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PETITIONER: P. N. ESWARA IYER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE REGISTRAR, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/02/1980

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA DESAI, D.A. PATHAK, R.S. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  808            1980 SCR  (2) 889  1980 SCC  (4) 680  CITATOR INFO :  R          1983 SC1125  (8)  F          1989 SC1298  (9)  RF         1990 SC 538  (4)

ACT:      Supreme Court  Rules 1966-O.XL, rules 2 and 3 Scope of- Disposal of  review petitions  by circulation  without  oral arguments-If violative of Art. 14.

HEADNOTE:      Order XL,  rule 2(1)  of the  Supreme Court  Rules  (as amended) provides that an application for review shall be by a petition  and shall  be filed  within thirty days from the date of  the judgment  or order  sought to  be reviewed.  It shall set  out clearly  the grounds for review. Sub-rule (3) provides that  "unless otherwise  ordered by  the  Court  an application for  review shall  be disposed of by circulation without any oral arguments but the petitioner may supplement his petition by additional written arguments".      In a  petition under Article 32 of the Constitution the petitioners contended  that scuttling  of oral  presentation and open  hearing is  subversive of  the  basic  creed  that public justice  shall be  rendered from  the public seat and that  secrecy  and  circulation  are  negation  of  judicial justice.      Dismissing the petitions, ^      HELD: per Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and Desai, JJ (Pathak and Koshal JJ concurring).      Unchecked review  has never  been the  rule.  A  review petition  must   be  supported  by  proper  grounds  because otherwise every  disappointed litigant may avenge his defeat by a routine review petition. [895D]      The  original   rule  required  a  certificate  by  the advocate to  the effect that the petition was review-worthy. If it  was so  certified then  a  preliminary  oral  hearing followed. After  such oral  argument the court issued notice to the  other side  or dismissed  the petition.  But  as  it turned out,  laxity  in  certification  and  promiscuity  in

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filing review  applications crowded  the court with unwanted review petitions and the very solemnity of finality would be frustrated if such a game were to become popular. [895E-H]      The amended  rule is  designed to  remove the  evil  of reckless reviews by the introduction of preliminary judicial screening in  circulation replacing counsel’s certification. If the review petition and written submissions convinced the court prima facie that material error had marred the justice or legality of the earlier judgment or order, the case would be posted for oral hearing in court. Now ’certworthiness’ is shifted from counsel to court. [896H]      Circulation in the judicial context merely means not in court through  oral arguments  but by discussion at judicial conference. Judges,  even under the amended rule, must meet, collectively cerebrate  and reach  conclusions. In  a review petition the  same judges who have once heard oral arguments and are familiar with 890 the case  direct a  hearing  in  court  if  they  find  good grounds. It  is not  as if  all oral  advocacy is altogether shut out.  Where oral presentation is not that essential its exclusion is not obnoxious. What is crucial is the guarantee of the  application of  an impartial  and open  mind to  the points presented.  If without much injury a certain class of cases can  be disposed  of without oral hearing, there is no good reason for not making such an experiment. If on a close perusal of  the paper  book the judges find that there is no merit or  statable case,  there  is  no  special  virtue  in sanctifying the  dismissal by  an oral  ritual. [898E, 899E, 900C]      The rule on its face affords a wider set of grounds for review for  orders  in  civil  proceedings  but  limits  the grounds vis a vis criminal proceedings to errors apparent on the face  of the  record. Here  "record" means  any material which is already on record or may with the permission of the court be brought on record. [909C]      The substantive  power is  derived from Article 137 and is as  wide for  criminal as for civil proceedings. Even the difference in  phraseology in the rule (r.2) must be read to encompass the  same area  and not  to engraft the artificial divergence productive of anomaly. If the expression "record" is read  to mean  any material even later brought on record, with the  leave of  the court,  it will  embrace  subsequent events, new  light and  other grounds  which are found in O. 47, r. 1, C.P.C. [909G-H]      Sow Chandra Kanta and Anr. v. Sheikh Habib [1975] 3 SCR 933; Lala  Ram v.  Supreme Court of India & Ors [1967] 2 SCR 14 referred to. Per Pathak and Koshal JJ (concurring).      Oral hearing  is not  an essential  requirement if on a preliminary examination  a review application is found to be devoid of  substance. A  review application attempts nothing more than to obtain a reconsideration of the judgment of the court disposing of the substantive proceeding. The merits of the  controversy   having  already  been  examined  the  re- examination sought  cannot proceed  beyond  the  controversy already disposed of. [911C-D]      If the  judges, on  screening the  review  application, hold that  there is  no case  whatever for  review they will reject it.  If on the other hand they find that a good prima facie case  for review  has been made out, they will give an oral hearing  in the presence of the parties. There may also be cases  where even  after they are satisfied that no prima facie case  has been  made out they consider it desirable to hear an applicant orally they will afford him an opportunity

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of oral hearing and in the event of a prima facie case being made out  they will  issue notice to the respondent and oral hearing will  follow, in  the presence  of the  parties.  In short  the  denial  of  oral  hearing  is  confined  to  the preliminary stage  only. It  is not possible to hold that at that preliminary  stage also  the applicant  for  review  is entitled to  be heard  orally. The merit of the oral hearing lies in  the fact that counsel addressing the court are able to discern  what are the aspects of the controversy on which more light  is needed. The court can utilise an oral hearing in  order  to  express  its  doubts  on  a  point  and  seek clarification thereon  from counsel.  If there  is no  doubt whatever oral  hearing becomes  a superfluity  and at best a mere formality. [911F-H]      A written submission is capable of careful drafting and explicit expression,  and is amenable to such arrangement in its written  content that  it pointedly brings to the notice of the reader the true scope and merit of the submission. 891      It is not correct to say that oral hearing is mandatory in all  classes of  cases and  at every stage of every case. [912D]           [The question  under consideration  being the need           for  an   oral  hearing   in  relation  to  review           applications only, there is no need to express any           opinion  on   whether  an   oral  hearing   is  an           imperative requirement  in the  disposal of  other           kinds of cases brought before the Court.]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Writ Petition  Nos.  151,  187, 238, 458, 1038, 1069 and 1277 of 1979.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      R.K. Garg,  S. Balakrishnan  and M.K.D.  Namboodiri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No. 151/79.      Soli J.  Sorabjee Sol.  General,  E.C.  Agarwala,  R.N. Sachthey and  Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent, in W.P. No. 151/1979.      Petitioner in person-in W.P. No. 1038/79.      P.R. Mridul  and H.K.  Puri for the Petitioner, in W.P. No. 187/79.      A.K. Gupta,  Vivek Seth,  Miss Madhu  Moolchandani  and O.P. Rana for the Respondent No. 1, in W.P. 187/79.      Soli  J.  Sorabjee,  Sol.  Genl.  E.C.  Agarwala,  R.N. Sachthey and  Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent No. 2 in W.P. No. 187/79.      A.K. Ganguli  and D.P.  Mukherjee for the Petitioner in W.P. 238/79.      A.K. Ganguli  and O.P.  Rana for the petitioner in W.P. No. 458/79.      Soli J.  Sorabjee, Sol. General, R.N. Sachthey and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent in W.P. Nos. 458 & 238/79.      G.L. Sanghi and Miss Lily Thomas for the Petitioners in W.P. Nos. 1069 & 1277/79.      Dr. L.M.  Singhvi and  Sardar Bahadur  Saharya for  the intervener.      The Judgment of V.R. Krishna Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali and D.A.  Desai, JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J., R.S. Pathak, J. gave a separate Opinion on behalf of A.D. Koshal, J. and himself.      KRISHNA IYER, J. Tersely expressed, this bunch of cases challenges the  vires of  a recent  amendment  made  by  the Supreme Court  under  Art.  145  in  the  matter  of  review

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petitions whereby  the judges  will decide  in  circulation, without the  aid of oral submissions, whether there is merit in the  motion and,  in their  discretion,  choose  to  hear further arguments in court. 892      Is orality  in  advocacy-that  genius  of  Indo-Anglian Justice-an inalienable  and ubiquitous presence in the court process, or does it admit of abbreviated appearance and-more pertinent to  the point here-discretionary eclipse, at least when it  has been  preceded by  a sufficient  oral session ? Secondly is  hearing on  Bench in  public,  in  contrast  to considering the matter in conferential circulation, the only hall-mark of  judicial justice,  absent which the proceeding always violates  the norms  of equality  implicit in Art. 14 the limits  of "reasonableness"  bedrocked in  Art. 19,  the procedural fairness  rooted in  Art. 21  ? And,  finally, by resort to  operational secrecy, does rationing or burking of oral hearing travesty the values of our Justice System ?      These  basic  problems  of  the  forensic  process,  of pervasive impact  and seminal import, fall for consideration in these  writ petitions  under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The charge  is that  the novel  expedient of substitution of oral  arguments   by  written   submissions  and  orders  in circulation dispensing  with public  sitting, save where-and that may  be rare-the  judges in  their discretion choose to hear arguments  in court,  is a  dangerous deviance from the fundamentals of  the Judicial  Process. Apprehending  maybe, the  futuristic   repercussions  of   a  decision  on  these questions, even  though now  restricted to review petitions, in other  fields of  ’hearing’ at  a later time, the Supreme Court Bar  Association has  intervened and  argued to impugn the amended  rule through  its President, Dr. L. M. Singhvi, in supplementation  of parties’ submissions. We have allowed even other  advocates to  make brief contributions, because, when this  Court considers  issues of  moment and pronounces thereon, the  law so  declared binds all: and it is ensouled in  democratic  propriety  that  the  voice  of  reason  and instruction be received from every permissible source in the nation,  if  processed  according  to  cursus  curiae.  This participative principle  lends people’s  legitimation to the judicial process and strengthens the credentials of the rule of law.      The composite question, which settles the fate of these petitions, emerges this way. Art. 137 provides for review of judgments or orders of this Court, subject to the provisions of any  law made  by Parliament  or any rule made under Art. 145. We  are here  concerned with a rule made by this Court. The  rule-making   power  under   Art.  145   is  geared  to ’regulating generally  the practice  and  procedure  of  the Court’. In  particular, Art.  145(1) (b)  and (e)  authorise such ’judicial’ legislation in the shape of rules as to "the procedure for  hearing appeals  and other matters pertaining to appeals"  and also "as to the conditions subject to which any judgment  pronounced or  order made  by the Court may be reviewed and  the procedure  for such  review". Such  rules, like any  other law,  are subject to the imperatives of Part III 893 and become  non est  if violative  of the  proscriptions and prescriptions of  the  Constitution  vide  Premchand  Garg’s case. Even the Supreme Court, in the scheme of our Republic, is no imperium in imperio.      The substantive  power of  review and the procedure for its exercise  are  essential  for  any  judicial  system  if unwitting  injustice   is  to  be  obviated  to  the  extent

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pragmatically possible,  without being  blinded by any claim to impervious  infallibility in  the  first  judgment.  Even judges, more than other mortals, to correct injustice if the error is  discovered within  working limits.  Thus, the root principle of judicial review is profound. Judge Learned Hand commended to the judges the great rule of humility contained in the oft-repeated words of Cromwell:           "I beseech  ye in the bowels of Christ, think that      ye may  be mistaken"  said Oliver  Cromwell just before      the battle  of Dunbar.  These words  Judge Hand said he      would like  to have  written "over the portals of every      church, every  court-house and  at every  cross-road in      the nation."                                             (emphasis added) Such is  the high-minded tolerance with which this Court re- examines its  own orders  to eliminate  the happenstance  of injustice unhampered by judicial hubris.      This Court  had framed rules for review, right from the start, but a certain amendment, recently made, has curtailed oral hearing in court as a matter of course and this measure of discretionary  truncation is  attacked  as  fundamentally offensive to  judicial justice  of which  this Court  is the highest custodian. "If the salt hath lost his savour, where- with shall  it be  salted ?"  Surely, this Court’s procedure should be  the  paradigm,  nothing  short  of  it.  So,  the question is  whether it  is so  heathen to make oral hearing discretionary at  the review  stage and at the Supreme Court level that  the rule  can be  condemned as  constitutionally apostate ?  Another fatal  infirmity was also pointed out as the arguments proceeded, viz., that a hostile discrimination had been  made by  r. 2(1)  against litigants  who moved for review in criminal proceedings as against those in the civil jurisdiction. He  will relegate  it for  consideration to  a later stage.      The relevant original rules ran thus:           2. (1)  An application  for review  shall be  by a      petition, and  shall be  filed within  thirty days from      the date of the 894      judgment or  order sought  to be reviewed. It shall set      out clearly  the grounds  for review  and shall, unless      otherwise ordered  by the  Court, be  accompanied by  a      certificate from  the  Advocate  who  appeared  at  the      hearing of  the case  for the  party seeking review, or      where the  party appeared  in person, from any advocate      of this  Court, that it is supported by proper grounds.      The certificate  shall be  in the  form of  a  reasoned      opinion.           (2)  No   application  for   review  in   a  civil      proceeding  shall   be  entertained  unless  the  party      seeking review furnishes to the Registrar of this Court      at the  time of  filing the  petition for  review, cash      security to  the extent  of two thousand rupees for the      costs of the opposite party.           3. An  application  for  review  shall  be  posted      before the  Court for  preliminary hearing and order as      to the issue of notice to the opposite party. Upon such      hearing, the  Court may  either dismiss the petition or      direct a  notice to  the opposite party and adjourn the      hearing for  such party  to be  heard. A  petition  for      review shall as far as practicable be posted before the      same Judge  or  Bench  of  Judges  that  delivered  the      judgment or order sought to be reviewed.           4. Where  on  application  for  review  the  Court      reverses or modifies its former decision in the case on

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    the ground of mistake of law or fact, the Court may, if      it thinks  fit in  the interests  of justice  to do so,      direct the  refund to  the petitioner  of the court-fee      paid on  the application in whole or in part, as it may      think fit.      The corresponding amended rules read thus:           2. (1)  An application  for review  shall be  by a      petition, and  shall be  filed within  thirty days from      the  date  of  the  judgment  or  order  sought  to  be      reviewed. It  shall set  out clearly  the  grounds  for      review.           (2) No change.           3. [Unless  otherwise ordered  by  the  Court]  an      application  for   review  shall   be  disposed  of  by      circulation  without   any  oral   arguments,  but  the      petitioner may  supplement his  petition by  additional      written arguments.  The Court  may either  dismiss  the      petition or direct notice to the oppo- 895      site party.  An application  for review shall as far as      practicable be circulated to the same Judge or Bench of      Judges that  delivered the  judgment or order sought to      be reviewed.           4. No change.           5. Where an application for review of any judgment      or order  has been  made and  disposed of,  no  further      application for review shall be entertained in the same      matter.      (newly inserted) The vital difference, vis a vis the first point, is that now oral hearing  is no  longer a  right of  the petitioner  but facultative with  the Bench  and  the  ’circulatory’  system replaces the  public hearing  method. A  brief study  of the anatomy of the rules will highlight the points urged.      Dissecting the  rules and comparing their directives we find that  unchecked review has never been the rule. It must be   supported   by   proper   grounds.   Otherwise,   every disappointed litigant  may avenge  his defeat  by a  routine review adventure  and thus  obstruct  the  disposal  of  the ’virgin’ dockets  waiting in  the long queue for preliminary screening  or   careful  final   hearing.  It  is  perfectly reasonable to  insist that  the existence  of proper grounds for review  should be  responsibly vouched  for  before  the further time  of the  court is  taken. So, the original rule required a  certificate to  that effect  by the advocate who earlier had  appeared in  the case. Here, counsel functioned as an officer of the court and, under the mandate of the old r. 2(1)  the Court  granted  or  refused  a  certificate  of review-worthiness.  If   it  was   so  certified,   then   a preliminary oral hearing followed. After such oral argument, the court  issued notice  to the other side or dismissed the petition. The  system was  fair enough  if the certification process worked  well and  real errors  and apparent mistakes marring the  original judgment  were the  restricted grounds for review.  But as  it turned  out, laxity in certification and promiscuity  in filing  review applications  crowded the court with ’unwanted review babies’. The docket crisis which quaked the calendar deepened, to the detriment of litigative justice to the deserving who awaited their turn for hearing. Even otherwise,  frivolous motions  for review  would ignite the ’gambling’  element in  litigation with  the finality of judgments even by the highest court, being left in suspense. If, every vanquished party has a fling at ’review’ lucky dip and if,  perchance, notice  were issued in some cases to the opponent the  latter-and, of  course, the  former, -would be

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put to  great expense  and anxiety.  The very  solemnity  of finality,  so   crucial  to   judicial  justice,   would  be frustrated if such a game were to become popular. And it did become popular, as 896 experience showed. The inflow of meritless review petitions, which were  heard and  dismissed, interrupted  the stream of public justice.  This Court in Sow Chandra Kanta and Anr. v. Sheikh  Habib   was  faced  with  this  problem  and,  while dismissing the review petition, observed how the opportunity for correction  of grave errors was being perverted into the purchase of a fresh appeal to the same court against its own appellate or  other judgment  on the same grounds which were earlier rejected. This Court said:           A review  of a  judgment is  a  serious  step  and      reluctant resort  to it  is proper only where a glaring      omission or  patent mistake  or like  grave  error  has      crept  in  earlier  by  judicial  fallibility.  A  mere      repetition, through different counsel, of old and over-      ruled  arguments,  a  second  trip  over  ineffectually      covered ground  or minor  mistakes  of  inconsequential      import are obviously insufficient. The very strict need      for compliance  with these  factors  is  the  rationale      behind the  insistence of  counsel’s certificate  which      should not  be a  routine affair or a habitual step. It      is neither  fairness to  the court  which  decided  nor      awareness of  the precious public time lost what with a      huge backlog  of  dockets  waiting  in  the  queue  for      disposal, for  counsel to  issue easy  certificates for      entertainment of  review and  fight over again the same      battle which  has been  fought and  lost. The Bench and      the Bar,  we are  sure, are  jointly concerned  in  the      conservation of  judicial  time  for  maximum  use.  We      regret  to  say  that  this  case  is  typical  of  the      unfortunate   but   frequent   phenomenon   of   repeat      performance with  the review label as passport. Nothing      which we  did not hear them has been heard now except a      couple of rulings on points earlier put forward. Maybe,      as counsel  now  urges  and  then  pressed,  our  order      refusing special  leave  was  capable  of  a  different      course. The  present stage  is not  a virgin ground but      review of an earlier order which has the normal feature      of finality. These observations were symptomatic of the ’review syndrome’ which, therefore,  demanded remedying.  And the amended rule purposefully incarnated  under such  auspices to  remove the evil of  reckless reviews by the introduction of preliminary judicial  screening   in  circulation,  replacing  counsel’s certification with  court’s scanning  exercise-an added  but necessitous judicial  burden. If  the  review  petition  and written submissions (for which provision was made) convinced the Court, 897 prima facie,  that material  error had marred the justice or legality of  the earlier judgment or order the case would be posted  for   oral  hearing   in  court.   Otherwise,   not. ’Certworthiness’-an   American    judicial   shorthand   for ’certificate-worthiness’-was,  by  this  amendment,  shifted from counsel  to court.  This, in pith and substance, is the rationale of the amended rule.      Counsel, at  one stage, asked whether there was back-up empirical  research   to  warrant  the  assumptions  in  the amendment, whether  facts and  figures about  the number and nature of  wasted ’review’ time of court and a host of other related aspects  were available.  No such material is before

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us now.  It is fair to confess that the scientific method of undertaking research  and  study  into  public  problems  as prelude to  legislation is  a ’consummation  devoutly to  be wished’ and  lamentably lacking  in our  country; and  court management,  with   special  reference  to  maximisation  of judicial time-a matter of great national moment-is a problem the very  existence of which is currently beyond the keen of juristic research. Where ’awareness’ is absent, ad-hocism is inevitable. But here the experiential evidence of the judges who  considered   and  decided  on  the  amendment  and  the inference available  from the  decisions on review petitions make  good   the  proposition   or  makes-do  for  empirical research.      Be that  as  it  may,  we  are  satisfied  that  enough justification exists  in the  daily experience of this Court to warrant  the change  the way  it has  been done. Even so, constitutional  canons   cannot  be   contravened  even   by pragmatic  compulsions.   Paramountcy  is   paramountcy  and exigency must  bow before  it. What, then, are the paramount principles of constitutionality violated by the amended rule ? Absence  of public  hearing and  oral presentation are the vices identified in counsel’s arguments.      Two major submissions were made to invalidate r. 2(1) . The scuttling  of oral  presentation  and  open  hearing  is subversive of  the basic  creed that public justice shall be rendered from  the public seat, not in secret conclave, that hearing becomes  ’deaf’ if  oral impressiveness is inhibited by the  circulation process, more congenial to the seclusion of bureaucratic  cells, fed  on files,  than to  the  audio- visual argumentation  heard in  the halls of court, which is the insignia  of judicial  justice. Secrecy  and circulation are the  negation of  judicial  procedure.  A  review  is  a judicial proceeding  and its hearing, to fill the bill, must not   run   away   from   the   essentials   of   processual jurisprudence, however  allergic some  judges may  be to the ’sound system’  which is  the heart  of our  forensics. With allotropic modifications,  counsel’s arguments stressed this recurrent theme. 898      We must  make it  perfectly plain, right at the outset, that audi  alterem partem  is a  basic value of our judicial system. Hearing the party affected is too deeply embedded in the consciousness  of our constitutional order. The question is about  the quality, content and character of ’hearing’ in the special  ’review’ situation.  Incidentally, we  may deal with oral  hearing and  its importance in the court process, the possibilities  of its  miniaturisation and,  in  certain categories its substitution by written submissions.      We  agree   that  public   hearing  is   of   paramount significance. Justice,  in the  Indian Republic,  is public; and if  judges shun  the halls of court, read papers at home confer in private and issue final fiats without listening to the bar as the representative of the seekers of justice, the rule of  law could well darken into an arcane trick and back door diktats  issued from  ’robed’-adjudicators  strain  the escutcheon of  justice. We also agree that oral advocacy has a non-fungible  importance in the forensic process which the most brilliant  brief cannot  match and the most alert judge cannot go  without. The  intellectual jallywork of intricate legal  reasoning   and  impassioned  sculpture  of  delicate factual emphasis  may often  be beyond  the craftsmanship of pen and  paper. There  is no  controversy that  disposal  by circulation, Secretariat  fashion, cannot  become a  general judicial technique  nor  silent  notings  replace  Bench-Bar dialogues. We  must clarify one point. ’Circulation’, in the

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judicial context,  merely means,  not in  court through oral arguments but  by discussion at judicial conference. Judges, even  under   the  amended  rule,  must  meet,  collectively cerebrate and  reach conclusions.  Movement  of  files  with notings  cannot   make-do.  Otherwise,   mutual  persuasion, reasoned dissent  and joint  judgment will  be defeated  and machinisation of opinion and assertions of views in absentia will  deprive   judicial  notices   of  that  mental  cross- fertilisation essential  for a  Bench decision.  The learned Solicitor General  strongly urged  that he  was at  one with counsel opposite on this point. We agree.      The key  question is  different. Does  it mean  that by receiving written arguments as provided in the new rule, and reading  and   discussing  at   the  conference   table,  as distinguished from  the ’robed’  appearance on the Bench and hearing  oral   submissions,  what   is  perpetrated  is  so arbitrary, unfair  and  unreasonable  a  ’Pantomini’  as  to crescendo into  unconstitutionality  ?  This  phantasmagoric distortion must  be dismissed  as too  morbid to be regarded seriously-in the  matter of  review petitions at the Supreme Court level.      Let us  look at  the actuality without being scary. The rule under  challenge  does  not  implicate  or  attract  an original hearing at all. It 899 relates to  ’review’ situations. Ex hypothesi, an antecedent judicial hearing and judicial order exist. Indeed, if a full oral hearing  on the  Bench  has  already  taken  place  the dangerousness of  secret disposals  dies out.  What is asked for is  a review  or second  look at the first order. Should this second consideration be plenary ? Never. The focus must be limited  to obvious,  serious errors  in the first order. Indiscriminate second  consideration cannot  be purchased by more payment of court fee. We reject the strange plea one of the advocates put forward that since the petitioner had paid court-fee for review he had the right to the full panoply of oral hearing ad libitem covering the whole range.      Review must  be restricted if the hard-pressed judicial process is  not to be a wasting disease. There are many ways of limiting its scope, content and modality. The confinement to certain  special grounds,  as in Order 47 Rule 1, C.P.C., is  one   way.  The   requirement  of   counsel’s   reasoned certificate  of   fitness  (Certworthiness)  for  review  is another. Judicial  screening to discover the presence, prima facie, of good grounds to hear counsel in oral submission is a third.  The first  is good  and continues.  The second was tried and  found ineffective  and the  third is being tried. Legislative policy  is experimental  as  life  itself  is  a trial- and-error  adventure. What  is  shocking  about  this third alternative  ? Judges  scrutinise-the same  judges who have once  heard oral  arguments and  are familiar  with the case-and, if  they do  not play  truant, direct a hearing in court if  they find  good grounds.  If there is ground, oral hearing follows.  It is  not as  if  all  oral  advocacy  is altogether shut  out. Only  if preliminary judicial scrutiny is not able to discern any reason to review is oral exercise inhibited. The  court process is not a circus or opera where the audience  can clamour  for encore.  When the  system  is under the  severe stress of escalating case-load, management of  Justice  Business  justifies  forbiddance  of  frivolous reviews  by   scrutiny  in  limine  on  the  written  brief. Justicing too is in need of engineering.      In  many  jurisdictions  oral  submissions  and  public hearings are  disallowed in  like circumstances.  In England and America where orality in advocacy has been apotheosised,

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certain extended  stages of ’hearing’ in the superior courts have been slimmed or removed. Even disposal of petitions for leave in  judicial conference,  without a Bench hearing, has been in vogue.      This  Court,   as  Sri  Garg  rightly  emphasised,  has assigned special value to public hearing, and courts are not caves nor  cloisters but  shrines of  justice accessible for public prayer  to all  the people. Rulings need not be cited for this basic proposition. But every judicial exercise need 900 not be  a public  show. When  judges meet  in conference  to discuss it  need not  be televised  on the nation’s network. The right to be heard is of the essence but hearing does not mean more  than fair opportunity to present one’s point on a dispute, followed  by a  fair consideration thereof by fair- minded judges.  Let us  not  romanticise  this  process  nor stretch it  to snap it. Presentation can be written or oral, depending on  the  justice  of  the  situation.  Where  oral persuasiveness is  necessary it  is unfair to exclude it and therefore, arbitrary too. But where oral presentation is not that essential,  its exclusion  is not  obnoxious.  What  is crucial  in   the  guarantee   of  the   application  of  an instructed, intelligent,  impartial and  open  mind  to  the points presented.  A blank  judge wearied by oral aggression is  prone  to  slumber  while  an  alert  mind  probing  the ’papered’ argument  may land  on vital  aspects. To swear by orality or  to swear  at manuscript  advocacy is as wrong as judicial allergy  to arguments  in court.  Oftentimes, it is the judge  who will  ask for  oral argument  as it  aids him much. To  be  left  helpless  among  ponderous  paper  books without  the   oral  highlights   of  counsel,   is  counter productive. Extremism fails in law and life.      We agree  that the  normal rule of the judicial process is oral hearing and its elimination an unusual exception. We are now  on the  vires of  a rule  relating to review in the highest  court.   A  full-dress  hearing,  to  the  abundant accompaniment of  public presence  and oral  submission,  is over. It  is a  second probe.  Here  written  arguments  are given. The  entire papers  are with  the judges.  The judges themselves  are   the  same  persons  who  have  heard  oral presentation earlier. Moreover, it is a plurality of judges, not only one. Above all, if prima facie grounds are made out a further  oral hearing  is directed.  Granting  basic  bona fides in the judges of the highest court it is impossible to argue that partial foreclosure of oral arguments in court is either unfair  or unreasonable  or so vicious an invasion of natural justice  as to be ostracised from our constitutional jurisprudence. It  must be  remembered that  review is not a second dose  of  the  same  arguments  once  considered  and rejected. The  rejection might  have  been  wrong  but  that cannot be  helped. Dissenting minorities regard the dominant majorities wrong  in their judgments but there is no helping it.      It  may   not  be   inept  to  refer  to  the  critical distinction,  even   where  review   of  fundamental  rights proceeding is  sought, between an original or virgin hearing and a  second look  at or review of the order already passed after a full hearing. In Lala Ram’s case this Court accented on the essential distinction between an original application for the 901 enforcement of  fundamental rights  and  an  application  to review the order made therein. It was there observed:           The main  purpose of  a review  petition is not to      enforce a  fundamental right,  but to  reopen an  order

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    vitiated by  an error  on the face of the record or for      such other  reasons. But  it is said that the effect of      reopening of  the earlier order would be to restore his      application  to  enforce  the  fundamental  right  and,      therefore, in  effect and  substance, an application to      review such  an order is also an application to enforce      the fundamental  right.  It  may  be  that  this  is  a      consequence of  reopening an order, but the application      itself,  as  we  have  said,  is  not  to  enforce  the      fundamental right.      Is there  any nexus  between the  elimination  of  oral advocacy and  the goal  of dispensation of justice ? Counsel urge there is none. We cannot agree. The goal to be attained is maximisation of judicial time and celerity of disposal of review petitions.  And, despite the heavier burden thrown on the judges  during  the  hours  outside  court  sittings  by agreeing to  read through  and discuss the review papers for themselves, there  is obvious  acceleration of  disposal  of review petitions  without intrusion into court time. Equally clearly, the benches are able to spare more time for hearing cases. To  sum up,  the advantages of the circulation system linked up with the objects of saving judge-time in court and prompter  despatch  of  review  petitions  are  obvious.  To organize review  Benches of  the same judges who first heard the case  only to last for a few minutes or a little longer, then to  disperse and re-arrange regular Benches, especially when most of the review petitions are repeat performances in futility, is a judicial circus the court can ill afford. The rule is rational, the injury is marginal.      The magic of the spoken word, the power of the Socratic process and  the instant  clarity of  the bar-bench dialogue are too  precious to  be parted with although a bad advocate can successfully  spoil a  good case if the judges rely only on oral  arguments for  weaving their  decision. The written brief, before  careful judges,  can be  a surer  process  of deeper communication  than the ’vanishing cream’ of speaking submissions. And  a new  skill-preparation of  an  effective brief, truly  brief, highly telling and tersely instructive- is an  art of the pen worth the acquisition especially when, in practice,  there are  many gifted  lawyers  who  go  with Goldsmith who  ’wrote like  an angel  and talked  like  poor Paul’. India is neither England nor America and our forensic technology must be fashioned by our needs and resources. 902 Indeed, in  this Court,  counsel have begun to rely heavily, with  good   reason,  on   written  submissions   and   oral ’sweeteners’. The  Bench can never go it alone. The bar must collaborate and catalyse.      Nor is  there any attempt, in this circulation rule, to run away  from the  open. Secret  sittings, exclusion of the public and  cabals  in  conclave  are  bete  noire  for  the judicial process.  A review  implies an earlier full hearing and, if  warranted, a  future further hearing. Every measure has to  be viewed  in perspective,  not out  of  focus.  The consternation that the court, by hidden procedures, may undo the ’open’  heritage is  a chimerical fear or a disingenuous dread.      In  other  jurisdictions  which  our  jurists  hold  in anglophilic esteem,  this  practice  is  current  coin.  The balancing of  oral advocacy  and written  presentation is as much a matter of principle as of pragmatism. The compulsions of realities,  without compromise on basics, offer the sound solution in  a given  situation. There are no absolutes in a universe of relativity. The pressure of the case-load on the judges’ limited  time, the  serious responsibility to bestow

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the  best  thought  on  the  great  issues  of  the  country projected on  the court’s  agenda, the  deep study and large research which must lend wisdom to the pronouncements of the Supreme  Court   which  enjoy   awesome  finality   and  the unconscionable backlog  of chronic litigation which converts the expensive  end-product through  sheer  protraction  into sour  injustice-all   these   emphasise   the   urgency   of rationalising and  streamlining court management with a view to saving  court time  for the most number of cases with the least sacrifice  of quality  and turnover.  If without  much injury, a  certain class of cases can be disposed of without oral hearing, there is no good reason for not making such an experiment. If,  on a  close perusal  of the paper-book, the judges find  that there  is no merit or statable case, there is no special virtue in sanctifying the dismissal by an oral ritual. The  problem really  is to  find out  which class of cases may, without risk of injustice, be disposed of without oral presentation.  This is  the final  court of provisional infallibility, the  summit court,  which not merely disposes of  cases   beyond  challenge,  but  is  also  the  judicial institution entrusted with the constitutional responsibility of authoritatively declaring the law of the land. Therefore, if oral  hearing will  perfect the  process it should not be dispensed with.  Even so,  where issues  of national  moment which the  Supreme Court alone can adequately tackle are not involved, and  if a considerable oral hearing and considered order have  already been rendered, a review petition may not be  so   demanding  upon   the  judge’s  ’Bench’  attention, especially if,  on the  face of  it, there  is nothing  new, nothing grave  at stake.  Even here,  if there  is some case calling for examination or suggestive 903 of an earlier error, the court may well post the case for an oral hearing.  (Disposal by circulation is a calculated risk where no problem or peril is visible.)      Oral argument  has been restricted at several stages in the judicial process in many countries. In the United States the problem of a large number of frivolous petitions for re- hearing (in  our diction,  review) filed by counsel provoked the court  into framing restrictive rules of hearing. One of the rules prescribes:           A petition  for rehearing  is not  subject to oral      argument, and will not be granted, unless a justice who      concurred in the judgment or decision desires it, and a      majority of the court so determines. In England,  leave to  appeal to  the House  of Lords  is  a pattern of  proceedings where  obligatory oral  hearing does not always  exist. The  recent  practice  direction  may  be usefully referred to here:           As from  October 1,  1976 Petitions  for leave  to      appeal to  the House  of Lords  will be  referred to an      Appeal Committee  consisting of  three Lords of Appeal,      who will  consider whether  the petition  appears to be      competent to  be received  by the  House  and,  if  so,      whether it should be referred for an oral hearing.           Where a petition is not considered fit for an oral      hearing, the  Clerk of  the Parliaments will notify the      parties that the petition is dismissed. Justice John  M. Harlan  of the  U.S. Supreme  Court  wrote, while explaining  the need for controlling court work within manageable proportions,           ...... it would be short sighted and unwise not to      recognise that preserving the certiorari system in good      health, and  in proper  balance with  the other work of      the Court,  are matters  that will  increasingly demand

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    thoughtful and  imaginative attention.  As I have tried      to show,  the essence  of the  problem as  things stand      today is  to guard  against wasteful encroachments upon      the Court’s  time by  preventing an increase in, if not      reducing, the  volume of  improvident applications  for      certiorari.                                             (emphasis added) 904      It is significant that in the U. S. Supreme Court leave to appeal is decided in conference, not in court and even in regular hearing  the maximum  time  for  argument  is  often restricted in  the highest court. Under r. 28 it is one hour for each side. The mechanics of controlling argument time is interesting and instructive.           Counsel arguing should keep track of his own time-      when he  started and  how much  he has  left. There  is      large clock  in front  of him.  A note  on the  counsel      table admonished  counsel not  to ask the Chief Justice      what time remains.           When counsel  has only  five minutes left, a white      light on  the lectern  immediately in front of him goes      on. When  time has  expired, a  red light  goes on. The      Chief Justice  is likely  to stop  counsel immediately,      seldom allowing  him to  do more  than  to  finish  his      sentence. The  red light  also marks the time to recess      for lunch  at two  o’clock, and  the end  of the  day’s      session at 4.30 p.m. The rationale of reducing oral submissions without danger to efficacy  or   advocacy  is  explained  by  George  Rossman, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon:           Crowded dockets  have forced  appellate courts  to      curtail the  time allotted  for oral argument, with the      result that  some  members  of  the  profession  wonder      whether courts care for oral argument.. The practice of      today shows  that advocacy can be effective even though      the period  of delivery is short. Some attorneys can be      effective even  though the period of delivery is short.      Some attorneys  can do  wonders in  thirty minutes when      nothing more is available. The English practice, of course, is different. Delmar Karlan has correctly set out the situation:           In the United States, oral arguments are secondary      in importance to the briefs, and are rigidly limited in      duration. In  the United States Supreme Court, one hour      is allowed  to each side, but in many appellate courts,      less time  that is  permitted, frequently  no more than      fifteen minutes  Or a  half-hour for each side. Reading      by counsel  is frowned  upon. The judges do not wish to      hear what  they can read for themselves. They expect to      get all the information they need 905      about  the   judgment  below,   the  evidence  and  the      authorities relied  upon from  studying the  briefs and      record on appeal. They do not even encourage counsel to      discuss in  detail the precedents claimed to govern the      decision, preferring  to do  that job  by themselves in      the relative privacy of their chambers, with or without      the assistance of law clerks.           In England,  where there  are no  written  briefs,      oral  arguments  are  all  important.  They  are  never      arbitrarily limited  in duration.  While some  last for      only a  few minutes,  others go  on for many days, even      weeks. The  only control  ordinarily exercised over the      time of  oral argument are informal, ad hoc suggestions      from the judges.

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    The methods  of the  Marble Palace  in Washington  D.C. have some  relevance though certainly not compulsiveness for us. John Frank writes:           As the  docket of  the Court  became more crowded,      necessarily  the  time  allowed  for  argument  had  to      shrink. Under today’s system the time is either a half-      hour or  an  hour  for  each  side,  depending  on  the      complexities of the case. This obviously precludes long      introductions or  eloquent perorations. Time is usually      rigidly controlled;  the legend  is that  Chief Justice      Hughes once  cut off  an attorney  in the middle of the      word "if". If there are not too many interruptions, the      hour is sufficient; lawyers must learn to be brief. We assume  that judges  will be up to the additional strain. We have  stated enough to establish that judicial justice is not sabotaged  by the  eclipse of  oral argument  in a small sector of  the forensic  process. That  is all that has been done by  the  amendment.  A  brief  comparison  between  the earlier and the current position will bring this out.      In the  earlier rule  a certificate by the lawyer was a condition  precedent   for  entertainment   of  the   review proceeding. In  the revised  rule, no certificate by counsel but  certification   by  the  Bench  that,  prima  facie  an infirmity of  the kind  mentioned in  the rule vitiates, the judgment takes  its place.  Thereafter in  both  cases  oral advocacy follows.  Thus the  only difference  is not,  as is some times  assumed, that  oral arguments  are for the first time and  finally cut  out. Even  now, oral  hearing may  be given and  is given, not routinely but if ground is made out to the  satisfaction of  the judges who first heard the case (ignoring exceptional  situations for  the present). We have stated enough to repel 906 the attack  on the  vires of  the rule.  Nothing  arbitrary, nothing arcane, nothing obnoxious, given a sober appraisal.      The possible impression that we are debunking the value of oral  advocacy in  open court  must be erased. Experience has shown  that, at  all levels, the bar, through the spoken word and  the  written  brief,  has  aided  the  process  of judicial justice. Justicing is an art even as advocacy is an art.  Happy  interaction  between  the  two  makes  for  the functional fulfilment  of  the  court  system.  No  judicial ’emergency’ can jettison the vital breath of spoken advocacy in an  open forum.  Indeed, there  is no  judicial  cry  for extinguishment of oral argument altogether. But the time has come for a proper evaluation of the role of oral argument at the appellate  level  in  the  decisional  process.  Justice Harlan has insisted that oral argument should play a leading part. It  is not  "a traditionally  tolerated  part  of  the appellate process"  but a decisively effective instrument of appellate advocacy.  He rightly stresses that there are many judges "who  are more  receptive  to  the  spoken  than  the written word". He hits the nail on the head when he states:           For my  part, there  is no substitute, even within      the time  limits afforded  by  the  busy  calendars  of      modern appellate  courts, for  the Socratic  method  of      procedure in  getting at the real heart of an issue and      in finding out where the truth lies. We wholly  endorse the  conclusion of that experienced Judge of the  United States  Supreme Court  when he  concludes his thesis on oral arguments:           Oral argument  is exciting  and will  return  rich      dividends if  it is done well. And I think it will be a      sorry day for the American bar if the place of the oral      argument in  our appellate  courts is  depreciated  and

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    oral  advocacy   becomes  looked  upon  as  a  proforma      exercise which,  because of tradition or because of the      insistence of his client, a lawyer has to go through.      The importance of oral advocacy has been the subject of many articles  by  learned  writers.  As  Frederick  Bernays Wiener writes in the Harvard Law Review:           Appellate judges, virtually without exception, say      that a  case should  never be  submitted  without  oral      argument. A  good many  are on  record in  print to the      same effect, and 907      add that  they feel  a sense of genuine regret whenever      the clerk  announces that  a case is being submitted on      briefs alone.  These expressions  reflect the  fact the      task of  judgment is  infinitely harder when counsel is      not  present  to  be  questioned  regarding  his  exact      position or  the limits of a principle he has argued in      the brief. We concur with the view expressed by American Judges on oral advocacy           In the  Supreme Court,  flexibility is  especially      essential Chief  Justice Hughes  in 1928  characterised      the  argument   before  the   Supreme  Court  as  "oral      discussions". The  then Professor Frankfurter stated in      1933, "The  atmosphere of  the Court  is uncongenial to      oratory and the restrictions imposed on counsel tend to      deflate rhetoric.  But true argument-the exploration of      issues, particularly through sharp questioning from the      bench-continues to  be one  of the liveliest traditions      of the Court." Thus, among  the methods  of persuasion,  the power  of  the spoken word  cannot be  sacrificed without paying too high a price in  the quality  of justice  especially in the Supreme Court litigation. Maybe, that the brief is valuable; indeed, a well  prepared brief gives the detailed story of the case; the oral  argument gives the high spots. The supreme success of oral  argument and  the grave risk of jettisoning it from the repertoire  of persuasive  arts in  the judicial process consists in George Rossman’s observation:           The oral  argument can portray the case as a human      experience which  engulfed the  parties but  which they      could not  solve. Thus,  the oral  argument can help to      keep the law human and adapted to the needs of life. It      typifies the Bar at its best.      We may  sum up  that the value of oral submissions need not be under-rated nor of written briefs over-rated. A blend of both  is the best. It is apt to repeat the words of Judge Brian Mckenna.           The fault is that the rules of our procedure which      by  their   discouragement  of  written  argument  make      possible extensively protracted bearings in open court.      Those responsible might think more of changing them. In      civil cases  a written argument supplemented by a short      oral discussion,  would sometimes  save a great deal of      time. 908 The judicial  process is  in crisis  not because  there is a flood of  cases flowing  into the  courts. In  a  developing country with an awakened people and democratic rights, it is inevitable that  the  litigative  Ganga  may  swell  in  its stream, but as justice Warren Burger wrote:           In the  final third  of the  century we  are still      trying to  operate the  courts with  fundamentally  the      same basic  methods, the  same procedures  and the same      machinery, Roscoe  Pound said  were not  good enough in

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    1906. In  the super-market age we are trying to operate      the courts  with cracker-barrel  corner grocer  methods      and equipment-vintage 1900. We have  to introduce  management techniques  and  sensitive skills in  the administration  of  justice  if  its  present pathological   conditions   are   to   receive   therapeutic attention.  The   Rule  regarding  the  disposal  of  review petitions by  circulatory conference,  supplemented by  oral hearing in appropriate cases, is one small step in the right direction. Indeed,  by  modernising  our  procedure  we  are furthering social  justice for  which the litigant community is waiting.      We have  set out  the parameters  of judicial procedure vis-a-vis original  hearings and  review hearings having due regard to the realities of forensic life. In the dynamics of hearing orality  does play a role at the first round, but at the second  round in  the same  court is  partly expendable. After all,  romance with oral hearing must terminate at some point. Nor  can it  be made  a "sacred  cow" of the judicial process. Comparative  law lends  confidence  and  from  that angle we  may refer  to Halsbury  (Vol. 10,  para 761) where disposal, without  oral hearing,  of petitions  to leave  to appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords  is  mentioned.  Likewise, American Jurisprudence  (Vol. 5 para 979 especially footnote 13) endorses a similar procedure.      Sri  Mridul   pressed  upon  us  that  this  judge-made legislation at the highest level was so plainly violative of Art. 14-an  objection not  spelt out  in any  writ  petition before us  that, without  seeking refuge  under the  rule of practice that  a point  not raised  in the writ petition may not be allowed to be urged, the judges must invalidate their own handiwork. Surely, Justice and Truth are never afraid of exposure nor  bothered about  prestige. Certainly,  drafting legislation is  not an  easy art  and judges are not artists beyond their  orbit. Even  otherwise, Homer nods. Therefore, if we  find our  rules void  we must declare so and we will. The  omission   of  the  ground  of  discrimination  in  the pleadings may  often forbid  the argument  because the other side may  be prejudiced or the necessary facts may not be on record. But here 909 no such  disability exists. A technical objection should not throw out a suitor from the plea for justice. After all, the courts belong  to the people, as Jerome Frank once said. And litigants  are  legal  patients  suffering  from  injustices seeking healing  for their wounds. Would you tell a sufferer in hospital that because he disclosed a certain symptom very late therefore  he would be discharged without treatment for the sin  of delayed  disclosure ? Humanism, which, at bottom sustains  justice,   cannot   refuse   relief   unless,   by entertaining the  plea, another  may sustain injury. We have permitted the contention and proceed to consider it.      The rule,  on its  face, affords a wider set of grounds for review  for orders  in civil proceedings, but limits the ground vis-a-vis criminal proceedings to ’errors apparent on the face  of the  record’. If at all, the concern of the law to avoid  judicial error  should be  heightened when life or liberty is  in peril  since civil  penalties are  often less traumatic. So,  it is  reasonable to assume that the framers of the  rules could  not have  intended a restrictive review over criminal  orders or  judgments. It  is likely to be the other way  about. Supposing an accused is sentenced to death by the  Supreme Court  and the  ’deceased’ shows up in court and the court discovers the tragic treachery of the recorded testimony. Is the Court helpless to review and set aside the

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sentence of hanging? We think not. The power to review is in Art. 137 and it is equally wide in all proceedings. The rule merely canalises  the flow  from the reservoir of power. The stream cannot  stifle the  source. Moreover, the dynamics of interpretation depend  on the  demand of the context and the lexical limits of the text. Here ’record’ means any material which is  already on  record or  may, with the permission of the court,  be brought  on record.  If justice  summons  the judges to  allow a vital material in, it becomes part of the record, and  if apparent  error is there, correction becomes necessitous.      The purpose  is plain;  the  language  is  elastic  and interpretation  of  a  necessary  power  must  naturally  be expansive. The  substantive power  is derived  from Art. 137 and is  as wide  for criminal as for civil proceedings. Even the difference  in phraseology in the rule (Order 40 Rule 2) must, therefore,  be read to encompass the same area and not to engraft  an artificial  divergence productive of anomaly. If the  expression ’record’ is read to mean, in its semantic sweep, any  material even  later brought on record, with the leave of  the court,  it will embrace subsequent events, new light and  other grounds which we find in Order 47 Rule 1 C. P. C.  We see no insuperable difficulty in equating the area in civil  and criminal  proceedings  when  review  power  is invoked from the same source. 910      True, the  review power  vis-a-vis criminal matters was raised only in the course of the debate at the Bar. But when the  whole   case  is   before  us   we  must   surely  deal comprehensively with  every aspect  argued and not piecemeal with  truncated   parts.  That  will  be  avoidance  of  our obligation. We  have, therefore,  cleared the  ground as the question is of moment, of frequent occurrence and was mooted in the  course of  the hearing. This pronouncement on review jurisdiction in criminal proceedings sets at rest a possible controversy and  is as  much binding  on this  Court  itself (unless over-ruled)  as on litigants. That is the discipline of the law of precedents and the import of Art. 141.      As we conclude, we wish to set the sights aright vis-a- vis  oral   hearings  in   judicial  proceedings.   To   put superstitious  faith   in  oral   submissions  or  unlimited argumentation  as   the  sole   means  of  presentation  and persuasion and  to  debunk  the  potency  of  well  drawn-up manuscript representations may be condemned as absurd. True, our judicial  culture nourishes  oral  advocacy  and  public hearing since  secret cerebrations  and cabal  deliberations are ordinarily  anathema. Speaking  generally, oral advocacy is a  decisive art  in promoting  justice. The  Bench cannot dispense with  the  Bar.  In  our  system  advocacy  becomes functional when  present  viva  voce  and  is  enfeebled  if presented in  muted print.  We do not claim that orality can be given  a permanent  holiday. Such an attitude is an over- reaction to  argumentum ad  nauseum. But we must importantly underscore that  while lawyer’s  advocacy cannot  be made to judicial measure  especially if  judges are impatient, there is  a   strong  case   for   processing   argumentation   by rationalisation, streamlining,  abbreviation and in, special situations, elimination.  Review proceedings  in the Supreme Court belongs  to the  last category.  There is  no rigidity about forensic  strategies  and  the  court  must  retain  a flexible power  in regard  to  limiting  the  time  of  oral arguments or,  in  exceptional  cases,  eliminating  orality altogether, the  paramount  principle  being  fair  justice. Therefore, it  is quite on the cards that where no injury to justice will  be all,  orality may suffer partial eclipse in

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the shape  of time-limitation  or  substitution  by  written submission even in categories other than review proceedings. All that  we mean to indicate is that the mode of ’hearing’, whether it  should be  oral or  written or  both, whether it should be  full-length or  rationed, must  depend on  myriad factors and future developments. Judges of the Supreme Court must be  trusted in  this regard and the Bar will ordinarily be associated  when decisions  affecting processual  justice are taken.  We thus  see no  disparity given  flexibility in decoding the meaning of meanings.      We see  no force in the challenges and do hope that the Bar will  make its  contribution to  making  experiments  in modernization and  humanization of  the Justice  System  and court culture. 911      PATHAK, J. We are in general agreement with our brother V. R.  Krishna Iyer on the points directly in controversy in this writ  petition, but  we consider  it desirable to say a few words  on certain aspects concerning the scope of Rule 3 of Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.      At the  outset, we may state that as we are considering the question  of the need for an oral hearing in relation to a review  application only,  we refrain  from expressing any opinion  on   the  point  whether  an  oral  hearing  is  an imperative requirement  in the  disposal of  other kinds  of cases brought before the Court. That is a point to which, we think, we  should address  ourselves only  when it  directly arises.      In regard  to a review application we are clear that an oral hearing  is  not  an  essential  requirement  if  on  a preliminary examination  the review  application is found to be devoid  of substance.  A review application is an attempt to obtain  a reconsideration  of the  judgment of  the court disposing of the substantive proceeding. It attempts nothing more. The  merits  of  the  controversy  have  already  been examined by  the Court and, in view of the ordinary scope of the  power  of  review,  the  re-examination  sought  cannot proceed beyond  the controversy  already disposed  of. It is substantially  the   same  ground  traversed  again,  either entirely or in part. However, the Rule takes care to provide for oral arguments should the Court consider that necessary. That necessity  may arise  in either  of two  cases. On  the review application being placed before the judges, they will consider it  together with  any additional written arguments filed by  the petitioner  in supplementation  of the  review application. If  the judges  hold on  that screening  of the review application  that there  is no  case  what  ever  for review, they  will reject  the review  application.  On  the contrary, they  may find  that a  good prima  facie case for review has  been made out, and so they will direct notice to issue to  the respondent, and upon that an oral hearing will take place  in the  presence of  the parties.  That  is  one occasion on  which an  oral hearing  is  necessary.  If  the judges are  not convinced  that a  prima facie case has been made out  by  the  review  application,  but  are  also  not satisfied that  there is no merit whatever in it, and are of opinion that  in order  to come  to a definite opinion prima facie  on  the  merits  of  the  review  application  it  is desirable to  hear the applicant orally they will notify him accordingly and  afford an  opportunity of  oral hearing. On such  oral  hearing,  the  judges  may  dismiss  the  review application if  finally satisfied  that there  is  no  prima facie case  for review,  but in  the event  of a prima facie case  being   made  out  they  will  issues  notice  to  the respondent and  an oral  hearing will follow in the presence

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of the  parties. It  is apparent  that the  denial  of  oral argument is confined to the preliminary stage 912 only, when  the review  application  is  placed  before  the judges and,  as it  were, they  screen it for the purpose of determining whether  there is  reason to  proceed further in the matter  or whether  it merits  outright rejection. It is not possible  to hold  on principle that at that preliminary stage also, the applicant for review is entitled to be heard orally. The  merit of  an oral  hearing lies  in  this  that counsel addressing  the court  are able  to discern what are the aspects  of the  controversy  on  which  more  light  is needed. The  Court likewise  can utilise  an oral hearing in order  to   express  its   doubts  on   a  point   and  seek clarification thereon from counsel. But if there is on doubt whatever that  the review  application  is  totally  without substance, an  oral hearing  becomes a  superfluity and,  at best, a mere formality.      A written submission is capable of careful drafting and explicit expression,  and is amenable to such arrangement in its written  content that  it pointedly brings to the notice of the reader the true scope and merit of the submission. We do not  believe  that  a  written  submission  in  a  review application cannot  do adequate  justice in  the  matter  of setting forth the case of the litigant. If there is need for an oral hearing it is for the reason mentioned earlier, that counsel come  to know of the doubts in the mind of the Court and the  court has  an  opportunity  of  having  its  doubts resolved. It  is this feature of an oral hearing which gives to it  its primary  value and  relevance. But  that an  oral hearing is  mandatory in  all classes  of cases and at every stage of  every case  is a  proposition  to  which  we  find ourselves unable to accede.      The writ  petition is  dismissed, but without any order as to costs. P.B.R.    Petitions dismissed. 913