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PETITIONER: ONKAR NATH & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE DELHI ADMINISTRATION

DATE OF JUDGMENT15/02/1977

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1108            1977 SCR  (2) 991  1977 SCC  (2) 611

ACT:         Defence of India Rules 1971--Rule  118(1)(a)   r/w   Notifi-         cation   dated 26-11-1973  prohibiting a strike "in  connec-         tion  with any  industrial dispute",  ingredients  of--Legal         evidence must be led to prove the ingredients of an offence.         Judicial notice--Whether the courts can take judicial notice         of  facts namely "a railway strike was imminent" and such  a         strike was, in fact, launched on May 8, 1974 "in a trial for         an offence of "exciting workmen to go on strike"--Section 46         and 57 of the Evidence Act (Act 1 of 1872), 1872.

HEADNOTE:           In respect of an alleged speech made, on May 5, 1974, at a         meeting  held in Tughlakabad Railway Station  Yard  inciting         workers to go on strike from May 8, 1974, the appellants who         were  leaders  of  the Northern   Railwaymen’s   Union  were         convicted by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate under  Rule         118  and 119 of the Defence of India Rules and sentenced  to         six  months rigorous imprisonment.  The order of  conviction         was upheld in appeal by the Sessions Court but in  revision,         the  Delhi High Court while upholding the   conviction   re-         duced  the sentence to the period already undergone.             In appeal by special leave to this Court, the appellants         contended  (1)  There was no legal evidence to  warrant  the         conviction;  (2)  The  courts below were  not  justified  in         taking judicial notice of the fact that on the date when the         appellants  delivered  their speeches a railway  strike  was         imminent  and that such a strike. was, in fact, launched  on         May 8, 1974 and (3) The conduct attributed to the appellants         does  not  fall  within the mischief of  the  order  because         inciting other workers to go on strike is outside the  defi-         nition  of the word "strike" contained in rule 118(3)(b)  of         the Defence of India Rules, 1971.         Allowing the appeal by special leave, the court,             HELD:  (1) The courts below were justified  in  assuming         without   formal evidence that the railway strike was  immi-         nent  on May 5. 1974 and that a strike intended to  paralyse         the civic life of the nation was undertaken by a section  of         workers On May 8, 1974.  [995A-B]             (2)  The  purpose  of s. 57 of the Evidence  Act  is  to         provide that the court shall take judicial notice of certain

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       facts rather than exhaust the category of facts of which the         court may in appropriate cases take judicial notice.  Recog-         nition of facts without formal proof is an act of  expedien-         cy.    Shutting  the judicial eye to the existence  of  such         facts and matters is in a sense an insult to commonsense and         would  tend to reduce the judicial process to a  meaningless         and wasteful ritual.  No court insists on a formal proof  by         evidence of notorious facts of history--past or present  and         events  that  have rocked the nation need no -roof  and  are         judicially  noticed.  judicial notice in such matters  takes         place of proof and is of equal force.  [994F-H, 995-A]             (3)  The  Government  possesses the power  to  issue  an         appropriate  order under rule 118(1) prohibiting the  strike         "in connection with any industrial dispute" even if there is         no  existing  industrial dispute because the  owner  can  be         exercised prophylactically by preventing a strike in connec-         tion with an imminent strike. [995C-D]             (4)  In order to maintain a charge under rule 118(1)  of         the  Defence  of India Rules, 1971, the prosecution  has  to         establish not only that a strike was imminent or had actual-         ly  taken  place of which indicial notice may be  taken  but         further that the strike was in connection with the industri-         al dispute which is a matter of evidence.  [995E-F]         992             (5)  What is chargeable as contravening the  prohibition         must under the order issued by the Government of India under         Rule  118(1)(a) is, in the circumstances of this  case,  the         words used by the speakers and not the gist of the  speeches         made  by a member of the audience.  A summary of speech  may         broadly  and  generally not be inaccurate and  it  may’  not         faithfully  reflect  what the speaker actually said  and  in         what context.  [994D-E]         (6)  Rule  118(1)(a) limits the power of the  Government  to         issue an appropriate order, general or special, for  prohib-         iting inter alia, a strike in connection with any industrial         dispute.  Since the rule does not empower the Government  to         issue an order prohibiting strikes generally, whet.her it is         in connection with the industrial dispute or not, there  can         be no contravention of the order unless it is established by         evidence that the strike was in connection with an industri-         al  dispute.  In the instant case, the prosecution  did  not         lead any evidence to prove this important ingredient of  the         offence  and  the generalisation made by  the  witnesses  in         their  evidence is wholly inadequate for accepting that  the         appellants  gave incitement to a strike in  connection  with         any industrial  dispute. [995F-G]         (7)  The contention of the prosecution that what is  contem-         plated  by rule 118 (1)(a) itself is a strike in  connection         with an industrial dispute and, therefore, it is not  neces-         sary for the prosecution to establish that the strike was in         connection with any industrial dispute is neither  warranted         nor supported by anything contained in sub-rule (3) of  rule         118  which  defines  expressions  "industrial  dispute"  and         "strike".  [995H, 996A-B]                             [In  view of the finding that  the  evi-                       dence  led by the prosecution is  insufficient                       to establish the charge, in the instant  case,                       the  court thought it unnecessary to  consider                       the question whether the conduct attributed to                       the appellants fall within the mischief of the                       order  dated 26-11-1973, since inciting  other                       workers  to  go on strike may be  outside  the                       definition of the words "strike" contained  in                       Rule 118(3)(b) of the Defence of India  Rules,                       1971."   The court, however, pointed out  that

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                     the  appropriate provision of the  Defence  of                       India  Rules  under  which  an  incitement  to                       strike as in the instant case may be  punished                       in Rule 36(6) read with Rule 43(1)(a).]

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 502         of 1976.             (Appeal  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated 16-9-1975 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision         No. 139 of 1975).         A.K. Gupta, for the appellants.         G. Das, and R.N. Sachthey, for the respondent.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             CHANDRACHUD, J.--The appellants who are Railway  employ-         ees, were convicted by the learned Metropolitan  Magistrate,         Delhi under rules 118 and 119 of the Defence of India Rules,         1971  and  were sentenced to six months’ rigorous  imprison-         ment.   The order of conviction was upheld in appeal by  the         learned  Additional  Sessions Judge and in revision  by  the         Delhi  High  Court  with the difference   that  whereas  the         former upheld the sentence too, the latter has reduced it to         the  period  already undergone.  In this appeal  by  special         leave the Iegality of conviction is questioned by the appel-         lants.             The  case of the prosecution is that the appellants  are         leaders of the Northern. Railwaymen’s Union and that on  May         5, 1974  they         993         held a meeting in Tughlakabad Railway Yard inciting  railway         workers  to go on strike from May 8.  This is alleged to  be         in  breach  of the order passed by the Government  of  India         under rule 118(1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971.  That         rules reads thus:                             "118.   Avoidance of strikes  and  lock-                       outs.--(1)  If in the opinion of  the  Central                       Government  or  the  State  Government  it  is                       necessary or expedient so to. do for  securing                       the  defence of India and civil  defence,  the                       public safety, the maintenance of public order                       or  the efficient conduct of  military  Opera-                       tions,  or  for   maintaining   supplies   and                       services essential to the life of the communi-                       ty, nothwithstanding anything contained in any                       other  provisions of these rules, the  Central                       Government may, by  general or  special order,                       applying generally or to any specific area and                       to .any undertaking or class of  undertakings,                       make provision--                             (a)  for  prohibiting,  subject  to  the                       provisions of  the order, a strike or lock-out                       in connection with any industrial dispute;                             (b)  for requiring employers,   workmen,                       or   both,  to observe for such period as  may                       be,  specified  in the order  such  terms  and                       conditions of employment as may be  determined                       in accordance with the order:                             Provided   that  no  order  made   under                       clause  (b)   shall require  any  employer  to                       observe  terms  and conditions  of  employment                       less favourable to. the  workmen  than   those                       which  were  applicable to them at  any   time                       within  three months preceding the date of the

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                     order."         By   sub-rule (2), if any person contravenes any order  made         under  sub-rule (1) he shall be  punishable with   imprison-         ment  for  a term which may extend to three ’years  or  with         fine or with both.             The order issued under rule 118(1)(b) by the  Government         of  India  in its Ministry of Labour on  November  26,  1973         recites that in the opinion of the Central Government it was         necessary  and expedient for maintaining supplies and  serv-         ices  essential  to  the life of the  community  to  prevent         strikes  in the Railway  Services ’and  that therefore  "the         Central  Government hereby prohibits a strike in  connection         with  any industrial  dispute/disputes in the said   Railway         Services in India for a period of six months w.e.f. the 26th         November, 1973."             In  support of its case the prosecution examined   three         witnesses called S.D. Sharing, Dilbagh Rai and jasbir Singh.         Sharma’s evidence is in the nature of hearsay and indeed  he         admits  in  so many words that his knowledge  regarding  the         incitement given by the appellants to the Railway workers to         go on strike was derived solely from information received by         him.   The witness admits that he had no personal  knowledge         that the appellants had held any meeting nor had         994         he heard their speeches.  The second witness Dilbagh Rai was         in charge of the Police Post at Tughlakabad Railway  Station         and   was entrusted with the investigation of the case.   In         the  nature  of things he too has no personal  knowledge  of         what the appellants did or said.             Jasbir  Singh  who was in charge of the Diesel  Shed  at         Tughlakabad  is in the circumstances the only witness  whose         evidence could, if at all, help the prosecution to establish         the  charge  that  the appellants had contravened the  order         issued by the Government of India under r. 118(1)(a) of  the         Defence of India Rules, 1971. But even that evidence, in our         opinion,   is inadequate  for proving  the  charge  levelled         against the appellants.  Jasbir Singh claims to have attend-         ed  a  meeting addressed by the appellants but  he  has  not         stated  as to what exactly the appellants said in the  meet-         ing.   He  has  given his own gist or summary  of  what  the         appellants meant to convey to the audience stating that they         incited the workers to go on strike and threatened them with         dire consequences if they did not respond to the call.  Such         a  broad,  resume is not safe to rely upon for  holding  the         charge  proved.   In view of the total absence  of  evidence         showing what the appellants in fact said in the meeting, the         summary  coined  by Jasbir Singh of the  happenings  in  the         meeting  cannot  form  the basis  of  conviction.   What  is         chargeable as contravening the prohibition imposed under the         order issued by the Government of  India under r.  118(1)(a)         is  in the circumstances of this case the words used by  the         speakers  and not the gist of the speeches made by a  member         of  the  audience.  A summary of a speech  may  broadly  and         generally  not be inaccurate and yet it may  not  faithfully         reflect what the speaker actually said and in what  context.         Therefore, we would prefer not to rely on the gist given  by         the  witness without knowing the data on the basis of  which         the gist was given.  The charge must therefore fail.             One of the points urged before us is whether the  courts         below  were justified in taking judicial notice of the  fact         that on the date when the appellants delivered their speech-         es  a railway  strike  was imminent and that such  a  strike         was  in fact launched  on  May  8, 1974.  Section 56 of  the         Evidence  Act  provides that  no  fact  of which  the  Court         will  take judicial notice need be proved.  Section 57  enu-

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       merates  facts  of  which the Court  "shall"  take  judicial         notice  and  states that on all matters of  public  history,         literature, science or art the ’Court may resort for its aid         to appropriate books or documents of reference.  The list of         facts  mentioned in section 57 of which the Court  can  take         judicial notice is not exhaustive. and indeed the purpose of         the  section  is  to> provide that the  .Court  shall   take         judicial  notice  of certain facts rather than  exhaust  the         category  of  facts of which the Court  may  in  appropriate         cases  take  judicial  notice. Recognition of facts  without         formal proof is a. matter of expediency and no one has  ever         questioned the need and wisdom of accepting the existence of         matters  which  are  unquestionably  within   public  knowl-         edge.   (see  Taylor 11th edn. pp 3-12; Wigmore   sec   2571         foot-note;  Stephen’s  Digest,  notes to  Art,  58;  Whitley         Stokes’  Anglo-Indian Codes Vol. II p. 887).   Shutting  the         judicial  eye  to  the         995         existence   of  such  facts and matters is in  a  sense   an         insult  to commonsense and would tend to reduce the judicial         process   to  a meaningless and wasteful ritual.   No  Court         therefore insists on formal proof, by evidence, of notorious         facts  of  history, past or present. The date of  poll,  the         passing  away  of  a man of eminence and  events  that  have         rocked  the  nation need no proof and are   judicially   no-         ticed. Judicial notice, in such matters, takes the place  of         proof  and  is  of equal force.  In fact,  as  a  means   of         establishing  notorious  and widely known facts it is  supe-         rior  to  formal means of proof.   Accordingly,  the  Courts         below  were justified in assuming, without formal  evidence,         that the Railway strike was imminent on May 5, 1974 and that         a strike intended to paralyse the civic life of the   Nation         was undertaken by a section of workers on May 8, 1974.             But  the  matter does not rest  there.   Rule  118(1)(a)         empowers  the  Government to issue an  order  prohibiting  a         strike  "in  connection with any industrial  dispute".   The         Order issued by the Government on November 26, 1973 recites,         as required by the Rule, that the Central Government prohib-         its a strike "in connection with any industrial dispute"  in         the  Railway Services in India for a period of  six  months.         Rule  118 (2) prescribes punishment for a person  who   con-         travenes  any order made under the Rule.  We have  no  doubt         that  the Government possesses the power to issue an  appro-         priate order under Rule 118 (1) even if there is no existing         industrial  dispute   because  the power  can  be  exercised         prophylactically for preventing a strike in connection  with         an  imminent industrial dispute.  But the  prosecution  must         establish,  in order that the conduct charged as  penal  may         fall  within the mischief of the Order, that the  strike  in         regard  to which the incitement was given was in  connection         with  an  industrial dispute. Unless  that  is  established,         there  can  be no contravention of the order issued  by  the         Government,  because the  contravention  consists  in  doing         what is prohibited by the order.  And what is prohibited  by         the  order  is  a strike in connection  with  an  industrial         dispute. Thus the prosecution has to establish not only that         a strike was imminent or had actually taken place, of  which         judicial  notice may be taken, but further that  the  strike         was  in  connection with an industrial dispute, which  is  a         matter  of evidence.  Rule 118(1)(a)  limits  the  power  of         the  Government  to issue an appropriate order,  general  or         special,  for prohibiting inter alia a strike in  connection         with   any  industrial dispute.  Since the  rule  does  riot         empower  the  Government  to  issue  an  order   prohibiting         strikes generally,  whether they bear any connection with an

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       industrial  dispute or not, there can  be  no  contravention         of  the order unless it is established by evidence that  the         strike  was in connection with an industrial  dispute.   The         prosecution  did not lead any evidence to prove this  impor-         tant ingredient of the offence and the generalisation made’-         by the witnesses in their evidence is wholly inadequate  for         accepting that the appellants gave incitement to a strike in         connection with any industrial dispute.             It is urged by the learned counsel  appearing  for   the         Delhi  Administration,  who are respondents to  the  appeal,         that   what  is contemplated by rule 118(1)(a) itself  is  a         strike in connection with         996         an industrial dispute and therefore it is not necessary  for         the prosecution to establish that the strike was in  connec-         tion  with any industrial dispute.  There is no warrant  for         this  submission  and nothing contained in sub-rule  (3)  of         rule 118 which defines the expressions "industrial  dispute"         and "strike" lends support to the counsel’s submission.   It         is  well  known that strikes are  sometimes  undertaken  for         purposes  unconnected  with an industrial  dispute,  as  for         example when the workers demand a closure of the  establish-         ment  on the demise Of a person of national importance.   In         fact,  strikes are  not  unoften launched for reasons  which         do  not  reasonably bear any connection with  an  industrial         dispute.             An  argument  was advanced before us on  behalf  of  the         appellants  that  the conduct attributed to  the  appellants         does  not  fall  within the mischief of  the  order  because         inciting other workers to go on strike is outside the  defi-         nition  of the  word "strike"  contained in  rule  118(3)(b)         of the Defence of India Rules, 1971.  It i,s unnecessary  to         consider  this  question  in view of our  finding  that  the         evidence  led by the prosecution is insufficient to  ’estab-         lish  the charge levelled against the appellants.  We  would         however like to point out that the appropriate provision  of         the  Defence  of India Rules under which  an  incitement  to         strike  as  in  the instant case may  be  punished  is  rule         36(6)(j)  read  with rule 43(1)(a).  The former  defines   a         "prejudicial act" to include  instigation or  incitement for         cessation  or  slowing  down of work by a  body  of  persons         employed in any place of employment in which 100 persons  or         moro  are  normally employed, in furtherance of  any  strike         which  is prohibited under rule 118 or is illegal under  any         law  for the time being in force.  The latter provides  that         no  person shall without lawful authority or excuse  do  any         prejudicial  act.  By rule 43 (5) a person  who  contravenes         any of the provisions  of rule 43 is punishable with impris-         onment  which  may extend to 5 years or with  fine  or  with         both.             In  the result we allow the appeal, set aside the  order         of conviction and sentence and acquit the appellants.         S.R.                                       Appeal allowed.         997