http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 4  

PETITIONER: OM PRAKASH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHAGWAN DAS

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/03/1986

BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) BENCH: SEN, A.P. (J) RAY, B.C. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR 1643            1986 SCR  (1) 598  1986 SCC  (2) 428        1986 SCALE  (1)1278

ACT:      U.P. Urban  Buildings (Regulation of Rent and Eviction)      Act 1972 & U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent      & Eviction)  Rules, 1972,  s.  21(1)  (a)  4th     Proviso/Rule      16(1)(f) - Landlord seeking ejectment of tenant on bona fide      need -Landlord     offering reasonable,  suitable accommodation      to tenant-  Landlord’s claim  to eviction  to be  considered      liberally.

HELD:

    The  Prescribed  Authority,  Varanasi  and  the  Second Additional District  Judge, in  revision, after  considering the comparative  hardship likely  to be caused to the tenant and the landlord, allowed the application of the appellant - landlord under  s. 21(1)(a)  of  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings (Regulation of  Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 on the ground that the need of the appellant-landlord was bona fide and he  was entitled to the release of the demised premises. The Authorities  also held  that  since  the  appellant  was living in  the rented  premises, there  was no reason why he should be  deprived of  the beneficial  enjoyment of his own property. However,  in the  appeal, the High Court set aside the orders passed by the aforesaid two Authorities.      Allowing the appeal, ^      HELD :  1. There  was no  infirmity in the order of the Prescribed Authority  or that  of the  learned II Additional District Judge.  The High  Court was  clearly  in  error  in interfering  with   the  order   passed  by  the  Prescribed Authority, Varanasi  and that  of the II Additional District Judge, Varanasi.  The judgment  and order  of the High Court are, therefore,  set aside.  The  order  of  the  Prescribed Authority, Varanasi  and that  of the  II Additional  Judge, Varanasi directing  the release  of the  accommodation under s.21 (1)(a) of the Act are restored. [601 D; 601 H] 599      2. One  of the  factors prescribed  by r.  16 (1)(f) is that if  the landlord applies for ejectment of the tenant on the ground  that the  accommodation is bona fide required by him for  his use  and the  members of  his family and if the landlord offers  reasonably suitable  accommodation  to  the tenant for the needs of his family, the landlord’s claim for

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 4  

eviction shall be considered liberally. [601 B]      In the  instant case, the refusal of the application of the landlord  under s.21 (1)(a) of the Act would undoubtedly cause greater  hardship to  him as that would deprive of his beneficial enjoyment of his own property. In such a case, it could not  be said  that the  landlord had not fulfilled the requirement of the 4th proviso to s.21(1)(a) of the Act.[601 D]

JUDGMENT:

    CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 959 of 1986.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  1.5.1985  of  the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 11377 of 1980.      R.B. Mehrotra for the Appellant.      Sunil Ambwani and Mukul Mudgal for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SEN, J.  After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are  satisfied that  the High  Court, in  the  facts  and circumstances  of   the  case,  was  clearrly  in  error  in interfering  with   the  order   passed  by  the  Prescribed Authority, Varanasi  and that  of the II Additional District Judge, Varanasi  by which  they allowed the application made by the  appellant under  s. 21(1)  (a)  of  the  U.P.  Urban Buildings (Regulation  of Letting,  Rent and  Eviction) Act, 1972. Although  the Authorities  on a  consideration of  the evidence came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  need  of  the landlord was bona fide and he was entitled to the release of the  demised  premises  under  s.  21(1)  (a)  of  the  Act. Admittedly, the  appellant and  the respondent are displaced persons and  the authorities  held that  since the appellant was living  in rented  premises there  was no  reason why he should be  deprived of  the beneficial  enjoyment of his own property. 600      In Bhaichand Ratanshi v. Laxmishanker Tribhovan, [1981] 3  S.C.C.   502  this   Court  interpreting   the  analogous provisions in  s. 13  (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 observed :           "The Legislature by enacting Section 13 (2) of the           Act seeks  to strike  a just  balance between  the           landlord and  the tenant  so  that  the  order  of           eviction under  Section 13 (1) (g) of the Act does           not  cause   any  hardship  to  either  side.  The           considerations  that  weigh  in  striking  a  just           balance between  the landlord  and the tenant were           indicated in a series of decisions of the Court of           Appeal, interpreting an analogous provision of the           Rent   and    Mortgage    Interest    Restrictions           (Amendment)  Act,  1933  (c.32),  Section  3  (1),           Schedule I,  para (h)  : Sims  v. Wilson, [1946] 2           All E.R. 261; Fowle v.Bell, [1946] 2 All E.R. 668;           Smith v. Penny, [1946] 2 All E.R. 672; Chandler v.           Strevett, [1947]  1 All  E.R. 164;  and Kelley  v.           Goodwin, [1947]  1 All  E.R.810. One  of the  most           important factors  in considering  the question of           greater  hardship   is  whether  other  reasonable           accommodation is  available to the landlord or the           tenant. The  court would  have to put in the scale           other circumstances  which would  tilt the balance           of hardship  on either  side, including  financial           means available  to them  for securing alternative

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 4  

         accommodation either by purchase or by hiring one,           the nature  and extent  of the  business or  other           requirement of  residential accommodation,  as the           case may  be. It  must, however,  be observed that           the existence of alternative accommodation on both           sides is  an important  but not a decisive factor.           On the  issue  of  greater  hardship  the  English           Courts have uniformly laid down that the burden of           proof is  on the  tenant. We  are inclined  to the           view that  on the  terms of  Section 13 (2) of the           Act, the  decision cannot  turn on  mere burden of           proof, but  both the  parties must  lead evidence.           The question whether or not there would be greater           hardship caused  to  the  tenant  by  passing  the           decree  must   necessarily  depend  on  facts  and           circumstances of each case." 601      A plain  reading of  s. 21  (1)(a) of the Act read with the 4th  proviso thereto  and r.  16 (1)(f)  shows that  the scheme under  the Act  is  the  same.  One  of  the  factors prescribed by  r. 16  (1)(f) is that if the landlord applies for  ejectment   of  the  tenant  on  the  ground  that  the accommodation is  bona fide  required by him for his use and the members  of  his  family  and  if  the  landlord  offers reasonably suitable  accommodation to  the  tenant  for  the needs of his family, the landlord’s claim for eviction shall be considered liberally. In the present case, the Prescribed Authority and  the II  Additional District Judge both, after considering the  comparative hardship likely to be caused to the tenant  and the landlord, recorded a finding that on the refusal of  the application,  the landlord  would be  put to greater hardship.      There was  no infirmity  in the order of the Prescribed Authority or  that of  the learned  II  Additional  District Judge. The  refusal of the application of the landlord under s. 21  (1) (a)  of the  Act would  undoubtedly cause greater hardship to  him as  that would  deprive of  his  beneficial enjoyment of  his own property. In such a case, it could not be said  that the landlord had not fulfilled the requirement of the  4th proviso  to s.  21(1) (a)  of the  Act. The High Court obviously  committed an  error in interfering with the findings of  the Prescribed  Authority and  the  learned  II Additional District  Judge on  the ground  that the landlord had failed  to fulfil the requirements of the 4th proviso to s. 21 (1) (a) of the Act.      We  wish  to  record  that  Shri  R.B.Mehrotra  learned counsel for  the appellant  made an  offer that  the  rented premises in  occupation of the appellant may be given to the respondent who is his tenant in exchange. We think that this was a  very reasonable  offer and  should be  accepted. Shri Sunil Ambwani,  learned counsel appearing for the respondent stated  that   the  respondent  was  not  agreeable  to  his proposal. We, therefore, heard the parties on merits.      In the  view that  we take, the appeal must succeed and is allowed.  We set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and restore that of the Prescribed Authority, Varanasi and that  of the  II  Additional  District  Judge,  Varanasi directing the  release of  the accommodation under s. 21 (1) (a) of  the Act.  We direct  that the  Prescribed Authority, Varanasi shall 602 on an  application being  made by  the  parties,  allot  the rented premises  occupied by  the appellant in favour of the respondent with  the consent  of the  landlord. If  no  such consent is forthcoming, the Prescribed Authority shall allot

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 4  

a  reasonably  suitable  alternative  accommodation  to  the respondent for  his occupation  on such terms as he may deem fit.      We further  direct that the order of eviction shall not be executed  for six  months in  the  event  the  respondent furnishes usual  undertaking within  four weeks  from today. Both the  parties  shall,  in  the  meantime,  move  to  the Prescribed Authority,  Varanasi, for  permission to exchange their respective premises on the terms set out above.           No costs. M.L.A.                                       Appeal allowed. 603