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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  2532 of 2007

PETITIONER: Oriental Insurance CO. Ltd

RESPONDENT: Brij Mohan & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/05/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Markandey Katju

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2532 of  2007 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 10655 of 2004]

S.B. SINHA, J.           

       1.      Leave granted.

       2.      Appellant Insurance Company is before us being aggrieved by  and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 27.1.2004 passed by a  Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan dismissing an appeal from  the judgment and award dated 7.4.1999 passed by Motor Accident Claims  Tribunal, Baran in the State of Rajasthan.   

3.      First Respondent Brij Mohan filed the claim petition.  He was a  labourer.  On or about 11.3.1998 he was travelling on a trolley attached to a  tractor.  There exists a dispute as to whether both the tractor and the trolley  were insured or not.  It may not be necessary to determine the said question.  He was engaged to dig earth from a place known as Shishwali Ka Rasta.   The earth so dug was loaded on the trolley attached to the tractor.   Respondent and other workers were returning to the Bhatta (brick-klin).  He  was sitting on the earth loaded on the trolley.  The tractor allegedly was  being driven rashly and negligently by Hemraj, the driver.  He slipped down  from the trolley, came under the wheels thereof  injuring his gall-bladder and  left thigh, as a result whereof he suffered grievous injuries.   

4.      The learned Tribunal noticed the defence raised by the appellant  herein in the said proceedings which, inter alia, were :   (i)     the trolley was not insured, and only the tractor was insured;  (ii)    as  the  tractor  was  not  being  used  for  agricultural work,  the          claim petition was not maintainable. (iii)   issuance of premium having been paid only for one person,          namely, the driver      of the tractor;  no award could be passed          against the     insurer. 5.      The Tribunal, however, by reason of its award, awarded a sum of Rs.  1,96,100/- by way of compensation in favour of the respondent in respect of  the injuries suffered by him as a result of the said accident.  An appeal,  preferred thereagainst, as noticed hereinbefore, has been dismissed by the  High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.   

6.      Mr. M.K. Dua, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant  submitted that the Tribunal as also the High Court committed manifest errors  in passing the impugned Award and judgment insofar as they failed to take  into consideration :

(i)     The tractor alone was insured and thus the claim petition was          not maintainable.

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(ii)    In any event, Respondent no.1 was merely a gratuitous          passenger and thus the claim was not covered under Section          147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.   (iii)   The tractor having not been used for agricultural purpose there          had been a violation of the conditions of contract of insurance.

7.      Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  respondent, on the other hand, submitted : (i).    The question as to whether both the tractor and the trolley were          insured or not having not been raised before the Tribunal, this          Court should not permit the appellant to raise the said          contention before this Court. (ii)    The representative of the appellant in his statement before the          Court admitted that putting the earth and leveling the field          would also be an agricultural work and thus it cannot now be          contended that the tractor was not being used for the said          purpose.   (iii)   In any event, having regard to the grievous injuries suffered by          the respondent, this Court should direct the appellant to pay the          awarded amount and recover the same from the owner of the          tractor and  trolley.  

8.      The Tribunal in its award has, inter alia, noticed that the appellant  herein had raised a specific defence, namely, the trolley was not insured.  It  does not appear that the said contention of the appellant had been gone into.   There is nothing on records to show that the owner of the tractor had  produced any insurance cover in respect of the trolley.  It is furthermore not  disputed that the tractor was insured only for the purpose of carrying out  agricultural works.   The representative of the Insurance Company Mr. Hari  Singh Meena on cross-examination merely accepted the suggestion that  cutting the earth and levelling the field with earth would be an agricultural  work but respondent no.1 himself categorically stated in his claim petition  before the Tribunal stating that the earth had been dug and was being carried  in the trolley to the brick-klin.  Evidently the earth was meant to be used  only for the purpose of manufacturing bricks.  Digging of earth for the  purpose of manufacture of brick-klin indisputably cannot amount to carrying  out of the agricultural work.            9.      In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. V. Chinnamma & Ors. [(2004) 8  SCC 697], this Court held :- "14. An insurance for an owner of the goods or his  authorised representative travelling in a vehicle became  compulsory only with effect from 14-11-1994 i.e. from  the date of coming into force of amending Act 54 of  1994. 15. Furthermore, a tractor is not even a "goods carriage".  The expression goods carriage has been defined in  Section 2(14) to mean "any motor vehicle constructed or adapted for use solely  for the carriage of goods, or any motor vehicle not so  constructed or adapted when used for the carriage of  goods"                                                           (emphasis supplied) whereas "tractor" has been defined in Section 2(44) to  mean "a motor vehicle which is not itself constructed to carry  any load (other than equipment used for the purpose of  propulsion); but excludes a roadroller". "Trailer" has been defined in Section 2(46) to mean "any vehicle, other than a semi-trailer and a sidecar,  drawn or intended to be drawn by a motor vehicle". 16. A tractor fitted with a trailer may or may not answer  the definition of goods carriage contained in Section  2(14) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The tractor was meant  to be used for agricultural purposes. The trailer attached

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to the tractor, thus, necessarily is required to be used for  agricultural purposes, unless registered otherwise. It may  be, as has been contended by Mrs K. Sharda Devi, that  carriage of vegetables being agricultural produce would  lead to an inference that the tractor was being used for  agricultural purposes but the same by itself would not be  construed to mean that the tractor and trailer can be used  for carriage of goods by another person for his business  activities. The deceased was a businessman. He used to  deal in vegetables. After he purchased the vegetables, he  was to transport the same to the market for the purpose of  sale thereof and not for any agricultural purpose. The  tractor and trailer, therefore, were not being used for  agricultural purposes. However, even if it be assumed  that the trailer would answer the description of "goods  carriage" as contained in Section 2(14) of the Motor  Vehicles Act, the case would be covered by the decisions  of this Court in Asha Rani1 and other decisions following  the same, as the accident had taken place on 24-11-1991  i.e. much prior to coming into force of the 1994  amendment."   10.     Furthermore, respondent was not the owner of the tractor.  He was  also not the driver thereof.  He was merely a passenger travelling on the  trolley attached to the tractor.  His claim petition, therefore, could not have  been allowed in view of the decision of this Court in New India Assurance  Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani & Ors. [(2003) 2 SCC 223] wherein the earlier  decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. v. Satpal Singh [(2000) 1  SCC 237] was overruled.  In Asha Rani (supra) it was, inter alia, held :- "25. Section 147 of the 1988 Act, inter alia, prescribes  compulsory coverage against the death of or bodily  injury to any passenger of "public service vehicle".  Proviso appended thereto categorically states that  compulsory coverage in respect of drivers and conductors  of public service vehicle and employees carried in a  goods vehicle would be limited to the liability under the  Workmens Compensation Act. It does not speak of any  passenger in a "goods carriage". 26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in  the 1988 Act vis-‘-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the  opinion that the meaning of the words "any person" must  also be attributed having regard to the context in which  they have been used i.e. "a third party". Keeping in view  the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that  as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory  liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle  insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle,  the insurers would not be liable therefor. 27. Furthermore, sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 147 speaks of liability which may  be incurred by the owner of a vehicle in respect of death  of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any  property of a third party caused by or arising out of the  use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas sub-clause  (ii) thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by  the owner of a vehicle against the death of or bodily  injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused  by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public  place." [See also National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.  Bommithi Subbhayamma and  Others [(2005) 12 SCC 243 and United India Insurance Co. Ltd., Shimla v.  Tilak Singh and Ors. [(2006) 4 SCC 404]. 11.     Although the effect in 1994 amendment in the Motor Vehicles Act did  not call for consideration in Asha Rani (supra), a 3 Judge Bench of this  Court had the occasion to consider the said question in National Insurance

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Co. Ltd. Vs. Baljit Kaur & Ors. [(2004) 2 SCC 1] in the following terms : "17. By reason of the 1994 amendment what was added  is "including" owner of the goods or his authorised  representative carried in the vehicle. The liability of the  owner of the vehicle to insure it compulsorily, thus, by  reason of the aforementioned amendment included only  the owner of the goods or his authorised representative  carried in the vehicle besides the third parties. The  intention of Parliament, therefore, could not have been  that the words any person occurring in Section 147 would  cover all persons who were travelling in a goods carriage  in any capacity whatsoever. If such was the intention,  there was no necessity of Parliament to carry out an  amendment inasmuch as the expression any person  contained in sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of sub-section (1)  of Section 147 would have included the owner of the  goods or his authorised representative besides the  passengers who are gratuitous or otherwise. 18. The observations made in this connection by the  Court in Asha Rani case2 to which one of us, Sinha, J.,  was a party, however, bear repetition: (SCC p. 235, para  26) 26. In view of the changes in the relevant provisions in  the 1988 Act vis-‘-vis the 1939 Act, we are of the  opinion that the meaning of the words any person must  also be attributed having regard to the context in which  they have been used i.e. a third party. Keeping in view  the provisions of the 1988 Act, we are of the opinion that  as the provisions thereof do not enjoin any statutory  liability on the owner of a vehicle to get his vehicle  insured for any passenger travelling in a goods vehicle,  the insurers would not be liable therefor. 19. In Asha Rani2 it has been noticed that sub-clause (i)  of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 147 of the  1988 Act speaks of liability which may be incurred by  the owner of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily  injury to any person or damage to any property of a third  party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in  a public place. Furthermore, an owner of a passenger- carrying vehicle must pay premium for covering the risks  of the passengers travelling in the vehicle. The premium  in view of the 1994 amendment would only cover a third  party as also the owner of the goods or his authorised  representative and not any passenger carried in a goods  vehicle whether for hire or reward or otherwise.   12.     Interpretation of the contracts of insurance in terms of Section 147  and 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act came up for consideration recently  before a Division Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v.  Laxmi Narain Dhut  [2007 (4) SCALE 36], wherein it was held :-

"24. As noted above, there is no contractual relation  between the third party and the insurer.  Because of the  statutory intervention in terms of Section 149, the same  becomes operative in essence and Section 149 provides  complete insulation.

25. In the background of the statutory provisions, one  thing is crystal clear i.e. the statute is beneficial one qua  the third party.  But that benefit cannot be extended to the  owner of the offending vehicle.  The logic of fake licence  has to be considered differently in respect of third party  and in respect of own damage claims."

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       It was further observed :

"36. It is also well settled that to arrive at the intention of  the legislation depending on the objects for which the  enactment is made, the Court can resort to historical,  contextual and purposive interpretation leaving textual  interpretation aside.

37. Francis Bennion in his book "Statutory  Interpretation" described "purposive interpretation" as  under:

       ’A purposive construction of an enactment is one  which gives effect to the legislative purpose by-

(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where  that meaning is in accordance with the legislative  purpose, or

(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal  meaning is not in accordance with the legislative  purpose.’

38. More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute  or a provision of a statute results in absurdity.  Therefore,  while interpreting statutory provisions, the Courts should  keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute  has been enacted.  Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme  Court in an article titled as Some Reflections on the  Reading of Statutes (47 Columbia Law Reports 527),  observed that, "legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate  some mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change  of policy, to formulate a plan of Government.  That aim,  that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is  evidenced in the language of the statutes, as read in the  light of other external manifestations of purpose."

[See also The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Meena Variyal  Ors.  [2007 (5) SCALE 269]

13.     However, respondent no.1 is a poor labourer.  He had suffered  grievous injuries.  He had become disabled to a great extent.  The amount of  compensation awarded in his favour appears to be on a lower side.  In the  aforementioned situation, although we reject the other contentions of Ms.  Indu Malhotra, we are inclined to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction  under Article 142 of the Constitution of India so as to direct that the award  may be satisfied by the appellant but it would be entitled to realize the same  from the owner of the tractor and the trolley wherefor it would not be  necessary for it to initiate any separate proceedings for recovery of the  amount as provided for under the Motor Vehicles Act.   

14.     It is well settled that in a situation of this nature this Court in exercise  of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India read with  Article 136 thereof can issue  suit directions for doing complete justice to the  parties.   15.     In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kusum Rai & Others (2006) 4  SCC 250], this Court observed :            "19. Thus, although we are of the opinion that the  appellant was not liable to pay the claimed amount as the  driver was not possessing a valid licence and the High  Court was in error in holding otherwise, we decline to  interfere with the impugned award, in the peculiar facts  and circumstances of the case, in exercise of our  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution but we

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direct that the appellant may recover the amount from the  owner in the same manner as was directed in  Nanjappan."

16.     This appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions.  There   shall, however,  be no order as to costs.