REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.     2763     OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15983 of 2008]

Pallawi Resources Ltd.            ……. Appellant

Versus

Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd.    ...... Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. Leave Granted.

2. This  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  against  the  

judgment  and  order  dated  26.03.2008  passed  by  the  

Calcutta  High  Court  under  its  ordinary  original  civil  

jurisdiction  whereby  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  

application G.A. No. 800 of 2008 in C.S. No. 14 of 2008  

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moved by the appellant herein under Chapter XIIIA of the  

Rules on the Original  Side Rules of  the  Calcutta  High  

Court for a summary judgment.

3. The issue and the controversy that falls for consideration  

in the present appeal deals with the interpretation of the  

provisions of  sub-section 4A of  Section 17 of  the West  

Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,  1997. The question that  

arises for our consideration is whether the fair  rent in  

respect of a tenancy which subsists for 20 years or more  

in respect of the premises constructed in or before the  

year 1984 and used for commercial purpose is required  

to be determined by the Rent Controller or whether the  

same would stand automatically determined under sub-

section 4A of Section 17 read with Section 20 of the West  

Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997.

4. At  this  juncture,  it  will  be pertinent to set  out a brief  

statement of facts in the backdrop of which the present  

controversy  has  arisen  before  us.  A  lease  deed  dated  

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15.02.1969 was executed between the appellant and the  

respondent herein for grant of lease, for office purposes,  

of the entire first floor of premises no. 20, Rajendra Nath  

Mukherjee  Road,  Calcutta for  a period of  twenty years  

from 01.02.1969 to  31.01.1989 and the  rent  mutually  

settled and agreed upon by the parties was Rs. 2,250/-  

per month as the basic component of the rent (the service  

charges and other additional payments excluded).  

5. Upon the expiry of the term of twenty years, the appellant  

herein instituted a suit being C.S. No. 778 of 1989 before  

the Calcutta High Court. The appellant herein, however,  

had withdrawn the said suit by way of an order dated  

18.04.2006. In the meanwhile, the West Bengal Premises  

Tenancy Act,  1997 came into force which repealed the  

earlier Act of 1956. Section 17(4A) was inserted by the  

West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2002  

with retrospective effect from 10.07.2001.  

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6. The appellant therefore issued to the respondent a notice  

dated 12.03.2007 under Section 20 of the West Bengal  

Premises  Tenancy  Act,  1997  intending  to  increase  the  

rent of the said premises to Rs. 13,500/- per month, it  

being  five  times  the  rent  earlier  agreed  upon  by  the  

parties due and recoverable from the month of May 2007.  

A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property  

Act, 1882 dated 09.06.2007 terminating the tenancy and  

calling  upon  the  respondent  to  hand  over  vacant,  

peaceful and khas possession of the said premises was  

served upon the respondent by the appellant.  

7. Since  the  respondent  continued  to  occupy  the  said  

premises, the appellants instituted a suit C.S. No. 14 of  

2008 in the High Court  of  Calcutta under its  ordinary  

original civil jurisdiction, praying,  inter alia, for a decree  

of  peaceful,  vacant  and  khas  possession  of  the  said  

premises. Subsequently, an application G.A. No. 800 of  

2008  for  a  summary  judgment  was  moved  by  the  

appellant wherein it was contended by the appellant that  

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under sub-section 4A of Section 17 there is a mandate  

for  increase  of  rent  which  automatically  comes  in  

operation  upon  a  notice  in  that  regard  being  issued  

under  Section  20  without  the  landlord  requiring  to  

perfect  the  demand before  any other  authority.  It  was  

also urged that if there is no dispute as to the quantum,  

the increased rent becomes payable from the month or  

period of tenancy next after the expiry of 30 days from  

the date of the notice and the refusal without any dispute  

as to the quantum would not make the landlord liable to  

apply before  the Rent Controller  for  fixation of  rent.  It  

was further contended that only where a tenant refused  

to accept the increase as suggested by a landlord,  the  

landlord has perforce to seek the increase before the Rent  

Controller.  However,  the  Court  relying  on  an  earlier  

judgment of the Division Bench of that Court reported as  

2006 (2) CHN 386 dismissed the said application. Hence,  

the parties are in appeal before us.

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8. Before proceeding further,  we wish to refer to the rival  

contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for  

the  parties.  Dr.  A.M.  Singhvi  and  Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  

learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant, contended before us that Section 17(4A) of the  

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as inserted by  

the  2002  Amendment  Act,  envisages  that  the  

determination of the fair rent would be automatic under  

Section 17(4A) read with Section 20 of the West Bengal  

Premises  Tenancy  Act,  1997  without  reference  to  the  

Rent  Controller  once  the  three  pre-conditions  which  

govern the applicability of Section 17(4A) spelt out in that  

Section  are  fulfilled.  According  to  the  counsel  for  the  

appellant,  fixation  of  the  rent  is  automatic  because  

Section 17(4A) prescribes a formal method of fixing the  

rent  requiring  only  minimal  calculation.  The  counsel  

further forcefully submitted before us that since the job  

of  fixing  the  rent  does  not  involve  any  adjudicatory  

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process, it is a ministerial task, and hence reference to  

the Rent Controller is not required.

9. Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing  

on  behalf  of  the  respondent,  on  the  other  hand,  

contended that sub-section 4A of Section 17 has to be  

read in conjunction with the other sub-sections of that  

Section  and  that  application  of  Section  17(1)  which  

requires the Rent Controller to fix the fair rent cannot be  

dispensed with. Mr. Gupta also laid emphasis on the fact  

that Rule 8 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Rules,  

1999  which  prescribes  the  manner  of  making  

applications under Section 17 for fixation of the fair rent  

remains  unamended  even after  the  amendment  of  the  

1997 Act, thereby keeping the manner of fixation of the  

fair rent intact even for cases falling under sub-section  

4A of Section 17.  

10. We have carefully considered the aforesaid submission of  

the  counsel  appearing  for  the  parties.  In  order  to  

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appreciate the said contentions we have also perused not  

only the statutory provisions of the West Bengal Premises  

Tenancy Act, 1997 but also the Statement of Objects and  

Reasons leading to framing of the aforesaid legislation as  

also the Statement of Objects and Reasons for bringing in  

an  amendment  of  the  said  Act  in  2002  giving  

retrospective  effect  to  the  said  provisions  from  2001.  

Before  the  enactment  of  the  West  Bengal  Premises  

Tenancy Act,  1997,  the  field  was covered by the  West  

Bengal  Premises  Tenancy  Act,  1956.  However,  the  

aforesaid Act of 1997 was legislated after repealing the  

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.  We may now  

have a look at the definition of the term “fair rent” under  

the Act of 1997. The definition of “fair rent” is given in  

Section 2(b), where it is stated that fair rent means rent  

fixed under Section 17 of the Act.  At this stage, reference  

is also to be made to the relevant text of Section 17 which  

is reproduced below for the purpose of convenience but  

restricted only to the relevant portion: -

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“Section  17  -  Fixation  of  fair  rent  -  (1)  The  Controller  shall,  on  application  made  to  him  either  by the landlord or by the tenant in the   prescribed manner, fix the fair rent in respect of  any premises in accordance with the provisions  of this Act. …………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………

(4A) Where a tenancy subsist for twenty years   or more in respect of the premises constructed   in  or  before  the  year  1984  and  used  for  commercial  purpose,  the  fair  rent  shall  be  determined  by  adding  to  the  rent  as  on  1.7.1976 five times or by accepting the existing   rent if such rent is more than the increased rent  determined under this sub-section.”

The  text  of  Section  20  which  deals  with  the  issuance  of  a  

notice required to be mandatorily given to the tenant by the  

landlord if he wants to increase the rent is also reproduced  

hereunder: -

“Section 20 – Notice of increase of rent – Where  a landlord intends to increase the rent of any  premises, he shall give to the tenant the notice   of  his  intention  so  to  do  in  so  far  as  such  increase  is  permissible  under  this  Act;  the   increase  of  rent shall  be due and recoverable  from the month or period of tenancy next after   the expiry of thirty days from the date on which  the notice is given. “

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11. It  may be mentioned herein that in the original  Act of  

1997 there did not exist the provisions of sub-section 4A of  

Section 17 and the same was brought in by the Amendment  

Act  of  2002,  operating  retrospectively  with  effect  from  

10.07.2001.  In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the  

Bill of 2002 it was stated that one of the purposes for bringing  

in the Amendment Bill is to extend the application of the said  

Act to the premises let out for residential purpose and non-

residential purpose having monthly rent upto Rs. 6,000/- and  

Rs. 10,000/- respectively situated within the limits of Kolkata  

Municipal Corporation or the Howrah Municipal Corporation  

as  well  as  to  extend the  application  of  the  said  Act  to  the  

premises  let  out  for  residential  purpose and non-residential  

purpose  having  monthly  rent  upto  Rs.  3,000/-  and  Rs.  

5,000/- respectively situated in other areas to which the said  

Act  extends.   Another  reason  stated  for  bringing  in  the  

Amendment Bill was to amend Section 17 of the said Act for  

fixation of fair rent in such a manner so as to provide benefit  

to both the landlord and the tenant concerned.  

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12. A plain reading of Section 17(4A) would suggest that the  

three conditions which must co-exist  for  the applicability  of  

that sub-section in a given case are:

i. There must be a subsisting tenancy for twenty years or  

more; and

ii.  The  tenancy  must  be  in  respect  of  a  premises  

constructed in or before the year 1984; and

iii. The premises must be used for a commercial purpose.

The counsel for the parties have, before us, not disputed the  

fulfillment of these three pre-conditions in the present case.  

Therefore, we intend to directly move to the point which is in  

issue before us in the present appeal. At the outset, we wish to  

point out that for a number of reasons set out in the following  

paragraphs,  we  cannot  accept  the  view  propounded  by  the  

learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant.

13. A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that a  

provision in a statute must be read as a whole  and not in  

isolation ignoring the other provisions of that statute.  While  

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dealing with a statutory instrument, one cannot be allowed to  

pick and choose. It will be grossly unjust if the Court allows a  

person to single out and avail the benefit of a provision from a  

chain of provisions which is favourable to him. Reference may  

be made to a constitutional bench decision of this Court in the  

case of Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat (2005) 2 SCC 409.  

The Court, in para 30, of that judgment observed as follows:  

“30. By now it is well  settled principle of law  that  no  part  of  a  statute  and  no  word  of  a   statute  can be construed in isolation.  Statutes   have to be construed so that every word has a  place and everything is in its  place.  It  is also  trite that the statute or rules made thereunder  should be read as a whole and one provision   should be construed with reference to the other  provision to make the provision consistent with   the object sought to be achieved.”

14. We wish to also refer to a latest judgment of this Court  

reported as  SAIL v. S.U.T.N.I.  Sangam and Ors. 2009 (10)  

SCALE 416, wherein this Court, very succinctly reiterated the  

aforesaid position in, para 79, as follows:  

“79. The learned counsel, however, invited our  attention  to  take  recourse  to  the  purposive  interpretation  doctrine  in  preference  to  the   literal interpretation. It is a well settled principle  of law that a statute must be read as a whole   and then chapter by chapter, section by section,   

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and then word by word. For the said purpose,   the Scheme of the Act must be noticed.  If  the  principle of interpretation of statutes resorted to  by  the  Court  leads  to  a  fair  reading  of  the   provision, the same would fulfill the conditions  of  applying  the  principles  of  purposive  construction.”   

15. From these authorities, it is amply clear that a provision  

in a statute ought not to be read in isolation. On the contrary,  

a statute must be read as an integral whole keeping in view  

the other provisions which may be relevant to the provision in  

question in order to correctly  arrive at  the legislative  intent  

behind the provision in question. Applying this principle to the  

case at hand which involves an interpretation of Section 17  

(4A), it will not be appropriate for us to read sub-section 4A of  

Section 17 ignoring the other relevant provisions. It will also  

be pertinent to note that Section 18 of the Act which speaks  

about  revision  of  the  fair  rent  employs  the  words  

“automatically  increased”  in  contradistinction  to  the  word  

“determined”  used  in  Section  17  (4A).  The  use  of  different  

terminology  in  the  two  sections  thus  indicates  that  the  

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legislative intent was to lay down different modes for fixation of  

the rent under the two sections.  

16. Furthermore,  a  plain  reading  of  Section  20 of  the  Act  

would show that Section 20 allows the landlord to only give a  

notice of his intention to increase the rent, which becomes due  

and recoverable from the month or period of tenancy next after  

the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the notice is  

given. We are of the considered view that the requirement of  

giving by the landlord a notice of intention to increase the rent  

instead of a notice of increase of rent and the period of one  

month  which  has  been  allowed  before  the  increased  rent  

becomes due and recoverable from the tenant by the landlord  

sufficiently indicate that the legislature did not intend to make  

the rent fixed by the landlord automatically applicable without  

any reference to the Rent Controller.

17. The  stand  of  the  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the appellant that under sub-section 4A of Section 17  

there  is  automatic  fixation  of  the  fair  rent  without  any  

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reference to the Rent Controller is untenable as it  is not in  

conformity  with  the  cardinal  rule  referred  to  above  by  us.  

Section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, as  

it  stands today, consists of a number of sub-sections. Sub-

sections 4A and 4B were both inserted in Section 17 by the  

West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2002 with  

retrospective effect from 10.07.2001. Sub-section (1) of Section  

17 clearly states that the Controller shall be the authority to  

fix the rent in respect of any premises in accordance with the  

provisions of that Act. Sub-section 4A of Section 17 lays down  

the mode for the determination of fair rent where a tenancy  

subsists for twenty years or more in respect of the premises  

constructed  in  or  before  the  year  1984  and  used  for  

commercial purpose.  

18. Further,  it  is  a  well  established  principle  of  statutory  

interpretation  that  the  legislature  is  specially  precise  and  

careful in its choice of language. Thus, if a statutory provision  

is  enacted  by  the  legislature  in  a  certain manner,  the  only  

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reasonable  interpretation  which  can  be  resorted  to  by  the  

courts is that such was the intention of the legislature and  

that the provision was consciously enacted in that manner. It  

is a well-settled principle in law that the court cannot read  

anything  into  a  statutory  provision  which  is  plain  and  

unambiguous.  The  language  employed  in  a  statute  is  the  

determinative factor of the legislative intent. If the language of  

the  enactment  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  it  would  not  be  

proper  for  the  courts  to  add  any  words  thereto  and evolve  

some legislative intent, not found in the statute. Reference in  

this regard may be made to the recent decision of this Court in  

Ansal  Properties  &  Industries  Ltd.  v.  State  of  Haryana  

(2009) 3 SCC 553.

19. We must also take note of the submission made by the  

learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent that sub-

section 4A of  Section 17 employs the word ‘determine’.  The  

learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of  

a three Judge bench of this Court, which is binding on us,  

reported as  Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Rly. v.  

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T.R. Chellappan (1976)  3 SCC 190, the relevant portion of  

para 21 is reproduced herein below:

“21………………..The word “consider” has been  used  in  contradistinction  to  the  word   “determine”.  The  rule-making  authority   deliberately used the word “consider” and not  “determine” because the word “determine” has  a  much  wider  scope.  The  word  “consider”  merely  connotes  that  there  should  be  active   application  of  the  mind  by  the  disciplinary  authority  after  considering  the  entire   circumstances of the case in order to decide the  nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed  on the delinquent employee on his conviction on  a  criminal  charge.  This  matter  can  be  objectively  determined  only  if  the  delinquent  employee  is  heard  and  is  given  a  chance  to   satisfy the authority regarding the final orders  that  may be passed by the said  authority.  In   other  words,  the  term  “consider”  postulates   consideration  of  all  the  aspects,  the  pros and  cons of the matter  after hearing the aggrieved  person……………….”  

20. We  may  also add  herein  that  all  the  sub-sections  

included in Section 17 are independent provisions laying down  

different  criteria  on  the  fulfillment  of  which  an  application  

could be filed before the Rent Controller praying for increasing  

the fair rent. In other words, Section 17 lays down different  

types of causes of action as to when such an increase could be  

sought for. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 makes it crystal clear  

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that on the happening and fulfillment of the criteria laid down  

in  each  of  the  cause  of  action,  an  application  would  be  

required to be filed before the Rent Controller who would then  

determine  as  to  what  would  be  the  fair  rent.   Although,  it  

could only be a case of mathematical calculation yet an order  

in that regard is to be passed by the Rent Controller on the  

basis  of  an  application  filed  before  it  by  determining  the  

quantum of such fair rent.   

21. In case there is a case of deemed increase of fair rent or  

an automatic increase, as suggested by the counsel appearing  

for the appellant, still somebody would have to determine that  

it has so increased and that authority is definitely the Rent  

Controller  who could exercise the jurisdiction only when he  

receives an application.  Unless an application is received in  

that  regard,  nobody  would  know  that  in  fact  a  case  for  

increase  of  fair  rent  has  accrued  or  is  sought  for  by  the  

concerned party.  

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22. Thus, it cannot be said that sub-section 4A of Section 17  

was sought to be brought in by way of an exception to the  

general  rule  of  Section  17.   Had  the  legislature  intended  

otherwise, it would have specifically, in its wisdom, made sub-

section 4A an exception to sub-section (1) by adding a proviso  

or  by  making  a  specific  provision  thereto  under  Section  3,  

where the Act itself provides some exemptions and provides for  

specific cases where the Act is not applicable. The fact that the  

West Bengal State legislature did not, even after insertion of  

sub-section 4A, amend or modify Rule 8 of the West Bengal  

Premises Tenancy Rules, 1999 which prescribes the manner of  

making applications under Section 17 for fixation of fair rent  

also fortifies the fact that the State legislature did not intend  

to incorporate sub-section 4A as an exception to sub-section  

(1) of Section 17. On the contrary, the non-amendment of Rule  

8  goes  on  to  show  that  the  legislature  intended  the  same  

procedure to be followed with regard to making an application  

under any provision of Section 17 for the fixation of fair rent.

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23. Thus, in light of the discussion made above, we are of the  

considered opinion that this appeal is liable to be dismissed,  

which we hereby do.  The parties  are  left  to  bear  their  own  

costs.  

.……………………………J.      [V.S. Sirpurkar]

                                                                                                            ………………………………..J.                                                       [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi March 26, 2010.

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