09 May 1996
Supreme Court
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P.S. RAJYA Vs STATE OF BIHAR

Bench: VENKATASWAMI K. (J)
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000434-000434 / 1996
Diary number: 89365 / 1993


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PETITIONER: P.S.RAJYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/05/1996

BENCH: VENKATASWAMI K. (J) BENCH: VENKATASWAMI K. (J) ANAND, A.S. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (6)   480        1996 SCALE  (4)344

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R K. VENKATASWAMI, J.      Heard learned counsel for the parties.      The appeal  was allowed  with costs  by our Order dated 27.3.1996 reserving  the reasons  to be given later. Now the reasons are given.      The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal  is  whether  the  respondent  is  justified  in pursuing the prosecution against the appellant under section 5(2)  read   with  section  5(1)(e)  of  the  Prevention  of Corruption Act  1947 notwithstanding  the fact  that  on  an identical  charge   the  appellant  was  exonerated  in  the departmental proceedings  in the light of a report submitted by the  Central Vigilance  Commission and  concurred by  the Union Public Service Commission.      Short facts are as under :      The appellant  started his  career in  a college in the year 1955  and switched  over to TISCO in the year 1959 till he was selected and appointed as Inspector in the Income Tax Service in  the year  1961. The  appellant’s wife was also a teacher in  the Central School at Bokaro Steel City. She was allotted on long lease a plot at Bokaro in the year 1980 for a sum  of Rs.  20,000/- by  the  Steel  Authority  of  India Limited (for  short "SAIL").  As per  terms  and  conditions imposed by  SAIL, shops in the ground floor and residence at first floor  were constructed  by  the  appellant  with  his earnings  as   well  as   the  earnings  of  his  wife.  The construction was  strictly under  the supervision and on the drawings  supplied   freely  by   SAIL  township  authority. Subsequently  the  building  was  valued  by  SAIL  township engineer at Rs.4.75 lakhs.      The appellant  in the  meanwhile got  promotion and was functioning as  Income-tax Officer A-Ward, Dhanbad from 1981 to 1985.  It appears  that in the course of discharge of his duties, he  impounded  the  books  of  accounts  of  certain business people  who seemed  to have complained to the local

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Congress  Party  M.P.  who  in  turn  complained  about  the appellant to  the Minister  of Finance  with  a  request  to transfer the  appellant and  to order  for  a  CBI  inquiry. Accordingly,  an   FIR  was   lodged  on  9.4.1986  and  the appellant’s residence  and office  were raided  on  11.4.86. However, nothing  worth mentioning  was found.  Ultimately a charge-sheet was  filed on 31.7.89 showing the assets of the appellant consisting of cash, immovable property (house) and jewellery as follows :      i) Building at Bokaro                Rs. 7,69,300.00      ii) NSCs                             Rs.   82,500.00      iii) Bank balance                    Rs.    1,584.91      iv) Household articles               Rs. 1,34,709.00                                          __________________                                Total      Rs. 9,88,093.91                                          ------------------      As against  this the  estimated savings  for the  check period (1973 to March 1986) was arrived at in the sum of Rs. 6,30,000/- and  on that basis it was alleged that the assets were disproportionate to the extent of Rs. 3,57,439.00.      The appellant aggrieved by the above charge being taken cognizance of  by the  Special Judge  challenged the same by moving the  Patna High  Court under  section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court  by order  dated 3.8*90  allowed the petition and remitted the matter back to, the Special Judge directing him to get  a preliminary  enquiry conducted by higher authority of the  appellant or  do it himself before taking cognizance of the matter.      It is  the grievance  of  the  appellant  that  without strictly complying  with the  remit order of the High Court, the Special  Judge took  cognizance of the matter and wanted to proceed  further. Aggrieved  by that  the appellant again moved the  Patna High  Court under  section 482  Cr.P.C. for quashing the  cognizance of  charge as mentioned above. This time the  High Court dismissed the petition holding that the issues raised  before it  have to  be gone into in the final proceedings and  those cannot  be raised  at the preliminary stage.      The appellant  aggrieved by the Order of the High Court has filed the above appeal by Special Leave.      It may  not be  quite out  of place just to mention how the appellant  was persecuted, if we may use that expression on the facts of this case.      On the  basis of  the FIR  and consequential  raid  the appellant  was  placed  under  suspension  on  24.11.86.  No progress was  shown nearly  for two  years which obliged the appellant  to  move  the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal, Calcutta ("CAT"  for short). On 1.6.88 the Tribunal directed the Government  to complete  the investigation  within three months failing  which the fresh consideration. The appellant again moved  the Central  Administrative Tribunal, Patna for promotion and  other reliefs  which  in  turn  directed  the revocation of  the order  of suspension  and also to release all increments  from 1987  onwards and  for opening  of  the sealed cover  in which  the appellant’s  promotion order had been placed  by the  Department. That  order of  the CAT was challenged by  the Department  in this  Court and this Court dismissed  the   Special   Leave   Petition   on   14.10.91. Simultaneously  the   appellant  was  given  a  departmental charge-sheet containing identical charges. For more than two years no  progress was  made by the Department as no Inquiry Officer was  appointed. Again,  the appellant  was forced to move the  CAT, Patna  for quashing  the departmental charge- sheet. A  direction was given by the CAT, Patna on 22.2.1993 to complete  the  departmental  enquiry  by  15.5.1995.  The

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departmental enquiry  was  conducted  by  Central  Vigilance Commission and  the Central  Vigilance  Commission  after  a detailed  enquiry   submitted  a   report  exonerating   the appellant of  all the  charges. The Department forwarded the report of  the Central  Vigilance Commission for the opinion of the  Union Public  Service Commission.  By a long report, the Union  Public  Service  Commission  concurred  with  the conclusion of  exonerating the appellant of all the charges. Accepting the report of the Union Public Service Commission, the President  order of suspension would automatically stand revoked. Since the CBI did not complete the investigation as directed by CAT, the suspension stood automatically revoked. Thereafter the  CBI got the appellant’s house inspected by a team of  three C.P.W.D.  engineers on  27.9.88 on which date the appellant and his family members were away and the house was  locked.  The  appellant  was  forced  to  move  Central Administrative Tribunal,  Patna for  getting his promotional order and in that course the Tribunal passed some strictures against the  authorities. At  last the  CBI filed  a charge- sheet on  31.7.89 and  the main  basis for this charge-sheet was the  valuation of  the appellant’s house at Bokaro which the CBI  fixed at  Rs. 7,69,300.00  as against  the  earlier valuation by the Income-tax Department at Rs. 4.67 lakhs.      We may  also mention  that the only ground on which the arguments were addressed both by the learned counsel for the appellant and  the learned  Sr. counsel  for the  respondent centered round  the  valuation  fixed  by  the  CBI  to  the appellant’s house at Bokaro.      Soon after  the Special  Judge took  cognizance of  the charge, the  appellant was  again placed under suspension on 31.5.90. As mentioned above by order dated 3.8.90 High Court of Patna  quashed the  cognizance taken by the Special Judge and  remitted   the  matter  for  fresh  consideration.  The appellant again  moved the  Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna for promotion and other reliefs which in turn directed the revocation  of the  order  of  suspension  and  also  to release all  increments from 1987 onwards and for opening of the sealed  cover in  which the  appellant’s promotion order had been placed by the Department. That order of the CAT was challenged by  the Department  in this  Court and this Court dismissed  the   Special   Leave   Petition   on   14.10.91. Simultaneously  the   appellant  was  given  a  departmental charge-sheet containing identical charges. For more than two years no  progress was  made by the Department as no Inquiry Officer was  appointed. Again,  the appellant  was forced to move the  CAT, Patna  for quashing  the departmental charge- sheet. A  direction was given by the CAT, Patna on 22.2.1993 to complete  the  departmental  enquiry  by  15.5.1995.  The departmental enquiry  was  conducted  by  Central  Vigilance Commission and  the Central  Vigilance  Commission  after  a detailed  enquiry   submitted  a   report  exonerating   the appellant of  all the  charges. The Department forwarded the report of  the Central  Vigilance Commission for the opinion of the  Union Public  Service Commission.  By a long report, the Union  Public  Service  Commission  concurred  with  the conclusion of  exonerating the appellant of all the charges. Accepting the report of the Union Public Service Commission, the President  passed the  final orders  in  favour  of  the appellant. In  spite  of  that  we  are  informed  that  the appellant has not got the full retrial benefits.      Now reverting  to the  merits of  the case  it  is  the contention of  the learned counsel for the appellant that in view  of   the  clear   reports  of  the  Central  Vigilance Commission  and   the  Union   Public   Service   Commission concerning   identical   departmental   charge,   there   is

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absolutely nothing  for the  prosecution to proceed further. He also  submitted that notwithstanding the direction of the High Court  to the  Special  Judge  to  hold  a  preliminary enquiry before  taking cognizance of the charge sheet either by himself  or through  higher authorities of the appellant, the learned  Special Judge  has taken  cognizance once again without holding  any  preliminary  enquiry.  Therefore,  the order of  the Special Judge taking cognizance of the charge- sheet confirmed  by the  High Court  cannot be sustained. On this point he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in the case  of P.Siraiuddin  vs. State  of  Madras  [1970  (3) S.C.R. 931]. According to Mr. Prashant Bhushan the result of departmental enquiry  must be  taken as  preliminary enquiry and in view of the exoneration order, further proceedings in criminal  charge  should  be  dropped.  It  is  the  further submission of  the learned  counsel, for  the appellant that the very same engineers who have given the report earlier to the Income-tax  Department now  at the  instance of the CBI, presumably on  pressure, have  given different valuation and here  again  there  are  over-writings  and  alterations  in several places. According to the learned counsel the Central Vigilance Commission  has dealt  with  this  aspect  in  its report elaborately  and ultimately came to a conclusion that the  subsequent   valuation  reports  on  which  CBI  placed reliance are  of doubtful nature. The same view was taken by the Union  Public Service  Commission.  Even  otherwise  the value given  as basis  for the charge-sheet is not the value given in the report subsequently given by the valuers.      Mr. Malhotra,  learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent, contended  that both  the learned  Special Judge and the learned Single Judge of the High Court have not shut out the  appellant from  establishing his  case in the final hearing  and   the  points  now  raised  can  very  well  be established by  giving evidence  at the appropriate time and there is  no case  made out  for quashing the charge itself. According  to   the  learned   counsel  notwithstanding  the findings rendered under the departmental enquiry, the CBI is entitled to  proceed on  the basis of the material available and the mere allegation that the reports regarding the value of the  building was  of doubtful  nature will  not take the place of  proof and that has to be gone into and established in the  final hearing after taking evidence of the concerned valuers. He,  therefore, supported the orders of the learned Special Judge and the learned Single Judge of the High Court      At the outset we may point out that the learned counsel for the  respondent could  not but  accept the position that the standard  of proof  required to establish the guilt in a criminal case  is far  higher than  the  standard  of  proof required  to   establish  the   guilt  in  the  departmental proceedings. He  also accepted that in the present case, the charge in  the departmental  proceedings and in the criminal proceedings is  one and  the same.  He did  not dispute  the findings rendered  in the  departmental proceedings  and the ultimate result  of it.  On these  premises, if  we  proceed further then there is no difficulty in accepting the case of the appellant.  For if  the charge  which is identical could not be established in a departmental proceedings and in view of the  admitted discrepancies  in the  reports submitted by the valuers  one wonders  what is  there further  to proceed against the  appellant  in  criminal  proceedings.  In  this context, we  can usefully  extract certain relevant portions from the  report of the Central Vigilance Commission on this aspect.      "Neither the  prosecution  nor  the      defence has  produced the author of

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    various  reports   to  confirm  the      valuation. The  documents cited  in      the list  of documents  is a report      signed  by   two  engineers  namely      S/Sh. S.N.Jha  and  D.N.  Mukherjee      whereas  the  document  brought  on      record (Ex.  S-20) has  been signed      by three  engineers. There  is also      difference in  the estimated  value      of the property in the statement of      imputation  and   the  report.  The      document at Ex.S-20 has been signed      by three engineers and the property      has been  valued at  Rs. 4,85,000/-      for  the   ground  floor   and  Rs.      2,55,600/- for  the second floor. A      total    of     this    comes    to      Rs.7,40,900/-  which   is   totally      different from  the figure  of  Rs.      7,69,800/-indicated     in      the      statement of  imputation.  None  of      the  engineers   who  prepared  the      valuation report  though  cited  as      prosecution   witnesses    appeared      during the  course of enquiry. This      supports the  defence argument that      the authenticity  of this  document      is in  serious doubts. It is a fact      that the Income Tax Authorities got      this property  evaluated by  S/Sh.S      N.Jha and  Vasudev and  as per this      report  at  pages  50  to  63  they      estimated  the   property  at   Rs.      4,57,600/- including  the  cost  of      land Rs.  1,82,000/- for ground and      manezaine floor plus Rs. 2,55,600/-      for first  floor and  Rs.  20,000/-      for cost  of land).  Thus both  the      engineers    who    prepared    the      valuation  report  for  income  tax      purposes also  prepared the  report      for  the   CBI  and   there  is  no      indication in the subsequent report      as to  why there is a difference in      the  value   of  the   property.  A      perusal  of   these   two   reports      reveals that there is difference in      the specification  of the work. The      valuation report  prepared  by  Sh.      S.N.Jha for ground floor for income      tax purposes  clearly  states  that      the  structure   was  having   "RCC      Pillars at  places, brick  work  in      cement mortar,  RCC lintal,  60  cm      walls, 9  inch floor  neight, 17.6,      8.00, 8.00  inch" but in the report      for CBI  which was also prepared by      him the  description is "RCC framed      structure open  warandah  on  three      sides   in    the   ground   floor.      Similarly, for  the first  floor it      is written in the report as "partly      framed structure  and  partly  load      being walls, floor heights 3.20 mm.      Further Sh.  S.N.Jha on  page 54 of

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    Ex. D1  had adopted  a rate  of Rs.      290 per  sq. mtr  for ground  floor      and adding  for extra height he had      estimated  ground  floor  including      mezaine floor at Rs.2,02,600/-. But      for the  report at Ex.S-20 the rate      has been  raised to 365 per sq.mtr.      There is  no explanation  for  this      increase of rate by Rs. 75 per mtr.      It is  also observed  that for  the      updating of  the cost  of index 5-%      was added  to the  rate of Rs. 290/      as per  page 55  of Ex.  D-1 by Sh.      S.N. Jha  but this  has been raised      to 97%  as an  esclanation  to  the      cost of  index in  Ex.S-20  without      explaining or  giving  the  reasons      therefore. It  is  surprising  that      same set  of engineers have adopted      different standard  for  evaluating      the  same   property  at  different      occasions. Obviously, either of the      report is  false and it was for the      prosecution to suitably explain it.      In  the  absence  of  it  the  only      inference  to   be  drawn  is  that      report at Ex-S-20 is not authentic.      Since the  same  set  of  engineers      have done  the  evaluation  earlier      and if  subsequently they felt that      there was some error in the earlier      report, they  should have explained      detailed  reasons   either  in  the      report itself  or during the course      of enquiry.  Therefore, Ex.S-20  is      not reliable.      20. Moreover  a perusal of Ex. S-20      reveals that Sh. Vasudev, Executive      Engineer has  recorded  a  note  as      follows :           "Hence the  valuation  of  Sh.      S.N.Jha was never superceded by any      other estimates.  As  is  confirmed      from  the  records,  his  estimated      figures were  only accounted for by      the ITO Bokaro".           Thus according to Sh. Vadusev,      who was  the senior-most  among the      three CPWD  engineers who  prepared      Ex.S-20, the  valuation  of  ground      floor remains at Rs.1,82,600/- plus      Rs.20,000/- for  the cost  of land.      The first  floor as per Ex.S-20 was      estimated at  Rs. 2,55,600/-  and a      total of  all  this  comes  to  Rs.      4,57,600/- which  is very nearer to      the declaration  of actuals  to the      income tax  authority and  also the      estimated cost  by the Bokaro Steel      Township  Engineer  and  the  Govt.      approved valuer.      21. It  is  clear  from  the  above      discussions   that    though    the      document cited in Annexure III is a      joint report  of two engineers what

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    has been  brought on  record  is  a      document signed  by three engineers      the same set of engineers evaluated      the   property   for   income   tax      purposes  and   there  is   a  vast      difference  in  the  specifications      and   the    rates   adopted    for      calculating  the  cost  in  Ex.S-20      have  been  increased  without  any      explanation  and   none  of   these      engineers were  produced during the      course of  enquiry to  clarify  the      position. Hence the authenticity of      Ex. S-20  is doubtful as claimed by      the defence.      22. It  needs to  be mentioned that      the report at Ex.S-20 has evaluated      the ground  floor at Rs. 4,85,300/-      and a  note to  the effect that 10%      should   be    allowed   for   self      supervision  and   procurement   of      material has  also been recorded at      the end.  On  this  basis  the  net      value of  ground floor comes to Rs.      4,36,810/-    (Rs.    4,85,344    -      Rs.48,534).  The  first  floor  has      been evaluated  at  Rs.  2,55,600/-      after allowing  the  allowance  for      self supervision  and  a  total  of      both  items   would  come   to  Rs.      6,62,410/-. Thus,  even the  report      at ex.  S-20 does  not support  the      prosecution case  that as  per  the      report  of   CPWD   Engineers   the      property   is    valued   at    Rs.      7,69,800/-.   As    the    property      assessed   by    the   income   tax      authority for  Rs. 4.67  lakhs  and      even the  valuation  given  by  the      Bokaro Steel  Township Engineer and      the Govt.  approved valuer are very      nearer   to    this   figure,   the      reasonable value  of this  property      could only  be taken  as 4.75 lakhs      assessed  by  the  Bokaro  Township      Engineer   on   detailed   estimate      basis."      It may  not be  out of  place to extract a portion from the order  exonerating the  appellant from the charge framed in the departmental proeedings. It reads as follows :      "The   Commission   after   careful      consideration  of   the  facts  and      records of  the case,  have advised      that the  savings of the applicant,      Shri P.S. Rajya, were more than the      assets   acquired   by   him   and,      therefore,    the     charge     of      acquisition        of        assets      disproprotionate to income does not      stand proved.  A copy of the advice      of the  Commissioner  is  enclosed.      The Commission  have  also  advised      that the  ends of  justice would be      met  by   exonerating  the  charged      Officer, Shri P.S. Rajya.

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    The  President  has  given  careful      consideration  to   the  facts  and      records of  the case  and advice of      the UPSC. The President has come to      the conclusion  that the  advice of      the  UPSC   be  acepted.   It   is,      therefore, held  that the  Articles      of charge framed against Shri Rajya      has not  been proved. The President      is, therefore, pleased to exonerate      Shri  Rajya,  AIT  (Retd.)  of  the      charges framed against him and drop      the proceedings  initiated  against      him."      We are inclined to think that the above extracts give a correct picture about the issue.      At the risk of repetition, we may state that the charge had not  been proved  and on  that basis  the appellant  was cleared of  departmental enquiry. In this connection, we may also usefully  cite a  decision of  this Court  in State  of Haryana and  Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others (1992 Supp.(1) SCC 335).  This Court  after considering  almost all earlier decisions has  given guidelines  relating to the exercise of the  extra   ordinary  power   under  Article   226  of  the Constitution or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of  Criminal procedure  for quashing  an  F.I.R.  or  a complaint. This Court observed as follows ;      "In    the    backdrop    of    the      interpretation   of   the   various      relevant  provisions  of  the  Code      under  Chapter   XIV  and   of  the      principles  of  law  enunciated  by      this Court in a series of decisions      relating to  the  exercise  of  the      extraordinary power  under  Article      226 or  the inherent  powers  under      Section 482  of the  Code which  we      have   extracted   and   reproduced      above,  we   give   the   following      categories  of   cases  by  way  of      illustration  wherein   such  power      could  be   exercised   either   to      prevent abuse of the process of any      court or  otherwise to  secure  the      ends of  justice, though it may not      be  possible   to  lay   down   any      precise,   clearly    defined   and      sufficiently    channelized     and      inflexible  guidelines   or   rigid      formulae and  to give an exhaustive      list  of   myriad  kinds  of  cases      wherein  such   power   should   be      exercised.      (1) Where  the allegations  made in      the first information report or the      complaint, even  if they  are taken      at their face value and accepted in      their entirety  do not  prime facie      constitute any  offence or make out      a case against the accused.      (2) Where  the  allegation  in  the      first information  report and other      materials, if any, accompanying the      FIR  donot  disclose  a  cognizable      offence,       justifying        an

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    investigation  by  police  officers      under Section  156(1)  of  the  ode      except  under   an   order   of   a      Magistrate within  the  purview  of      Section 155(2) of the ode.      (3)   Where    the   uncontroverted      allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or      complaint    and    the    evidence      collected in support of the same do      not disclose  the commission of any      offence and make out a case against      the accused.      (4) Where,  the allegations  in the      FIR do  not constitute a cognizable      offence but  constitute only a non-      ongnzable offence, no investigation      is permitted  by  a  magistrate  as      contemplated under  Section  155(2)      of the Code.      (5) Where  the allegations  made in      the FIR  or complaint are so absurd      and inherently  improbable  on  the      basis of  which no  prudent  person      can ever  reach a  just  conclusion      that there is sufficient ground for      proceeding against the accused.      (6) Where there is an express legal      bar  engrafted   in  any   of   the      provisions  of   the  Code  or  the      concerned  Act   (under   which   a      criminal proceeding  is instituted)      to the  institution and continuance      of  the  proceedings  and/or  where      there is  a specific  provision  in      the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act,      providing efficacious  redress  for      the  grievance   of  the  aggrieved      party.      (7) Where  a criminal proceeding is      manifestly attended  with mala fide      and/or  where   the  proceeding  is      maliciously  instituted   with   an      ulterior   motive    for   wreaking      vengeance on the accused and with a      view to spite him due to private an      personal grudge.           We also give a note of caution      to the  effect that  the  power  of      quashing  a   criminal   proceeding      should be  exercised very sparingly      and with  circumspection  and  that      too in  the rarest  of rare  cases;      that  the   court   will   not   be      justified  in   embarking  upon  an      enquiry as  to the  reliability  or      genuineness  or  otherwise  of  the      allegations made  in the FIR or the      complaint     and      that     the      extraordinary or inherent powers do      not    confer     an-     arbitrary      jurisdiction on  the court  to  act      according to its whim or caprice."      The present  case can  be brought  under more  than one head given above without any difficulty.      The above discussion is sufficient to allow this appeal

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on the facts of this case.      Even though all these facts including the Report of the Central Vigilance  Commission were  brought to the notice of the High  Court, unfortunately,  the High  Court took a view that the  issues raised  had to  be gone  into in  the final proceedings  and   the  Report   of  the  Central  Vigilance Commission, exonerating  the appellant of the same charge in departmental proceedings  would not  conclude  the  criminal case against  the appellant.  We have  already held that for the reasons  given, on  the peculiar facts of this case, the criminal proceedings  initiated against the appellant cannot be pursued.  Therefore, we  do not agree with the view taken by the High Court as stated above. These are the reasons for our order  dated  27.3.1996  for  allowing  the  appeal  and quashing  the   impugned  criminal  proceedings  and  giving consequential reliefs.      Before parting with the case, we cannot but express our anguish about  the way  in which  the C.B.I.  has  conducted itself in  this case. From the record it is seen that number of adjournments  were  taken  for  getting  instructions  to withdraw  the   prosecution.  After   taking  a   number  of adjournments, ultimately the Department decided to leave the matter to the court’s decision.      In this  connection, it  will be  useful to  set out  a portion from  the rejoinder affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant which reads as follows :      "It  seems,   however,   that   the      reluctance of  the Regional  C.B.I.      in dropping the proceedings against      the petitioner/stumps from the fact      that they  used to  forge the house      valuation report  as the sole basis      for charging  the  petitioner.  The      fact that  this report is forged is      abundantly clear from the facts and      circumstances  set   out   in   the      S.L.P.By this  report the  house of      the petitioner  was  sought  to  be      valued at Rs. 3 lakhs and odd above      the original  valuation by the same      Engineer which  was accepted by the      Income-tax  Department.   On   this      basis the  petitioner’s assets were      shown to be Rs. 3 lakhs and odd and      above as income.      The petitioner  has in fact filed a      complaint under Section 340 Cr.P.C.      for taking  ognizance  against  the      officer  concerned   for  using   a      forged  document  in  charging  the      petitioner. This  complaint of  the      petitioner is  pending  before  the      Special Judge  (CBI) Patna.  It  is      perhaps on  account of  the fear of      being  found   guilty  on   forgery      document that  the Regional  C.B.I.      Officers are  reluctant to withdraw      the charge  against the petitioner.      That is  why after  having a  short      adjournment  on  6  occasions  from      this  Court   to  enable   them  to      withdraw  the  proceedings  against      the  petitioner,   the  C.B.I.  has      changed its  stand and  even  their      Senior Counsel in his place."

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    We cannot  simply ignore  the above  extracts from  the rejoinder affidavit  in the  facts and  the circumstances of the case. To put it mildly we observe that we are not at all happy about the way in which the C.B.I. has conducted itself in this  case. We are sure that the department will not give room for such observations in the future.