IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7982 OF 2002      

Oswal Fats and Oils Limited ……..Appellant

Versus

Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly Division, Bareilly and others …….Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. Singhvi,  J.

1. Feeling aggrieved by refusal of the learned Single Judge of Allahabad  

High  Court  to  quash  orders  dated  24.5.1993  and  30.5.2001  passed  by  

Collector, Pilibhit (for short, ‘the Collector’) and Additional Commissioner  

(Administration),  Bareilly  (for  short,  ‘the  Additional  Commissioner’)  

respectively  under  the  U.P.  Zamindari  Abolition  and Land Reforms Act,  

1950 (for short, ‘the Act’), declaring that 27.95 acres land purchased by the  

appellant in Shahi and Khamaria Pul villages of District Pilibhit shall vest in  

the State Government,  the appellant has filed this appeal.

2. The appellant is a company incorporated under Section 149(3) of the  

Companies Act, 1956.  In 1991, the appellant decided to set up agro based  

paper  projects  in  the  State  of  U.P.   By  resolution dated  14.10.1991,  the  

Board of Directors of the appellant authorised Shri Kamal Oswal (Director),  

Shri  T.R.  Sharma  (General  Manager)  and  Shri  Jai  Prakash  Kaushal  

(Authorised Signatory) to negotiate and finalise purchase of land in the State  

of Uttar Pradesh and/or other States and Union Territories, to sign sale deeds  

etc. for effective acquisition/transfer of land.  Paragraphs (e) and (f) of that  

resolution read as under:

“To  sign  for  and  on  behalf  of  the  company  all  sales  deeds  conveyance  deeds,  Intkals,  Mutations  and  other  documents  necessary for the effective acquisition/transfer of the land in the  name of the company and for this purpose to appear for and on  behalf of the company before any court of law, Tehsildar, Naib  Tehsildar, Patwari, Registrar, Sub Registrar of any other land  transferring authority.

And to do all other acts, things and deeds for and on behalf of  the  company  which  any  of  the  above  noted  persons  in  the  discharge of their lawful duties consider proper and in the best  interest of the company.”

3. Soon thereafter,  an application  dated 24.10.1991 was submitted on  

behalf of the appellant to Joint Director of Industries, Bareilly Zone, Bareilly  

for grant of permission under  Section 154(2) of the Act for purchase of land  

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in  excess  of  12.5  acres.   The  relevant  portions  of  that  application  are  

extracted below:

“Our Company is proposing to set up a 100 TPD (Gross) Agro  based  paper  project  in  area  adjoining  villages  of  Shahi  Kamariapul,  Adhkata  Nazrana.   For  this  project  we  require  about 200 Acres of land out of which about 50 Acres shall be in  Pilibhit District and about 150 Acres in Nawabganj Tehsil of  Bareilly District.

The  proposed  paper  project  shall  utilise  Agricultural  wastes such as wheat Straw, Rice Straw and Bagasse etc. as the  main  raw  materials.   The  project  shall  generate  direct  employment opportunities for about 750 persons and for many  more indirectly.  The project shall be of special benefit to the  people living in the areas near the site.

We through this letter are applying to your office for the  permission under section 154 of ZALR Act for purchase of land  in  excess  of  12.5  Acres  for  industrial  purpose.   We  are  enclosing  two  additional  copies  of  this  letter.   We  are  also  enclosing  the  site  plan,  recommendations  of  Technical  Consultants for your ready reference.

We  shall  be  pleased  to  furnish  any  other  information  required by you in this connection.  We wish to bring to your  kind notice that we plan to start the purchase of land for this  project from next month i.e. Nov. 1991.”

4. However without waiting for response of the concerned authority, the  

appellant purchased 40.45 acres land in Shahi and Khamaria Pul villages,  

Pargana Jahanabad, Tehsil and District Pilibhit through different sale deeds  

executed between January and April, 1992.

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5. The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged transfer of various parcels of  

land in favour of the appellant by filing identical suits under Sections 154,  

167, 168A and 194 of the Act.   The transferors,  who were impleaded as  

parties in all the suits did not contest the same.  However, the appellant filed  

identical written statements in all the cases.  In first paragraph of the written  

statement  filed  in  Suit  No.133  of  1993,  the  appellant  admitted  all  the  

paragraphs of the suit.   In the additional statement, the appellant virtually  

conceded that the land was purchased in contravention of the Act and stated  

that it may be allowed to retain 12.5 acres out of the disputed land.  This is  

evinced  from  English  translation  of  paragraphs  2  to  4  of  the  written  

statement which are reproduced below:

“2. That all the lands of both the village had been purchased  for establishment of Industry after making the payment to the  farmers.  But I had the knowledge of law in Punjab and was not  well  conversant  with  the  provisions  of  U.P.  Zamindari  Abolition Act therefore, I purchased the land in question which  is  more  than  12  acres.   We  had  given  an  application  dated  24.10.1991  to  the  State  Government  for  the  permission  of  establishment  of  Industry  and  only  thereafter  we  started  purchasing the land without waiting for the permission from the  Government because we had the belief that permission will be  granted to us for establishment of Industry.  

3. That we filed application for mutation of whole of the  land under the sale and all of them had been accepted and we  continued the purchasing of land because we had the belief that  we are not violating any provision of Zamindari Abolition Act.

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4. That the details of land which we want to keep for the  establishment of factory, measuring twelve and a half acres out  of the disputed land, are being given in the succeeding paras  and we have no objection for any legal action with regard to the  remaining land.”

The particulars of the land suit sought to be retained by the appellant  

were given in the affidavit  of Shri T.R. Sharma.  A sketch map showing  

those khasra numbers were also filed with the written statement.

6. By an order dated 24.5.1993, the Collector declared that the purchase  

made by the appellant in excess of 12.50 acres is against the provisions of  

Sections 154/167 of the Act and that it will be entitled to retain only 12.50  

acres and the remaining land measuring 27.95 acres would vest in the State  

Government.  The relevant portion of the order passed by the Collector is  

extracted below:

“I have heard the arguments of Government Counsel (Revenue)  for State and the learned counsel for M/s. Oswal Fats and Oil  Limited and perused the records.  After hearing the arguments  of both the parties and the perusal of records,  I have reached on  the  conclusion  that  the  defendants  M/s.  Oswal  Fats  and  Oil  Limited, New Delhi have purchased the total land measuring  40.45  Acres  in  Village  Shahi  and  Khamaria  Pul,  Pargana  Jahanabad,  Tehsil  and  District  Pilibhit,  as  detailed  above.  However as per the provisions of Section 154/167 of  Jamindari  Abolition  and Land Management  Act,  they can possess  only  12.50 Acres land.   Therefore,  the  transfer  of  remaining land  measuring 27.95 Acres, which is in excess than 12.50 Acres, is  against  the  provisions of  Section 154/167 of  Z.A. Act.   The  

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defendant Company Oswal Fats and Oil Limited has also given  the option for 12.50 Acres land, in their affidavit.  Therefore,  the remaining land except the 12.50 Acres land mentioned in  the  Affidavit  dated  19.05.93  is  liable  to  be  merged  into  the  State.”

7. The appellant questioned the order of the Collector by filing revision  

under Section 333 of the Act.  In the memo of revision, it was claimed that  

excess land was purchased under the belief that the State Government would  

grant permission under Section 154(2).  It was then urged that although the  

Board of Directors had given power to Shri T.R. Sharma to appear before  

any court of law on behalf of the appellant, he was not authorized to enter  

into a compromise or give consent for retaining the particular land.  Another  

plea taken by the appellant was that the company consists of 8 directors and  

if each Director is entitled to have a share of 12.5 acres, the purchase made  

by  the  appellant  will  not  exceed  the  prescribed  limit.   However,  at  the  

hearing of the revision petition,  the plea that  Shri  T.R. Sharma had filed  

written statement and affidavit beyond the scope of his authority appears to  

have been given up and it was submitted that the general manager had been  

authorised to pursue the case but he did not do it properly.  The Additional  

Commissioner  dismissed  the  revision  of  the  appellant  and confirmed  the  

order of the Collector by recording following reasons:

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“It  is  clear  from  the  perusal  of  records  that  the  defendants  themselves  have admitted in their  objections  filed before the  court below that the land in question had been purchased for  establishment  of  Industry  and  purchased  the  land  more  than  12.50 acres intentionally.  They have also given the details of  land which they want to keep with them and agree for merging  of  remaining land into the  State.   Revisionist  has stated that  they had given an application for obtaining the permission and  it has also been admitted that they had purchased the land in  excess than 12.50 acres without waiting for the permission.  In  these circumstances,  the court  below has correctly passed an  order for merging of 27.95 Acre land into the State, which is in  excess than the 12.50 acres land and this order does not require  any  intervention.   Therefore,  the  Revision,  being  devoid  of  merits, is liable to be dismissed.”  

8. The  appellant  challenged  the  orders  of  the  Collector  and  the  

Additional Commissioner in Writ Petition No.25819/2001 by taking up the  

position  that  Shri  T.R.  Sharma  was  not  authorised  to  enter  into  a  

compromise or to make a statement relinquishing the land in favour of the  

State Government.  It  was also pleaded that the appellant was entitled to  

purchase land in excess of 12.50 acres because its case is covered by the  

explanation appearing below Section 154(1) of the Act.   

9. The learned Single Judge rejected the argument on the issue of lack of  

authority of Shri T.R. Sharma to indirectly admit violation of Section 154(1)  

of the Act and to agree to surrender excess land by making the following  

observations:  

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“It is apparent on face of record that petitioner Company has no  authorization either general or special to hold land in excess of  12.50 acres by State Government.  Indisputably the petitioner  Company is not a Co-operative Society registered under the Co- operative Societies Act nor petitioner Company is established  for charitable purposes.  Nothing is brought to my notice that  the present  Company is established in the interest  of general  public.   Contrary  to  it,  there  are  overwhelming materials  on  record and also from attending circumstances it is inferable that  the  petitioner  Company  is  an  establishment  established  with  profit orientation for its shareholders.  It is pertinent to mention  here that the petitioner Company has not produced its certificate  of registration under the Companies Act.  During the course of  argument articles of association of Nuskar Enterprises Ltd. is  produced by the learned counsel  for the petitioner.   It  is  not  understandable as to why the certificate  of registration under  the Companies Act is not produced before the Court.  It is also  not  understandable  as  to  how the  Articles  of  Association  of  Nuskar Enterprises Ltd. has nexus with the petitioner Company.  I  am of  the  view that  even  if  the  affidavit  dated  19.5.1993  (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) of the General Manager of the  petitioner  Company  giving  consent  to  relinquish  the  land  in  excess of 12.50 acres in favour of State Government is ignored  even  then  the  findings  of  respondents  No.1  and  2  are  sustainable for the reasons given hereinabove.”

The learned Single Judge then referred to the provisions of Sections  

152, 154, 166 and 167 of the Act and held that the purchase made by the  

appellant in excess of 12.50 acres was illegal per se and its case does not fall  

within the ambit of the exceptions carved out in sub-section (2) of Section  

154.  The learned Single Judge rejected the appellant’s plea that surrender  

made by Shri T.R. Sharma was unauthorized and held that the Collector did  

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not commit any illegality by declaring that excess land will vest in the State  

Government.  Simultaneously, he gave a direction to the Chief Secretary to  

ensure that possession of the excess land is taken by the Government free  

from all encumbrances without any delay.

10. At this stage, we may mention that during the pendency of the suits  

filed by the State Government before the Collector, the appellant instituted  

Suit No.25/1992-93 under Section 143 of the Act, which was disposed of by  

Pargana Adhikari, Pilibhit vide her order dated 12.7.1993 by declaring that  

7.97 acres land purchased by the appellant in Tehsil and District Pilibhit was  

non-agricultural land.

11. Shri Manoj Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the  

order passed by the Collector was vitiated due to violation of the basics of  

natural  justice inasmuch as the concerned officer did not give reasonable  

opportunity  to  the  appellant  to  defend  its  case  on  the  issue  of  alleged  

violation of Section 154 of the Act and the Additional Commissioner and the  

learned Single Judge gravely erred in confirming/upholding the order of the  

Collector.  The learned counsel further argued that Shri T.R. Sharma, who  

was holding the post of General Manager was not authorised to make any  

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concession on behalf of the appellant or give consent for surrendering 27.95  

acres land on the ground that the purchase of land was made in violation of  

mandate of Section 154 and the Collector was not at all justified in acting  

upon  the  concession  made  by  Shri  T.R.  Sharma.   Learned  counsel  then  

referred to Section 154 of the Act and submitted that the embargo contained  

in that  section is  not  applicable to the appellant’s  case because purchase  

made by a company does not  fall  within the ambit  of  that  section.   The  

learned counsel reiterated the plea that if each director of the company is  

held entitled to purchase 12.50 acres of land, the purchase of 40.45 acres  

land by the appellant cannot be treated as violation of Section 154(1).  He  

lastly argued that even if transfer of land in favour of the appellant is held to  

be contrary to the mandate of Section 154(1), the Court may direct the State  

Government  to  accord  post  facto sanction  in  terms  of  sub-section  (3)  of  

Section  154  which  was  inserted  by  an  amendment  dated  24.3.2005.  

Learned counsel also criticized the direction given by the High Court to the  

Chief  Secretary to take possession of the excess  land and submitted that  

while deciding the writ petition filed by the appellant against the orders of  

the Collector and the Additional Commissioner,  the learned Single Judge  

was not justified in treating the case as a public interest litigation.

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12. Shri  T.N.  Singh,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondents  

supported the impugned order and argued that the Collector did not commit  

any error by declaring that the excess land will vest in the State Government  

because  the  purchase  was  made  by  the  appellant  without  obtaining  

permission in terms of Section 154 of the Act.  Learned counsel relied upon  

the  averments  contained  in  the  written  statement  filed  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant  in  Suit  No.  133/1993  and  argued  that  after  having  indirectly  

admitted contravention of Section 154(1) of the Act, the appellant did not  

have the locus to challenge the orders of the Collector and the Additional  

Commissioner on the ground that Shri T.R. Sharma was not authorized to  

give option for retaining the particular parcels of land and the learned Single  

Judge rightly held that the transfers made in violation of Section 154 were  

null and void.

13. Before  dealing  with  the  respective  arguments/submissions,  we  

consider it appropriate to note that after one year and five months of passing  

of order by the Collector, the appellant and the State Government entered  

into a lease agreement dated 15.10.1994 whereby the latter agreed to give  

excess  land  measuring  27.95  acres,  the  details  of  which  were  given  in  

Schedule  `A’ appended to the agreement,  to the appellant  on lease for a  

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period of 30 years at an yearly rent of Rs.281.05.  The lease agreement was  

signed on behalf of the appellant by Shri Kamal Oswal, Director and Shri  

J.P. Kaushal, General Manager (Liaison). In the lease agreement, a copy of  

which has been annexed as Annexure CA-1 with the counter affidavit filed  

on  behalf  of  the  respondents  in  this  Court,  the  lessee  i.e.,  the  appellant  

candidly admitted that transfers made in its favour by the Bhumidhars were  

contrary to Section 154 of the Act and were void and, as such, land vested in  

the  State  Government  under  Section  167.    This  is  evinced  from  the  

following paragraphs of the lease agreement:

“AND WHEREAS   the  transfers  as  aforesaid  made  by  the    Bhumidhars  in  favour  of  the  Lessee  in  respect  of  the  land  described  in  Schedule  ‘A’  hereto  being  in  contravention  of  Section 154 of the Uttar Pradesh Jamindari Abolition and Land  Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter called “the said Act”) were void  under Section 166 of the said Act and consequently the said  land  vested  in  the  Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh  (hereinafter  called “the State Government”) under Section 167 of the said  Act, free from all encumbrances with effect from the date of  their transfer.

AND WHEREAS the lessor at  the request of the Lessee has  agree to demise and land vested in the State  Government  as  aforementioned  subject  to  the  rights  and  restrictions  and the  several convenants hereinafter expressed for the purposes of the  said project.”

(emphasis supplied)

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14. It is quite intriguing and surprising that the lease agreement was not  

brought to the notice of the Additional Commissioner and the learned Single  

Judge of the High Court and neither of them was apprised of the fact that the  

appellant  had  taken  27.95  acres  land  on  lease  from the  Government  by  

unequivocally conceding that it had purchased excess land in violation of  

Section 154(1) of the Act and the same vested in the State Government.  In  

the list of dates and the memo of special leave petition filed in this Court  

also there is no mention of lease agreement dated 15.10.1994.  This shows  

that  the  appellant  has  not  approached  the  Court  with  clean  hands.   The  

withholding of the lease agreement from the Additional Commissioner, the  

High Court and this Court appears to be a part of the strategy adopted by the  

appellant to keep the quasi-judicial and judicial forums including this Court  

in dark about the nature of its possession over the excess land and make  

them believe that it has been subjected to unfair treatment.  If the factum of  

execution  of  lease  agreement  and  its  contents  were  disclosed  to  the  

Additional Commissioner, he would have definitely incorporated the same  

in order dated 30.5.2001.  In that event, the High Court or for that reason this  

Court would have non suited the appellant at the threshold.  However, by  

concealing a material fact, the appellant succeeded in persuading the High  

Court and this Court to entertain adventurous litigation instituted by it and  

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pass interim orders.  If either of the courts had been apprised of the fact that  

by virtue of lease deed dated 15.10.1994, the appellant  has succeeded in  

securing temporary legitimacy for its possession over excess land, then there  

would have been no occasion for the High Court or this Court to entertain  

the writ petition or the special leave petition.   

15. It is settled law that a person who approaches the Court for grant of  

relief,  equitable  or  otherwise,  is  under  a  solemn  obligation  to  candidly  

disclose  all  the  material/important  facts  which  have  bearing  on  the  

adjudication of the issues raised in the case.  In other words, he owes a duty  

to the court to bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing/suppressing  

any material fact within his knowledge or which he could have known by  

exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary prudence.   If  he is  

found  guilty  of  concealment  of  material  facts  or  making  an  attempt  to  

pollute the pure stream of justice, the court not only has the right but a duty  

to deny relief to such person. In one of the earliest decisions on the subject  

i.e.,  -  R. v.  Kensington Income  Tax Commissioner (1917)  1  KB 486,  

Viscount Reading, Chief Justice of the Divisional Court observed:

“Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for  a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion  that the affidavit in support of the applicant was not candid and  did  not  fairly  state  the  facts,  the  Court  ought,  for  its  own  

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protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to  proceed any further with the examination of the merits.  This is  a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be  used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court  that it has been deceived.  Before coming to this conclusion a  careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as  they  have  been  stated  in  the  applicant’s  affidavit,  and  everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view  of  the  Court  when it  reads  the  affidavit  and knows the  true  facts.   But if the result of this examination and hearing is to  leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will  refuse  to  hear  anything  further  from  the  applicant  in  a  proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a  misleading affidavit.”

16. The  above  extracted  observations  were  approved  by  the  Court  of  

Appeal in the following words:

“It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under  the notice of the Court all facts material to the determination of  his right to that injunction: and it is no excuse for him to say  that he was not aware of the importance of any facts which he  has omitted to bring forward.  If an applicant does not act with  uberrima fides and put every material fact before the Court it  will not grant him an injunction, even though there might be  facts  upon  which  the  injunction  might  be  granted.”   His  Lordship  rightly  pronounced:  “The  Court,  for  its  own  protection,  is  entitled  to  say:  We  refuse  this  writ…  without  going into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of  the applicant in bringing the case before us.”  Warrington, L.J.  was also of the same opinion.  In a concurring judgment His  Lordship observed:  “It  is  perfectly  well  settled that  a  person  who makes an ex parte application to the Court – that is to say,  in absence of the person who will be affected by that which the  Court is asked to do – is under an obligation to the Court to  make the fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within  his  knowledge,  and if  he does not  make that  fullest  possible  disclosure,  then  he  cannot  obtain  any  advantage  from  the  

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proceedings, and he will be deprived of any advantage he may  have already obtained by means of the order which has thus  wrongly been obtained by him.”

17. This  Court  and different  High Courts have repeatedly  invoked and  

applied the rule that a person who does not disclose all material facts has no  

right  to  be heard on the  merits  of  his  grievance –  State  of  Haryana v.  

Karnal Distillery Co. Ltd. (1977) 2 SCC 431, Vijay Kumar Kathuria v.  

State of Haryana (1983) 3 SCC 333, Welcome Hotel and others v. State  

of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  others  etc.  (1983)  4  SCC  575,  G.  

Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by LRs. and another v. Government of  

Karnataka and another (1991) 3 SCC 261,  S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu  

(dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. and others (1994) 1 SCC 1,  

Agricultural and Processed Food Products v. Oswal Agro Furane and  

others (1996) 4 SCC 297, Union of India and others v. Muneesh Suneja  

(2001) 3 SCC 92,  Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India (2007) 8  

SCC 449, Sunil Poddar and others v. Union Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC  

326, K.D. Sharma v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others (2008) 12  

SCC 481,  G. Jayshree and others v. Bhagwandas S. Patel and others  

(2009) 3 SCC 141 and C.A. No. 5239/2002 –  Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.  

and others, decided on 3.12.2009.

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18. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 S.C. 1558, this Court revoked  

the leave granted to the appellant by making following observations:

“It is of utmost importance that in making material statements  and  setting  forth  grounds  in    applications  for  special  leave  made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken  not to make any statements  which are inaccurate,  untrue and  misleading. In dealing with  applications  for special  leave,  the  Court  naturally takes statements  of fact and grounds of fact  contained  in  the petitions  at  their face value and it would  be  unfair   to  betray  the   confidence  of  the  Court  by   making  statements  which are  untrue and misleading.   Thus,  if  at  the  hearing of the appeal  the Supreme Court is  satisfied that the  material statements made by the appellant in his application for  special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent  is  entitled  to  contend  that  the  appellant  may  have  obtained  special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what  he characterizes as misrepresentations of facts contained in the  petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the  conclusion  that  in  such  a  case  special  leave  granted  to  the  appellant ought to be revoked.”

19. In  Dalip  Singh’s case,  the  appellant’s  grievance  was  that  before  

finalizing the case under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings  

Act, 1960, the prescribed authority did not give notice to the tenure holder  

Shri  Praveen Singh (predecessor  of  the  appellant).   On a  scrutiny of  the  

records, this Court found that the prescribed authority had issued notice to  

Shri  Praveen  Singh,  which was  duly  served upon him and held that  the  

appellant is not entitled to relief because he did not approach the High Court  

with clean hands inasmuch as he made a   misleading statement in the writ  

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petition giving an impression that  the tenure  holder  did not  know of the  

proceedings initiated by the prescribed authority.  The preface and para 21 of  

that judgment read as under:

“For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic values  of  life  i.e.,  `Satya’  (truth)  and  `Ahimsa’  (non-violence).  Mahavir,  Gautam  Buddha  and  Mahatma  Gandhi  guided  the  people  to  ingrain  these  values  in  their  daily  life.   Truth  constituted an integral part of justice delivery system which was  in vogue in pre-independence era and the people used to feel  proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences.  However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in  our value system.  The materialism has over-shadowed the old  ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that  those involved in litigation do not  hesitate  to  take shelter  of  falsehood,  misrepresentation  and  suppression  of  facts  in  the  court proceedings.  In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has  cropped up.  Those who belong to this creed do not have any  respect  for  truth.   They  shamelessly  resort  to  falsehood  and  unethical means for achieving their goals.  In order to meet the  challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have,  from  time  to  time,  evolved  new  rules  and  it  is  now  well  established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of  justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted  hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.

21. From what we have mentioned above, it is clear that in  this case efforts to mislead the authorities and the courts have  transmitted  through three  generations  and the conduct  of  the  appellant and his son to mislead the High Court and this Court  cannot,  but  be  treated  as  reprehensible.   They belong to  the  category  of  persons  who  not  only  attempt,  but  succeed  in  polluting the course of justice.  Therefore, we do not find any  justification  to  interfere  with  the  order  under  challenge  or  entertain  the  appellant’s  prayer  for  setting  aside  the  orders  passed  by  the  Prescribed  Authority  and  the  Appellate  Authority.”

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20. Notwithstanding  our  conclusion  that  the  appellant  is  guilty  of  

contumacious conduct and is not entitled to any relief, we have thought it  

proper to deal with the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the  

appellant  on  the  issues  of  violation  of  rules  of  natural  justice  and  non  

applicability of Section 154 of the Act.   

21. The question whether the appellant was denied reasonable opportunity  

to defend its cause needs consideration in the light of the written statements  

filed on behalf of the appellant before the Collector, wherein it was admitted  

that  land  had  been  purchased  without  waiting  for  the  permission  of  the  

Government under the belief that permission will be granted for establishing  

the industry.  Not only this, it was candidly stated that the appellant has no  

objection if any legal action is taken with regard to land in excess of 12.50  

acres.  In the proceedings of the suits, no prayer was made on behalf of the  

appellant for permission to lead evidence to prove that the purchase made by  

it  from Bhumidhars  was  not  in  violation  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Act.  

Before the Additional Commissioner and the High Court, the appellant did  

not make a grievance that the Collector had passed order without giving it a  

reasonable or effective opportunity of hearing.  In this view of the matter,  

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the  appellant  cannot  now  contend  that  the  Collector  did  not  act  in  

consonance with the rule of audi alteram partem.   

22. Though, Shri Manoj Swarup made strenuous efforts to convince the  

Court that Shri T.R. Sharma had no authority to make tacit admission of the  

illegality committed in the purchase of land and that he had no right to make  

an offer for surrender of excess land, we have not felt impressed.  A reading  

of resolution dated 14.10.1991 makes it clear that Shri T.R. Sharma, the then  

General  Manager  of  the  appellant  was  authorised  to  take  all  actions  

necessary for transfer of land.  That apart, in view of lease agreement dated  

15.10.1994, which was not produced by the appellant before the Additional  

Commissioner,  the learned Single Judge of the High Court and even this  

Court (for the first time, the lease agreement came to the fore when a copy  

thereof  was  annexed  with  the  counter  affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent),  challenge to the competence of Sri  T.R. Sharma to make an  

admission that the land was purchased by the appellant without waiting for  

the State Government’s permission and that appropriate legal action can be  

taken with regard to excess land pales into the realm of insignificance.  The  

learned counsel was at loss to explain as to how in the face of the lease  

agreement, which was signed by none else than Shri Kamal Oswal (Director  

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of the appellant), whose name finds mention in Resolution dated 14.10.1991  

and General Manager (Liaison) and which contains unequivocal admission  

that the land was purchased in violation of Section 154(1) and, as such, the  

transaction was void and that by virtue of Section 167, excess land vested in  

the State Government, it can be said that Shri T.R. Sharma acted beyond his  

authority in filing the written statement.  This being the position, it is not  

possible to find any fault with the order of the Collector who relied upon the  

written statement filed on behalf of the appellant and declared that land in  

excess of 12.50 acres will vest in the State Government.

23. We shall  now consider whether the restriction contained in Section  

154(1) is not attracted in a case involving transfer of land by Bhumidhar in  

favour of a company.  In this context, it is important to bear in mind that the  

Act was enacted by the State Legislature to achieve the goal of social and  

economic justice enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution.  It provides  

for abolition of zamindari  system, which involves intermediaries between  

tiller of the soil and the State and for acquisition of their rights, title and  

interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure.  Sections 154, 166 and  

167 of the Act, which contain restriction on transfer of land by Bhumidhar  

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and  also  specify  the  consequences  of  transfer  made  in  violation  of  that  

restriction, read as under:-

“154. Restriction on transfer by a bhumidhar.– (1) Save as  provided in sub-section (2), no bhumidhar shall have the right  to transfer by sale or gift, any land other than tea gardens to any  person where the transferee shall, as a result of such sale or gift,  become entitled to land which together with land if any, held by  his family will, in the aggregate, exceed 5.0586 hectares (12.50  acres) in Uttar Pradesh.

Explanation.– For the removal of doubt it  is hereby declared  that in this sub-section the expression ‘person’ shall include and  be deemed to have included on June 15, 1976 a ‘Co-operative  Society’:

Provided that where the transferee is a co-operative society, the  land held by it having been pooled by its members under clause  (a) of sub-section (1) of section 77 of the Uttar Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1965 shall not be taken into account in  computing the 5.0586 hectares (12.50 acres) land held by it.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any other law relating to the  land tenures for the time being in force, the State Government  may, by general or special order, authorise transfer in excess of  the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that  such transfer is in favour of a registered cooperative society or  an institution established for a charitable purpose, which does  not have land sufficient for its need or that the transfer is in the  interest of general public.

Explanation.– For the purposes of this section, the expression  ‘family’ shall mean the transferee, his or her wife or husband  (as  the  case  may  be)  and  minor  children,  and  where  the  transferee is a minor also his or her parents.

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(3) For  every  transfer  of  land  in  excess  of  the  limit  prescribed  under  sub-section  (1)  prior  approval  of  the  State  Government shall be necessary:

Provided that where the prior approval of the State Government  is  not  obtained under  this  sub-section,  the State  Government  may  on  an  application  give  its  approval  afterward  in  such  manner and on payment in such manner of an amount, as fine,  equal to twenty-five per cent of the cost of the land as may be  prescribed.  The cost of the land shall be such as determined by  the Collector for stamp duty.

Provided further that where the State Government is satisfied  that  any  transfer  has  been  made  in  public  interest,  it  may  exempt any such transferee from the payment of fine under this  sub-section.

166. Transfer made in contravention of the Act to be void.–  Every transfer made in contravention of the provisions of this  Act shall be void.

167.  Consequences  of  void  transfers.– (1)  The  following  consequences shall ensue in respect of every transfer which is  void by virtue of section 166, namely–

(a) the subject-matter of transfer shall with effect from the  date  of  transfer,  be  deemed  to  have  vested  in  the  State  Government free from all encumbrances;

(b) the trees, crops and wells existing on the land on the date  of transfer shall, with effect from the said date, be deemed to  have  vested  in  the  State  Government  free  from  all  encumbrances;

(c) the transferee may remove other movable property or the  materials of any immovable property existing on such land on  the date of transfer within such time as may be prescribed.

(2) Where any land or other property has vested in the State  Government  under  sub-section  (1),  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  

23

Collector  to  take  over  possession  over  such  land  or  other  property and to direct that any person occupying such land or  property be evicted therefrom.  For the purposes of taking over  such possession or  evicting such unauthorised occupants,  the  Collector may use or cause to be used such force as may be  necessary.”

24. While enacting law for abolition of zamindari system, the legislature  

was aware of the ground reality that despite the welfare measures which may  

be taken by the State to protect the interest of poor farmers, economically  

affluent class of people may persuade or pressurize them to part with their  

sole source of sustenance i.e., the land.  This is the reason why a ceiling has  

been imposed  on transfer  of  land by Bhumidhar.   Section 154(1),  in  no  

uncertain terms, declares that no Bhumidhar shall be entitled to transfer any  

land other than tea gardens by sale or gift to any person if holding of the  

transferee  would exceed 12.50 acres  (Earlier  the prescribed limit  was 30  

acres but by an amendment it was reduced to 12.50 acres). An explanation  

was subsequently added to clarify that the word `person’ shall include and  

be deemed to have included a cooperative society on June 15, 1976.  Proviso  

to  Section  154(1)  lays  down  that  where  the  transferee  is  a  cooperative  

society, the land held by it having been pooled by its members under Section  

77(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 shall not be  

taken into account for the purpose of computing 12.50 acres.  Under sub-

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section (2), the State Government is empowered to authorize transfer of land  

in excess of the limit prescribed in sub-section (1) if it is of the opinion that  

such transfer is in favour of a registered cooperative society or an institution  

established for a charitable purpose, which does not have sufficient land for  

its need or the transfer is in the interest of general public.  The substantive  

part of sub-section (3), which was added by an amendment made in 2005,  

lays down that every transfer of land in excess of the limit prescribed under  

sub-section (1) shall  require prior approval of the State Government.  By  

virtue of proviso to this sub-section, the State Government has been clothed  

with power to give post facto approval on payment of the specified amount  

as fine.  Section 166 declares that every transfer made in contravention of  

the  provision  of  the  Act  shall  be void.   This  obviously  includes  Section  

154(1).  Section 167 enumerates the consequences of void transfers.  Clause  

(a) of Section 167(1) lays down that a transfer which is void by virtue of  

Section 166, the subject matter of transfer shall be deemed to have vested in  

the State Government from the date of transfer.  In terms of Section 167(2),  

the Collector is entitled to take over possession of any land or other property  

which has vested in the State Government under sub-section (1) and also  

direct eviction of any person occupying such land or property.  

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25. The argument of Shri Manoj Swarup that a company is not a ‘person’  

within  the  meaning  of  Section  154(1)  of  the  Act  and,  therefore,  the  

restriction contained therein is not applicable to transfer of land in favour of  

a company sans merit.  Since, the word `person’ has not been defined in the  

Act,  reference can usefully be made to the definition of that word in the  

Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904.  Sections 3 and 4(33) of that Act  

read as under:

“3.  Application of  the Act  to other enactments.  – (1)  The  provisions of this Act shall apply to this Act and to all Uttar  Pradesh Acts, whether made before or after the commencement  of this Act.

(2)  The  provisions  of  this  Act  in  their  application  to  any  enactment  or  statutory  instrument  shall  be  subject  to  any  contrary  requirements  of  the  context  of  the  enactment  or  instrument that is to be interpreted.

4.  Definitions.  –  In  all  Uttar  Pradesh  Acts,  unless  there  is  anything repugnant in the subject or context, –  

xxxx xxxx xxxx

(33) “Person”  shall  include  any  company  or  association  or  body of individuals, whether incorporated or not;

xxxx xxxx xxxx”

A reading of Section 3(1) reproduced above makes it clear that the  

provisions contained in the U.P. General Clauses Act are applicable to all  

Uttar Pradesh Acts including the Act with which we are concerned.  To put  

26

it  differently,  by  virtue  of  Section  3(1)  of  the  General  Clauses  Act,  the  

definition of the word `person’ contained in Section 4(33) will be deemed to  

have been engrafted in the Act and the same cannot be given a restricted  

meaning  as  suggested  by  the  learned  counsel.   Rather,  in  view  of  the  

definition contained in Section 4(33) of the U.P. General Clauses Act, the  

word ‘person’ appearing in Section 154(1) would include any company or  

association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not.  This view  

of  ours  is  strengthened  by the  language  of  explanation  added to  Section  

154(1) whereby it was declared that the expression ‘person’ shall include a  

cooperative society.  The word ‘include’ is generally used in interpretation  

clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in  

the body of the statue and when it is so used those words or phrases must be  

construed as comprehending, not only such things, as they signify according  

to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause  

declares that they shall include.  The word ‘include’ is susceptible of another  

construction,  which may become imperative,  if  the  context  of  the Act  is  

sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding  

to  the  natural  significance  of  the  words or  expressions  used.   It  may  be  

equivalent to ‘mean and include’ and in that case it may afford an exhaustive  

explanation  of  the  meaning  which  for  the  purposes  of  the  Act  must  

27

invariably  be  attached  to  those  words  or  expressions.  –  Dilworth  v.  

Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99.  In State of Bombay and others  

v.  Hospital  Mazdoor  Sabha  and  others AIR  1960  SC  610,  

Gajendragadkar, J., observed:   

“It  is  obvious  that  the  words  used in  an inclusive  definition  denote  extension  and  cannot  be  treated  as  restricted  in  any  sense.   Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition,  it  would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon  terms of wider denotation.   

In CIT, A.P. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550, this  

Court interpreted the word ‘plant’ used in Section 10(2)(vi-b) of the Income  

Tax Act, 1922.  Speaking for the Court, Grover, J., observed:  

“The very fact that even books have been included shows that  the meaning intended to be given to ‘plant’ is wide.  The word  ‘includes’  is  often  used  in  interpretation  clauses  in  order  to  enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in the  body of the statute.  When it is so used these words and phrases  must be construed as comprehending not only such things as  they signify according to their nature and import but also those  things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall  include.”

26. Moreover, if the word ‘person’ used in Section 154(1) is interpreted  

keeping  in  view  the  object  of  legislation  and  by  applying  the  rule  of  

contextual interpretation, the applicability of which has been recognised in  

Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274 (para 7), S.K. Gupta  

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and another v. K.P. Jain and another (1979) 3 SCC 54 (para 25), Reserve  

Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and  

others (1987) 1 SCC 424 (para 33) and Central Bank of India v. State of  

Kerala and others (2009) 4 SCC 94 (para 98), it becomes clear that the  

same would include human being and a body of individuals which may have  

juridical or non juridical status.   

27. At the cost of repetition, we consider it appropriate to observe that the  

primary object of Section 154(1) is to put a restriction/ceiling on the transfer  

of land by a Bhumidhar to any other person by sale or gift.  Though, sub-

sections (2) and (3) of Section 154 empowers the Government to dilute the  

rigor of the restriction contained in Section 154(1), if that section is read in  

conjunction with Sections 166 and 167 which provide for consequences of  

transfer made in contravention of the Act including Section 154(1), the word  

‘person’ appearing in Section 154(1) cannot be construed in a manner which  

would defeat the object and purpose of legislation.  If a narrow meaning is  

given  to  the  word  ‘person’  appearing  in  Section  154(1),  the  purpose  of  

legislation viz., abolition of zamindari and making tillers owner of the land,  

which is in consonance with the mandate of the object of social justice set  

out in the preamble and the provisions contained in Articles 38 and 39 of the  

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Constitution,  would  be  substantively  defeated  because  in  that  event  

companies, corporations, etc. will be able to grab the land of the tillers by  

offering  them  comparatively  remunerative  prices  and  again  make  them  

landless poor.   

28. At this stage, we may notice two precedents which have direct bearing  

on the interpretation of word ‘person’.  In  Hasmukhlal Dahayabhai and  

others v. State of Gujarat and others (1976) 4 SCC 100, this Court was  

called upon to interpret Section 6 of the Gujarat Ceiling Act, 1961.  It was  

argued on behalf of the appellant that the concept of person embodied in  

Section 6(2) was contrary to the concept of that word in second proviso to  

Article  331A(1)  of  the  Constitution.   While  repelling  the  challenge,  this  

Court observed:

“It is evident that Section 6 conceives of each “person” holding  land as a single unit whose holding must not exceed the ceiling  limit.  Section  2  sub-section  (21)  says:  “  ‘person’  includes  a  joint family”,. Thus, the term “person” is not, strictly speaking,  defined in the Act. Section 2 sub-section (21) only clarifies that  the term “person” will “include” a joint family also. It certainly  does not exclude an individual from being a person in the eyes  of law.

This has been done apparently to make it clear that, in  addition  to  individuals,  as  natural  persons,  families,  as  conceived of by other provisions, can also be and are persons.  This elucidation of the term “person” is in keeping with Section  3(42) of the General Clauses Act,  1897, which lays down: “  

30

‘person’ shall include any company or association or body of  individuals, whether incorporated or not”.

We have referred to the Central General Clauses Act 10  of 1897 and not to the State General Clauses Act, which also  contains  a  similar  clarification,  because  Article  367  of  our  Constitution  provides  that  the  definitions  contained  in  the  Central Act “apply for the interpretation of the Constitution”.  The argument which has been advanced before us is that the  concept of the term “person”, having been fixed by the Central  General Clauses Act, this concept and no other must be used for  interpreting  the  second  proviso  to  Article  31-A(1)  of  the  Constitution which lays down:

“Provided  further  that  where  any  law  makes  any  provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate  and  where  any  land  comprised  therein  is  held  by  a  person under  his  personal  cultivation,  it  shall  not  be  lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as  is within the ceiling limit  applicable to him under any  law  for  the  time  being  in  force  or  any  building  or  structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless  the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building  or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a  rate  which  shall  not  be  less  than  the  market  value  thereof.”

It is true that, but for the provisions of Section 6, sub- section  (2)  of  the  Act,  the  term  “person”,  which  includes  individuals, as natural persons, as well as groups or bodies of  individuals,  as  artificial  persons,  such  as  a  family  is,  the  entitlement  to  the  ceiling  area  would  be  possessed  by  every  person, whether artificial or natural. In other words, if Section  6(2)  of  the  Act  was  not  there,  each individual  member  of  a  family would have been entitled to hold land upto the ceiling  limit if it was his or her legally separate property. This follows  from the obvious meaning of the term “person” as well as the  inclusive definitions given both in the Act under consideration  and in the General Clauses Act.

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Spouses and minor children, as natural persons, have not  been debarred from holding their separate rights to land by the  provisions of the Act. It is not the object of the Act to do that.  The object of the Act, as set out above, is twofold: firstly, to  limit the ceiling area of each holder; and, secondly, to acquire  what  falls  beyond  the  ceiling  limit  so  that  the  State  may  distribute  it  to  more  needy  persons.  It  is  not  disputed  that  compensation is provided for acquisition of what exceeds the  ceiling area in every case. As was held by this Court in H.H.  Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalavaru v.  State of Kerala the  amount of compensation fixed cannot be questioned. Therefore,  no provision of the Act could be or is challenged on the ground  that  the  required  compensation  is  not  prescribed  for  an  acquisition  under  it  as  required  by  Article  31(2)  of  the  Constitution or is inadequate.”

29. The issue was recently considered in Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State  

of  Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 449.  That  case involved interpretation of  the  

provisions contained in the  Gujarat  Agricultural  Land Ceiling Act,  1960.  

The High Court held that the word ‘person’ appearing in Section 6 of the  

Act  includes  an  association  of  persons  and  as  such  10  co-owners  were  

entitled  to  only  one  unit  i.e.  36  acres.   It  was  argued  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant that the definition of “person” in the General Clauses Act cannot  

be read into the definition of “person” in the Ceiling Act and in any case co-

owners  cannot  be  considered  as  a  body  of  individuals  or  association  of  

persons  and  each  co-owner  should  be  considered  as  a  person  for  the  

purposes of the Ceiling Act.  The Court referred to the provisions of Gujarat  

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General Clauses Act, which is pari materia to the General Clauses Act, 1897  

and held:

“The extent of land that could be held by the appellants depends  upon the interpretation of the word “person” in Section 6(1) of  the  Ceiling  Act  which  provides  that  “no  person shall  … be  entitled to hold … land in excess of the ceiling area”. If the ten  co-owners  are  considered  as  an  “association  of  persons”  or  “body of individuals”, and consequently as a “person”, then the  ten co-owners together as a person, will be entitled to only one  unit  of  land  which  is  the  ceiling  area  per  person.  But  if  “association  of  persons”  or  “body  of  individuals”  is  not  a  “person”,  or  if  a  co-ownership  is  not  an  association  of  person/body of individuals, then each co-owner or the family of  each co-owner, as the case may be will be a separate “person”  having regard to the definition of person in Section 2(21) of the  Ceiling Act, in which event, each family will be entitled to hold  one unit of land.

The word “person” is defined in the Act, but it is an inclusive  definition, that is, “a person includes a joint family”. Where the  definition  is  an  inclusive  definition,  the  use  of  the  word  “includes” indicates an intention to enlarge the meaning of the  word  used  in  the  statute.  Consequently,  the  word  must  be  construed as comprehending not only such things which they  signify according to their natural import, but also those things  which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.  Thus, where a definition uses the word “includes”, as contrasted  from “means”,  the  word defined not  only  bears  its  ordinary,  popular  and  natural  meaning,  but  in  addition  also  bears  the  extended  statutory  meaning  (see  S.K.  Gupta v.  K.P.  Jain  following  Dilworth v.  Commr.  of  Stamps and  Jobbins v.  Middlesex Country Council).

The  ordinary,  popular  and  natural  meaning  of  the  word  “person” is “a specific individual human being”. But in law the  

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word “person” has a slightly different connotation and refers to  any entity that is recognised by law as having the rights and  duties  of  a  human being.  Salmond defines  “person”  as  “any  being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties” or  as “a being, whether human or not, of which rights and duties  are the attributes” (Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., p. 299).  Thus  the word “person”, in law, unless otherwise intended, refers not  only to a natural person (male or female human being), but also  any legal person (that is an entity that is recognised by law as  having  or  capable  of  having  rights  and duties).  The  General  Clauses Act thus defines a “person” as including a corporation  or an association of persons or a body of individuals whether  incorporated  or  not.  The  said  general  legal  definition  is,  however, either modified or restricted or expanded in different  statutes  with  reference  to  the  object  of  the  enactment  or  the  context in which it is used. For instance, the definition of the  word  “person”  in  the  Income  Tax  Act,  is  very  wide  and  includes an individual, a Hindu Undivided Family, a company,  a firm, an association of persons or body of individuals whether  incorporated or not, a local authority and every other artificial  juridical  person.  At the other extreme is the Citizenship Act,  Section 2(f) of which reads thus: ‘ “Person”  does  not  include  any  company  or  association  or  body  of  individuals  whether  incorporated  or  not.’  Similarly,  the  definition  under  Section  2(g)  of  the  Representation  of  People  Act,  1950,  is  “person” does not include a body of persons.

Both definitions of the word “person”, in the General Clauses  Act and the Ceiling Act, are inclusive definitions. The inclusive  definition of “person” in the General Clauses Act applies to all  Gujarat Acts unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or  the  context.  The  inclusive  definition  of  “person”  in  Section  2(21) of the Ceiling Act, does not indicate anything repugnant  to the definition of “person” in the General Clauses Act,  but  merely adds “joint family” to the existing definition. Therefore  the definition of person in the Ceiling Act, would include the  definition  of  person in  Section 3(35)  of  the  General  Clauses  Act. The resultant position can be stated thus: the definition of  person  in  the  General  Clauses  Act,  being  an  inclusive  

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definition,  would  include  the  ordinary,  popular  and  general  meaning and those specifically included in the definition. The  inclusive  definition  of  “person”  in  the  Ceiling  Act,  in  the  absence  of  any  exclusion,  would  have  the  same  meaning  assigned  to  the  word  in  the  General  Clauses  Act,  and  in  addition, a “joint family” as defined. Thus, the word “person”  in the Ceiling Act will, unless the context otherwise requires,  refer to:

(i) a natural human being; (ii) any  legal  entity  which  is  capable  of  possessing  rights and duties, including any company or association of  persons  or  body of  individuals  (whether  incorporated  or  not); and (iii) a  Hindu Undivided  Family  or  any  other  group or  unit of persons, the members of which by custom or usage,  are joint in estate and residence.”

30. In view of the above, the argument of the learned counsel that the  

word ‘person’ in Section 154(1) means a human being or a natural person  

only and that the explanation by which a cooperative society was included in  

the said word is indicative of the legislature’s intention to give a narrow  

meaning  to  the  word  ‘person’  is  liable  to  be  rejected.   In  our  view,  the  

explanation instead of narrowing the meaning of the word ‘person’ makes it  

clear that the same would include a non natural person.

31. The submission that if share of the individual Director is taken into  

consideration, the total land of the appellant would not exceed 12.50 acres is  

being  mentioned  only  to  be  rejected  in  view  of  the  contents  of  lease  

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agreement.  That apart, no evidence was produced before the Collector or  

the Additional Commissioner to prove that the land was purchased in the  

name of the Directors of the appellant.  Even before the learned Single Judge  

of the High Court and this Court, no such evidence has been produced.  In  

Ramanlal Bhailal Patel’s  case, this issue was considered and answered in  

negative in the following words:

“Instead of buying the land (172 acres 36 guntas) jointly under  the  four  sale  deeds  it  was  open  to  the  ten  persons  to  have  bought the lands individually, that is each of them purchasing  such extent of land as he or she wanted. If they had registered  the  sale  deeds  individually  (subject  to  each  of  them  being  entitled to buy agricultural land, under the land reforms laws in  force) each couple would have been entitled to hold land to the  extent  of  one  unit.  Instead  of  each  individual  or  couple  purchasing  the  land  in  their  respective  names,  if  for  convenience  in  negotiations,  ten  individuals  buy  the  land  jointly, the position will be no different. It cannot be said that  merely  because  the  sale  deed  is  in  the  joint  names  of  ten  persons, they purchased the land as “an association of persons”  or  as  “body  of  individuals”  with  the  common  intention  of  carrying on agricultural activities jointly or producing income,  profit or gain or carry on some common joint venture. In fact  before purchasing the lands, the ten persons had entered into an  agreement placing on record that the object of purchasing the  lands  jointly  was  only  to  facilitate  negotiations  and  avoid  duplicating the purchase procedures and not to cultivate them  jointly. There is no evidence of any joint cultivation, nor any  evidence of any intention to have a joint venture. On the other  hand, after purchase, they divided the lands and informed the  Land Revenue Authorities and each co-owner was registered as  the owner of the respective land allotted to him/her. This is not  a case where a body of individuals purchased the land with the  intention of having a continued community of interest by way  

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of a joint venture or as a business venture. It is therefore not  possible  to  treat  the  ten  purchasers  as  an  “association  of  persons/body of individuals” nor is it permissible to treat them  as a single “person”, thereby restricting their entitlement to hold  land to only one unit, even though there are ten purchasers.    The Tribunal and the High Court were right in holding that the  word “person” in the Ceiling Act includes an “association of  persons/body  of  individuals”.  But  they  were  not  justified  in  treating  the  co-owners  as  an  “association  of  persons”,  or  in  holding that the ten co-owners will be entitled to own only one  unit. Having regard to Section 6(2) of the Act, the share of each  couple  (husband  and  wife)  in  the  land,  plus  any  other  land  individually held by them will have to be calculated to find out  whether  they  held  any  land  in  excess  of  the  ceiling  limit.  Therefore,  the  share  of  each  appellant  in  the  lands  jointly  purchased, with the addition of the lands held by his spouse,  and addition of any other land held by them, will give the basis  for determining the surplus land. For example, if a husband’s  share as co-owner is 20 acres and wife’s share as co-owner is  20 acres, and their other individual holding is another 10 acres  (all of the same category in ‘C’ Class), the total holding of the  family will be 50 acres (20+20+10 acres) and the surplus will  be 14 acres.”

32. The submission of Shri Manoj Swarup that a direction may be given  

to the State Government to accord  post facto sanction to the purchase of  

excess land cannot be entertained much less accepted because the appellant  

has been found guilty of not coming to the Court with clean hands.  In any  

case,  in  the  absence  of  any  factual  foundation,  such  a  plea  cannot  be  

entertained at this stage.

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33. The appellant’s grievance against the direction given by the learned  

Single Judge to the Chief Secretary to ensure that possession of excess land  

is taken without delay does not merit consideration because as mentioned in  

the earlier part of this judgment, the State Government had already granted  

lease of excess land to the appellant.

34. Before  parting with the case,  we deem it  necessary to  express  our  

serious reservation about the bona fides of the State Government in granting  

lease of excess land to the appellant.  It is impossible to fathom any rational  

reason for this action of the State Government ignoring that the appellant  

had purchased land in patent violation of Section 154(1) of the Act.   By  

executing lease agreement dated 15.10.1994, the concerned officers of the  

State effectively frustrated the object sought to be achieved by the legislature  

by enacting the Act and the order passed by the Collector.  

35. In the result,  the  appeal  is  dismissed.   Since the  appellant  has not  

approached  the  quasi  judicial  and  judicial  forums  i.e.,  the  Additional  

Commissioner,  the  High  Court  and  this  Court  with  clean  hands  and  

succeeded in securing interim orders, it is ordained to pay costs, which is  

quantified at Rs.2 lacs.  With a view to ensure that functionaries of the State  

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Government may not connive with the appellant and compound the wrong  

already done, we direct the Government of Uttar Pradesh not to renew the  

lease of the appellant at the end of 30 years period and deal with excess land  

in accordance with the provisions of the Act.      

….………………….…J. [G.S. Singhvi]

…..…..………………..J. [Asok Kumar Ganguly]

New Delhi April 01, 2010.

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