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PETITIONER: P. VIRUDHACHALAM & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE MANAGEMENT OF LOTUS MILLS & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/12/1997

BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T S.B. Majmudar, J :      A  short   but  an   interesting  question  arises  for consideration in  this appeal  by certificate granted by the High Court  of Judicature  at Madras under Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. It reads as under :-      "Whether  an   individual  workman   governed  by   the Industrial Disputes  Act, 1947  (hereinafter referred  to as ’the Act’)  can claim lay-off compensation under Section 25C of  the   Act  despite   a  settlement   arrived  at  during conciliation proceeding  under Section 12(3) of the Act by a union of  which he  is not a member and when such settlement seeks to  restrict the right of lay-off compensation payable to such  workman as per the first proviso to Section 25-C of the Act."      A few  relevant  facts  leading  to  these  proceedings require to be stated at the outset :-      BACKGROUND FACTS :      The five  appellants before  us were  employed  at  the relevant time  under Respondent No.1 in various departments. Respondent No.1  was running  a  textile  mill  wherein  the appellants were  employed. The  said textile  mill  remained closed due  to financial  crisis from 8.8.1976 to 31.1.1978. The workmen  of the mill raised a dispute pertaining to lay- off during  the aforesaid  period  and  claimed  appropriate wages for the said period. In the conciliation proceedings a settlement was  arrived at between the parties on 28.2.1977. Five unions  representing all  the workmen  took part in the conciliation proceedings.  A settlement  was arrived  at  in these proceedings between the management on the one hand and the unions  on the  other. In clause 6 of the settlement, it was provided  that lay-off  compensation would  be  paid for the days  during which  the mill did not function and marked as "no work". It was also agreed that the compensation would be paid  after January  1981 in instalments and the question as to  the number  of instalments  would be  decided by both parties on  mutual discussion in January 1980. Though it was agreed under  that settlement  in January  1980, the workers insisted upon  immediate payment  of compensation and raised another dispute,  Consequently, the  earlier settlement lost

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its efficacy.  Again in  the  matter  was  referred  to  the conciliation officer  who held negotiation. Different unions representing various  categories of workmen took part in the negotiation. The  union representing  the present appellants also took  part in  the said negotiation. Ultimately a fresh settlement was arrived at during conciliation proceedings as per Section 12(3) of the Act on 5.5.1980. Out of five unions representing the  workmen of Respondent No.1 - Textile Mill, four  unions  signed  the  said  settlement  but  the  union representing the appellants did not think it fit to sign the same. The  relevant terms  of the aforesaid settlement under Section 12(3)  of the  Act in connection with the payment of lay-off compensation read as under :-      "TERMS OF SETTLEMENT "      1.   It   is   agreed   that   this      settlement shall  be applicable  to      all  permanent   employees  of  the      Mills except      (a) Watchman      (b) Electrical Department workers      (c) Staff      in  respect   of  whom  a  separate      settlement has been signed.      2. It  is agreed that in respect of      the period  8.8.1976  to  7.8.1977,      all  workers   who  were  laid  off      during that  period shall  be  paid      lay-off compensation  for the first      forty-five days of lay off and that      no compensation shall be payable in      respect  of  the  days  of  lay-off      after  the   expiry  of  the  first      forty-five days.      3.   In is  further agreed  that in      respect of  the period  9.8.1977 to      31.1.1978,  all  workmen  who  were      laid-off during  that period  shall      be paid  lay off  compensation  for      the first  forty-five days  of lay-      off and  that no compensation shall      be payable  in respect  of the days      of lay-off  after the expiry of the      first forty five days.      4.   In  addition  to  the  lay-off      compensation payable  under Clauses      (2) and  (3) above  each  permanent      workman shall  be paid an ex-gratia      sum which  shall be  calculated  as      follows :      The  total   of  the   compensation      amount payable  to  each  permanent      worker under  clauses (2)  and  (3)      above  and   the  ex-gratia  amount      shall be  equal to 67% of the total      lay-off  compensation  payable  for      him in  respect of  all the days of      lay-off during  the period 8.8.1976      to 31.1.1978."      It is  not in dispute appellants were in paragraph 1 of the settlement,  meaning thereby  they were  covered by  the said settlement. The question is as to whether they would be bound by  the settlement and the terms regarding the payment of retrenched lay-off compensation, when their union did not sign the  said settlement. The appellants on the ground that their union had not signed the settlement, filed application

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under  Section   33C(2)  of   the  Act   for  computing  the appropriate lay-off  compensation payable  to  them  as  per Section 25C  of the  Act. The Labour Court after hearing the parties allowed  the said application on the ground that the appellants individually  had not  entered into any agreement with the  management and consequently the proviso to Section 25C of  the Act  would not come in their way and, therefore, they were  entitled to  be paid 50% lay-off compensation for the entire  period during which they were laid-off i.e. from 8.8.1976 to  31.1.1978 and  the term of the settlement under Section 12(3)  arrived at  during compensation at 67% of the permissible statutory  lay-off  compensation  would  not  be binding on  the appellants. Accordingly, the amounts payable to the appellants were computed by the Labour Court and were directed to  be paid  by Respondent No.1  by its Order dated 30.1.1982.  Respondent  No.1  carried  the  matter  in  Writ Petition being  No. 2962  of 1982  in the Madras High Court. The Court by its impugned judgment dated 11.8.1989 held that the settlement  arrived at  during  conciliation  proceeding under Section  12 (3)  was binding  to all the workmen being parties to  industrial dispute  as per  Section 18(3) of the Act and consequently the said settlement could be treated as an agreement  arrived at  between all the workmen as per the first proviso  to Section 25C and, therefore, the appellants could not  claim anything more than what was permissible and payable to  them as  per the binding terms of the settlement dated 5.5.1980.  The writ  petition of  Respondent No.1 was, therefore allowed  and  the  claim  petition  under  Section 33C(2) as  moved by  the appellants  was dismissed. However, while  dismissing   the  same,  the  High  Court  granted  a certificate under  Article 133(1)  of the  Constitution  for leave for  appeal to this Court and that is show this appeal was filed  in this  Court and  has reached the final hearing before us.      CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS :      Learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contended that Section  25C is  in  Chapter  VA  of  the  Act  and  it represents a  complete code  in itself.  that the  statutory right given  to the  workmen under Section 25C of Chapter Va cannot be  whittled down,  save and  except by  an agreement entered into  between the workmen concerned and the employer as provided  by the first proviso to Section 25C of the Act. But before the provisions of the said proviso are attracted, it should  be shown  that the  workman who  has a  statutory right under  Section 25C has willingly agreed to give up his right by  entering into  such an agreement with the right by entering into such an agreement with the employer. That such an agreement  was independent of any settlement contemplated under Section  12(3) of the Act which could have any binding effect under Section 18(3) of the Act. It was submitted that on a  conjoint reading of Sections 25C and 25J, it has to be held that  any inconsistent  in any  other part  of the  Act itself would  not whittle  down the right to receive lay-off compensation as guaranteed to the workman under Section  25C of the  Act and consequently the settlement arrived at under Section 12(3)  of the  Act would not have any adverse effect on the  right of  the  appellants  who  admittedly  had  not entered into  any independent  agreement with the management curtailing their  right under  Section 25C  of  the  Act  to receive 50% statutory compensation during the entire lay-off period. The  contesting Respondent No.1 being served has not though it fit to appear in these proceedings.      STATUTORY SCHEME :      In  order   to  appreciate  the  aforesaid  contentions canvassed  by   counsel  for  the  appellants,  it  will  be

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necessary to have a look at the statutory scheme of the Act. The act  is  enacted  for  resolving    industrial  disputes between workmen  and employer  which would  have  pernicious effect on  industrial peace  and industrial  production  and which would  in their  turn adversely  affect the economy of the Nation as a whole. The act is enacted to make provisions for the  investigation and settlement of industrial disputes for the  investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for  certain other  purposes mentioned in the Act. Under the  Act,   the  principal  bargaining,  (2)  Mediation  and conciliation, (3)  Investigation, (4)  Arbiration,  and  (5) Adjudication, The  scheme of the Act shows that adjudication is to  be resorted  to as  the last  alternative. Before any matter is  referred for adjudication under Section 10 of the Act, there  should be  an attempt  for conciliation. As laid down by  this Court  in Herbertsons  Ltd. vs. The Workmen of Herbetsons Ltd.  & Ors.  (AIR 1977  SC 322)  any  settlement between the employer and the employees is placed on a higher pedestal that  an ward passed after adjudication. It is easy to visualise  that individual  workmen  have  by  themselves scant bargaining power. Therefore, their disputes have to be highlighted by their bargaining agents, namely, their unions representing the  body of  workmen so  that  the  bargaining power of  individual workmen  can get  strengthned.  As  per Section 36 of the Act, a workman who is a party to a dispute shall be  entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act  by any  member of  the executive  or other  office bearer of a registered trade union of other office bearer of a registered  trade union  of which  he  is  a  member.  The machinery of  the Act  envisages  resolution  of  industrial disputes  and   conflicts  at   the   grassroot   level   by conciliation by  which settlement  can be arrived at between the employer  and the  workmen   and industrial peace can be achieved and industrial strife can be put to an end. The Act envisages two  types  of  settlements  between  the  warring groups of employer and employees. As defined by Section 2(P) of the  Act, "settlement"  means a  settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes a written agreement  between  the  employer  and  workmen  arrived  at otherwise than  in the  course of  conciliation  proceedings where such  agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such  manner as  may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent  to an  officer authorised  in this  behalf by the appropriate Government  and the  conciliation officer. Thus, a settlement  which is  based on a written agreement between the  parties  can  be  arrived  at  either  in  conciliation proceedings or even outside conciliation proceedings between the representatives  of the  workmen on the one hand and the management on  the other. But even if such written agreement signed by  the parties  is arrived  at outside  conciliation proceeding,  it   would  become   a  settlement,   once  the prescribed  procedure   as  envisaged  by  Section  2(p)  is followed. So  far as settlements arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings  are concerned,  Section 12  of the Act deals  with such  settlements. As  laid down  by Section 12(1) where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation  officer may,  or where the dispute relates to a  public utility  service and  a notice under Section 22 has been  given shall,  hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner Sub-section (2) of Section 12 enjoins upon him for  the purpose  of bringing  about a settlement of the dispute, without  delay to  investigate the  dispute and all matters  affecting  the  merits  and  the  right  settlement thereof and  to make  all efforts  as he  thinks fit for the purpose of  inducing the  parties to  come  to  a  fair  and

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amicable settlement of the dispute. Then follows sub-section (3) of Section 12 under which settlement in the present case saw the light of the day. It reads as under :-      "12 (3).  If a  settlement  of  the      dispute or of any of the matters in      dispute is arrived at in the course      of  the  conciliation  proceedings,      the conciliation officer shall send      a report thereof to the appropriate      Government or an officer authorised      in this  behalf by  the appropriate      Government    together    with    a      memorandum of the settlement signed      by the parties to the dispute".      Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 12 lay down that if no settlement  is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall submit a  full report to the appropriate Government which if satisfied that  there is a case for reference of the dispute to a  Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case  may be, may make such a reference and shall record and  communicate   to  the  parties  concerned  its  reasons therefore. So  far as  the settlement arrived at outside the conciliation proceedings  is concerned,  Section 18(1) deals with such settlement and lays down that a settlement arrived at by  agreement between  the employer and workmen otherwise than in  the course  of  conciliation  proceeding  shall  be binding on  the parties to the agreement. Sub-section (3) of section 18, however, deals with settlement arrived at during conciliation  proceedings  and  lays  down  that  settlement arrived at  in the  course of conciliation proceedings under this Act,  or  an  arbitration  award  in  a  case  where  a notification has  been  issued  under  sub-section  (3A)  of Section 10A  or an  award of  a Labour  Court,  Tribunal  or National  Tribunal  which  has  come  enforceable  shall  be binding on -      (a)  all parties to the industrial dispute;      (b)   all other  parties  summoned  to  appear  in  the           proceedings as  parties to the dispute, unless the           Board,  arbitrator,   Labour  Court,  Tribunal  or           National Tribunal, as the case may be, records the           opinion that  they were so summoned without proper           cause:      (c)   Where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause           (b) is  an  employer,  his  heirs,  successors  or           assign in  respect of  the establishment  to which           the dispute relates;      (d)   Where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause           (b) is  composed of  workmen, all persons who were           employed in  the  establishment  or  part  of  the           establishment, as  the case  may be,  to which the           dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all           persons who  subsequently become  employed in that           establishment or part.      DISCUSSION ON THE POINT FOR CONSIDERATION :      The aforesaid relevant provision of the Act, therefore, leave no  room for  doubt that  once a written settlement is arrived  at   during  the   conciliation  proceedings   such settlement under Section 12(3) has a binding effect not only on the signatories to the settlement but also on all parties to the  industrial dispute which would cover the entire body of workmen,  not  only  existing  workmen  but  also  future workmen. Such  a settlement  during conciliation proceedings has the  same legal  effect as  an award of Labour Court, or Tribunal or  National Tribunal or an Arbitration award, They all stand  on part.  It is easy to visualise that settlement

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contemplated by  Section 12(3)  necessarily means  a written settlement which would be based on a written agreement where signatories  to   such  settlement   sign   the   agreement. Therefore,   settlement    under   Section    12(3)   during conciliation   proceedings   and   all   other   settlements contemplated   by    Section   2(p)   outside   conciliation proceedings must  be based  on written  agreements.  Written agreements would  become settlements contemplated by Section 2(p) read  with section  12(3) of  the Act  when arrived  at during conciliation proceedings or even outside conciliation proceedings.   Thus,   written   agreements   would   become settlements  after   relevant  procedural   provisions   for arriving  at   such  settlements  are  followed.  Thus,  all settlements necessarily  are  based  on  written  agreements between  the   parties.  It  is  impossible  to  accept  the submissions of  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  that settlements  between   the  parties   are   different   from agreements between  the parties. It is trite to observe that all settlements  must be  based on  written  agreements  and such written  agreements get embeded in settlements. But all agreements may  not  necessarily  be  settlements  till  the aforesaid procedure  giving the  status of  such settlements gets followed.  In other words, under the scheme of the Act, all settlements  are necessarily  to be  treated as  binding agreements between the parties but all agreements may not be settlements so  as to  have binding effect as provided under Section 18(1)  or (3)  if the necessary procedure for giving them such  status is  not followed  in given  cases. On  the aforesaid scheme of the Act, therefore, it must be held that the settlement  arrived Respondent  No.1 - Management on the one hand  and the  four out  of 5  unions of  workmen on the other, had  a binding  effect under Section 18(3) of the Act not only  on the members of the signatory unions but also on the remaining  workmen who  were represented  by  the  fifth union  which,  though  having  taken  part  in  conciliation proceedings, refused to sign the settlement. It is axiomatic that if  such settlement  arrived at during the conciliation proceedings is  binding to  even future workmen as laid down by Section  18(3) (d),  it would  ipso facto  bind  all  the existing workmen  who are  all  parties  to  the  industrial dispute and  who may  not  be  members  of  union  that  are signatories to such settlement  12(3) of the Act.      It has  to be kept in view that the Act is based on the principle of  collective bargaining for resolving industrial disputes  and   for  maintaining   industrial  peace.   Thus principles of  industrial democracy  is the  bed-rock of the Act. The  employer or  a class  of employers on the one hand and the  accredited representatives  of the  workmen on  the other  are   expected  to  resolve  the  industrial  dispute amicably as  for as possible by entering into the settlement outside the  conciliation proceedings of if no settlement is reached and  the dispute  reaches  conciliator  even  during conciliation proceedings.  In all these negotiation based on collective bargaining individual workman necessarily recedes in background.  The reins  of bargaining  on his  behalf  is handed over  to the  union representing  such  workmen.  The unions espouse  the common  cause on  behalf  of  all  their members. Consequently,  settlement arrived  at b  them  with management would  bind at  least their  members and  if such settlement is arrived at during conciliation proceedings, it would bind  even non-members.  Thus settlements are the live wires under  the  Act  for  ensuring  industrial  peace  and prosperity.  Section   10(2)  of  the  Act  highlights  this position  by   providing  that   where  the  parties  to  an industrial dispute  apply in  the prescribed manner, whether

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jointly or  separately, for  a reference of the dispute to a Board, Court,  Labour Court,  Tribunal or National Tribunal, the appropriate  Government, if  satisfied that  the persons applying represent  the majority  of each  party, shall make the reference accordingly. Individual workman comes into the picture  only   in  connection   with  a  limited  class  of industrial disputes  as indicated  by Section  2A of the Act dealing  with   discharges,  dismissals,   retrenchments  or otherwise termination  of services of an individual workman. Save and  except the  aforesaid class  of disputes, which an individual workman  can  rest  of  the  industrial  disputes including disputes  pertaining to  illegal lock out, lay-off and lay-off  compensation have  to be  filtered through  the process of  collective barganing  and they  are disputes  of general nature  or class disputes wherein individual workman by himself  has no say. In this connection, it is profitable to keep  in view  a decision  of three-member  Bench of this Court in  the case  of Ram  Prasad Vishwakarma  vs. Chairman Industrial Tribunal, Patna & Ors. [AIR 1961 SC 857] where in Das Gupta,  J, speaking  for this  Court made  the following pertinent observations on the scheme of the Act, at the time when Section 2A was not on the statute book :-      "It is  now  well  settled  that  a      dispute   between   an   individual      workman and  an employer  cannot be      an industrial dispute as defined in      section  2(k)   of  the  Industrial      Disputes Act  unless it is taken up      by a  Union of  the workmen or by a      considerable number  of workmen. In      Central Provinces Transport Service      Ltd. vs.  Raghunath Gopal, 1956 SCR      956 :  (S) AIR  1957 SC  104),  Mr.      Justice Venkatarama  Ayyar speaking      for the  Court  pointed  out  after      considering  numerous  decision  in      this matter  that the preponderance      of judicial  opinion was clearly in      favour of  the view  that a dispute      between an  employer and  a  single      employee  cannot   per  se   be  an      industrial  dispute   but  it   may      become one  if it  is taken up by a      union of a number of workmen.      "Notwithstanding that  the language      of Section  2(k) it  wide enough to      cover disputes  between an employer      and a  single  employee".  observed      the learned  Judge, "the  scheme of      the Industrial  Disputes  Act  does      appear  to   contemplate  that  the      machinery provided  therein  should      be set  in motion  to  settle  only      disputes which  involve the  rights      of workmen  as a  class and  that a      dispute  touching   the  individual      rights  of   a  workman   was   not      intended  to   be  the  subject  of      adjudication under  the  Act,  when      the same  had not  been taken up by      the Union or a number of workmen"      This view which has been reaffirmed      by  the   Court  in  several  later      decision   recognises   the   great      importance  in   modern  industrial

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    life   of   collective   bargaining      between   the   workmen   and   the      employers. It  is  well  known  how      before  the   days  of   collective      bargaining labour  was at  a  great      disadvantage      in      obtaining      reasonable terms  for contracts  of      several from his employer. As trade      unions developed in the country and      collective  bargaining  became  the      rule   the   employers   found   it      necessary and  convenient  to  deal      with   the    representatives    of      workmen,  instead   of   individual      workman, not only for the making or      modification of  contracts  but  in      the matter  of taking  disciplinary      action against  one or more workmen      and as regards all other disputes.      The necessary  corollary to this is      that the  individual workman  is at      no stage  a party to the industrial      dispute independently of the Union.      The Union or those workmen who have      by  their   sponsoring  turned  the      Individual    dispute    into    an      industrial dispute,  can  therefore      claim to  have a say in the conduct      of  the   proceedings  before   the      Tribunal.      It is  not  unreasonable  to  think      that Section  36 of  the Industrial      Disputes   Act    recognises   this      position,  by  providing  that  the      workman who is a party to a dispute      shall be entitled to be represented      by an officer of a registered trade      union   of    which   he    is    a      member........"      Consequently, the  provisions contained  in  the  first proviso to  Section 35C  of the  Act would  also necessarily require an  agreement to  be entered  into on  behalf of the affected   class    of   workmen    by   their    accredited representatives being  office bearers  of their union. It is easy to  visualise that when lay-off has been imposed by the management in an establishment or in any department thereof, there entire  body  of  workmen  working  therein  would  be affected  by   lay-off.  Therefore,   their   grievance   in connection  with  lay-off  compensation  pertaining  to  the period of  lay-off would  not be  necessarily an  individual grievance but  would be grievance of the class of workmen as a whole  affected by  such lay-off.  If there  is a  binding settlement embodying  an agreement  on behalf  of a class of workmen through  their  union  in  connection  with  lay-off compensation it  would  obviously  be  binding  on  all  the members of  the  union  and  if  such  settlement  based  on agreement is  arrived at  during conciliation proceedings it would be  binding to  the entire class of workmen covered by the industrial  dispute regarding  lay-off compensation. The Individual  dispute   regarding  lay-off  compensation.  The individual workman can raise his grievance under Section 25C only if  his statutory right of lay-off under Section 25C is not hedged  on by any binding effect of an agreement entered into by  its own  union with  the management,  whether in or outside conciliation  proceedings or  even by  other  unions

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that  may  arrive  such  settlement  during  the  course  of conciliation proceedings.  Then only  individual workman can have full  play under  Section 25C for vindicating his right of lay-off compensation.      In Barauni  Refinery Paragatisheel Shramik Parishad vs. Indian Oil  Corporation Ltd.  & Ors.  [AIR  1990  SC  1801], Ahmadi, J.  as he  ten was,  speaking for  a  Bench  of  two learned Judges of this Court had an occasion to consider the binding effect  of  such  a  settlement  arrived  at  during conciliation proceedings  in the  light of Section 18 of the Act.  The   following  pertinent   observations,   in   this connection, were made :      " A  settlement arrived  at in  the      course of  conciliation proceedings      with a  recognised  majority  union      will be  binding on  all workmen of      the establishment,  even those  who      belonging  to  the  minority  union      which had  objected to the same. To      that extent  it  departs  from  the      ordinary  law   of  contract.   The      object obviously  is to up-hold the      sanctity  of   settlements  reached      with the  active assistance  of the      Conciliation   Officer    and    to      discourage an  individual  employee      or a  minority union from scuttling      the   settlement.   There   is   an      underlying   assumption    that   a      settlement reached with the held of      the Conciliation  Officer  must  be      fair  and   reasonable   and   can,      therefore, safety  be made  binding      not only  on the  workmen belonging      to the union signing the settlement      but also  on others.  That is why a      settlement arrived at in the course      of conciliation  proceedings is put      on part  with an  award made  by an      adjudicatory authority."      In this  light we  have now  to  examine  the  relevant provisions of  the Act dealing with lay-off and compensation to be  paid to  workmen for lay-off. Section 25C is found in Chapter  VA   of  the  Act  which  deals  with  lay-off  and retrenchment. We  are concerned  with lay-off in the present case. Section  25C deals with statutory right of the workmen laid off  for compensation.  Sub-section (1)  of Section 25C with the first proviso reads as under :-      "25C. Right of workmen laid off for      compensation.  -   (1)  Whenever  a      workman (other than a badll workman      or a  casual workman) whose name is      borne on  the  muster-rolls  of  an      industrial  establishment  and  who      has completed  not  less  than  one      year of continuous service under an      employer  is   laid  off,   whether      continuously or  intermittently, he      shall be  paid by  the employer for      all days  during which  he is  laid      off,  except   for   which   weekly      holidays    as    may    intervene,      compensation which  shall be  equal      to fifty  per cent of the  total of      the  basic   wages   and   dearness

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    allowance  that   would  have  been      payable to  him had  he not been so      laid off:      Provided that  if during any period      of twelve  months, a  workman is so      laid off  for more  than forty-five      days, no such compensation shall be      payable in respect of any period of      the lay-off after the expiry of the      first forty-five  days, if there is      an agreement to that effect between      the workman and the employer."      It is  of course  true that  sub-section (1) of Section 25C lays  down that  if there  is a legal lay-off imposed by the employer, the permanent workman covered by sweep of sub- section (1)  of Section  25C would be entitled to be paid by way of  lay-off compensation  50% of  the  total  wages  and dearness allowances  during the  relevant period of lay-off. However, because  of the  first proviso to the said section, the right of the workman to be paid 50% lay-off compensation during the relevant period of lay-off would be curtailed and restricted to  45 days only if there is an agreement to that effect between the workman and the employer. The question is whether there  was such  an agreement between the appellants and  the   employer.  Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants submitted that  for attracting  the first proviso to Section 25C(1), there  should be  independent agreement  between the workman and  the employer  to that  effect agreeing  not  be demand lay-off  compensation beyond  45 days of the starting of the  lay-off period.  It is  difficult to appreciate this contention. An  agreement restricting  the claim  of lay-off compensation beyond  the available  period of 45 days can be said to  be arrived  at between  the workmen on the one hand and the  employer on the other as there is such an agreement embedded in a binding settlement which has a legal effect of binding all  the workmen  in the  institution as per Section 18(3) of  the Act.  Such building  effect  of  the  embedded agreement in  the written  settlement arrived  at during the conciliation proceeding  would get telescoped into the first proviso to  Section 25C(1)  and bind all workmen even though individually they  might not  have signed the agreement with the management  or their  union might  to have  signed  such agreement with  the management  on  behalf  of  its  member- workmen. The  first proviso  to Section  25C(1) clearly lays down that  if there is an agreement for into paying any more lay-off compensation  beyond 45 days between the workman and the employer,  such an  agreement has binding effect both on the employer  and the  workman concerned. Such binding force gets clearly  attracted in  the case  of the  appellants  by virtue of operation of Section 12(3) read with Section 18 of the Act  emanating from the settlement arrived at during the conciliation  proceedings  as  aforesaid.  Learned  counsel, however, strongly  relied upon  Section 25J  of the  Act for isolating the  effect of  Section 18(3) in the present case, Section 25J reads as under :-      "25J. Effect  of laws  inconsistent      with  this   Chapter.  -   (1)  The      provisions of  this  Chapter  shall      have     effect     notwithstanding      anything   inconsistent   therewith      contained   in    any   other   law      (including  standing   orders  made      under  the   Industrial  Employment      (Standing Orders) Act, 1946) (20 of      1946) :

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    Provided  that   where  under   the      provisions  of  any  other  Act  of      rules,  orders   or   notifications      issued  thereunder   or  under  any      standing orders or under any award,      contract of service or otherwise, a      workmen is  entitled to benefits in      respect of  any matter  to benefits      in respect  of any matter which are      more favourable  to him  than those      to which he would be entitled under      this   Act;   the   workman   shall      continue to be entitled to the more      favourable benefits  in respect  of      that matter,  notwithstanding  that      he receives  benefits in respect of      other matters under this Act.      (2) For  the removal  of doubts, it      is  hereby  declared  that  nothing      contained in  this Chapter shall be      deemed to  affect the provisions of      any other law for the time being in      force in  any State  in so  far  as      that   law    provides   for    the      Settlement of  industrial disputes,      but the  rights and  liabilities of      employers and  workmen in so far as      they  relate   to  lay-off      and      retrenchment shall be determined in      accordance with  the provisions  of      this Chapter."      It is  difficult to appreciate how the said proviso can be of  any assistance  to the appellants. All that is stated is that anything inconsistent with the provisions of Chapter VA found  to have  been laid down by any other law including standing orders  etc. will  have no effect. Even sub-section (2) of  Section 25J   is  to  the  same  effect.  Therefore, Section 25J  overrides any  inconsistent  provision  of  any other law or otherwise binding rule of conduct and makes the provisions  of  Chapter  VA  operative  of  their  own.  The submission of  learned counsel  for the  appellants in  this connection was  to  the  effect  that  "any  other  law"  as provided in Section 25J(1) would include even the Industrial Disputes Act,  specially the  provision contained in Section 18 thereof.  It  is  difficult  to  agree.  Section  nowhere provides that the provisions of Chapter VA shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other chapter of  the Industrial  Disputes Act  as well  as in any other law.  Such a  provisions is  conspicuously  absent  in Section 25J  (1). If  submission of  learned counsel for the appellants is  accepted, Section  25J(1) will have to be re- written by  introducing the additional words therein "in any other part of this  Act or" before the words "any other law" as mentioned  therein. On  the express  language of the said provision, therefore,  such an  exercise is contra-indicated is total impermissible.      In fact,  this Court  in Krishna  District Co-operative Marketing Society  Ltd. vs.  N.V. Purnachandra  Rao  &  Ors. [1987 (4) SCC 9 99 (at 111)] pointed out that the purpose of Section 25J(2)  in Chapter V of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 was  to give  overriding effect  to  the  provisions  of retrenchment  and   lay-off  in   Chapter  VA  over  cognate provisions of  State laws dealing with retrenchment and lay- off. In  the above  case Venkataramiah, J., (as he then was) observed :-

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    "By   enacting    Section   25J(2),      Parliament, perhaps  intended  that      the rights  and liabilities arising      out  of  lay-off  and  retrenchment      should be  uniform throughout India      where the  Central Act was in force      and did  not wish  that the  States      should   have    their   own   laws      inconsistent with the Central law."      The above  passage also  shows that  Chapter V  was not intended  to  override  any  provisions  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 itself.      Once Section  25J(1) is  out of  the  picture,  Section 25C(1) will  have to  be read  with the  proviso and  once a settlement  is   arrived  at   between  the  parties  during conciliation proceedings  as laid  down by Section 18(3) the binding effect  of such  settlement gets  visited on all the workmen, as  seen earlier. Consequently the appellants would remain bound  by the settlement which would be treated as an agreement binding  on  them  as  contemplated  by  the  said proviso. Once  that conclusion is reached no fault can found with the High Court taking the view on the scheme of the Act that additional  benefit which  the appellants claimed under the settlement  arrived at  under Section  12(3)  read  with Section 18  of the  Act could  not be computed under Section 33C(2) of  the Act  and  such  application  was,  therefore, rightly held incompetent.      It is  now time  for us  to refer  to some decisions of this Court to which our attention was invited.      This  Court  speaking  through  Untwalia,  J.  held  in Workmen of  Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd.. Etc. vs.  The Firestone  Tyre and  Rubber Co etc., (1976 (1) L.L.J. 493)  that Chapter  VA of the Act was a complete code and if  the workmen  are found  to have  been laid  off, the benefit of  the said  provision  can  be  attracted.  It  is difficult to  appreciate how  this decision  can be  of  any assistance to  the counsel  for the  appellants  as  in  the aforesaid  case   there  was  no  question  of  any  binding settlement between  the parties which had tried to which did tried  to  whittle  down  the  statutory  right  of  lay-off compensation as  per the first proviso to Section 25C of the Act.      In R.B.  Bansilal Abirchand  Mills  Co.  Ltd.  vs.  The Labour Court.  Nagpur &  Ors. [(1972)  1 SCC 154] this Court was concerned  with a  question  whether  application  under Section 33C(2)  could be  filled by co-employees who claimed benefit  under   Section  25C   of  the   Act  for   lay-off compensation even  though those  workmen had  not filed such application   earlier.  Even  in  that  case  there  was  no question of  any binding  effect  of  any  settlement  under Section 12(3) read with Section 18(3) of the Act.      In  Workmen   of  Dewan  Tea  Estate  &  Ors.  vs.  The Management [(1964)  5 SCR 548] this Court was concerned with the question  whether lay-off  compensation could be claimed by the  workmen under section 25C even though such claim was not covered  by the  standing orders.  It was  held that the lay-off compensation  would be permissible only where one or the other  of the  factors mentioned  by Section  2(kkk)  is present, and  for  such  a  lay-off  compensation  would  be permissible only  where one  or the  other  of  the  factors mentioned by Section 2(kkkk) is present, and for such a lay- off, compensation  could be  awarded under Section 25C. Even in this  case the question of binding effect of a settlement arrived at  during conciliation  proceedings and curtailment of right  of workmen laid-off for compensation under Section

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25C of the Act was not on the anvil of scrutiny.      In the  Cachar Chah Sramik Union Silchar, Assam vs. The Management of the Tea Estate of Cachar, Assam [(1966 (2) SCR 344] it  was held that even though the management might have given ex-gratia  compensation to  the workmen  laid-off they were entitled  to claim  lay-off compensation as per the Act and as  per the  relevant  standing  Orders.  The  aforesaid decision cannot  advance the case of the appellants as there was no  question of  any binding  effect of  any  settlement arrived at  between the parties which would govern the claim of all  the workmen  even though  their union might not have been  signatory   to  such  settlement  during  conciliation proceedings.      In the  result this  appeal fails  and is dismissed. In the facts  and circumstances  of the  case, there  will e no order as to costs.