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PETITIONER: P.R. DESHPANDE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: MARUTI BALARAM HAIBATTI

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       11/08/1998

BENCH: K.T. THOMAS

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T THOMAS, J.      When this  appeal came up for consideration on 7-4-1995 before R.  M. Sahai  and N. Venaktachala, JJ, learned Judges ordered this  to be listed before a larger Bench, in view of the  preliminary   objections  raised   by  the  landlord  - respondent regarding  maintainability  of  the  appeal  (the reference order is reported in 1995 Supple, (2) SCC 539).      This appeal  by special  leave is  against the order of the High  Court of  Karnataka dismissing a revision petition filed by  the  appellant-tenant  under  Section  50  of  the karnataka Rent  Control Act,  1961  (for  short  "the  Act") challenging  an   order  of   eviction  passed  against  the appellant. While  dismissing the  revision petition on 25-7- 1994, learned  Judge of  the High  Court granted six months’ time  to  appellant-tenant  for  vacating  the  premises  in question and  directed him  to file  an undertaking within 4 weeks. Appellant-tenant  has pursuant to the said direction, filed the  undertaking that  he would  vacate  the  premises within six months.      The preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the  respondent is  that the  tenant is  precluded  from approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India  after giving  the aforesaid undertaking before the High Court. In support of the said objection learned counsel cited the  decision of  a two  Judge Bench of this Court (K. Jayachandra Reddy  and S. C. Agrawal, JJ) in R. N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir  (1992 4  SCC  683)  wherein  it  was  held  as follows:      "   By    furnishing    the    said      undertaking the  petitioner elected      to  avail   the   protection   from      eviction from  the premises  and he      enjoyed the  said  protection  till      the passing  of the  order  by  the      Supreme Court  on March  26,  1992,      staying   dispossession    of   the      Petitioner.  Having  done  so,  the      petitioner cannot  be permitted  to      invoke  the   jurisdiction  of  the

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    Supreme Court  under Article 136 of      the  Constitution  and  assail  the      said judgment of the High Court."      Learned Judges  found support  to the  said  view  from three decisions of this Court rendered by two member Benches in Vidhi  Shanker vs.  Heera  Lal  (1987  supple,  SCC  200) Ramchandra Jai  Ram Randive  (since deceased) vs. Chandanmal Rupchand &  ors. (1987  supple. SCC 254) and Thacker Hariram Motiram vs. Balkrishan Chatrabhu Thacker & Ors. (1989 supple SCC 655). In all those three decisions Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. (as  he then  was), speaking  for the  Bench,  adopted  a uniform approach  that "whatever  be the  merits of the case ............  it   would  not   be  proper,  after  such  an undertaking was  given in  the High Court and time was taken on the  basis of  such undertaking,  to interfere  with  the finding made  by the  High Court," Appeals were dismissed on that score alone.      Relying on  those decisions  Agrawal, J.,  speaking for the two Judge Bench in R. N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir (supra) has observed thus:      " Law  does not  permit a person to      both approbate  and reprobate. This      principle is  based on the doctrine      of election  which postulates  that      no party  can accept and reject the      same instrument  and that ’a person      cannot  say  at  one  time  that  a      transaction is  valid  and  thereby      obtain some advantage, to which the      could  only   be  entitled  on  the      footing that  it is valid, and then      turn round  and say  it is void for      the purpose  of securing some other      advantage."      A passage  from Halsbury’s Laws of England was cited by the learned  Judges (vide  para 1508  in Vol.  16 of the 4th Edn.).      Learned Judges  who referred this matter have expressed in the  reference order  that remedy  under Article 136 is a Constitutional  right   which  cannot   be  taken   away  by legislation,  much   less  by  invoking  the  principles  of election or estoppel. The following observations made in the reference order are worthy of quotation here:      " The  principle of  ’approbate and      reprobate’ or  the law  of election      which is  the basis of the decision      in  R.  N.  Gosain’s  case  (supra)      cannot, in  our opinion, be applied      appropriately  to   preclude   this      Court    from     exercising    its      jurisdiction under Article 136. The      doctrine of  election is founded on      equitable principle  that  where  a      person persuades another one to act      in a  manner to  his prejudice  and      derives  any  advantage  from  that      then  he  cannot  turn  around  the      claim that  he was  not  liable  to      perform his part as it was void. It      applies  where   a  vendor   or   a      transferor  of  property  tries  to      take advantage  of his  own  wrong.      this  principle   cannot,  in   our      opinion, be extended to shut out or      preclude a person from invoking the

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    constitutional remedy  provided  to      him under Article 136. The law that      there  is   no   estoppel   against      statute is well settled. Here it is      a remedy under the Constitution and      no law  can be framed much less the      principle  of  election  which  can      stand in  the way  of the appellant      from  invoking  the  constitutional      jurisdiction of this Court."      The doctrine  of election  is  based  on  the  rule  of estoppel -  the principle  that  one  cannot  approbate  and reprobate inheres in it. Doctrine of estoppel by election is one of  the  species  of  estoppel  in  pais  (or  equitable estoppel) which  is a  rule in equity. By that rule a person may be  precluded by  his actions or conduct or silence when it is  his duty  to speak,  from asserting  a right which he otherwise would  have had, (vide Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn.).      It is  now trite  that the principle of estoppel has no application  when   statutory  rights  and  liabilities  are involved. It  cannot imped  right of appeal and particularly the constitutional remedy. The House of Lords has considered the same  question in  Evans vs.  Bartlam (1937  2 All  E.R. 646). The  House was  dealing with  an order of the Court of Appeal whereby Scott L.J. approved the contention of a party to put  the matter  on the  rule of  election on the premise that the  defendant knew or must be presumed to know that he had the  right to  apply to  set the  judgment aside  and by asking for  and obtaining  time he  irrevocably  elected  to abide by the judgment. Lord Atkin, reversing the above view, has observed thus:      " My  Lords, I  do not  find myself      convinced  by  these  judgments.  I      find nothing in the facts analogous      to  cases  where  a  party,  having      obtained   and   enjoyed   material      benefit from  a judgment,  has been      held precluded  from  attacking  it      while he  still is  in enjoyment of      the benefit.  I cannot bring myself      to think  that a  judgment  debtor,      who asks for and receives a stay of      execution, approbates the judgment,      so as  to preclude  him  thereafter      from  seeking   to  set  it  aside,      whether by appeal or otherwise. Nor      do I  find it possible to apply the      doctrine of election."      Lord Russell  of Killowen  while  concurring  with  the aforesaid observations has stated thus:      "My lord, I confess to a feeling of      some  bewilderment  at  the  theory      that a  man  who,  so  long  as  it      stands, must  perforce  acknowledge      and bow  to a judgment of the court      regularly obtained), by seeking and      obtaining a temporary suspension of      its   execution,    thereby   binds      himself  never   to   dispute   its      validity or  its  correctness,  and      never to  seek to have it set aside      or reversed. If this were right, no      defeated litigant  could safely ask      his  adversary   for  a   stay   of

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    execution pending  an  appeal,  for      the grant  of the request would end      the right  of appeal.  The doctrine      of election  applies only  to a man      who elects  with full  knowledge of      the facts."      A party to a lis can be asked to give an undertaking to the court  if he requires stay of operation of the judgment. It is  done on  the supposition  that the order would remain unchanged.  By   directing  the   party  to   give  such  an undertaking no  court can  scuttle or  foreclose a statutory remedy of  appeal or  revision, much  less a  constitutional remedy. If the order is reversed or modified by the superior court or  even the  same court  on a  review the undertaking given by  the party  will automatically  cease  to  operate. merely because  a party  has complied with the directions to give an  undertaking as  a condition  for obtaining  stay he cannot be presumed to communicate to the other party that he is thereby giving up his statutory remedies to challenge the order. No  doubt he  is bound to comply with his undertaking so long  a s the order remains alive and operative. However, it is  open to  such superior  court to consider whether the operation of the order or judgment challenged before it need be stayed  or suspended  having regard  to the fact that the concerned party  has given undertaking in the lower court to abide by  the decree  or order within the time fixed by that court.      We are,  therefore, in agreement with the view of Sahai and Venkatachala,  JJ, that  the appeal  filed under Article 136 of the Constitution by special leave cannot be dismissed as not  maintainable on  the more  ground that appellant has given an undertaking to the High Court on being so directed, in order to keep the High Court’s order in abeyance for some time.      On the  merits it  was contended  that dismissal of the revision petition  filed by  the tenant, without considering it on merits, was bad in law. The revision petition was held not maintainable  as it  was not  accompanied by  deposit of arrears of  rent.  It  was  a  condition  for  preferring  a revision under  the Act  that the  tenant should deposit the entire arrears of rent.      Section 29 of the Act reads thus:      "29. Deposit  and payment  of  rent      during the  pendency of proceedings      for  eviction.   -  (1)  No  tenant      against  whom  an  application  for      eviction  has   been  made   by   a      landlord under Section 21, shall be      entitled to contest the application      before the Court under that Section      or  to   prefer  or   prosecute   a      revision petition  under Section 50      against an  order made by the Court      on  application  under  Section  21      unless he  has paid  or pays to the      landlord or deposits with the Court      or the  District Judge  or the High      Court, as  the  case  may  be,  all      arrears of  rent due  in respect of      the  premises   upto  the  date  of      payment or  deposits and  continues      to pay or to deposit any rent which      may  subsequently   become  due  in      respect of the premises at the rate      at which it was last paid or agreed

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    to be  paid, until  the termination      of the proceedings before the court      or the  District Judge  or the High      Court, as the case may be.      (2) The  deposit of  the rent under      sub-section  (1)   shall  be   made      within the  time and  in the manner      prescribed and shall be accompanied      by such  fee as  may be  prescribed      for  the   service  of  the  notice      referred to in sub-section (5).      (3) Where  there is  any dispute as      to the amount of rent to be paid or      deposited  under  sub-section  (1),      the  Court  shall,  on  application      made to  it either by the tenant or      the landlord  and after making such      enquiry  as   it  deems   necessary      determine summarily the rent tot be      so paid or deposited.      (4) If  any tenant  fails to pay or      deposit the  rent as aforesaid, the      Court, the  District Judge  or  the      High Court,  as the  case  may  be,      shall  unless   the  tenant   shows      sufficient cause  to the  contrary,      stop all  further  proceedings  and      make an  order directing the tenant      to put  the landlord  in possession      of  the  premises  or  dismiss  the      appeal or revision petition, as the      case may be.      (5) When  any deposit is made under      sub-section  (1),  the  court,  the      Court, the  District Judge  or  the      High Court,  as the  case  may  be,      shall cause   notice of the deposit      to be served on the landlord in the      prescribed manner  and  the  amount      deposited  may,   subject  to  such      conditions as may be prescribed, be      withdrawn  by   the   landlord   on      application  made  by  him  to  the      Court in this behalf."      The words in sub-section (1) "or to prefer or prosecute a revision  petition under Section 50" encompass two stages. First is at the threshold when tenant files the petition for revision. Second is a stage when he prosecutes his revision. On the  first  stage  when  his  revision  petition  is  not maintainable unless  it is  accompanied by either payment or deposit of  "all the  arrears of  rent due up to the date of payment or  deposit". If  the revision  is validly preferred then in the next stage of prosecution of revision the tenant has to  continue to  pay or  deposit  "any  rent  which  may subsequently  become   due"   until   termination   of   the proceedings.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant contended  that the liability of the tenant under Section 29(1) of the Act would come into  operation only  after the  court  determines  the amount to be paid. This argument is based on sub-section (3) but the  contingency under that sub-section would arise only where there is a dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or to  be  deposited.  In  this  case  the  appellant  filed revision petition  on 20.4.1991. High Court has noticed that "admittedly, the  tenant did  not deposit  the rent on 20-4-

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1991 when the revision petition was filed before the learned District Judge."      The admitted position being as above, it is not open to the appellant  now to  contend that  he  did  not  make  the deposit along  with filing  of revision petition due to want of an order from the Court.      Learned counsel  for the  appellant made  an attempt to raise a contention that though the appellant did not deposit the arrears  of rent along with filing the revision petition he has subsequently paid rent arrears on 27-5-1991 and hence the revision  must be  treated as preferred on that date. We are not  disposed to countenance the said contention in this particular case for two reasons. Firstly, that the landlord- respondent filed  an application  under Section 29(4) of the Act before  the District  Court and the tenant has not taken up such  a ground  in the  petition filed  by  him  thereto. Secondly, even  in the  Special Leave  Petition he  has  not adopted any  such contention  and hence the landlord, has no occasion to meet the factual situation on the basis of which the aforesaid contention is raised.      In the result, we dismiss this appeal.