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PETITIONER: PUNJAB NAT.IONA.L BANK, DASUYA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CHAJJU RAM & ORS.  .

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       01/08/2000

BENCH: B.N.Kirpal, A.P.Misra, Ruma Pal

JUDGMENT:

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     KIRPAL, J:

     Special leave granted.

     The  .appellant, on 26th August, 1988 filed a suit for recovery  of  Rs.   6,19,250/-  in   the  Civil  Court.   By judgment.   dated  16th  February, 1994,  the  trial  court, decreed  the suit.  for the aforesaid amount with  interest. at.   the rate of 16/1/2 per cent.  per annum from the  date of filing of the suit t.ill the recovery of money.  On 21st. December,  1994, an execution application .was filed by  the appellant,  before  the  Court,  of  Civil  Judge,   Dasuya. According  to  the appellant, an amount,  of  Rs.l2,91,398/- being  the principal amount, of Rs.6,19,250/- plus interest, thereon  as per the decree, had become due & payable and  it was  in  respect,  of  this  amount,  that.   execution  was sought..

     In  the meanwhile on 25th June, ,1993, the Recovery of Debts  Due  to  Banks and Financial Institutions  Act,  1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") had come into force.

     On  30th  August;   1994, a Tribunal was set.   up  in Jaipur  and it was given jurisdiction to decide claims  even with regard to those arising in the State of Punjab, On 18th February,  1997, the.  appellant moved an application before the  Civil  Court,  Dasuya.  for transfer of  the  execution proceedings  to  the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur.   This application  was  allowed  and the trial court  ordered  the transfer  of the execution proceedings to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur.

     The respondents thereupon filed a revision petition in the High Court.  By judgment dated 1st April, 1999) the High Court  came to the conclusion, while reversing the  decision of  the  trial court, that the execution  proceedings  could not.   be  transferred  and it.  is only the  Civil  Court., which  had passed the decree, which could execute the  same. Hence, this appeal by special leave.

     The  point  in  issue is no  longer  resintegra  After analysing  the  provisions  of  the   Act,  this  Court,  in Allahabad  Bank vs.  Canara Bank & Another.  JT 2000 (4)  SC 411  held  that the word ^proceeding* in Section 31  of  the

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Act.  would include an execution proceeding pending before a Civil  Court  before  the commencement of the Act.   It  was further  held  that,  the suits and proceedings  so  pending would  stand  transferred to the Tribunal.  This  conclusion emanated  from  the  fact that the definition  of  the  word ’debt*  contained  in Section 2(g) of the Act, inter  all.a, meant  any liability which was due to a bank and was payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court.  The

     decretal  amount,  being  a  debt.   as  envisaged  by Section  2(g)  would  clearly attract,  t.he  provisions  of Sections  17  and  18  of the  Act.   which  give  exclusive jurisdiction  to  the  Tribunals constituted  thereunder  to decide  the questions regarding recovery of debts due to the banks  a.nd financial institutions.  Section 31 which  deals with transfer of cases reads as under :

     "31.   Transfer of pending cases.  - (1) Every suit or other  proceeding  pending before any court  .   immediately before  the  date of establishment of a Tribunal under  this Act,  being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it  is  based  is such that it would have been,  if  it  had arisen  after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such  Tribunal,  shall stand tra.nsf erred on that, date  to such Tribunal.

     Provided  that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court.

     (2)  Where  any  suit,  or  other  proceeding   stands transferred  from any court to a Tribunal under  sub-section (1), -

     (a)  the  court shall, as soon as may’ be- after  such transfer,  forward  the  records  of   such  suit  or  other proceeding to the Tribunal;  and

     (b)  the  Tribunal may, on receipt cof  such  records) proceed  to deal with such suit of other proceeding, so  far as  may  be,  in  the  same manner’ as in  the  case  of  an application  made under Section 19 from the stage which was" reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de novo as the Tribunal may deem fit,"

     A  bare  reading of the aforesaid Section  shows  that execution  application being a proceeding pending in a Civil Court when the Act came into force was liable to be

     transferred  to  the Tribunal because the  amount  for which  the  execution application had been filed as per  the decree which had been passed, was over Rs.  10 lakhs.

     Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the use  of the words ’cause of action* in Section 31  indicated that  it  is only penning suits which could be  transferred. We  are  unable  to agree with this submission.   The  words ’cause of action’ are preceded by the words ’being a suit or proceeding’’.   Section  .31  contemplates   not  only   the transfer  of a suit but also transfer of a proceeding  which may  be  other than a suit, like an  execution  application. Understood  in  this  context, the words ’being  a  suit  or proceeding  the cause of action whereon it is based ...,...* would  mean that in the case of an execution application  if the  decree  is for more than Rs, .  10 lakhs, then that  is the  cause  of action or the reason for an  application  for

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execution being filed before the Tribunal.

     To  put matters beyond doubt, the Act has been amended by  the  Recovery  of  Debts  Due  to  Banks  and  Financial Institutions  (Amendment) Act, 2000 and Section 31A has been inserted which reads as follows :

     "31A.   Power  of  Tribunal to  issue  certificate  of recovery in case of decree or order, - (1) Where a decree or order was passed by any court before the commencement of the Recovery  of  Debts Due to Banks and Financial  Institutions (Amendment)  Act, 2000 and’ has not yet been executed, then, the decree-holder may

     apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of the amount,

     (2)  On  receipt of an application  under  sub-section (1),  the Tribunal may issue a certificate for recovery to a Recovery Officer.

     (  3  ) On receipt of a certificate under  sub-section (2)  )  the Recovery Officer shall proceed to  recover  t.he amount  as  if  it was a certificate in respect- of  a  debt recoverable under this Act."

     The aforesaid Section 31A is clearly applicable in the present  case.   The decree was passed by court  before  the commencement  of the Amendment Act and the same has not yet. been executed.  At least after the amendment, it is only the Tribunal  which would have the jurisdiction of  entertaining the  application for execution of the decree inasmuch as the amount due for which the decree was sought to be executed is over Rs.lO lakhs.  We are also unable to agree with the High Court that because t.he original decree which was passed was for principal sum of Rs.6,19,250/- the Tribunal would get no jurisdiction.  It is to be seen that decree was for a sum of Rs.6,19,250/-  plus interest at the rate of 18-1/2 per  cent per  annum  from  the date of filing of the  suit  till  the recovery  of money.  As and when the amount due to the  bank under  the  decree  became more than Rs.  10  lakhs  and  an application  for  execution  was filed, it  could  only  be. entertained  by the Tribunal and not by the Civil Court.  It is clear that in view of the provisions of Section 34 of the Act,  the provisions of Order 21 Rule 10 C.P.C.  would  have no application.

     For  the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed  and the  judgment  of  the High Court is set aside,  with  costs throughout.