REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2564  OF 2009 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 7508 of 2008]

Om Prakash Singh …Appellant

Versus

M. Lingamaiah & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

S.B. SINHA, J :

1. Leave granted.

2. Application of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing

(Prohibition) Act, 1982 (for short “the Act”) is involved in this appeal.

3. It arises out of the following factual matrix.

One Ram Katin Singh was the owner of a land measuring 16 acres, 30

guntas situate in Feerzadiguda Village, Ranga Reddy District in the State of

Andhra Pradesh.   

Appellant claims that it was a joint family property.  There exists a

dispute as regards date of death of Ram Katin Singh.  Whereas, according to

the appellant, he died issueless on 22.02.1978, the respondents contend that

he expired in 1992.

4. Appellant indisputably is a resident of Uttar Pradesh.  The suit land is

fallow.  Respondents allegedly taking advantage of the death of Ram Katin

Singh fabricated three fraudulent sale deeds dated 4.03.1980, 6.03.1980 and

17.03.1981 impersonating the said Ram Katin Singh.  Respondents contend

that  Ram  Katin  Singh  was  the  exclusive  owner  of  the  property  and

transferred  his  right,  title  and interest  in  favour  of  the respondent  No.  1

herein by reason of the aforementioned deeds of sale.  Respondent No. 1, in

turn, transferred his right,  title and interest by executing deeds of sale in

favour  of  several  persons.   Respondents  denied  and  disputed  that  the

transactions  entered  into  by  and  between  Ram  Katin  Singh  and  the

respondent No. 1, on the one hand, and the latter and the respondent Nos. 2

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to 6, on the other, were bogus, sham or illegal transactions as alleged or at

all.   

5. Appellant  filed an  application  before  the Special  Court  constituted

under the Act on or about 16.02.2002.  It was marked as L.G.C. SR No. 442

of  2002.   The  Special  Court  by  reason  of  an  order  dated  4.11.2003

dismissed the said application opining that the only question as to whether

Ram Katin Singh was alive on the date of execution of the said deeds of sale

in  the  year  1980,  by  itself,  cannot  be  determined  as  foundational  fact

necessary  for  initiating  a  proceeding  before  it  in  absence  of  requisite

pleadings.  

6. Aggrieved  thereby  and  dissatisfied  therewith,  the  appellant  filed  a

writ  application  before  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Andhra Pradesh,

which  by  reason  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13.12.2007  has  been

dismissed.

7. Mr. G. Hanumanth Rao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

appellant would contend:

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(i) The Special Court and consequently the High Court committed a

serious  error  in  passing  the impugned judgment  insofar  as  they

failed  to  take  into  consideration  that  the  Special  Court  had  the

jurisdiction  to  go  into  the  question  of  title  by and  between the

parties.

(ii) Appellant  having  pleaded  the  factum  of  land  grabbing  in  the

concise statement annexed to the application, it was obligatory on

the part of the Special Court to determine the said issue.

8. Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment.

9. Before adverting to  the core question,  we may notice  some salient

features of the Act.

The Government of Andhra Pradesh noticed organized attempts  on

the part of certain lawless persons operating individually and in groups, to

grab either by force or by deceit or otherwise, lands (whether belonging to

the Government,  a  local  authority,  a  religious  or  charitable  institution  or

endowment, including a wakf, or any other private persons) as also the fact

that the land grabbers are forming bogus co-operative housing societies or

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setting up fictitious claims and indulging in large scale and unprecedented

and fraudulent  sales  of  lands through unscrupulous  real  estate  dealers  or

otherwise  in  favour  of  certain  sections  of  the  people  resulting  in  large

accumulation of unaccounted wealth and as thereby public order was also

adversely  affected  now  and  then  by  such  unlawful  activities  of  land

grabbers in the State in respect of urban and urbanisable land.   

The Act was enacted with a view to prohibiting the activities of land

grabbing  in  the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  to  provide  for  matters

connected therewith.  The Act is a Special Act.  It is a self-contained Code.   

‘Land Grabber’ is defined in section 2(d) of the Act to mean a person

or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person

who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands

or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or

attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands, rent, compensation and

other charges by criminal intimidation; or who abets the doing of any of the

above mentioned acts; and also includes the successors in interest.   

‘Land grabbing’ has been defined in Section 2(e) to mean :

“every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious  or  charitable  institution  or  endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a

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person  or  group  of  persons,  without  any  lawful entitlement  and  with  a  view  to  illegally  taking possession  of  such  lands  or  enter  into  or  create illegal  tenancies  or  lease and licence  agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands,  or  to  construct  unauthorized  structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such land to any person  on  rental  or  lease  and  licence  basis  for construction,  or  use  and  occupation  of unauthorized  structures;  and  the  term  ‘to  grab land’ shall be construed accordingly.”

Section 3 declares ‘land grabbing’ in any form to be unlawful and any

activity  connected  therewith  to  be  an  offence  punishable  under  the  Act.

Section 4 imposes prohibition on land grabbing, violation whereof results in

penal action(s) as specified therein.  Section 7 provides for constitution of

Special Courts.  The Chairman of the Special Court is a sitting or retired

Judge of the High Court and out of other four members thereof, two ought

to be sitting or retired District Judges (Judicial members) and the other two

who hold or have held a post not below the rank of a District Collector.  The

process  for  appointment  of  the  Chairman  and  Members  of  the  Judicial

Members of the special court has been laid down in the Act.   

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The Special Court has been empowered to make regulations relating

to the procedures to be followed for the conduct of cases as also the manner

of taking decisions.  Sub-section (5D) of Section 7 reads as under :

“5(D)(i)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908,  the  Special Court may follow its  own procedure which shall not  be inconsistent  with  the principles  of natural justice  and  fair  play  and  subject  to  the  other provisions  of  this  Act  and  of  any  rules  made thereunder while deciding the Civil liability.

(ii) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in Section  260  or  Section  262  of  the  Code  of Criminal  Procedure,  1973,  every  offence punishable  under  this  Act  shall  be  tried  in  a summary way and the provisions of Sections 263 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be apply to such trial.

(iii) When a person is convicted of an offence of land grabbing attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Special Court that, by such force or show of force  or intimidation  the land  of  any person has been grabbed,  the Special  Court  may if  it  thinks fit, order that possession of the same be restored to that  person  after  evicting  by force,  if  necessary, any other person who may be in possession of the property.”

Section  7A  of  the  Act  provides  for  the  powers  of  the  Special

Tribunal, sub-section (1) whereof reads as under :

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“7-A. “Special Tribunals and its powers etc:—(1) Every Special Tribunal shall have power to try all cases not taken cognizance of by the Special court relating to any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect  to  the  ownership  and  title  to,  or  lawful possession of the land grabbed whether before or after  the  commencement  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh Land  Grabbing  (Prohibition)(Amendment)  Act, 1987 and brought before it  and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit.

Provided  that  if,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Special Tribunal, any case brought before it is prima facie frivolous  or  vexatious,  it  shall  reject  the  same without any further enquiry;

Provided  further  that  if  in  the  opinion  of  the Special Tribunal any case brought before it is a fit case  to  be  tried  by the  Special  court  it  may for reasons to be recorded by it transfer the case to the Special Court for its decision in the matter.”

The  first  proviso  appended thereto  empowers  the  Special  Court  to

reject a case brought before it  without any further enquiry, if prima facie

appears to be frivolous or vexatious.  Special Court may also for reasons to

be recorded by it transfer a case to the special court for its decision in the

matter.   A  special  court  ordinarily  is  required  to  follow  the  procedures

prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure.  An appeal is maintainable from

a judgment or  order  to the  special  court.   Sub-section (4) of  Section 7A

makes a finding of the special tribunal with regard to any alleged act of land

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grabbing  to  be  conclusive  of  the  said  fact  as  also  the  persons  who

committed the act of land grabbing conclusive.   

Section 8 provides for the procedure and power of the special courts,

the relevant portions whereof read as under :

“8. Procedure and Powers of the Special Court: —(1) The Special Court may, either suo motu, or on  application  made  by  any  person,  officer  or authority,  take  cognizance  of  and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing, or with  respect  to  the  ownership  and  title  to,  or lawful  possession  of,  the  land  grabbed,  whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass  such  orders  (including  orders  by  way  of interim directions) as it deems fit.

XXX XXX XXX

(2B)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to try all offences punishable under this Act. (Central Act 2 of 1974).

(6) Every  finding  of  the  Special  Court  with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and  every  judgment  of  the  Special  Court  with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land.

Provided  that  the  Special  Court  shall  by notification specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act.  Such notification shall

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state that any objection which may be received by the Special  Court  from any person including the custodian  of  evacuee  property  within  the  period specified therein will be considered by it.

Provided  further  that  where  the  custodian  of evacuee  property  objects  to  the  Special  court taking cognizance of  the case, the  Special  Court shall not proceed further with the case in regard to such property;

Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case under the Act, served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy  itself  about  the  persons  likely  to  be interested in the land.

(7) It  shall  be  lawful  for  the  Special  Court  to pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the cause  of  justice.   It  may award  compensation  in terms  of  money  for  wrongful  possession  of  the land  grabbed  which  shall  not  be  less  than  an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed  as  on  the  date  of  the  order  and  profits accrued from the land, payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct re-delivery  of  the  grabbed  land  to  its  rightful owner.  The amount of compensation and profits, so awarded and costs of re-delivery, if any, shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case the Government is the owner, or as a decree of a Civil  Court,  in any other case to be executed by the Special Court.

Provided  that  the  Special  Court  shall,  before passing an order under this sub-section, give to the land  grabber  an  opportunity  of  making  his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this  regard and consider  such  representation  and evidence.

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(8) Any case, pending before any court or other authority immediately before the constitution of a Special  Court,  as  would  have  been  within  the jurisdiction  of  such  Special  Court,  shall  stand transferred to the Special court as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based had  arisen  after  the  constitution  of  the  special court.”

Section 10 of the Act provides for the burden of proof.   Section 15 of

the Act contains a non-obstante clause stating that  the provisions thereof

shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained

in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or agreement

or decree or order of a court of any other tribunal or authority.   

10. The  Act  indisputably  confers  a  wide  jurisdiction  upon  the  Special

Tribunal and Special Court.  All attributes of a civil litigation can be gone

into by the Special Court and the Tribunal.  The Tribunal is not only a court

but  by reason of a legal fiction created is deemed to be a civil  court.  It

contains a non-obstante clause, by reason whereof the provisions of the Act

would prevail over the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as also the Andhra

Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972.   

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The Tribunal, however, derives jurisdiction only when jurisdictional

facts are disclosed in the petition.  For invoking the jurisdiction of the said

court, it is necessary not only to allege the act of land grabbing within the

meaning of the provisions of the Act but also a prima facie case must be

found out to the Special Court and/or the Tribunal in order to enable it to

issue notices upon satisfying itself  as regards existence of an act of land

grabbing.  When it takes a suo motu action, it has to hear the alleged land

grabbers  also.   The  statute,  therefore,  provides  for  sufficient  safeguards.

Ordinary  disputes  with  regard  to  a  title  of  property  are  not  within  the

exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Court or the Tribunal.  They have to be

determined in ordinary civil courts.  The Special Courts and the Tribunals

are  not  substitutes  for  the  civil  courts  in  the  litigations  involving a civil

dispute relating to immovable property within the meaning of Section 9 of

the Code of Civil Procedure.  It has the exclusive jurisdiction where land

grabbing is alleged or appeared from the application filed before it.

11. The principal  disputes  which  are  required to  be determined by the

Special Court,  in view of the statements made by the appellant  before it,

were:

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(i) Whether the property in question was a joint family property or a

self-acquired  one  and  in  case  it  was  found  to  be  joint  family

property, whether Ram Katin Singh was the Karta thereof.

(ii) Whether Ram Katin Singh died in 1978 or in 1992.

12. Such broad questions, in our opinion, have rightly been held to be

beyond the purview of the Special Court as the concise statement did not

disclose the foundational fact of land grabbing.  In the concise statement, it

was merely stated:

“12.  It  is  submitted that  the applicant  informed that  the  said  transfers  through  so  called manipulated, created and fabricated sale deeds in favour  of  M. Linamaiah  and M. Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy are not the transfers effected by late Ram Katin Singh, the brother of the applicant,  after  2 years  of  his  death,  which  documents  are  illegal, unlawful  and  void  documents  and  that  such documents  do  not  convey or  transfer  any of  the applicant’s  rights  in  respect  of  the  application schedule land, which were mentioned in the said documents,  which  document  are  illegal  and unlawful transfers either on facts or in law.”

13. Our attention has also been drawn to the paragraph 15 of the said

concise statement, which reads as under:

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“15. It is submitted that all  the respondents had resorted to illegal,  unlawful and malafide acts of creation  of  documents  on  the  client’s  land  by resorting to forgery of the signatures of late Ram Katin  Singh  and  fabrication  of  the  sale  deeds impersonating  the  dead  person  late  Ram  Katin Singh.”

14. Such bald allegations, both according to the Special Court as also the

High Court creating a forged document by itself would not come within the

mischief  of  ‘Land  Grabbing’.   Appellant  indisputably  could  raise  such

contentions  before  a  civil  court.   Such  a  relief  of  delivery  of  and

cancellation  of  the  deed  comes within  the  purview of  Section  31  of  the

Specific Relief Act, 1963.

15. Mr. Hanumanth Rao has placed strong reliance on paragraph 7 of the

decision of this Court in  L.L. Sudhakar Reddy and Others v.  State of A.P.

and Others [(2001) 6 SCC 634], which reads, thus:

“7. In the view we have taken, we do not propose to  express  any  opinion  on  merits  of  the  case. Suffice  it  to  observe  that  having  made  the observation that the appellants could have availed the remedies of review under Section 17-A of the Act and the suit for declaration of title and right, in our view, the learned Single Judge ought not to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case because after the High Court has put its seal

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of  approval  on  the  judgment  and  order  of  the Special Court, the result of the review application and the suit would become a foregone conclusion. Further in regard to the remedy of the suit, having regard  to  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of Section 8 read with Section 15 of the Act, no suit for title  in respect  of  the disputed land which is alleged to be a land grabbed by the first appellant, could be entertained by the civil court. It may be apt  to  point  out  that  under  sub-section  (8)  of Section 8,  any case pending before any court  or other authority immediately before the constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction  of  such  Special  Court,  stood transferred to the Special Court as if the causes of action  on  which  the  suit  or  proceeding  is  based had  arisen  after  the  constitution  of  the  Special Court.  In  other  words  the suit  for  declaration  of title by the appellants would not be maintainable. For the above reasons,  the order  of  the Division Bench under challenge confirming the order of the Single  Judge  is  set  aside,  the  writ  petition  is restored to the file of the High Court and the case is remitted to the High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh in accordance with law.”

The  said decision,  itself,  suggests  that  the lands  must  be  found  to

have been grabbed before proceeding under the Act could be initiated.

16. Reliance has also been placed on Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt.

of A.P. and Others [(2002) 3 SCC 258] wherein this Court opined:

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“45. In regard to the ingredients of the expression “land grabber”, it is necessary to point out that it is only when a person has lawful entitlement to the land  alleged  to  be  grabbed  that  he  cannot  be brought within the mischief of the said expression. A mere prima facie  bona  fide  claim to  the  land alleged  to  be  grabbed  by such  a  person,  cannot avert  being  roped  in  within  the  ambit  of  the expression  “land  grabber”.  What  is  germane  is lawful entitlement to and not a mere prima facie bona fide claim to the land alleged to be grabbed. Therefore, the observation of the Division Bench of the High Court in the said Writ Appeal No. 61 of  1978 that  the appellant  can  be  taken  to  have prima facie bona fide claim to the land in dispute which  was  relevant  for  the  said  Land Encroachment  Act,  cannot  be  called  in  aid  as  a substitute  for  lawful  entitlement  to  the  land alleged  to  be  grabbed,  which  alone  is  relevant under the Act.”

17.  Respondents herein have prima facie satisfied the Special Court that

they have lawful entitlement to the land in question and have possession

thereof since 1980.

18. In  Gouni  Satya Reddi v.  Govt.  of  A.P. and Others [(2004)  7 SCC

398], it was held:

“10.  From  a  reading  of  the  definitions  of  the phrases “land grabber” and “land grabbing” it  is clear that the grabbing of any land must be without any  lawful  entitlement  and  with  a  view to  take possession of such lands illegally. That is to say,

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the land grabber must be aware of the fact that he is  entering  into  the  possession  illegally  and without any lawful entitlement. If such elements as indicated above are missing in our view, it would not be a case of land grabbing.”

Upon considering the facts, it was furthermore opined:

“…The Special Court has not recorded any finding that no such publication was made. S. Prabhakara Rao may have been an impostor, or not a genuine person or  a  genuine  power-of-attorney holder  of Respondent 3, but neither is there any such finding nor facts or circumstances on the record to impute any such knowledge to the appellant at the time of execution  of  sale  deed  in  his  favour.  The provisions of the Act would not cover such cases, unless coupled with the fact of not being entitled to  possession  the  person  enters  into  possession with  a  view to  obtain  illegal  possession.  Where such view of taking illegal possession is missing or lacking, a person would not be covered under the  definition  of  the  phrase  or  expression  “land grabber”.  The  facts,  to  indicate  such  intention, though have been pleaded, as indicated earlier, but no such finding has been recorded. The mere fact of legally not entitled to the possession would not fulfil  the  ingredients  of  the  definitions  of  “land grabber” and “land grabbing”…”

19. We may, however, notice that in  N. Srinivasa Rao v.  Special Court

under the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act and Others [(2006) 4 SCC

214], a Two-Judge Bench of this Court opined that the Special Court has no

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jurisdiction  to  decide  question  as  regards  acquisition  of  title  by  adverse

possession in a proceeding under the Act as the same would fall within the

domain of the civil court.

20. In  A.P.  Housing  Board v.  Mohd.  Sadatullah  and Others [(2007)  6

SCC 566],  another  Two-Judge Bench  although  noticed  the  difference  of

opinion in the decisions of this Court in N. Srinivasa Rao (supra) and Konda

Lakshmana Bapuji (supra) in the light  of factual matrix involved therein,

directed that the dispute between the parties be determined by a civil court.

21. We  may  furthermore  notice  that  the  question  in  regard  to  the

jurisdiction of the land grabbing court has been considered at some length in

Mahalaxmi Motors Ltd. v. Mandal Revenue Officer and Others [(2007) 11

SCC 714] wherein inter alia it was stated:

“40.  The  Tribunal  being  possessed  of  extensive jurisdiction, subject of course to fulfilment of the conditions  precedent,  for  initiation  of  the proceeding, was entitled to go into all issues. We have  furthermore  to  bear  in  mind  that  the definition of “land grabber” is not only restricted to the party to the proceeding, but also includes his predecessor-in-interest. Once the land is held to be a  government  land,  the  logical  corollary  thereto would be that subject to the law of limitation and prescription, the State would not lose the said right to the opposite party.

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41.  It  may  be  true  that  absence  of  lawful entitlement by itself may not be sufficient to pass a judgment  and  decree  in  favour  of  the  State  and against the land grabber, but also it must be shown that he had taken illegal possession thereof.”

It was furthermore opined:

“44.  We  would  like  to  add  that  the  person’s purported belief that he is legally entitled to hold the land and his possession is not otherwise illegal must  also  be  judged  not  only from the  point  of time when he entered into the possession or when he had acquired the purported title but also from the  point  of  view  as  to  whether  by  reason  of determination of such a question by a competent court  of law, he has been found to have no title and  consequently  continuance  of  his  possession becomes illegal. If the proceedee against whom a proceeding has been initiated under the provisions of the said Act is entitled to raise the question of adverse  possession,  which  being  based  on knowledge of a lawful title and declaration of the hostile title on the part of the person in possession, there does not appear to be any reason as to why knowledge of defect in his title and consequently his  possession  becoming  unlawful  to  his  own knowledge would not come within the purview of the term “land grabbing” as contained in Section 2 (e) of the Act. The provisions of the Act must be construed so as to enable the tribunal to give effect thereto.  It  cannot  be  construed  in  a  pedantic manner  which  if  taken  to  its  logical  corollary would  make  the  provisions  wholly  unworkable. Only because a person has entered into possession of a land on the basis of a purported registered sale deed, the same by itself, in our considered opinion,

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would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that  he  had  not  entered  over  the  land unauthorisedly, unfairly, or greedily.”

22. The question has now been settled by a Three-Judge Bench of this

Court  in  V.  Laxminarasamma v.  A.  Yadaiah  (Dead)  &  Ors. [2009  (3)

SCALE 685] wherein it has categorically been held that the Special Court/

Tribunal  has  the  requisite  jurisdiction  to  decide  the  question  of  adverse

possession.

This case, as indicated hereinbefore, stands on a different footing.

23. Mr.  Hanumanth Rao would submit  that  whereas under  the  Act the

burden of proof would be on the land grabber, in the civil court, it would be

on  the  plaintiff.   It  may  be  so,  but,  in  a  case  of  this  nature,  where

jurisdictional facts have not been pleaded, the Special Court could not have

exercised its jurisdiction.  

Furthermore, in  K. Sharada Bai (Smt) and Another v. Shamshunnisa

(Smt)  and  Others [(2008)  3  SCC  49],  this  Court  upon  noticing  the

definitions of “land grabbing” as also “land grabber” held as under:

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“…In view of the above statutory provisions and of the claim of the applicant that she is the original owner of the schedule property and her land was grabbed by the appellants, the initial burden is on her to prove her right and title to the property and if the same is discharged, the burden shifts on the respondents.”  

24. It is not a case where the respondents claimed their title by reason of a

registered deed of sale,  which was executed long time back.   They have

been exercising their right of possession over the lands in suit for 22 years.

Appellant did not disclose that he had either been in possession of the land

or  he has  been dispossessed.   He had not  been able  to  show any act  of

possession  on  his  part  or  on  the  part  of  the  predecessor-in-interest  after

1978.  An application at his instance was maintainable provided he proved

himself  to  be  lawfully  entitled  to  be  restored  back  possession  by

establishing the fact that the land has been grabbed.

25. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which

is dismissed accordingly.  No costs.

………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

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..…………………………J.     [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi; April 15, 2009

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