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PETITIONER: P. ANANTHAKRISHNAN NAIR & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DR. G. RAMAKRISHNAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT31/03/1987

BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) BENCH: SINGH, K.N. (J) MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J)

CITATION:  1987 AIR 1272            1987 SCR  (2) 734  1987 SCC  (2) 429        JT 1987 (2)     7  1987 SCALE  (1)662

ACT:     Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1921: ss. 2,  3, 4  and  9--Tenants right to  purchase  demised  land--Nature of--Superstructures  constructed  thereon in  occupation  of sub-tenants--Whether  tenants  entitled  to  the   statutory benefit.

HEADNOTE:     Section  3  of the Tamil Nadu City  Tenants’  Protection Act,  1921 provides that every tenant shall on ejectment  be entitled  to be paid compensation for the value of  building which  may have been erected by him. Section 9 of  the  Act, provides that a tenant who is entitled to compensation under s. 3 and against whom a suit for ejectment is instituted may apply for an order that the landlord may be directed to sell the land to him for the price to be fixed by the court.     The  predecessor-in-interest of the appellants  had  ob- tained a lease of vacant land in the city of Madras from the ancestors of the respondent-landlords in 1924 and construct- ed  superstructures  thereon for carrying on  business.  The business  was,  however, discontinued in 1964.  A  partition suit was filed and the first appellant was appointed receiv- er. Before a final decree could be passed in that suit,  the respondent-landlords  served  notices on the  heirs  of  the original tenant terminating the lease and later filed eject- ment  suits against them. Only defendant No. 4  (2nd  appel- lant)  and defendant No. 11, advocate receiver  (1st  appel- lant)  contested the ejectment suits.  Ex-parte  proceedings were  taken  against the other defendants. Defendant  No.  4 filed an application in each of the ejectment suits claiming the  benefit of s. 9 of the Act, with a prayer to the  court for directing the landlords to sell the land to the  defend- ants and to appoint a commissioner to ascertain the price.     The Trial Court rejected the application on the findings that the defendants were not in occupation of the  property, for  they  had let out the entire  building  to  sub-tenants except a small portion thereof where the account books  were kept, and that the defendants did not require any portion of the  land for running their business or for  the  convenient enjoyment of the superstructures. 735

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   On appeal by defendants 4 and 11 under s. 9A of the Act, the appellate authority held that as the defendants had  not been in possession and occupation of the premises, they were not entitled to the benefit of s. 9.     The High Court affirmed the findings of the courts below and dismissed the revision petitions preferred by the appel- lants. Dismissing the appeals, this Court,     HELD:  Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants  Protec- tion Act, 1921 confers a privilege on a tenant, against whom a  suit  for  ejectment has been filed by  the  landlord  to exercise an option to secure conveyance of only such portion of the demised land as would be necessary for his convenient enjoyment.  It  creates a statutory right to  purchase  land through the medium of the court on fulfilment of the  condi- tions specified therein. It is not an absolute right, as the court  has  discretion  to grant or refuse  the  relief  for purchase  of  the land on the facts of  a  particular  case. [743G-H]     S.M. Transport (P) Ltd. v. Sankaraswamingal Mutt, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 282, referred to.     The policy underlying s. 9 is directed to safeguard  the eviction  of those tenants who may have  constructed  super- structures on the demised land so that they may continue  to occupy the same for the purpose of their residence or  busi- ness. The section contemplates that the tenant requires  the land for the convenient enjoyment of the property.  Whenever an application is made by tenant before the Court for  issu- ance of direction to the landlord for the sale of the  whole or  part of the land to him the Court is under  a  mandatory duty  to determine the minimum extent of the land which  may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment by the tenant. For this  determination  the Court must hold an  enquiry  having regard  to  the area of the demised land and the  extent  of superstructure  standing thereon and the tenant’s  need  for the  said  land. That inquiry pre-supposes that  the  tenant making  the application has been in occupation of  the  land and the super-structure wherein he may be either residing or carrying  on  business and on his eviction he would  be  ad- versely affected. The court has to consider the need of  the tenant and if it finds that the tenant does not require  any part  of the land it may reject the application  and  direct eviction  of the tenant. In that event, the landlord has  to pay  compensation  to  the tenant  for  the  superstructure. [744G-H; 745A-B] 736     In the instant case, the findings recorded by the courts below clearly show that none of the defendants have been  in occupation  of  the  land or  the  superstructures  standing thereon  and  they have not been carrying  on  any  business therein.  The  land in dispute and the  superstructure  have been in occupation of the sub-tenants since 1964. Thus,  the tenants  could  not be said to require the  land  for  their convenient  enjoyment. Having regard to these  findings  and the nature of the tenants’ right to purchase land under s. 9 it would be inequitable to direct the landlords to sell  the land to the tenants. [745E-G]     The price of land, specifically in the urban areas,  has escalated  to  a great extent and it would not  be  fair  to deprive  the  landlords of their property and to  allow  the tenants to enrich at the landlord’s expense. [745G-H]

JUDGMENT:

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   CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.  387390 of 1977.     From  the  Judgment  and Order dated  30.7.1976  of  the Madras High Court in C.R.P. Nos. 1288 to 1291 of 1975.     T.S.  Krishnamurthy lyer, A.T.M. Sampath and  Thirumaran for the Appellants.     G.L. Sanghi, P.S. Poti, A.V. Rangam, M.G. Natarajan  and T.V. Ratnam for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     SINGH,  J. These four appeals are directed  against  the common judgment of the High Court of Madras dismissing  four Civil Revision Petitions filed by the appellants against the order  of the appeal court upholding the order of the  Trial Court dismissing their applications made under Section 9  of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act 1921.     Briefly the facts giving rise to these appeals are: N.V. Abdullah  Sahib  predecessor-in-interest of  the  appellants obtained a lease of about 10 grounds of vacant land  situate in  the  city of Madras from the  ancestors  of  Respondent- landlords in 1924, for carrying on business, he  constructed super-structures on the vacant land and carried on  business in  timber under a partnership firm along with  his  brother N.V. Ummer Kutty and two minors. The super-structures  which were  constructed  prior to 1954 on the  demised  land  were treated partner- 737 ship assets along with other properties. After the death  of N.V.  Abdullah  Sahib and N.V. Ummer Kutty  the  partnership business  could not be carried on, as dispute arose  between the  partners. A suit being Civil Suit No. 152 of  1960  was filed for partition and in that suit defendant Nos. 2 and  4 were appointed joint receivers, subsequently on 7.9.1966 Sri Ananthakrishnan Nair, Appellant No. 1 was appointed Receiver who was authorised to take custody of the account books  and to realise rent from the sub-tenants occupying the  property which  was  the subject matter of dispute in  the  partition suit.  The  High Court passed a preliminary  decree  in  the partition suit but before final decree could be prepared  or finalised,  the Respondent-landlords served notices  on  the heirs  of  N.V.  Abdullah Sahib terminating  the  lease  and demanding  surrender  of the land. Since the  land  was  not restored  to  the landlords inspite of  termination  of  the lease,  the landlords, in 1972 instituted four  suits  being Suit Numbers 33 to 36 in the Court of Small Causes at Madras for  ejectment  against the heirs of  N.V.  Abdullah  Sahib, which included defendant Nos. 1 to 10 and Sri P.  Ananthakr- ishnan  Nair, Advocate receiver as defendant No. 11. In  the ejectment  suits defendant Nos. 1 to 3 and 5 to 10  did  not appear  or contest the suit, and ex-parte  proceedings  were taken  against  them  but K.K. Kunhammoo,  defendant  No.  4 (second  appellant) and Sri P. Ananthakrishnan  Nair,  Advo- cate-receiver  defendant  No.  11  contested  the  ejectment suits.  Defendant No. 4, namely, appellant No. 2,  filed  an application in each of the ejectment suits claiming  benefit of  Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection  Act III  of  1922 (hereinafter referred to as the  Act)  with  a prayer  to the Court for issuing orders directing the  land- lords  to sell the land, to the defendants and to appoint  a Commissioner  to  ascertain the price which  the  defendants would  pay. The Respondent-landlords contested the  applica- tions.  The  Trial  Court rejected the  application  on  the findings  that the defendants were not in occupation of  the property except a small portion where the account books were kept  and the defendants did not require any portion of  the land for running their business or for the convenient enjoy-

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ment  of  the super-structures. On appeal by  the  defendant Nos.  4 and 11 under section 9-A of the Act,  the  appellate authority held that proceedings for ejectment had been taken ex-parte against most of the defendants and persons entitled to the statutory privilege did not exercise their right  and further  they have not been in possession and occupation  of the premises therefore, defendants were not entitled to  the benefit of Section 9 of the Act. The appellate court further held that defendant No. 4 (the receiver) was not entitled to maintain an application under Section 9 of the Act on behalf of other defendants. Thereafter both the receivers,  defend- ant Nos. 4 and 11 preferred four 738 petitions  in  revision  before the High  Court.  A  learned single  Judge  by  his order dated  30.7.1976  affirmed  the orders of the Courts below and dismissed the revision  peti- tions.  Aggrieved  defendant No. 4  and  P.  Ananthakfishnan Nair, Advocate-receiver have preferred these appeals against the order of the High Court after obtaining Special Leave.     In  the  instant case the  appellants’  application  was rejected  firstly  on the ground that the  application  made under  Section 9 of the Act had not been signed by  all  the tenants  against whom suit for ejectment had been  filed  by the  respondent-landlords.  Secondly all  the  three  courts ejected the appellants’ application on the findings that the defendants have not been in possession or occupation of  the superstructure and they have let out the entire building  to sub-tenants, thereby they are not entitled to claim  benefit of  Section 9 of the Act. As regards the first question  the learned  counsel for the appellants urged that the  applica- tion  made  under  Section 9 of the Act was  signed  by  the second  Appellant who was defendant No. 4 in the  suit.  The suit  for  partition of the property had  not  been  finally decreed and as no final decree had been passed the shares of the defendants had not been partitioned by metes and  bounds the  property continued to retain its joint status  and  de- fendant  No. 4 being a co-owner could legally make  applica- tion  on behalf of other co-owners claiming the  benefit  of Section 9 of the Act. Since there was no conflict of  inter- est  among the co-owners, defendant No. 4 being  a  co-owner could  maintain the application not only on his own  benefit but  also on behalf of all other co-owners as the  fight  of each  co-owner extends to every inch of the  whole  property alongwith  the other co-owners. It is always open to  a  co- owner to conserve the property for the benefit of all  other co-owners.  The preliminary decree passed in  the  partition suit  did not affect the joint interest:st of the  co-owners as  no  final  decree had been passed in the  suit  and  the property under tenancy continued to be joint. Learned  coun- sel  further  urged  that defendant No.  4  being  a  party- receiver in the partition suit was entitled to do everything for the conservation and protection of the property for  the benefit of the parties to the suit. The court below  commit- ted error in rejecting the application on the plea that  the same had been signed only by defendant No. 4.     On  the other hand, learned counsel for the  respondent- landlords urged that the application made by only one of the co-heirs  of the deceased N.V. Addullah Sahib, the  original tenant,  could  not be conscrued as one made  on  behalf  of other co-heirs, as they did not contest 739 the  ejectment suit and ex-parte decree for  their  eviction had  been passed by the trial court which  clearly  indicate that  they were not interested in retaining the property  or in  continuing possession of the same. Since all  the  other

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heirs  of N.V. Abdulla Sahib were not interested to  contest the suit, defendant No. 4 (Appellant No. 2) could not  main- tain  application  under Section 9 of the Act on  behalf  of other  co-heirs and the application made by him did not  and could  not  reflect  the desire of other  co-heirs  who  had settled outside the State of Tamil Nadu. The learned counsel further  urged  that defendant No. 4 though  functioning  as party-receiver was not authorised to take legal  proceedings by  filing suit or application on behalf of parties  to  the partition suit. In the absence of authorisation by the court the defendant. No. 4 had no authority in law to act as agent of other co-heirs. It was further urged that the receiver is an officer of the Court and he is not agent of any party  to the  suit notwithstanding the fact that in law his  position is ultimately treated as an agent of the successful party on the termination of the suit.     We  do not consider it necessary to express our  opinion on these rival submissions made before us as in our  opinion the  appeals must fail on the second question which  relates to the findings recorded by all the three courts that  since the  tenants have not been in occupation of the property  in dispute,  they are not entitled to the benefit of Section  9 which is equitable in nature.     The  Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 192  1  was enacted,  as its preamble shows, to give protection to  cer- tain  classes  of tenants in municipal towns  and  adjoining areas  in  the  State of Madras, who  may  have  constructed buildings  on others’ lands in the hope that they would  not be  evicted so long as they paid a fair rent for  the  land. The  object of the Act as contained in the objects and  rea- sons of the bill state:               "In many parts of the City of Madras  dwelling               houses  and other buildings have from time  to               time been erected by tenants on lands  belong-               ing  to others, in the full  expectation  that               subject to payment of a fair ground rent, they               would  be  left  in  undisturbed   possession,               notwithstanding  the absence of  any  specific               contract  as to the duration of the  lease  or               the  terms on which the buildings were  to  be               leased. Recently attempts made or steps  taken               to  evict a large number of such tenants  have               shown that such expectations are likely to  be               defeated.  The tenants, if they  are  evicted,               can at the               740               best remove the super-structure which can only               be  done by pulling down the buildings.  As  a               result of such wholesale destruction, congest-               ed parts of the city will become more congest-               ed to the serious deteriment of public health.               In these circumstances it is just and reasona-               ble  that  the landlords when they  evict  the               tenants should pay for and take the buildings.               There may however be cases where the  landlord               is unwilling to eject a tenant, if he can  get               a fair rent for the land. The Act provides for               the  payment of compensation to the tenant  in               case of ejectment for the value of any  build-               ings which may have been erected by him or his               predecessors in interest. It also provides for               the settlement of fair rent at the instance of               the landlord or tenant provision is also  made               to  enable the tenant to purchase the land  in               his occupation subject to certain conditions."

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   The  Act has been subject to several amendments  seeking to  protect  the tenants’ interest and  also  safe  guarding landlords’ rights in the property. It would be profitable to refer  to the provisions of the Act highlighting  broad  as- pects  of  the benefits to a tenant and the  rights  of  the landlords  which have been safe guarded. The  Principal  Act was  amended by the Act XIX of 1955 and XIII of  1960  which made  comprehensive amendments in the Principal Act of  1921 (Act III of 1922). The Principal Act was further amended  by Act  IV of 1972 and XXIV of 1973. "Landlord" as  defined  by Section 2(3) means any person owing any land including every person  entitled  to collect the rent of the  whole  or  any portion of the land whether on his own account or on  behalf of  or for the benefit of any other person, or by virtue  of any  transfer from the owner or his predecessor-in-title  or of  any  order of a competent court or of any  provision  of law.  "Tenant"  as defined by Section 2(4)  means  a  person liable  to pay rent in respect of such land under a  tenancy agreement express or implied and it also includes any person who continues in possession of the land after  determination of  the  tenancy agreement. Section 3  provides  that  every tenant shall on ejectment be entitled to be paid as  compen- sation the value of any building, which may have been erect- ed  by him and also the value of trees which may  have  been planted  by him in a suit for ejectment. If  the  landlord’s suit  for  ejectment  is decreed the court  is  required  to ascertain the amount of compensation payable under Section 3 and it shall thereupon pass a decree for the amount so found due and direct that on payment of the amount by the landlord within three months from the date of decree the tenant shall put the landlord into possession of the land along with  the building and trees thereon, as 741 provided  by  Section 4 of the Act. Section 5  provides  for determination of compensation to the tenant. If the landlord is  unable or unwilling to pay compensation as  directed  by the Court he may apply to the Court for fixation of reasona- ble  rent  for  the occupation of the land by  a  tenant  in accordance  with  Section 6 of the Act. Section  9  provides that a tenant who is entitled to compensation under  Section 3  and against whom a suit for ejectment is  instituted  may apply for an order that the landlord may be directed to sell the land to him for the price to be fixed by the Court,  and thereupon  the Court shall fix the price in the manner  pre- scribed therein and direct the said amount to be paid to the landlord  by  the  tenant within a particular  time  and  in default,  his application shall stand dismissed. Section  11 provides  that  no suit for ejectment  shall  be  instituted against  the tenant except after giving three months  notice requiring him to surrender possession of the land,  building and trees to the landlord. These provisions broadly seek  to recapitulate  the objects and reasons as quoted  earlier  by protecting the tenant from eviction who may have constructed super-structure  on the land demised to him and  it  further safeguards  the landlord’s interest by making provision  for payment of the price of the land to him by the tenant.     In the instant case since the tenant’s right to purchase the  land  is involved we would refer to the  provisions  of Section 9 of the Act in detail, which reads as under:               "9.  Application  to Court for  Directing  the               Landlord to Sell Land: (1) (a) (i) Any  tenant               who is entitled to compensation under  section               3  and  against whom a suit in  ejectment  has               been instituted or proceeding under section 41               of  the  Presidency Small  Causes  Courts  Act

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             1882,  taken by the landlord may,  within  one               month  of the date of the publication  of               the  Madras City Tenant’s  Protection  (Amend-               ment)  Act 1979 in the Tamil  Nadu  Government               Gazette or of the date with effect from  which               this  Act is extended to the  municipal  town,               township  or  Village  in which  the  land  is               situate or within one month after the  service               on  him of summons, apply to the Court for  an               order  that the landlord shall be directed  to               sell for a price to be fixed by the Court, the               whole  or part of extent of land specified  in               the application.                        (ii)  Notwithstanding  anything  con-               tained in clause (a) (i) of this  sub-section,               any such tenant as is referred to in               742               sub-clause (ii) (b) of clause (4) of Section 2               or  his  heirs,  may within a  period  of  two               months from the date of the publication of the               Madras  City Tenants’  Protection  (Amendment)               Act 1973 apply to the Court (whether or not  a               suit  for  ejectment has  been  instituted  or               proceeding under Section 41 of the  Presidency               Small  Causes Courts Act 1882 (Central Act  XV               of  1882)  has been taken by the  landlord  or               whether  or  not such suit  or  proceeding  is               pending  having  jurisdiction to  entertain  a               suit  for ejectment or in the City  of  Madras               either  to  such court or  to  the  Presidency               Small  Causes  Court  for an  order  that  the               landlord under the tenancy agreement shall  be               directed  to sell for a price to be  fixed  by               the  Court the whole or part of the extent  of               land specified in the application.               (b) On such application the Court shall  first               decide  the minimum extent of the  land  which               may be necessary for the convenient  enjoyment               by  the tenant. The Court shall, then fix  the               price on the minimum extent of the land decid-               ed  as aforesaid or of the extent of the  land               specified in the application under clause  (a)               whichever  is less. The price aforesaid  shall               be the average market value of the three years               immediately  preceding the date of the  order.               The Court shall order that within a period  to               be determined by the Court not being less than               three  months  and not more than  three  years               from the date of the order of the tenant shall               pay  into Court or otherwise as  directed  the               price so fixed in one or more instalments with               or without interest.               (2) In default of payment by the tenant of any               one  instalment, the application under  clause               (a) of sub-section (1) shall stand  dismissed,               provided that on sufficient cause being shown,               the  Court may excuse the delay and pass  such               orders  as it may think fit, but not so as  to               extend  the time for payment beyond the  three               years  above  mentioned.  On  the  application               being  dismissed,  the Court shall  order  the               amount  of  the instalment or  instalments  if               any,  paid by the tenant to be repaid  to  him               without any interest.               (3)  (a) On payment of the price  fixed  under

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             clause (b) of sub-section (1), the Court shall               pass an order directing the conveyance by  the               landlord  to the tenant of the extent of  land               for which the said price was fixed. The  Court               shall by               743               the  same order direct the tenant to  put  the               landlord  into  possession  of  the  remaining               extent of the land, if any. The stamp duty and               registration fee in respect of such conveyance               shall be borne by the tenant.               (b)  On  the order referred to in  clause  (a)               being made the suit or proceeding shall  stand               dismissed,  and any decree or order in  eject-               ment  that  may have been passed  therein  but               which has not been executed shall be vacated.     Once a suit is filed by the landlord for the eviction of a  tenant  from land the tenant has right to  apply  to  the Court  within  one  month from the date of  the  service  of summons for the issuance of order directing the landlord  to sell the whole or part of the extent of land as specified in the application to him for a price to be fixed by the Court. On making of such an application the Court is under a manda- tory  duty  to first decide the minimum extent of  the  land "which may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment by  the tenant." (emphasised). The court must hold enquiry to deter- mine whether the tenant requires the land for his convenient enjoyment, and if so, what area or portion of the land would be necessary for his convenient enjoyment. The court may  on the  facts of a particular case come to the conclusion  that the  tenant does not require any portion of the land and  in that event it may reject the application and decree the suit for ejectment and direct the landlord to pay compensation to the tenant. But if the court finds that the tenant needs the whole  or  any portion of the demised land  for  "convenient enjoyment",  the Court has to fix the price of the  land  on the basis of market value of three years immediately preced- ing  the date of the order. The Court may  thereupon  direct the  tenant  to deposit the amount so  determined  within  a specific  period  not being less than three months  and  not more than three years. If the tenant fails to pay the amount so  determined,  the tenant’s application shall  stand  dis- missed.     Section 9 confers a privilege on a tenant against whom a suit  for eviction has been filed by the landlord  but  that privilege is not absolute. Section 9 itself imposes restric- tion on the tenant’s right to secure conveyance of only such portion of the holding as would be necessary for his conven- ient  enjoyment.  It creates a statutory right  to  purchase land through the medium of court on the fulfilment of condi- tions specified in Section 9 of the Act. It is not an  abso- lute  right, as the court has discretion to grant or  refuse the  relief for the purchase of the land. In S.M.  Transport (P) Ltd. v. Sankaraswamingal Mutt, [1963] Suppl 1 744 SCR 282 this Court considered the question whether the right of  a tenant to apply to a court for an order directing  the landlord to sell the land to him for a price to be fixed  by it under Section 9 of the Act is a property right. The Court held,  that  the law of India does not  recognise  equitable estates, a statutory right to purchase land does not  confer any  right or interest in the property. The right  conferred by  Section 9 is a statutory right to purchase land  and  it does  not create any interest or right to the property.  The tenant’s right to secure only such portion of the holding as

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may  be necessary for his convenient enjoyment is  equitable in nature. Under the common law a tenant is liable to  evic- tion and he has no right to purchase the land demised to him at any price as well as under the Transfer of Property  Act. The only right of a tenant who may have put up structure  on the  demised land is to remove the structure at the time  of delivery  of possession on the determination of  the  lease. Section 9 confers an additional statutory right on a  tenant against  whom  suit for ejectment is filed  to  exercise  an option  to  purchase the demised land to  that  extent  only which he may require for convenient enjoyment of the proper- ty. The tenant has no vested right in the property  instead; it  is  a privilege granted to him by the statute  which  is equitable in nature.     Whenever  an application is made by a tenant before  the Court for issuance of direction to the landlord for the sale of the whole or part of the land to him, the Court is  under a mandatory duty to determine the minimum extent of the land which  may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment by  the tenant. This determination can obviously be made only  after an enquiry is held by the Court having regard to the area of the demised land and the extent of super-structure  standing thereon, and the tenant’s need for the land for the  benefi- cial  enjoyment  of the super-structure which  he  may  have constructed  thereon.  The  enquiry  pre-supposes  that  the tenant making the application has been in the occupation  of the  land and the super-structure wherein he may be  either, residing  or  carrying on business, and on his  eviction  he would be adversely affected. The policy underlying Section 9 of  the Act, is directed to safeguard the eviction of  those tenants  who  may have constructed  super-structure  on  the demised  land, so that they may continue to occupy the  same for  the purposes of their residence or business. Section  9 (1) (b) ordains the court to first decide the minimum extent of the land which may be necessary for the convenient enjoy- ment  by  the  tenant, it therefore  contemplates  that  the tenant requires the land for the convenient enjoyment of the property.  If  the tenant does not occupy the  land  or  the super-structure or if he is not residing therein or carrying on any business, the question of convenient enjoy- 745 ment  of the land by him could not arise. The Court  has  to consider  the  need of the tenant and if it finds  that  the tenant does not require any part of the land, it may  reject the  application and direct eviction of the tenant, in  that event the landlord has to pay compensation to the tenant for the superstructure.     In the instant case, admittedly the land in dispute  was leased out to N.V. Abdullah Sahib for carrying on  business, the  Trial Court as well as the First Appellate  Court  both have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the  business which  was being carried on by N.V. Abdullah Sahib  and  his heirs  was  discontinued in 1964, and except  for  defendant Nos. 4 and 7, all other defendants have settled down outside Madras and they were not occupying the land or the  building thereon  nor they were carrying on any business in any  por- tion of the building on the date of filing of the  ejectment suit.  Only  in a small portion of the entire  land  account books of the business was kept and the rest of the land  and the super-structure standing thereon has been in the occupa- tion  of  sub-tenants since 1964. The  Courts  have  lurther recorded findings that except defendant No. 4 (Appellant No. 1)  other  defendants  are not interested as  they  did  not contest  the  landlords’ suit for eviction.  These  findings clearly  show that the none of the defendants have  been  in

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occupation  of  the  land of  the  super-structure  standing thereon  and  they have not been carrying  on  any  business therein. Even in the ejectment suits, barring defendant  No. 4 none appeared to contest the suit and ex-parte proceedings were  taken  against them. The Trial Court as  well  as  the appeal  court both have recorded findings that the  land  in dispute  and the super-structure has been in  occupation  of sub  tenants since 1964. In view of these findings the  High Court  refused  to interfere with the orders  of  the  Trial Court  as  confirmed by the appeal court. Having  regard  to these  findings  and  the nature of the  tenants’  fight  to purchase land under Section 9 being equitable in nature,  it would  be  unreasonable to direct the landlord to  sell  the land  to the tenants. The facts and circumstances  available on record show that the tenants do not require the land  for their convenient enjoyment, therefore, it would be inequita- ble  to  direct the landlords to sell the  property  to  the tenants.  It is a matter of common knowledge that  price  of land, specially in the urban areas has escalated to a  great extent and it would not be fair to deprive the landlords  of their  property  and to allow the tenants to enrich  at  the landlords’ expense. The law does not intend that the  tenant should  enrich at the instance of the landlord  even  though the  tenants  do not require the land for  their  convenient enjoyment. 746     We  do not therefore find any good reason  to  interfere with the High Court’s order dismissing the appellants  revi- sion  application. We accordingly dismiss these appeals  but make no order as to costs. P.S.S.                                               Appeals dismissed. 747