18 August 2006
Supreme Court
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P. NARAYANAPPA Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA .

Bench: K.G. BALAKRISHNAN,G.P. MATHUR,TARUN CHATTERJEE
Case number: C.A. No.-003540-003540 / 2006
Diary number: 9905 / 2004
Advocates: DINESH KUMAR GARG Vs


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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3540 of 2006

PETITIONER: P. Narayanappa & Anr.

RESPONDENT: State of Karnataka & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/08/2006

BENCH: K.G. Balakrishnan,G.P. Mathur & Tarun Chatterjee

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.9394-9403 of 2004) With C.A. Nos. 3542,3541 and 3543 of 2006 (@ SLP (C) Nos.22798-22800/04, 22869/04 and 6072/05)

G.P. MATHUR, J.  

       Leave granted. 2.      These appeals, by special leave, have been filed challenging the  judgment and order dated 6.4.2004 of a Division Bench of Karnataka  High Court by which writ appeals filed by the appellants were  dismissed and the judgment and order dated 28.1.2004 of the learned  Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions was affirmed.  The subject  matter of  challenge in the writ petitions were two notifications issued  under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of Karnataka Industrial Areas  Development Board Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).    3.      The impugned notifications were issued for acquisition of land  for establishment and development of industries by the Karnataka   Industrial Areas Development Board. Before adverting to the  contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it will be  convenient to reproduce the impugned notifications. The first  notification bears No.CI:289:SPQ:2001 and was issued on  10.12.2001, relevant part whereof, is reproduced below : "INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE SECRETARIAT NOTIFICATION NO:CI:289:SPQ:2001, Bangalore, Dated 10th Dec 2001         The below mentioned lands specified are required for the State  government for establishment and development of industries by the  Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board.         With an intention of acquiring the lands notification is  hereby published according to Section 28(1) (Act No.18 of  1966) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act,  1966. According to Section 25 of the Act .........................  ................................................... (Omitted as not relevant) From the date of publication of this notification .....  ................................................... (Omitted as not relevant) The map of the lands comprised therein is kept in the  office of the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB."                                   The second notification under Section 28(4) of the Act bears  No.CPMG/KA/BG-GPO/13/2003-05 and was issued on 23.10.2003.   The relevant part of the notification is being reproduced below : Notification under Section 28(4) Where as it appears, to the State Government that the  Lands are to be acquired specified in the schedule here to

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likely to be needed for the purpose stated in the  notification No. CI-289 SPQ 2001 dated 10.12.2001  published in Karnataka Gazette part 3-1 page 4 to 11 in  exercise of powers conferred according to section 28(1)  of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board  (Karnataka Act No. 18 of 1966).         The State Government is satisfied that Lands  specified in the schedule of Notification be acquired for  the purpose specified as such orders are passed according  to section (3).  In exercise of the powers conferred  according to section 28(4) (Act No. 18 of 1966) of the  Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 the  Karnataka Government is acquiring said Lands below for  the purpose specified in the notification as such a  declaration is made."     

       By the notification under Section 28(1) of the Act 110.30 acres  of land was proposed to be acquired but by the notification under  Section 28(4) of the Act, the acquisition was restricted to an extent of  106 acres 12.3/4 guntas of land.  Some of the land owners had  challenged the preliminary notification by filing writ petitions under  Article 226 of the Constitution before the Karnataka High Court after  orders had been passed under Section 28(3)of the Act.   The writ  petitions were allowed and the orders passed under Section 28(3) of  the Act were quashed giving liberty to proceed with the acquisition  from the stage of preliminary notification.  Thereafter, the Land  Acquisition Officer, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the  landowners on the objections filed by them, passed a detailed order  and then the notification under Section 28(4) of the Act was issued.  4.      Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants,  has challenged the impugned notifications on several grounds and the  principal ground is that the land has been acquired in order to benefit  a company, namely, Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) who  had submitted a project report for setting up a software technology  park which included an I.T. Training Institute/Engineering College,  Research and Development Centre, Educational Centre, Commercial  and Residential Buildings and Service Apartments, Convention  Centre, Hotel, Shopping Mall, etc.   In the notification under Section  28(1) of the Act, the purpose of acquisition, namely, the purpose for  which the company, Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. wanted the land, as  enumerated above, was not mentioned and, therefore, the appellant  landowners were kept in dark and did not get an adequate opportunity  to make an effective objection against the proposed acquisition.  Learned counsel has submitted that the notification being absolutely  vague and cryptic, it deprived the landowners of a valuable right of  making an effective representation and in these circumstances the  entire acquisition proceedings are illegal and the impugned  notifications are liable to be struck down.    5.      Shri L. Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel for Karnataka  Industrial Areas Development Board (respondent no.2) (hereinafter  referred to as ’KIADB’), has submitted that the land was actually  acquired by the State Government for industrial development and  after acquisition of the land, the same vests with the KIADB which  has the authority to give the same on leasehold basis or outright sale  to entrepreneurs or companies for the purpose of industrial  development and the basic object of acquisition is to promote the  establishment and orderly development of industries in that area.    Learned counsel has further submitted that the impugned notification  did not suffer from any vagueness and clearly indicated the purpose  for which the land was sought to be acquired and there is no illegality  in the same.   He has also urged that the mere fact that a substantial  area of the land was subsequently given on lease to a company, Vikas  Telecom (P) Ltd., it was not at all obligatory to specifically mention  the details of the project which the said company wanted to establish.    Learned counsel for the State of Karnataka and also Shri A.

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Sundaram, learned senior counsel for Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd.  (respondent no.9) supported the stand taken by learned counsel for  KIADB and submitted that the impugned notifications fully satisfied  the requirements of the Act and the Act did not contemplate that at the  time of acquisition of the land, the details of the project which was to  be set up by the lessees or the subsequent purchasers from the KIADB  should also be mentioned in the notifications.   6.      In order to examine the contentions advanced by learned  counsel for the parties, it is necessary to notice the provisions of the  Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act.   The preamble of the  Act reads as under : "An Act to make special provisions for securing the  establishment of industrial areas in the State of Karnataka  and generally to promote the establishment and orderly  development of industries therein, and for that purpose to  establish an Industrial Areas Development Board and for  purposes connected with the matters aforesaid."

       Some of the provisions of the Act, which are relevant for the  decision of the issue involved, are as under: -

"Section 2 \026 Definitions: -          In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (1) "amenity" includes road, supply of water or  electricity, street lighting, drainage, sewerage,  conservancy, and such other convenience, as the State  Government may, by notification specify to be an  amenity for the purposes of this Act; (2) "Board" means the Industrial Areas Development  Board established under this Act; (3)     ......................................................................... (4)     ........................................................................ (5) "development" with its grammatical variations means  the carrying out of levelling, digging, building,  engineering, quarrying or other operations in, on, over or  under land, or the making of any material change in any  building or land, and includes re-development; and "to  develop" shall be construed accordingly; (6) "industrial area" means any area declared to be an  industrial area by the State Government by notification  which is to be developed and where industries are to be  accommodated and industrial infrastructural facilities and  amenities are to be provided and includes, an industrial  estate; (7) "industrial estate" means any site selected by the State  Government where factories and other buildings are built  for use by any industries or class of industries; (7a) "industrial infrastructural facilities’’ means facilities  which contribute to the development of industries  established in industrial area such as research and  development, communication, transport, Banking,  Marketing, Technology parks and Townships for the  purpose of establishing trade and tourism centres; and  any other facility as the State Government may by  notification specify to be an industrial infrastructural  facility for the purposes of this Act.

Section 3 - Declaration of industrial areas: -  (1)     The State Government may, by notification,  declare any area in the State to be an industrial area for  the purposes of this Act. (2)     Every such notification shall define the limits of  the area to which it relates.     

Section 5 - Establishment and incorporation: -

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(1)     For the purposes of securing the establishment of  industrial areas in the State of Karnataka and generally  for promoting the rapid and orderly establishment and  development of industries and for providing industrial  infrastructual facilities and amenity in industrial areas in  the State of Karnataka, there shall be established by the  State Government by notification a Board by the name of  the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board. (2)     The said Board shall be a body corporate with  perpetual succession and a common seal, and may sue  and be sued in its corporate name, and shall subject to the  provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder be  competent to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both  movable and immovable, and to contract and do all  things necessary for the purposes of this Act.

Section 14 - General powers of the Board: -          Subject to the provisions of the Act, the Board  shall have power:- (a)     to acquire and hold such property, both movable  and immovable as the Board may deem necessary for the  performance of any of its activities and to lease, sell,  exchange or otherwise transfer any property held by it on  such conditions as may be deemed proper by the Board; (b)     ........................................................................ (c)     to provide or cause to be provided amenities,  industrial infrastructural facilities and common facilities  in industrial areas and construct and maintain or cause to  be maintained works and buildings therefor; Section 28 - Acquisition of land: -  (1)     If at any time, in the opinion of the State  Government, any land is required for the purpose of  development by the Board, or for any other purpose in  furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State  Government may by notification, give notice of its  intention to acquire such land. (2)     On publication of a notification under sub-section  (1), the State Government shall serve notice upon the  owner or where the owner is not the occupier, on the  occupier of the land and on all such persons known or  believed to be interested therein to show cause, within  thirty days from the date of service of the notice, why the  land should not be acquired. (3)     After considering the cause, if any, shown by the  owner of the land and by any other person interested  therein, and after giving such owner and person an  opportunity of being heard, the State Government may  pass such orders as it deems fit. (4)     After orders are passed under sub-section (3),  where the State Government is satisfied that any land  should be acquired for the purpose specified in the  notification issued under sub-section (1), a declaration  shall, by notification in the official Gazette, be made to  that effect. (5)     On the publication in the official Gazette of the  declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest  absolutely in the State Government free from all  encumbrances. (6)     ......................................................................... (7)     ......................................................................... (8)     Where the land has been acquired for the Board,  the State Government, after it has taken possession of the  land, may transfer the land to the Board for the purpose  for which the land has been acquired."

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       Section 29 provides that where the land is acquired by the State  Government under Chapter VII (Sections 27 to 31), the compensation  for acquisition shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of the  Act.  Section 30 provides that the provisions of the Land Acquisition  Act shall mutatis mutandis apply in respect of the enquiry and award  by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to Court, the  apportionment of compensation and payment of compensation in  respect of lands acquired under this Chapter.   It is important to note  that the Land Acquisition Act is not applicable at the stage of  acquisition of the land but becomes applicable only in the matter of  payment of compensation on account of Section 30 of the Act.   Therefore, the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition  Act have no application here and acquisition of land has to be done in  accordance with the provisions of the Act.   7.      The Preamble of the Act shows that it has been enacted to make  special provisions for securing the establishment of industrial areas  and generally to promote the establishment and the orderly  development of the industries in such industrial areas.   Section 2(7a)  defines industrial infrastructural facilities.  This provision was  inserted on 19.2.1997 by an amendment made by Act No.11 of 1997.   The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Act has some  relevance and the same is being reproduced below : "After the liberalization of economic and industrial  policies in the year 1991 increased emphasis has been  given for Private Sector Investment not only in the  Industrial Sector but also in the Infrastructural Sectors.   As such a number of proposals, both from indigenous  and foreign companies have been received for  considerable investments in infrastructural areas like  establishment of power projects, express highways, ports,  airports, townships, industrial parks etc.  These projects  need considerable extent of land for implementation.         Therefore, it is considered necessary to amend the  Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, to  enable the Board to acquire land for providing Industrial  Infrastructural Facilities."                                          As the definition shows, anything which contributes to the  development of industries in industrial areas like technology parks,  townships for the purpose of establishing trade and tourism centres  and any other facility as the State Government may notify, will be an  industrial infrastructural facility.  It, therefore, shows that the object of  the Act is not only to secure establishment of industrial areas and  orderly development of industries therein, but also to create facilities  which contribute to the development of industries which may include  technology parks, townships, trade and tourism centres, etc.

9.      The provision for acquisition of land under the Act is contained  in Section 28 which is somewhat different from the provisions  contained in Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.   The  legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to make a specific  provision for acquisition of the land in the Act itself rather than to  take recourse to Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.   A  plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 28 would show that land  can be acquired for the purpose of (i) development by the Board, or  (ii) for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act.    Sub-section (3) of Section 28 is similar to Section 5A of the Land  Acquisition Act and the final notification is issued under sub-section  (4) of Section 28.   The necessary precondition for a valid notification  under sub-section (4) of Section 28 is that the State Government  should be satisfied that the land is required for the purpose specified  in the notification issued under sub-section (1), viz., for the purpose   of (i) development by the Board, or (ii) for any other purpose in  furtherance of the objects of the Act.   Therefore, in order to judge the  validity of the notification what is to be seen is whether the

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acquisition of land is being made for securing the establishment of  industrial areas or to promote the establishment or orderly  development of industries in such areas.   In view of wide definition  of the words "industrial infrastructural facilities" as contained in  Section 2 (7a) of the Act, making of a technology park, research and  development centre, townships, trade and tourism centres or making  provisions for marketing and banking which would contribute to the  development of industries will meet the objectives of the Act and  acquisition of land for such a purpose would be perfectly valid.  

10.     Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants,  has strongly urged that as the impugned notification under Section  28(1) of the Act did not mention that the land was sought to be  acquired for a technology park, research and development centre,  shopping mall, engineering college, residential apartments, etc., the  landowners could not make a proper and effective representation  under Section 28(2) of the Act which deprived them of a valuable  right given to them under the Act of showing cause against the  proposed acquisition and consequently the notification is bad.    Learned counsel has also submitted that the notification is very vague  and cryptic.   We are unable to accept the contention raised.   Sub- section (1) of Section 28 clearly shows that the land can be acquired  for (i) development by the Board; or (ii) for any other purpose in  furtherance of the objects of the Act.  Under sub-section (8) of Section  28, the State Government is empowered, after it has taken possession  of land, to transfer the same to the Board for the purpose for which the  land has been acquired.   Section 32 empowers the State Government  to place at the disposal of the Board any land vested in it and the  Board is enjoined to deal with the land in accordance with the  regulations made and directions given by the State Government in this  behalf.   This stage when the Board gets the authority to deal with the  land comes at a later stage which is after the land has been developed  by it.  An entrepreneur or a company may give a proposal to the State  Government for setting up an industry or infrastructural facility and  the Government may thereafter acquire the land and give it to the  Board.   It is also possible that after the land has already been acquired  and developed by the Board, it may be allotted to an entrepreneur or a  company for setting up an industry or infrastructural facility.   Therefore, the scheme of the Act does not show that at the time of  acquisition of the land and issuing a preliminary notification under  Section 28(1) of the Act, the complete details of the nature of the  industry or infrastructural facility proposed to be set up should also be  mentioned.  At that stage what is to be seen is whether the land is  acquired for development by the Board or for any other purpose in  furtherance of the objects of the Act, as mentioned in sub-section (1)  of Section 28 of the Act.  In fact, if the contention raised by the  learned senior counsel for the appellants is accepted, it would mean  that even at the stage of preliminary notification under Section 28(1)  of the Act, the nature of the activity which may be done by some  entrepreneur or a company which may give a proposal for setting up  an industry or infrastructural facility much after land has been  acquired should also be taken note of and specifically mentioned in  the notification, which is well nigh impossible.  While interpreting the  provisions of the Act, the Court should not only take into  consideration the facts of the present case but should also have in  mind all possible contingencies.   Therefore, on a plain reading of the  language used in the Act, it is not possible to accept the contention of  the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the impugned  notification is vague or cryptic as the complete details of the project  which was proposed to be established by Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd.  (respondent no.9) were not mentioned and on account of the aforesaid  lacuna, the landowners were deprived of their right to make a proper  representation or to show cause against the proposed acquisition.  

11.     Learned senior counsel for the appellant has placed strong

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reliance on a Three Judge Bench decision of this Court in Munshi  Singh & Ors. v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337 in support of his  submission that the impugned notifications are vague and are,  therefore, liable to be struck down.   In this case a notification was  issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by the State  Government on 16.7.1960 declaring its intention to acquire 34,000  acres of land in 50 villages of Ghaziabad.   By a subsequent  notification dated 9.2.1962, the proposed area was reduced from  34,000 acres to 6,158 acres.  The appellants Munshi Singh and others  made an application on 4.7.1962 to the Special Land Acquisition  Officer for supplying a copy of the Scheme of the planned  development to enable them to make an effective representation at the  time of hearing of the objections under Section 5A of the Land  Acquisition Act, but the same was rejected by an order which  mentioned that "the scheme of the planned development is not  necessary for a notification under Section 4 of the Act, as such, no  such scheme of the planned development is available in this office."  The Master Plan was sanctioned subsequently on 4.9.1962.  The  notification was challenged on the ground that the words in the  notification, viz. "for planned development of the area", gave no  indication whatsoever as to the purpose for which the land was  acquired and the same was vague.   It was held that there was no  indication whatsoever in the notification whether the development  was to be of residential area and building cities or of commercial and  industrial plots nor was it possible for anyone to find out what kind of  planned development was under contemplation i.e. whether the land  was to be developed by the Government or whether the owners of the  properties would be required to develop a particular area in a specified  way.  It was also held that if the Master Plan which came to be  sanctioned on 4.9.1962 had been available for inspection by the  persons interested or even if the knowledge of its existence on the part  of the appellants had been satisfactorily proved, the position may have  been different, as in that situation the landowners could not claim that  they were unable to file objections owing to the lack of any indication  in the notification under Section 4 of the nature of the development  for which the area was being acquired.  In our opinion, the authority  cited is clearly distinguishable on facts.  The Scheme of the planned  development was not available when the notification was issued and  in fact the Master Plan itself was sanctioned much after the  publication of the notification and in these circumstances the words  "planned development of the area" were clearly vague.   Such is not  the case here as the impugned notification clearly mentions that the  land is sought to be acquired for establishment and development of  industries by KIADB.   The second case relied upon by the learned  counsel for the appellants is M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi &  Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 168.  In this case, a notification was issued under  Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act to acquire 2.298 hectares of  land in city/village Mandsaur, Tehsil and Distt. Mandsaur and in the  column for purpose only "residential" was mentioned.   The  notification was struck down on the ground that no khasra number,  locality or any other particulars of the land sought to be acquired was  mentioned when Mandsaur city was spread over a large area of 25 sq.  kilometers.   It was also held that the word "residential" was  hopelessly vague as it conveyed no idea about the purpose of  acquisition.   In our opinion, this case can be of no assistance to the  appellants for the obvious reason that the no details or particular of the  land like khasra number and locality had been mentioned and the  word "residential" by itself did not show that the acquisition was  being made for a public purpose, which is essential for a valid  notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.   The next  decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel for the appellants is  State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. L. Krishnan & Ors. (1996) 1 SCC 250.   In this case, after referring to some earlier decisions including that of  Munshi Singh (supra), it was held that whether the public purpose  stated in a particular notification is vague or not, is a question of fact

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to be decided in each case and cannot be treated as a question of law.   12.     Shri Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counsel for KIADB has,  on the other hand, relied upon a Constitution Bench decision in Babu  Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 1203, wherein it was  held as under : "It is not absolutely necessary to the validity of the land  acquisition proceedings that the statement that the land to  be acquired was needed for a public purpose should find  a place in the notification actually issued. The  requirements of the law will be satisfied if, in substance,  it is found on investigation, and the appropriate  Government is satisfied as a result of the investigation  that the land was needed for the purpose of a company,  which would amount to a public purpose under Part VII."

       In Union of India v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar (1996) 3 SCC 491, it  was held that when the notification mentioned that the land is sought  to be acquired for a housing scheme but actually it is to be used for a  district centre, the public purpose does not cease to be a public  purpose and the notification could not be quashed on the ground that  the land is sought to be used for a commercial purpose.  This authority  has been cited to show that even a change of purpose (from residential  to commercial) would not result in invalidating the notification.    Strong reliance has also been placed on Pratibha Nema & Ors. v. State  of M.P. & Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 626, where the notification was  challenged on the ground that it was vague and reliance was placed on  the decisions rendered in M.P. Housing Board (supra) and Munshi  Singh (supra) where it was observed that the public purpose "needs to  be particularized" to satisfy the requirements of law.   The Bench held  as under in para 38:   "38.   When no prejudice has been demonstrated nor  could be reasonably inferred, it would be unjust and  inappropriate to strike down the notification under  Section 4(1) on the basis of a nebulous plea, in exercise  of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Even assuming that  there is some ambiguity in particularizing the public  purpose and the possibility of doubt cannot be ruled out,  the Constitutional Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under  Article 226 or 136 should not, as a matter of course, deal  a lethal blow to the entire proceedings based on the  theoretical or hypothetical grievance of the petitioner. It  would be sound exercise of discretion to intervene when  a real and substantial grievance is made out, the non  redressal of which would cause prejudice and injustice to  the aggrieved party. Vagueness of the public purpose,  especially, in a matter like this where it is possible to take  two views, is not something which affects the jurisdiction  and it would therefore be proper to bear in mind the  considerations of prejudice and injustice."

       It is necessary to emphasize that all the decisions cited by  learned counsel for the parties deal with notifications issued under  Land Acquisition Act and as demonstrated earlier, the Scheme of the  Act under our consideration is different.  Even on the principle laid  down in the authorities which were cited by learned counsel for the  parties and which have been discussed above, it cannot be held that  the impugned notifications are vague or cryptic or that they suffer  from any infirmity.   The challenge raised to the notifications on the  aforesaid grounds must fail.   

13.     Learned counsel for the appellant has next submitted that the  notification under Section 28(1) was published on 10.12.2001 and the  notification under Section 28(4) was published on 23.10.2003 and  thus there was a delay of more than 1 year and 10 months in  publication of the second notification.   As already discussed, the

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Scheme of the present Act is different and there is no similar  provision like the one contained in proviso to sub-section (1) of  Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act which lays down a period of  limitation of one year for making a declaration under Section 6(1) of  the Act.  In absence of any specific provision to that effect in the Act,  and the time gap being not very long, it is not possible to hold that the  notification under Section 28(4) of the Act is invalid.

14.     Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the appellants,  has also submitted that Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9)  were themselves owners of nearly 90 acres of land as three members  of a family who were promoters and directors of the company had  purchased agricultural land in the year 1995-96.  They being not  agriculturists, proceedings under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act  were initiated against them, whereunder the land would have been  forfeited to the State Government without payment of any  compensation.  In order to save their land, they manipulated with the  Government and got their own land acquired whereunder they would  be entitled to compensation.   It is thus submitted that the whole  proceedings for acquisition of the land whereunder not only the land  of promoters and directors of Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. but also the land  of the appellants, who are agriculturists, was acquired is clearly mala  fide.   This point has been considered in detail by the High Court and  has been repelled.   Initially, proceedings initiated under Sections  79A, 79B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 against  Devi Das Garg, one of the promoters of the company were dropped by  the order of the Assistant Commissioner dated 23.5.2001.   The  Assistant Commissioner passed an order of forfeiture of the land  against Santosh Kumar Garg on 29.12.2002 and a similar order was  passed against Devi Das Garg on 31.12.2003.   It may be noted that  the order for forfeiture of the land was passed much after the  preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Act had been  issued on 10.12.2001.  That apart, the appellants herein are interested  in saving their own land from acquisition and have no concern with  the land belonging to promoters of Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd.  They have  not laid any foundation in the writ petition to show that the action of  the State Government in acquiring their land was a mala fide one.   Even assuming that the promoters of Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd.  somehow succeeded in getting their own land acquired in order to  save it from being forfeited by the State Government in view of the  provisions of Karnataka Land Reforms Act, that by itself cannot be a  ground to strike down the impugned notifications insofar as the land  of the appellants is concerned.            Shri Nageshwara Rao, learned senior counse for KIADB has  also submitted that the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development  Board has only executed a lease deed in favour of Vikas Telecom (P)  Ltd. for a period of 11 years for a consideration of Rs.25,71,50,781/-  and the lessee has to pay a rent of Rs.1,000/- per annum from the date  of taking over possession of the land.  The lease has been granted on  stringent conditions and under clause 10(d) the lessor has the right to  terminate the lease and resume the possession of the scheduled  property in the event the lessee fails to implement the project within  the stipulated period or extended period, if any.   Clause 14 contains a  condition that the lessor shall be entitled to determine the lease and  resume possession of the land if and when there is breach of any of  the covenants and obligations contained in the lease deed.   The fact  that the lease deed has been executed only for a limited period of 11  years clearly shows that the land after acquisition has not been  reverted back to Vikas Telecom (P) Ltd. conferring proprietary rights  on them but they are merely lessees and the ownership and title  thereof still vests with the Board.  In such circumstances it is not  possible to accept the plea of mala fide raised on behalf of the  appellants.   

15.     It is lastly submitted that the State Government had acted in a

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discriminatory manner in de-notifying some of the lands which had  been earlier included in the preliminary notification under Section  28(1) of the Act and whosoever was in a position to approach the  concerned authority of the State Government, his land was exempted  from acquisition.   It has been urged that survey no.9/4 which was  earlier included in the notification under Section 28(1) of the Act was  specifically de-notified.   We are afraid that this plea cannot be  examined by us for want of sufficient details.   The acquisition of the  appellants’ land cannot be struck down on the ground that some of the  land which was initially included in the notifications issued under  Section 28 of the Act was de-notified.

16.     For the reasons discussed above, there is no merit in these  appeals, which are hereby dismissed.  No order as to costs.