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PETITIONER: OSWAL AGRO MILLS LTD.  ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/04/1993

BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. BENCH: RAMASWAMY, K. SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 2288            1993 SCR  (3) 378  1993 SCC  Supl.  (3) 716 JT 1993 (3)   260  1993 SCALE  (2)660

ACT: % Central Exercises and Salt Act, 1944: First  Schedule,  Item 15-Soap-Toilet  Soap-"Household"  and "other   sorts"-Interpretation  of   "Toilet   Soap"-Whether household soap within the meaning of Tariff item 15 (1). Interpretation of statutes; In interpreting a provision nothing to be added or  deleted- Object of legislature to be gathered from the language used.

HEADNOTE: The appellant-Mills claimed that the "toilet soaps" produced by them were bath soaps failing under tariff item 15 (1)  of the  First Schedule (Household) to the Central  Excises  and Salt  Act, 1944, but the Assistant Collector classified  the same  as  "other  sorts"  under tariff  item  15(2)  of  the schedule attracting higher levy of excise duty.  On  appeal, the  Collector held that they fell under tariff item No.  15 (1) "household". On second appeal, the Tribunal reversed the appellate order, against  which  the appellant-Mills  preferred  the  instant appeals. The  appellants  contended  that in  1954  toilet  soap  was treated as an independent tariff sub-item and household  and laundry soaps were treated as separate entity and separately subjected  to varied rates of tariff-, that on amendment  in 1964  toilet  soap  was omitted as  a  separate  entity  and brought   toilet  soap  as  part  of  genus,  namely,   soap "household",  as  toilet soap has always  been  a  household soap. The   respondents   contended  that  statute   always   kept distinction between soap "household and laundry" and  "other sorts" and that toilet soap was kept in the packet of  other sorts; that household and laundry soaps were being used  for cleaning  household  articles and utensils and  washing  the clothes,  while toilet soaps are for bathing  purpose.   The latter,  composed  of diverse varieties  based  on  personal liking  and  taste,  are  being  used;  and  that  they  are commercially known as other sorts but not household. 379 Allowing  the appeals, and remitting the matter  to  primary

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authority, this Court, HELD:1.1  The provisions of the Tariff do not determine  the relevant  entity of the goods.  They deal whether and  under what entry, the identified entity attracts duty.  The  goods are  to  be  identified and then  to  find  the  appropriate heading, sub-heading under which the identified  goods/prod- ucts   would  be  classified.   To  find   the   appropriate classification  the  description  employed  in  the   tariff nomenclature  should  he appreciated having  regard  to  the terms  of the headings read with the relevant provisions  or statutory  rules  or  interpretation put  up  thereon.   For exigibility  to excise duty the entity must he specified  in positive  terms  under a particular tariff  entry.   In  its absence it has to be deducted from a proper construction  of the tariff entry.  There is neither intendment nor equity in a  taxing  statute.   Nothing  is  implied.   It  should  be interpreted  and construed as per the words the  legislature has chosen to employ in the Act or Rules.  There is no  room for assumptions or presumptions.The object of Parliament has to be gathered from the language used in the statute.  (383- H, 384-A-B) 1.2"toilet  soap"  being of everyday household use  for  the purpose of the bath and having removed its sperate  identity which  it  enjoyed preceding amendment and having  been  not specifically  included in’other sorts’, it took its  shelter In  commercial parlance under household’.  If any body  goes to  the market and asked for toilet soap, he must asked  any for  household  bathing purpose and not  for  industrial  or other  sorts.  Even the people dealing with it would  supply it  only  for  household  purpose.   It  may  be  true  that household  consists  of  soap used  for  cleaning  utensils, laundry used for cleaning soiled clothes and soap toilet  is used  for  bathing  but house-hold  is  compendiously  used, toilet soap is used only by the family for bathing  purpose. Individual  preference  or choice or taste of  a  particular soap  for  bath is not relevant.  The soap  "toilet"  would, therefore,  fall within the meaning the word of  "household" in sub-item (1) of item 15 of the Schedule. (384-B-C,) Ajoy  kumar Bannerjee and-Ors. v. Union of India  and  Ors., [1984]  3  SCC 127; and Urkal Contractors and  Joinery  Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors.: [1987] 3 SCC 279, distinguished Manmohan  Das  v-  Vishnu Das, AIR 1967  SC  643;  Ramavatar Budhaipasad  etc.  v. Asstt.  Sales Tax Officer,  Akola  and Anr, [1962] 1 SCC 279; Motipur Zamindari Co. (Pvt. ) Ltd. v. State of Bihar: 380 [1962]  Supp.  1 SCR 498; State of West Bengal and  Ors.  v. Washi  Ahmed  etc.,  [1977] 3 SCR 149;  Porritts  &  Spencer (Asia)  Ltd.  v. State of Haryana, [1979] 1  SCR  545;  Indo International Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P., [1981] 3 SCR 294 at 297 C; P.A. Chillai Chidambara Nadar  v. Addl.   Appellate  Asstt.  Commissioner, Madurai  and  Anr., [1985]  4 SCC 30; Khandelwal Metal Works v. Union of  India, [1985]  Supp.  1 SCR 750 at 774  B-C;  Shri-Bharuch  Coconut Trading Co. and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahmedabad and Ors., [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 298; Hansraj  Gordhan Das  v.  H.H.  Dave Assti.  Collector of  Central  Excise  & Customs  and  Ors., [1969] 2 SCR 253; Dunlop India  Ltd.  v. Union of India & Ors. [1976] 2 SCR 98; Anant B. Timbodia  v. Union  of  India,  [1992] 1  Scale  527;  Superintendent  of Central  Excise,  Surat v. Vac Metal Corporation  Ltd.,  AIR 1986  SC 1167; Spaco Carburettors (India) Ltd. v.  Collector of Customs, Bombay, (1988) 3 SCR 37; Shashikant Laxman  Kale and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr., [1990] 4 SCC 366 at 376

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Para 17; Mitra Prakashan Pvt.  Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1991) 51 E.L.T. 115 para 15; Desh Bandhu Gupta and Ors.  v. Delhi Stock Exchange: [1979] 3 SCR 373; J.K. Coton  Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and  Ors., [1987]  Supp.   SCC 350; Dovack Systems Pvt.  Ltd.  etc.  v. Union of India & Ors. etc.[1988] 2 SCR %2 at 1000 F to H and State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s G. S. Dall and Flour  Mills:, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 150 at 153 para 18, referred to, Craises  on Statute Law (7th Edition) at Page 164,  referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2702 of 1984. From  the Judgment and Order dated 20.6.1984 of the  Customs Excise  and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi  in Appeal No. ED (SB) 2714/83 C. Harish  N.  Salve, Ashok H. Desai,  Miss  Meenakshi  Grover, Rajiv  Dutta,  Ravinder Narain, Miss Amrit and  Miss  Punita Singh for JBD & Co. for the Appellants. A.K. Ganguli, k.Swami, Dilip Tandon and P. Parameshwaran for the Respondents. 381 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K.   RAMASWAMY.   J.:  Common  questions of  law  arose  for decision in these 8 appeals need disposal by this  judgment. The  question relates to classification of "toilet soap"  in Excise  item 15 of the First Schedule to the Central  Excise and  Salt  Act 1 of 1944 as amended in 1964  for  short  the Act’.   In addition, in C.A. Nos. 81 3/86, 3632-34/88 and  1 102/89  sequal to its finding, they claim refund  of  excess excise duty.  The facts in C.A. Nos. 2702/84 and 2785/84 are sufficient   for  disposal.   The  appellants  laid   before Assiatant  Collect or classification list  claiming  "toilet soaps"  Kalpa  and Oasis, in other appeals Jai,  O.K.  Moti, Rain  drop, Gold and Ria as bath soaps under Tariff item  15 (1)  of  the First Schedule (Household).   By  notice  dated August  31,  1982, the Assistant Collector called  upon  the appellants to show cause as to why they cannot be classified under tariff item 15(2) other sorts and to levy excise  duty at  15 per cent ad valorem (as then stood).  The  appellants after  filing  their reply thereto and having  had  personal hearing,  by proceeding dated November 27, 1982, the  Asstt. Collector  classified  toilet soaps as "other  sorts"  under tariff item 15(2) of the Schedule.  On appeal the  Collector by Order dated January 21, 1983 classified them under tariff item  No. 15(1) "household" On second appeal, the  CEGAT  by its  order dated June 20, 1984 reversed the appellate  order and  upheld the Asstt.  Collector’s order, Same is the  case with regard to all other appeals except resultant claim  for refund.   In 1954 tariff item No. 15A was introduced in  the First Schedule of the Act thus: "15(A)   ’Soap’   all  varieties  of   the   product   known commercially as soap- 1.  Soap, in or in relation to the manufacture of which  any process is ordinarily carried on with the aid of power or of steam for heating:- (1)  Soap, household and laundry:-      (a) Plain bars of not less than          Rupees      one pound in weight                      fives &                                               annas                                               four                                               per                                               cwt.

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    (b) ther sorts                           Rupees                                               six &                                               annas 382                                               two per                                               cwt.      (2) Soap toilet                          Rupees                                               fourteen                                               per cwt.      (3) Soap, other then household           Rupees      and laundry or toilet.                   fourteen                                               per cwt.      This entry as amended in 1964 reads thus "   15   ’Soap’  means  all  varieties  of   product   known commercially as soap-:      (1)Soap, household and                  20 per cent      Laundary                                ad valorem      (2) Other sorts                         20 per cent                                              ad valorem (Ad  valorem rate of tarrif varies from time to time as  per amendments). Later  it was amended in the year 1979 empowering the  Govt. to grant exemption under section 8 of the Act.  The  details thereof are not material for the purpose of these cases.  It is  seen that in 1954 in Tariff entry 15A "soap"  means  all varieties of the product known commercially as soap.  Item 1 provided  that soap in relation to its manufacture with  the aid  of power or of steam for heating, they were  classified as  Plain  bars, other sorts, toilet soaps and  soap,  other then  husehold  or laundry or toilet.   While  amending  the entry  in 1964 the language couched therein as seen  earliar is  thus:  ’soap’  means  all  varities  of  products  known commercially as soap. 1)   Soap, household and Laundry 2)   "Other  sorts"  and graded ad valorem tariff  has  been prescribed.  It is seen that household and laundry soap  was subjected  to  levy of tariff at a lesser  rate  than  other sorts"  ad  valorem.   The contention of  Sri  Ganguli,  the learned Senior counsel for the union is that statute  always kept  distinction between soap "household and  laundry"  and "other sorts".  Toilet soap was kept in the packet of  other sorts.   Household  and  laundry soaps are  being  used  for cleaning  household  articles and utensils and  washing  the clothes  while  toilet soaps are for bathing  purpose.   The latter  compose  of  diverse varieties,  based  on  personal liking and 383 taste, are being used.  They are commercially known as other sorts but not household.  The legislative history  furnishes unimpeachable  evidence  that soaps used for  household  and laundry  are  compendiously  treated  as  a  class  and  are subjected  to  imposition of lesser  tariff.   They  receive their  colour from each other as compendiously known in  the commercial  parlance that the former are meant for  use  for household  purposes while toilet soap are for use  for  bath and  are subject to higher rate of tariff at par  with  soap for  commercial and industrial purposes.  They  bear  higher rate  of  tariff.   The explanatory  note  appended  to  the Finance  Bill 1964 would furnish the legislative  intendment to  amend  the tariff item and the treatment  meted  out  to toilet   soap  for  tariff  purpose.   It   is   accordingly understood by the department and also by the trade  circles. The  appellants  too intially treated toilet soap  as  other sorts  but  later, on legal opinion, they  claimed  them  as household  soaps.  The construction adopted by the  tribunal

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is consistent with the standard works on soaps.  M/s  Harish Salve  and Ashok Desai, contended that in 1954  toilet  soap was treated as an independent tariff sub-item and  household and  laundry  soaps  were treated  as  separate  entity  and separately   subjected  to  varied  rates  of  tariff.    On amendment  in  1964 toilet soap was omitted  as  a  separate entity  and  brought toilet soap as part of  genus,  namely, soap  "house hold", as a toilet soap is always  a  household soap.  Therefore, the reliance by revenue on varied rates of duty   or  departmental  contemporenia  expositio  have   no bearing.   The object of classification does not  show  that toilet  soap  is  not part of the  genus,  "soap  household" unless it is established otherwise. The question, therefore, emerges whether "toilet soap" would be household soap within the meaning of Tariff item 15(1) of the  Schedule.   Undoubtedly  true,  as  contended  by   Sri Ganguli, that preceding amendment toilet soap was classified separately   under   sub  item  2  and  assessed   to   duty accordingly.  But by amendment the distinction was wiped out and  toilet soap was brought into common hotchpoch.  So  the contention  that the variety of products known  commercially as  soaps  have been enumerated or  included  compendiously, retaining  their  original colour even after  the  amendment made  in the Finance Act, 1964 and falls into "other  sorts" same genus, prima facie, though attractive, on consideration from  proper  perspective  and  in  its  setting  in  common commercial  parlance,  soap  "toilet"  appears  to  fall  in household  in sub-item 1 of tariff item 15 of the  Schedule. It  is true that the heading "soaps" are commercially  known to be of diverse variety. The  provisions of the Tariff do not determine the  relevant entity ofthe goods.  They deal whether and under what entry, the  indentified entity attracts duty.  The goods are to  be identified  and then to find the appropriate  heading,  sub- heading  under which the identified goods/products would  be classified.    To   find  the   appropriate   classification description employed in the tariff nomenclature should 384 be appreciated having regard to the terms of the  headings read  with  the relevant provisions or  statutory  rules  or interpretation  put up thereon.  For exigibility’ to  excise duty the entity must be specified in positive terms under  a particular  tariff entry.  In its absence be deduced from  a proper  construction of the tariff entry.  There is  neither intendment  nor  equity  in a taxing  statute.   Nothing  is implied.   Neither can we insert nor anything can we  delete but it should be interpreted and construed as per the  words the  legislature has chosen to employ. in the Act or  Rules. There is no room for assumption or presumptions.  The object of the parliament has to be gathered from the language  used in  the  statute.   The  contention  that  toilet  soap   is commercially different from household and laundry soaps,  as could  be  seen from the opening words of  entry  15,  needs careful  analysis.   It  is well, at the  outset,  to  guard against  confusion between the meaning and the legal  effect of an expression used in a statute.  Where the words of  the statute  are plain and clear, there is no room for  applying any  of  the principles of interpretation which  are  merely presumption in cases of ambiguity in the statute.  The court would interpret them as they stand.  The object and  purpose has to be gathered from such word themselves.  Words  should not  be  regarded as being surplus nor be  rendered  Otiose. Strictly  speaking  there  is no place  in  such  cases  for interpretation  or  construction except where the  words  of statute  admit of two meanings.  The safer and more  correct

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course to deal with a question of construction of statute is to  take  the words themselves and arrive, if  possible,  at their  meaning,  without, in the first place,  reference  to cases  for  theories of construction.   Let  us,  therefore, consider the meaning of the word soap "household".  The word household  signifies  a  family  living  together.   In  the simplistic language toilet soap being used by the family  as household soap is too simplification to reach a  conclusion. Therefore,  one  has  to gather its  meaning  in  the  legal setting to discover the object which the Act seeks to  serve and the purpose of the amendment brought about.  The task of interpretation  of the statute is not a mechanical one.   It is more than mere reading of mathametical formula.  It is an attempt  to discover the intention of the  legislature  from the  language used by it, keeping always in mind,  that  the language  is  at  best  an  imperfect  instrument  for   the expression  of  actual human thoughts. it is  also  idle  to expect  that the draftman drafted it with divine  prescience and perfect and unequivocal clarity.  Therefore, court would endeavour  to  eschew literal construction  if  it  produces manifest  absurdity  or unjust result.  In Manmohad  Das  v. Vishnu  Das,  AIR 1967 SC 643 a Constitution bench  held  as follows: "The  ordinary  rule of construction is the provision  of  a statute  must be construed in accordance with  the  language used  therein unless there are compelling reasons, such  as, where  a leteral construction would reduce the provision  to absurdity  or prevent manifest intention of the  legislature from being carried out". 385 In Ramavatar Budhaiprasad etc. v. Assit.  Sales Tax Officer, Akola and Anr. [1962] 1 SCR 279, another Constitution  Bench was  to  consider  whether "betal  leaves"  are  "vegetable" within the meaning of item 6 of the 11 Schedule to the  M.P. Sales  Tax  Act.   It was contended that  betal  leaves  are vegetable and, therefore, they are exempted from the payment of sales tax.  While construing item 6, this court held that the  words must be construed not in any technical sense  nor from  the  botanical  point of view but  as,  understood  in common  parlance.   It has not been defined in the  Act  and being  a word of every day use it must be construed  in  its popular  sense meaning "that sense which  people  conversant with  the subject matter with which the statute  is  dealing would  attribute.  to  it".   It  is  to  be  construed   as understood in common language.  Therefore, betal leaves were held  to be not vegetable.  The term ’vegetables’ is  to  be understood as commonly understood denoting those classes  of vegetable matter which are grown in kitchen gardens and  are used for the table.  The same view was reiterated in Motipur Zamindari Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. v.  State of Bihar [1962] Supp.  1 SCR  498 and State of West Bengal and Ors. v.  Washi  Alumed etc.  [1977]3 SCR 149.  In Washi Ahmed’s case  green  ginger was held to be vegetable within the meaning of the word used in common parlance. In Motipur Zaminadari’s case it was held that  sugarcane  was not vegetable.  In Porritts  &  Spencer (Asia) Lid. v. State of Haryana, [1979] 1 SCR 545 this Court held  that Dryer felts’ are not textiles.  In  that  context the  principle of understanding the meaning of the  word  in common   parlance  was  adopted.   In   Indo   International Industries  v. Commissioner of Sales Tax.  U. P.,  [1981]  3 SCR  294  at 297C this Court held that "it is  well  settled that in interpreating items in statutes like the Excise  Tax Acts  or  Sales Tax Acts, whose primary object is  to  raise revenue   and  for  which  purpose  they  classify   diverse products,  articles and substances resort should be had  not

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to  "the scientific anti technical’ meaning of the terms  or expression  used  but to their popular meaning, that  is  to say,  the  meaning  attached to them  by  those  dealing  in them.If any term or expression has been defined in the (emphasis supplied) enactment  then it must he understood in the sense in  which it  is  defined but in the absence of any  definition  being given  in  the enactment the meaning of the term  in  common parlance or commercial parlance has to be adopted.  In  that case  the  clinical syringes manufactured and  sold  by  the assessee  were not considered as glassware’  falling  within entry  39 of the First Schedule of the Act.   In  commercial sense  Glassware  would  never  comprise  of  articles  like clinical  syringes  etc., or  specialised  significance  and utility.    Same  view  was  reiterated  in   P.A.   Chillai Chidambara  Nadar v. Addl.  Appellate  Asst.   Commissioner. Madurai  and Anr. [1985] 4 SCC 30 that coconut is neither  a fresh  fruit nor a vegetable.  In khandelwal Metal Works  v. Union of India, [1985] Supp. 1 SCR 750 at 774 B-C this Court held that court cannot decide classification 386 of  goods under Import Tariff by implication.  If  rules  of interpretation  are made in the Act, they should be  applied and  interpretation  would  be  made  with  their  aid   for classification.   The  court held that brass  scrap  is  not metal  alloy. Craises on Statute Law (7th Edition)  at  pace 164 specified one of the Rules of Interpretation of Statutes as extracted below: "The  second  Rule  is that if the statute  is  passed  with reference  to  a particular trade, business  or  transaction and, words are used therein which everybody conversent  with that trade, business or transaction knows and understands to have  a particular meaning in it, then the words are  to  be construed as having that particular meaning" In  Shri Bharuch Coconut Trading Co. and Ors.  v.  Municipal Corporation of the city of Ahemdabad and Ors., [1992] Suppl. 1  SCC  298  this  Court  applied  the  test  as  "would   a householder  when asked to bring some fresh fruits  or  some vegetable  for  the  evening  meal  bring  Coconut  too   as vegetable?  Obviously the answer is in the negative".  Again when a person goes to a commercial market ask for  coconuts, "no one will consider brown coconut to be vegetable or fresh fruit,  no  householder  would  purchase  it  as  a   fruit. Therefore, the meaning of the word brown coconut, whether it is  a  green  fruit has to be  understood  in  its  ordinary commercial  parlance".  Accordingly it was held  that  brown coconut  was not green fruit.  In interpreting  the  statute the  individual  appraisal of the wisdom or  unwisdom  of  a particular course consciously selected by the Legislature is to  be  put  aisde.  In Hansraj Gordhan Das  v.  H.H.  Dave. Assn.   Collector  of Central Excise & Customs and  Ors.,  [ 1969]  2 SCR 25 3 this court held that the operation of  the statutory  notification had to be judged not by  the  object which authority had in mind but by the words it had employed to  effectuate  the  legislative  interest.   The   question whether  the cotton textiles manufactured by  handlooms  are entitled  to exemption, this court held to be positive.   It may  be  noted  that  marketability of  the  product  is  an essential  facet to attract dutiability of the  goods  under the  Act.  The general purpose or common use of the  product though may not be conclusive but may be relevant to classify it in a tariff entry when it was not specifically enumerated in a particular entry or sub-entry.  The construction of the word must yield in favour of promoting and effectuating  the object  and  purpose of the Act.  In Dunlop  India  Ltd.  v.

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Union  of India & Ors. [1976] 2 SCR 98 this Court found  the entry  not  in  residuary but placed in  the  parentage  and relieved it from orphanage. in Anant B. Timbodia v. Union of India,  [1992]  1  Scale 527, this  Court  was  to  consider whether  imported  cloves fell with item 169 in  List  8  of Appendix  6  or para 167 of chapter 8 of import  and  export policy  1990-93.   Para 167 of Chapter 8  of  import  policy clearly  provided  the  heading-Import  of  Spices  includes cloves,  cinnamon/ cassia, nupneg and Mace.   Therefore,  it was  held that import permit is necessary.  The doctrine  of popular  sense  or trade or its use in  making  medicine  as crude drug 387 was  not accepted.  Dictionary meaning or meaning  given  in Indian Pharmaceutical Codex was not accepted as given in  in view of specific enumeration.  In Superintendent of  central Excise,  Surat  v.  Vac Metal Corporaion Ltd.  AIR  1986  SC 1167  when  the revenue contended that metalised  yarn  fell within  general Tariff entry 18 yarn and synthetic  fibres", this court held that entry 15A (2) first schedule of Central Excise & Salt Act’s specific entry relating to articles made of plastics of "all sorts" and metalised yam wax exigible to lessor  tariff duty.  In Spaco Carburettors (India) Ltd.  v. Collector  of  Customs.   Bombay [1988]  3  SCR  37  whether special purpose complex machine tool fell in entry 84-89  or 84,45/48,  this  court held, after taking into  account  the purpose  and  use of it, that it is a  multipurpose  machine tool and fell in item 84, 45/48 of 1st Schedule. The  contention of the Revenue which finds favour  with  the tribunal   that  the  legislative  history  and   memorandum appended  to  the  Finance Bill would  furnish  aid  to  the construction of the word "household" soap is not apposite to the  fact situation.  When there is ambiguity in  the  word, statement   and   objects  the  legislative   history,   the memorandum appended to the Bill and the speech of the  mover of the Bill are relevant material to discover the  intention intention of the legislature.  In Shashikant Laxman Kale and Anr.  v.  Union of India and Anr., [1990] 4 SCC 366  at  376 para 17 this Court held that "for determining the purpose or object  of the legislation, it is permissible to  look  into the circumstances which prevailed at the time when _the  law was made, the Statement of Objects and, Reasons of the  Bill which actuated the step to provide a remedy for  the  then existing  malady  can  be used for the  limited  purpose  of appreciating  the  background and the  antecedent  state  of affairs   leading  to  the  legislation.    The   memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill which were not part of the ’Notes on Clauses’ appended to the Statement  of Objects  and  Reasons  of the Bill cannot be  used  to  draw support  therefrom  as it is not an accurate  guide  of  the final  Act.   In  that  behalf  this  Court  relied  on  the statement  of  law  profounded by  Francis  Bennion  in  his Statuitory  Interpretation, Second Edition, 1984 at  p.  529 relied on by the appellants in this case too.  In Ajoy Kumar Bannerjee  and Ors. v. Union of India and ors. [1984] 3  SCC 127  relied  on  by Sri Ganguli in this  behalf  renders  no assistance  to  the Revenue.  Therein the question  was  the object  of  delegated legislation.  Therein  the  memorandum appended  to  the Bill incorporating s. 16  of  the  General Insurance   Business   (Nationalisation)   Act,   1972   was considered  in the context of fixation of the pay scales  of the  employees.   The  doctrine  of  reading  down,  placing reliance  on Utkal contranctors and Joinery Pvt.   Lid.  and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors. [1987] 3 SCC 279 also is of no assistance to the Revenue.  The doctrine of reading  down

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has  been applied only to sustain the  constitutionality  of the  statute which question is not before us.  There  is  no quarrel  with  the  proposition  that  in  ascertaining  the meaning of the word or a clause or 388 sentence  in the statute in its  interpretation,  everything which is logically relevant should be admissible.  It is  no doubt  true that the doctrine of Noscitur A Sociis,  meaning thereby,  that  it is a legitimate rule of  construction  to construe  words  in an Act of Parliament with  reference  to words found in immediate connection with them i.e. when  two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed  together, they are understood to be used  in  their cognate  sense.   They take, as it were, their  colour  from each other, the meaning of the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general.  The philosophy  behind it is that the meaning of doubtful words may be  ascertained by  reference  to the meaning of words associated  with  it. This  doctrine  is  broader than  the  doctrine  of  ejusdem generis.  This doctrine was accepted by this Court in catina of cases but its application is to be made to be context and the setting in which the words came to be used or associated in the statute or the statutory rule.  Equally the  doctrine of’  contemporanea erpositio is also being invoked  to  cull out   the   intendment   by  removing   ambiguity   in   its understanding  of the statute by the executive.  This  Court in  a  latest  case Indian metals &  Ferro  Alloys  Lid.  v. Collector of central Excise (1991) 51 E.L.T 165 (S.C)  cited all the decisions upto date and applied the doctrine to  the understanding by the revenue of the provisions in income-tax Act’  In Desh Bandhu Gupta and Ors v. Delhi  Stock  Exchange [1979] 3 SCR 373 this Court held that this principle can  be invoked, though the same will not always be decisive on  the question   of   construction.    But   the   contemporaneous construction placed by administrative or executive  officers charged   with   executing   the   statute,   although   not controlling, is nevertheless entitled to considerable weight as  highly  persuasive.   We  may  also  add  that  if   the interpretation is erroneous, court would without  hesitation refuse to follow such construction.  This Court also equally expressed  the view that its application was  in  restricted sense  to ancient legislation in J. K. Cotton  Spinning  and Weaving  Mills  Ltd.  and Anr. v. Union of  India  and  Ors. [1987] Supp.  SCC 350 and in Doypack Systems Pvt.  Lid. case [1988] 2 SCR 962 at 1000 F to H. In State of Madhya  Pradesh v.  M/s.  G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC  150 at  153 para 18, this Court doubted the application  of  the doctrine   of  contemporanea  exposito  as  given   to   the construction  or its applicability to a recent statute  that too in the first few years of its enforcement.  In this case also  the question whether toilet soap is a  household  soap had  arisen within a short period after the  Amendment  Act, 1964  came  into force, Therefore the understanding  by  the executive and its interpretation in bringing toilet soap  in sub-item  (2) "other sorts" instead of item (1)  "household" being  of  formative  period  of  statutory  operation   the doctrine became inapplicable. The  ratio in Indo Metal case, therefore,  is  inapplicable. As  rightly  contended by Sri Ganguli that the  doctrine  of placement of a particular goods in a particular tariff  item or  residuary i.e. parentage or orphanage i.e. in  placement of toilet soaps 389 in  either sub-items is not attracted to the facts as it  is not  a  case of residuary items  but  of  sub-classification

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within the same item. Thus considered in the legal setting and commercial parlance we  are of the considered view that "toilet soap"  being  of everyday  household  use  for the purpose of  the  bath  and having  removed  its  separate  identity  which  it  enjoyed preceding   amendment  and  having  been  not   specifically included in "other sorts", it took its shelter in commercial parlance  under "household".  As stated if any body goes  to the  market  and asks for toilet soap he must ask  only  for household  bathing purpose and not for industrial  or  other sorts.  Even the people dealing with it would supply it only for  houshold  purpose.   It  may  be  true  that  Household consists  of soap used for cleaning utensils,  laundry  used for  cleaning  soiled clothes and soap toilet  is  used  for bathing but household is compendiously used, toilet soap  is used  only  by the family for bathing  purpose.   Individual preference or choice or teste of a particular soap for  bath is  not relevant.  The soap "toilet" would, therefore  fall, within  the meaning the word of "household" in sub-item  (1) of  item  15  of the  Schedule.   The  classification  shall accordingly   be  adopted.   The  appeals  are   accordingly allowed. the cases are remitted to the primary authority  to deal with the matters accordingly.  We do not propose to  go into  the question of refund as it is a matter to  be  dealt with  by  the authorities concerned in accordance  with  the law., The appellants shall have to apply for refund and  the authorities shall be required to deal with it in  accordance with law.  It is for the authority, therefore, to decide the question  as  per  law.  In the  circumstances  parties  are directed to bear their own costs. V.M. Appeal allowed. 390