http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: PALI DEVI AND OTHERS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHAIRMAN MANAGING COMMITTEE & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       15/02/1996

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. PARIPOORNAN, K.S.(J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1589            1996 SCC  (3) 296  JT 1996 (3)   306        1996 SCALE  (2)633

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      The High  Court of  Punjab and Haryana allowed the writ petition of  the respondent  Managing Committee  of the Army School, Jallandhar,  upsetting the  orders of  the Authority under the  Minimum Wages  Act, 1948, on the premise that the appellants seeking  relief were  its  ex-employees  and  not existing ones,  and hence  dis-entitled to  move a  petition under Section 20(2) of the Act for appropriate relief.      The employees  voiced grievance  before  the  Authority that the  Army School  had not  paid them  the minimum wages fixed by  the State  Government from  time to  time, as  per details given  in the  application and  therefore they  were entitled to  reliefs enumerated  under Section 20 (2) of the above said Act. The said provision reads as under :      20(2) Where  an  employee  has  any      claim of  the nature referred to in      sub-section   (1),   the   employee      himself, or  any legal practitioner      trade union  authorized in  writing      to  act   on  his  behalf,  or  any      Inspector, or any Inspector, or any      person acting  with the  permission      of the  Authority  appointed  under      sub-section (1),  may apply to such      Authority  for  a  direction  under      sub-section (3):           Provided   that   every   such      application  shall   be   presented      within six  months from the date on      which the  minimum wages  [or other      amount] became payable:           Provided  further   that   any      application may  be admitted  after      the said  period of six months when      the   applicant    satisfied    the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

    Authority that  he  had  sufficient      cause   for    not    making    the      application within such period. The word ’employee’ as defined in Section 2(i) of the Act is as follows :      In  this   Act  unless   there   is      anything repugnant  in the  subject      or content:      "2(i) "employee"  means any  person      who is  employed for hire or reward      to  do   any   work,   skilled   or      unskilled, manual or clerical, in a      scheduled employment  in respect of      which minimum  rates of  wages have      been fixed;  and includes  an  out-      worker  to  whom  any  articles  or      materials are  given out by another      person  to  be  made  up,  cleaned,      washed,    altered,     ornamented,      finished,  repaired,   adapted   or      otherwise processes  for  sale  for      the  purposes   of  the   trade  or      business of that other person where      the process  is to  be carried  out      either in  the  home  of  the  out-      worker or  in some  other  premises      not  being   premises   under   the      control  and   management  of  that      other person,  and also includes an      employee declared to be an employee      by the  appropriate Government; but      does not  include any member of the      Armed Forces of the [Union]."      The High  Court relying  on an  earlier Division  Bench decision of  the Punjab High Court in Municipal Vs. Sham Lal Kaura &  Ors. [Volume 28 (1965-66), Indian Factories Journal 472] took  the view  that the  word ’employee’,  defined  in Section 2(i)  of the  Act did not include an ex-employee. It was held  in the  said case  that a person who is not in the actual employment  of the  employer at the time of making an application under section 20(2) of the Act, was not entitled to seek  relief. Another Single Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Mahiya Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. [1982 (1) Service Law Reporter 26] in line with the decision of M.C.  Rajkot’s case was taken in aid, to conclude that in the presence  of these  binding precedents the writ petition merited acceptance  and on  that basis  the  orders  of  the Authority was  set aside.  This  has  given  rise  to  these special leave petitions.      We grant  special leave  and  dispose  of  the  appeals simultaneously.      Section 30  of  the  Act  confers  on  the  appropriate government power  to make rules. The Minimum Wages (Central) Rules, 1950 framed by the Central Government prescribe Forms wherein particulars  to be  mentioned in the application for seeking relief  are provided.  Form VI  for the  purpose  of Section 20(2), so far relevant provides: "The applicant above-named states as follows:      (1)    The     applicant    was/has    been    employed from...............    to............     as................ (category)  in   .....................  (establishment)   of Shri/Messrs ............ engaged in ................ (nature of work)  which is a scheduled employment within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the Minimum Wages Act.      (2) The  opponent(s) is/are  the employer(s) within the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

meaning of section 2(a) of Minimum Wages Act.      (3) (a)  The applicant has been paid wages at less than the  minimum  rate  of  wages  fixed  for  his  category  of employment under the Act by Rs...................  per day for the period from...............  to...................;           (b) The  applicant has  not  been  paid  wages  at Rs................  per   day  for   weekly  days   of  rest from...........to...............;           (c) The  applicant has  not been paid wages at the overtime   rate    for   the   period   from................ to...............;"      It is  plain that paragraph one of the Form equates the past  and  the  present  as  an  alternative.  It  obviously establishes the  right of  an ex-employee to move a petition under Section  20(2) of the Act. This Form was introduced in the Rules by Notification No. GSR 1301 dated 28.10.1960. The statutory language  employed in  the Form  is a good hint to discern the true scope of Section 20(2) to determine whether a past employee can invoke the provisions of the Act or not.      In Wakefield  Estate v. P.V. Perumal [1958(16) FJR 1] a learned Single  Judge of the Madras High Court took the view that since  Section 20  of the  Act speaks only of employees and does  not speak  of past  employees and  since the  word ‘employee’ is  defined as  a person who is employed, it must be held  that the  summary remedy  provided by Section 20 is not available  to  past  employees.  This  was  the  literal construction of  Section 20(2)  of the  Act. Another learned Single Judge  of the  same High  Court in Murugan Transports vs. P. Rathakrishnan & Ors. [1960(19) FJR 355] differed from the earlier  view and held that in order to give full effect to the intendment of the Act, it would be necessary to bring within its  fold, not  merely the present, but also the past employee, who  at one  time being  employee had  earned  the minimum wages.  The latter  view of the Madras High Court in Murugan Transport’s  case was  followed by  the Kerala  High Court in  Chacko vs.  Varkey and  others  [1961(21)FJR  493] holding that  even an  ex-employee  or  employees  would  be competent to  file  an  application  claiming  relief  under section 20 of the Act.      In  Raikot’s   case,  the  Punjab  High  Court  however preferred the  earlier view  of the  Madras  High  Court  in Wakefield’ Estate  case opting for the literal construction. Had the  existence of  the Rules and Form VI been brought to the notice of the Division Bench, perhaps the interpretation would have  been different.  M.C. Raikot’s  case arose after retrenchment of  an employee  with effect from April 7, 1961 and on  his filing an application under Section 20(2) of the Act, when  the Rules  and Form  VI had become operative with effect from  28-10-1960. The  language of the Form, covering the cases  of past and existing employees, was in accord not only with  the latter  view of the Madras High Court and the Kerala High  Court but also with the views of the Patna High Court in  Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) vs. Presiding Officer, Labour  Court and Authority under the Minimum Wages Act, Patna and others [1976 ILR - Patna Series, 318] and the High Court  of Mysore at Bangalore in Athni Municipality vs. Shetteppa Laxman  Pattan and others [1965 volume 2 LLJ 307]. Thus on  account of the preponderance of Authority, Sections 20(2) and  2(i) had  to be read alongwith the Rules and Form VI to  lean in favour of the view that both past and present employees were entitled to move in the matter. Such would be a purposive  approach, which  would carry  out the necessary intendment of  the statute, for which the Rules and the Form lend a  hand to  carry out  the objectives  of the  Act. The language-employed therein,  even though executive voiced, is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

more  often  than  not,  demonstrative  of  the  legislative purpose.  So  viewed,  the  intendment  of  the  statute  is furthered if  an ex-employee  too is  held entitled  to seek relief under Section 20(2) of the Act.      Thus on the afore-analysis, we allow these appeals, set aside the  impugned order  of the  High Court  and remit the matters back  to it  for decision  on  other  points,  which allegedly arose  in  the  matter,  as  asserted  by  learned counsel for the respondent Army School. We have otherwise no doubt that  other points  did arise in these matters because the writ petitions were virtually First Appeals in disguise, since the  orders of  the Authority  under the Minimum Wages Act were neither appealable nor revisable in any other fora. The High  Court should now dispose of these remitted matters most expeditiously.  Any interim  orders which  prevailed in the High  Court during  the pendency  of the  writ petitions would automatically stand revived.      Ordered accordingly.  There shall  be no  order  as  to costs.