REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3241 OF 2009 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 460 of 2008]

OMPRAKASH & ORS. …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

RADHACHARAN & ORS.     …  RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. One Smt. Narayani Devi was married to one Dindayal Sharma in  

the year 1955.  She became widow within three months of her marriage.  

Concededly, she was driven out of her matrimonial home immediately  

after  the  death  of  her  husband.   After  that  she  never  stayed  in  her  

matrimonial home.  At her parental home, she was given education.  She

got an employment.  She died intestate on 11.7.1996.  She had various  

bank accounts; she left a huge sum also in her provident fund account.  

3. Ramkishori, mother of Narayani, filed an application for grant of  

succession certificate in terms of Section 372 of the Indian Succession  

Act.  Respondents herein also filed a similar application.  It now stands  

admitted that all her properties were self acquired.   

4. The question which arose for consideration before the courts below  

as also before us is as to whether sub-Section (1) of Section 15 of the  

Hindu Succession  Act,  1956 (for  short,  “the  Act”)  or  sub-Section  (2)  

thereof would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case.   

Section 15 of the Act reads as under:

“15 - General rules of succession in the case of  female  Hindus.  -  (1)  The  property  of  a  female  Hindu dying intestate  shall  devolve according to  the rules set out in section 16.—

(a) firstly,  upon  the  sons  and  daughters  (including the children of any pre-deceased son or  daughter) and the husband;

(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;

(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and

(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.

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(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1),--

(a) any  property  inherited  by  a  female  Hindu  from her  father  or  mother  shall  devolve,  in  the  absence  of  any son  or  daughter  of  the  deceased  (including the children of any pre-deceased son or  daughter)  not  upon the other  heirs  referred to in  sub-section (1) in the order specified therein, but  upon the heirs of the father; and

(b) any  property  inherited  by  a  female  Hindu  from her husband or from her father-in-law shall  devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of  the  deceased  (including  the  children  of  any pre- deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs  referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified  therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.”

5. There is  no doubt or dispute that the properties of the deceased  

were self-acquired ones and were not inherited from her parents’ side.   

Appellants before us are her brothers, the original applicant being  

the mother  of the deceased having died.  Respondents are the sons of  

sister of the Narayani’s husband.   

6. Mr. N.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  

appellant would contend that in a case of this nature where the husband of  

the deceased or her in-laws had not made any contribution towards her  

education or had not lent any support during her life time, sub-Section (2)  

of Section 15 of the Act should be held to be applicable.  It was urged  

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that the Parliamentary intent as contained in clause (a) of sub-Section (2)  

of Section 15 of the Act should be the guiding factor for interpreting the  

said provision.   

7. Mr. Arvind V. Savant, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf  

of the respondent, however, would support the impugned judgment.  

8. Section 15 provides for the general rules of succession in the case  

of  female  Hindus.   It  lays  down the  mode and  manner  in  which  the  

devolution of interest of a female shall take place.  Section 16 provides  

for the order of succession and manner of distribution amongst the heirs  

of a female Hindu, stating that the same shall be according to the rules  

specified therein.  It reads as under:

“Rule  1.—Among  the  heirs  specified  in  sub- section (1) of section 15, those in one entry shall  be preferred to those in any succeeding entry and  those  including  in  the  same  entry  shall  take  simultaneously.

Rule 2.—If any son or daughter of the intestate had  pre-deceased the intestate leaving his or her own  children alive at the time of the intestate’s death,  the  children  of  such  son  or  daughter  shall  take  between  them  the  share  which  such  son  or  daughter  would  have  taken  if  living  at  the  intestate’s death.

Rule  3.—The  devolution  of  the  property  of  the  intestate on the heirs referred to in clauses (b), (d)  

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and (e) of sub-section (1) and in sub-section (2) of  section 15 shall be in the same order and according  to  the  same  rules  as  would  have  applied  if  the  property had been the father’s or the mother’s or  the husband’s as the case may be, and such person  had died intestate  in respect  thereof  immediately  after the intestate’s death.”

9. It has not been disputed that the respondents are the heirs and legal  

representatives  of  Dindayal,  husband of Narayani.   Sub-Section (1)  of  

Section 15 lays down the ordinary rule of succession.  Clause (a) of sub-

Section (2) of Section 15 providing for a non-obstante clause, however,  

carves  out  an  exception  viz.  when  the  property  is  devolved  upon the  

deceased from her parents’ side, on her death the same would relate back  

to her parents’ family and not to her husband’s family.  Similarly, in a  

case where she had inherited some property from her husband or from her  

husband’s family, on her death the same would revive to her husband’s  

family and not to her own heirs.  The law is silent with regard to self-

acquired property of a woman.  Sub-section (1) of Section 15, however,  

apart  from the exceptions specified in sub-section (2) thereof does not  

make any distinction between a self-acquired property and the property  

which she had inherited.  It refers to a property which has vested in the  

deceased absolutely or which is her own.  The self-acquired property of a  

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female would be her absolute property and not the property which she  

had inherited from her parents.   

10. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that sub-Section  

(1)  of  Section 15 of the Act would apply and not  the sub-Section (2)  

thereof.   

This is a hard case.  Narayani during her life time did not visit her  

in-laws’  place.   We  will  presume  that  the  contentions  raised  by  Mr.  

Choudhury that she had not been lent any support from her husband’s  

family is correct and all support had come from her parents but then only  

because a case appears to be hard would not lead us to invoke different  

interpretation of a statutory provision which is otherwise impermissible.  

It is now a well settled principle of law that sentiment or sympathy alone  

would not  be a guiding factor in determining the rights  of  the parties  

which are otherwise clear and unambiguous.   

In M.D., H.S.I.D.C. and Ors. vs. Hari Om Enterprises and Anr  

[2008 (9) SCALE 241], this Court held:

“54. This  Court  applied  the  doctrine  of  proportionality having regard to a large number of  decisions  operating  in  the  field.  This  Court,  however, also put a note of caution that no order  should be passed only on sympathy or sentiment.”

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In Subha B. Nair & Ors. vs. State of Kerala & Ors. [(2008) 7 SCC  

210], this Court held:

“21. This  Court  furthermore  cannot  issue  a  direction only on sentiment/sympathy.”

In Ganga Devi vs. District Judge, Nainital & Ors. [(2008) 7 SCC  

770], this Court held:

“22. The court  would not  determine a  question  only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto  sensu  equity  as  such  may  not  have  any  role  to  play.”

If the contention raised by Mr. Choudhury is to be accepted, we  

will have to interpret sub-section (1) of Section 15 in a manner which was  

not contemplated by the Parliament. The Act does not put an embargo on  

a female to execute a will.  Sub-section (1) of Section 15 would apply  

only  in  a  case  where  a  female  Hindu  has  died  intestate.   In  such  a  

situation, the normal rule of succession as provided for by the statute, in  

our opinion, must prevail.  

For the aforementioned purpose, the golden rule of interpretation  

must be applied.  

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11. This Court in  Bhagat Ram (Dead)  vs.  Teja Singh [(1999) 4 SCC  

86], held as under:

“6. On perusal of the two Sub-sections we find  that their spheres are very clearly marked out. So  far  Sub-section (1),  it  covers  the  properties  of  a  female  Hindu  dying  intestate.  Sub-section  (2)  starts  with  the  words  'Notwithstanding  anything  contained in Sub-section (1)'. In other words, what  falls  within  the  sphere  of  Sub-section  (2),  Sub- section  (1)  will  not  apply.  We find  that  Section  15(2)(a) uses the words 'any property inherited by  a female Hindu from her father or mother'. Thus  property  inherited  by  a  female  Hindu  from  her  father  and  mother  is  carved-out  from  a  female  Hindu dying intestate. In order words any property  of female Hindu, if inherited by her from her father  or mother would not fall under Sub-section (1) of  Section 15. Thus, property of a female Hindu can  be classified under two heads : Every property of a  female Hindu dying intestate is a general class by  itself  covering  all  the  properties  but  Sub-section  (2)  excludes  out  of  the  aforesaid  properties  the  property  inherited  by  her  from  her  father  or  mother.

7. In  addition,  we  find  the  language  used  in  Section  15(1)  read  with  Section  16  makes  it  clearly, the class who has to succeed of property of  Hindu  female  dying  intestate.  Sub-section  (1)  specifically  state  that  the  property  of  a  female  Hindu dying intestate  shall  devolve according to  the rules set out in Section 16. So, in case Sub- section (1) applies,  then after the death of Santi,  Indro  can  not  inheritance  by  succession  but  it  would go to the heirs of the pre-deceased husband  of Santi.”

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12. For the aforementioned reasons, we find no merit in this appeal.  

The  appeal  is  dismissed  accordingly.   However,  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.

……………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

..…………………………..…J.      [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi; May 5, 2009

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