sentenced  in  the  aforesaid cases  to  a  term of imprisonment, the order  was  to  take effect  within  two days from the date of his  release  from jail.   Against  that order, the appellant filed  an  appeal under  section  60 of the Act, to the  2nd  respondent,  the Government of Maharashtra, but that appeal was dismissed  on May 20, 1971, have with the modification that the externment was to be effective from May 31, 1971. The appellant then filed a petition in the Bombay High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to  challenge the  order of externment.  Two contentions were made in  the High  Court  on  behalf of the appellant  :  one,  that  the allegations  contained in- the show-cause notice where,  too vague  to  afford  him a reasonable  opportunity  to  defend himself and       two,that  his activities were  at  best confined to specific localities withinthe jurisdiction  of the Vile Parle police station and thereforethe       order asking  him  to  remove  himself  from  the  limits  of  the Districts  of  Greater Bombay and Thana  was  excessive  and unreasonable.  On the first contention, reliance was  placed by  the appellant on the judgment dated April 29, 1971 of  a Division  bench  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  in   Criminal Application No.  67 332  of .1971, in which a similar notice was stuck  down  on the  ground  of vagueness.  The learned Judges  declined  to follow   that  judgment  as,  in  their  opinion,   it   was

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inconsistent  with the view taken by this Court in State  of Gujarat and Anr. v. Meliboob Khan Usman Khan etc.(1). On the second contention, distinguishing the judgment of a Division Bench  of  the  High Court in Balu  Shivling  Dombe  v.  The Divisional  Magistrate, Pandharpur (71 Bombay  Law  Reported 79) and following a judgment dated March 17, 1968 of another Division Bench in Criminal Application No. 1427 of 1966, the Iearned Judges held that in the circumstances of the case it was  reasonable  to extern the appellant from the  Emits  of Greater   Bombay  as  also  of  the  Thana  District.    The correctness of this view is under challenge before US. Learned  counsel  appearing on behalf of the  appellant  has raised the following points :- (i)  The allegation that witnesses were not willing to  come forward  to  depose  against  the  appellant  in  public  is falsified by the very record of the present proceedings. (ii)The  particulars contained in the notice  issued  under section 59 of the Act are so vague that the appellant  could not possibly meet the allegations made against him and  thus he was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself. (iii)The externing authority must pass a reasoned order or else the right of appeal would become illusory. (iv)The  State Government also ought to have given  reasons in support of the order dismissing the appeal.  Its  failure to state reasons show non-application of mind, and (v)  The   order   of   externment   imposes    unreasonable restrictions  on the personal liberty of the  appellant  in that, whereas his activities are alleged to be restricted to an  area  within the jurisdiction of the Vile  Parle  police station,  the  order of externment not only extends  to  the Whole  District  of Greater Bombay but to  the  District  of Thana also. Regarding  the  first point, it is urged  that  in  Criminal Cases No. 2106/P of 1969 and 2337/P of 1969 which were filed (1)  [1968] 3 S.C.R. 746. 68 against the appellant in the court of the learned Presidency Magistrate, 22nd Court, Andheri, Bombay, five witnesses were examined by the persecution in each case thereby  falsifying the.  assertion  that  witnesses were not  willing  to  come forward  to  depose  against the appellant  in  public.   We cannot  accept this contention.  No connection is  shown  to exist  between  the two particular criminal  cases  and  the incidents  referred  to in the  externment  order.   Counsel attempted  to  establish  that  connection  by  saying  that Damayanti Deshpande who was inmical to the appellant was the motive   force  behind  the  prosecution  as  well  as   the externment  proceedings.  But the, affidavit of  the  Deputy Commissioner   has  specifically  denied  that   allegation. Besides,  as  held by this Court in  Bhagubhai  Dullabhabhai Bhandari  v.  The  District Magistrate, Thana  &  Ors.  (1), though,  in order to attract the operation of section 56  of the  Act, the officer concerned has to satisfy himself  that witnesses  are not willing to come forward to give  evidence in  public, it is not necessary that all the witnesses  must be found thus unwilling to give evidence.  The  circumstance therefore  that in the two criminal cases certain  witnesses came  forward  to  depose against the  appellant  in  public cannot  falsify the assertion that witnesses were  unwilling to give evidence against the appellant in public. On  the second point, it is necessary to call  attention  to the notice issued to the appellant, which was in these terms : "NOTICE UNDER SECTION 59 OF THE BOMBAY                       POLICE ACT, 1961

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Name, address and age : Shri Pandharinath          Shridhar Rangnekar, Hindu, 28 years, Res.  Rama Niwas, Nariman  Road, Vile Parle (East), Bombay-57. Under Section 59 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 (Bom.  XXIII of  1951)  you  are  hereby  informed  that  the   following allegations are made against you in proceedings against  you under section 56 of the said Act. In   order  to  give  you  opportunity  of  tendering   your explanation regarding the said allegations, I have appointed 9 A.M. on 16-10-1969 to receive your explanation and to hear you  and  your  witness,  if any,  in  regard  to  the  said allegations  I Shri  N. S. Joshi, Assistant Commissioner  of               Police ’M’ Division, Bombay therefore  require                             you  to appear before me at Vile  Parl e  Police               Station on the said date viz. 16-10-1969 at  9               A.M.  for the said purpose and to pass a  bond               in the (1)  [1956] S.C.R. 533. the  69 sum of Rs. 5001- for your attendance ’during the enquiry  of the  said proceedings.  Should you fail to appear before  me and to pass the bond as directed above, I shall proceed with the enquiry in your absence. Take note. Allegations:- 1.Since  March  1969 in the localities of Nehru  Road,  Azad Road,  Monghibai Road, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Ram Mandir  Road and the areas adjoining thereto in the jurisdiction of  Vile Parle Police Station,   Great  of  Bombay  your   acts   and               movements  are causing harm, alarm and  danger               to  the residents of the aforesaid  localities               ’and areas. 2.That  you  assault  the  residents  of  the   aforesaid localities  and  areas  either  suspecting  them  of  giving information  to the police about your illegal activities  or because  they  fail  accede to your demand  of  money  which offences  are  punishable under chapter XVI of.  the  Indian Penal Code. 3.That you commit robberies by extorting money and  articles from the residents of the aforesaid localities and areas  by means  of assault and/or under threats of assault which  are offences  punishable under chapter XVII of the Indian  Penal Code. 4.That  since March,, 1969, you have committed  several-acts of the matter described in paras 1, 2 and 3 above. 5.That  the  witnesses to your above described  acts  and movements are not willing to come forward and depose against you  in  public by reason of apprehension on their  part  as regards  the safety of their persons in that they  apprehend danger to the safety of their person or property, if they do so. Sd/- 9-10-1969 N. S. Joshi, Assistant  Commissioner  of  Police  ’N’  Division,  Bandra, Bombay." Section 56 of the Act provides, to the extent material, that whenever   it  shall  appear  in  Greater  Bombay   to   the Commissioner  (a) that the movements or acts of any  person are causing or are calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to  person  or property, or (b) that  there  are  reasonable grounds  for  believing that such person is  engaged  or  is about to be engaged in the commission 70

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of  an  offence involving force or violence  or  an  offence punishable  under  Chapter XII, XVI or XVII  of  the  Indian Penal  Code,  and  when  in  the  opinion  of  such  officer witnesses  are not willing to come forward to give  evidence in  public against such person by reason of apprehension  on their  part  as  regards  the  safety  of  their  person  or property,  the said officer may by order in  writing  direct such  person to remove himself outside the area  within  the local  limits  of  his jurisdiction or  such  area  and  any district  or  districts,  or  any  part  thereof  contiguous thereto, within such time as the said officer may  prescribe and  not to enter or return to the said area from  which  he was directed to remove himself. .Under section 58, an  order of externment passed under section 56 can in no case  exceed a  period of two years from the date on which it  was  made. The  relevant part of section 59(1) provides that before  an order  under  section 56 is passed against any  person,  the officer shall inform that person in writing "of the  general nature of the material allegations against him and give  him a   reasonable  opportunity  of  tendering  an   explanation regarding  those  allegations.   The  proposed  externee  is entitled  to  lead evidence unless the authority  takes  the view  that the application for examination of  witnesses  is made for the purpose of vexation or delay.  Section 59  also confers  on the person concerned a right to file  a  written statement and to appear through an advocate or attorney. These provisions show that the reasons which necessitate or justify  the  passing of an externment order  arise  out  of extraordinary circumstances.  An order of externment can  be passed  under clause (a) or (b) of section 56 if,  and  only if, the authority concerned is satisfied that witnesses  are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the  proposed  externee by reason of apprehension  on  their part  as regards the safety of their person or property.   A full  and  complete  disclosure of particulars  such  as  is requisite  in  an open prosecution will frustrate  the  very purpose  of  an externment proceeding.  If  the  show  cause notice  were  to furnish to the proposed  externee  concrete data  like  specific  dates of incidents  or  the  names  of persons involved in-these incidents, it would be easy enough to  fix the identity of those who out of fear of  injury  to their person or property are unwilling to depose in  public. There  is a brand of lawless element in society which it  is impossible  to  bring  to book  by  established  methods  of judicial  trial  because  in such trials  there  can  be  no conviction without legal evidence.  And Illegal evidence  is impossible  to  obtain,  because out of  fear  of  reprisals witnesses  are unwilling to depose in public, That  explains why  section 59 of the Act imposes but a limited  obligation on  the authorities to inform the proposed externee "of  the general  nature  of the material allegations  against  him". That obligation fixes 71 the  limits  of  the  co-relative  right  of  the   proposed externee.  He is entitled, before an order of externment  is passed  under section 56, to know the  material  allegations against him and the general nature of those allegations.  He is  not  entitled  to be informed  of  specific  particulars relating to the material allegations. It is true that the provisions of section 56 make a  serious inroad  on personal liberty but such restraints have  to  be suffered in the larger  interests of society.  This Court in Gurbachan  Singh v. The State of Bombay and  Another(1)  had upheld  the validity of section 27(1) of the City of  Bombay Policy  Act,  1902, which corresponds to section 38  of  the

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Act.    Following  that  decision,  the  challenge  to   the constitutionality  of section 56 was repelled  in  Bhagubhai Dullabhabhai Bhandari v. The District Magistrate, Thana  &  Others (2 ). We will only add that  care  must  be taken  to  ensure that the terms of sections 56 and  59  are strictly complied with and that the slender safeguards Which those  provisions offer are made available to  the  proposed externee. In  Hari Khemu Gawali V. The Deputy Commissioner of  Police, Bombay  and Another(3), in which an order of externment  was passed  under  section 57 of the Act, it was  held  by  this Court  on  an examination of the general scheme of  the  Act that the provisions of sections 55, 56, 57 and 59 cannot  be held  to  be invalid on the grounds that  only  the  general nature  of  the  material  allegations  is  required  to  be disclosed  to the externee, and ,that it would be  difficult for  him to get the matter judicially examined.   Sinha  J., speaking for the majority, observed: "The grounds available to an externee had necessarily to  be very  limited  in  their  scope  because  if  evidence  were available  which could be adduced in public, such  a  person could  be  dealt with under the preventive sections  of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure, for example, under section  107 or  section  110.   But the  special  provisions  now  under examination proceed on the basis that the person dealt  with under  any  of  the  sections 55, 56 or  57  is  of  such  a character  as  not to permit the ordinary laws of  the  land being  put in motion in the ordinary way mainly of examining               witnesses  in open court who should be  cross-               examined  by the party against whom they  were               deposing.’ The provisions we are now examining               are  plainly  intended to be used  in  special               cases  requiring special treatment,  that  is,               cases  which  cannot be dealt with  under  the               preventive  sections of the Code  of  Criminal               Procedure." (1) [1952] S.C.R. 737.    (2) [1956] S.C.R. 533. (3)  [1956] S.C.R. 506. 72 In State of Gujarat and Anr. etc. v. Mehboob Khan Usman Khan etc.  (1)  this Court, reversing the judgment  of  the  High Court  of  Gujarat,  rejected the  argument  that  a  notice substantially similar to the one in the instant case was bad for  vagueness.  It was held that the person proposed to  be extend was entitled to be informed of the general nature  of the material allegations and not to the particulars of those allegations.   As  to  the meaning of  the  phrase  "general nature of the material allegations", it was observed : "Without attempting to be exhaustive we may state that  when a person is stated to be a ’thief, that allegation is vague. Again,  when it is said that ’A’ stole a watch from X  on  a particular  day and at a particular place’,  tie  allegation can  be  said to be particular.  Again, when  it  is  stated that’ X is seen at crowded bus stands and he picks  pockets’ it  is of a general nature of a material allegation.   Under the   last   illustration,  given  above,  will   come   the allegations,  which,  according to the Gujarat  High  Court, suffer  from  being too general, or vague.   Considering  it from the point of view of the party against whom an order of externment     is   proposed  to  be  passed,  it   must   be               emphasised  that  when  he has  to  tender  an               explanation  to a notice, under S. 59, he  can               only  give an explanation, which can be  of  a               general nature.  It may be open to him to take               a  defence, of the action being taken, due  to

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             mala fides, malice or mistaken identity, or he               may  be  able to tender proof of  his  general               good  conduct,  or alibi,  during  the  period               covered by the notice and the like." We  must therefore reject the argument that the  particulars contained  in the notice are vague.  We endorse the view  of the High Court that Criminal Application No. 332 of 1971  in which  judgment was delivered on April 29, 1971  by  another Division  Bench of that court was not correctly decided,  to the extent to which the notice therein was held to be vague. The  view taken in that case is inconsistent with  the  view expressed by this Court in Mehboob Khan’s case. The  third  and  fourth point have the same  answer  as  the second  point  just  dealt with by us.   Precisely  for  the reasons for which the proposed externee is only entitled  to be   informed  of  the  general  nature  of   the   material allegations,  neither the externing authority nor the  State Government in appeal can be asked to write a reasoned  order in  the nature of a judgment.  If those authorities were  to discuss  the evidence in the case, it would be easy  to  fix the identity of witnesses who were unwilling to depose in (1) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 746.  73 public against the proposed externee.  A reasoned order con- taining  a  discussion  of  the  evidence  led  against  the externee  would probably spark off another round of  tyranny and harassment. As  regards  the  last  point,  it  is  primarily  for   the externing, authority to decide how best the externment order can  be made effective, so as to subserve its real  purpose. Now  long,  within the statutory limit of 2 years  fixed  by section 58, the order shall operate and to what territories, within  the  statutory limitations of section 56  it  should extend, are matters which must depend for their decision  on the  nature  of  the data which the authority  is  able  ,to collect in the externment proceedings.  There are cases  and cases and therefore no general formulation can be made  that the  order  of externment must always be restricted  to  the area to which the illegal activities of the externee extend. A  larger area may conceivably have to be  comprised  within the externment order so as to isolate the externee from  his moorings. An excessive order can undoubtedly be struck down because no greater restraint on personal liberty can be permitted  that is  reasonable  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case.   The decision of the Bombay High Court in Balu Shivling Dombe  v. The   Divisional  Magistrate,  Pandharpur  (71  Bombay   Law Reporter  79)  is an instance in point where  an  externment order was set aside on the ground that it was far wider than was justified by the exigencies of the case.  The activities of  the  externee  therein  were confined  to  the  city  of Pandharpur  and yet the externment order covered an area  as extensive  as the districts of Sholapur, Satara  and  Poona. These  areas  are far widely removed from  the  locality  in which the externee had committed but two supposedly  illegal acts.  The exercise of the power was therefore arbitrary and excessive, the order having been passed without reference to the purpose of the externment. But Balu Shivling’s case furnishes no analogy in the instant matter.   A vast city like Bombay presents its own  peculiar problems   of  law  and  order.   It  has  an   ever-growing industrial complex and the city has spread its areas far and wide.   A  fair  proportion of its  teeming  population  is, mobile,  with large multitudes streaming in and out  of  the city in the pursuit of their daily avocations.  An order  of

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externment  restricted to the particular area chosen by  the externee  for  his  unlawful  activities  and  to  a   small periphery  thereof would in such circumstances fail  of  its true purpose.  It would be impossible to secure obedience to such  an  order and its enforcement  would  raise  practical problems  which would impair the efficacy of the order.   An order  in the instant case if restricted, say, to the  areas within the jurisdiction of the Vile Parle police station and its  periphery  would not serve its  purpose.   Rather  than solving a problem of law and order, it would create yet  one more. 74 That  is  why, on similar facts, the Bombay High  Court  has consistently  repelled challenges made to externment  orders on the ground that they extended not only to the district of Greater  Bombay  but to the district of Thana as  well.   In Criminal  Application  No.  1427 of 1968  a  Division  Bench (Kotval  C. J. and Kamat J.) observed in their  judgment  of March 17, 1968 :- "In  the present case the area of activity of  the  externee was  undoubtedly stated to be Santacruz, but Santacruz is  a fairly wide area.  Moreover, it is very intimately connected with  the surrounding area of Thana district.  It is  common knowledge that Thana town in the surrounding area is also an area  where large industries have grown contiguous with  the industrial  area  of  Greater Bombay  and  that  the  entire industrial  area is connected together by several  means  of communication  Including suburban trains of which there  are several  during  each  day,, by taxis  plying  to  and  from Greater Bombay and by bus services operating between Greater Bombay and several parts of Thana District.  Therefore,  the Police  could reasonably have thought that it would  not  be sufficient  to ask the petitioner to keep off only from  the area of Greater Bombay which has an equally busy and  highly industrialised area contiguous to it.  Therefore, the  order was extended to Thana District." A  similar view taken by Palekar and Gatne JJ.  in  Criminal Applications 30 and 93 of 1970 decided on February 23,  1970 by Tulzapurkar J. in 73 Bombay Law Reporter 442 at pp.  453- 454 and by Bhasme and Kania JJ. in Criminal Application  No. 149  of  1972  decided on March 3,  1972.   As  against  the judgment last mentioned the externee had filed special leave petition  No. 487 of 1972 in this Court, one of the  grounds stated  therein  being that the externment  order  was  void because  the externee was asked to remove himself  not  only out of the district of Greater Bombay but from the limits of Thana district as will.  The petition was dismissed by  this Court (Palekar and Dwivedi JJ.) on September 20, 1972. These judgments of the Bombay High Court have taken the view that  the districts of Greater Bombay and Thana form, so  to say, a single unit.  Palekar J. observes in his judgment  in Criminal  Applications Nos. 30 and 93 of 1970 : "It  may  be that the area of operation may be in a particular  locality, but if the externment is limited only to that area, then  it might  be impossible to prevent the externee from  visiting- that area every day.  Any part in Bombay is easily connected by transport with any other part of Greater Bombay and  also the  Thana  District, and if, for example, ’an  externee  is externed  outside  the  limits of Greater  Bombay,  then  he should not take more than 15 minutes ’to reach Kurla 75 from  a  Place  like Thana if the latter  is  excluded  from externment.  The very object of externment is to make it  as difficult as possible to the externee to return to the  field of  his activities." Tulzapurkar J. expressed the same  view

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by  saying  that "the contiguous area of Thana  district  is intimately  connected  with the industrial area  of  Greater Bombay  with  cheaper  and quicker means  of  transport  and communication."  According  to Bhasme J. who  delivered  the judgment  of  the Bench in Criminal Application No.  149  of 1972,   "By  reason  of  the  means  of  communication   and proximity, the districts of Greater Bombay and Thana are for all  practical  purposes one local area  or  one  district." Deshmukh  J.  in  the  _judgment  under  appeal,  says  that "Greater  Bombay  and  Thana districts  are  ...  intimately connected  by Several communications".  In matters of  local colour and conditions the view so consistently expressed  by the  learned Judges of the High Court must, in our  opinion, be accepted as correct. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed. K.B.N.                                                Appeal dismissed. 76