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PETITIONER: OM PRAKASH GUPTA ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DIG VIJENDRAPAL GUPTA ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT05/03/1982

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) KOSHAL, A.D. ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1982 AIR 1230            1982 SCR  (3) 491  1982 SCC  (2)  61        1982 SCALE  (1)153  CITATOR INFO :  C          1984 SC  87  (18,20)             1985 SC 817  (8)  D          1985 SC 817  (14)  F          1987 SC2284  (4,11,13)  F          1988 SC2031  (9)             1988 SC2164  (8)  E&D        1990 SC 897  (8,9,10,11,14)  D          1991 SC 266  (7)  D          1992 SC1106  (6,10)

ACT:      U.P. Urban  Buildings (Regulation  of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972. S.2 (2) and Expln. I and s. 39.      Applicability of  the Act-Act  not to apply to building for a  period of  ten years  from  ’date  of  completion  of construction’.      Date of  completion of  construction-What  is-’Date  of first assessment’  if assessed-’Date  of occupation’ when no record of completion of construction or of assessment.      Interpretation of  Statutes-Intention of legislature-To be ascertained  primarily from  words used  by  legislative- Question of interpretation arises when language ambiguous.

HEADNOTE:      The U.P.  Urban Buildings  (Regulation of Letting, Rent and (Eviction)  Act, 1972  provided by  sub-section  (2)  of section 2  that except  as provided  in the Act, the Act was not to  apply to a building during a period of 10 years from the  date   on  which   its  construction   was   completed. Explanation I  to the sub-section provided that the building shall be  deemed to have been completed on the date on which completion thereof  is reported or otherwise recorded by the local authorities  having jurisdiction,  and in  case  of  a building subject  to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof  comes into  effect, and  where the  said dates are  different, the  earliest of the said date, and in the absence  of any  such report,  record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied for the first time.      The appellant-tenant  was in  occupation of a shop from the 16th June, 1967 and prior to his occupation the shop was in occupation  of another  tenant for  about a  month and  a

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half. The  first assessment of the shop took place on Ist of April, 1968.  The respondent-landlord  filed a  suit for the eviction of  the tenant  on the  ground that the Act did not apply to the shop and the tenant was liable to eviction.      The Trial  Judge finding  that the  construction of the shop was completed in the year 1967 and that 10 years having not elapsed  since then, held that the provisions of the Act did not apply and decreed the suit. The appellant’s 492 petition under  section 25  of the  Provincial Small  Causes Courts Act  was dismissed.  In his  revision petition to the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code the appellant contended  that the  date of  occupation should be taken to  be the  date of  completion of the construction of the shop  and not  the date  of first  assessment. The  High Court  overruled   the  contention   and   held   that   the construction of  the shop  would  be  deemed  to  have  been completed on  1st of  April, 1968  the  date  of  the  first assessment and  ten years  not having elapsed, the Act would not be applicable to the building and dismissed the revision petition.      In the  appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the  appellant: (1)  that by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 2,  the Act  would be  applicable  to  the  shop  in question and  that the  exemption created by the sub-section did  not   embrace  buildings   constructed  prior   to  the commencement of  the Act and (2) that the building should be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th June, 1967 and not on the date of the first assessment. and that  the appellant  was  entitled  to  the  benefit  of section 39 of the Act.      Dismissing the appeal, ^      HELD: 1(i)  The suit  was rightly decreed by the Courts below. The  Act had  no application  and the appellant could not be given the benefit of section 39. [498 G-H]      (ii)  Primarily,   the   language   employed   is   the determining factor  of the intention of the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the  legislature must  be found  in the words used by the legislature itself.  The question  of interpretation  arises only when  the language  is ambiguous and, therefore capable of two interpretations. [497 F]      (iii) The  language of  sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Act is explict and unambiguous and is not capable of two interpretations. [497 G]      In the absence of any ambiguity there is no question of taking any  external aid  for the interpretation of the sub- section. The sub-section contemplates that the Act shall not apply to  a building  during a  period of  10 years from the date on  which its  construction is  completed. It  no where says that  the building  should have  been constructed after the enforcement of the Act and to interpret it in such a way would be  to add  words to  the sub-section,  which  is  not permissible. [497 D-F]      2 (i)  Explanation I makes it abundantly clear that the date of  occupation  would  be  taken  to  be  the  date  of completion of  the construction only when there is no report or record  of the  completion  of  the  construction  or  no assessment thereof.  If there  is an  assessment, as  in the instant case  it will  be the  date of  the first assessment which will  be deemed  to be  the date  of completion of the construction. The  building had  not therefore  become  more than ten  years’s old  on the date when the revision came to be decided  by the  High Court and consequently there was no

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question of  giving the  benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant. [498 D-F] 493      (ii) In  order to  attract section  39 the suit must be pending on  the date  of   the commencement of the Act which was 15th of July, 1972. [498 F]      In the instant case the suit was filed on 23rd of March 1974 long after the commencement of the Act. [498 F]      (iii) In  view of sub-section (2) of section 2, the Act is not  applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years. If the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to  say that  section 39 thereof would be applicable. [498 G]      Rattan Lal  Shinghal v.  Smt. Murti Devi (1980)4 S.C.C. 258 and  Ram Saroop  Rai v.  Lilavati (1980)  3 S.C.C.  452, over-ruled.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978.      Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and  order dated the  23rd March,  1978 of  the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 1906 for 1976.                             WITH                CIVIL APPEAL No. 2436 OF 1981      Appeal by  special leave  from the  judgment and  order dated the  20th August,  1981 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 6909 of 1979.                             AND                CIVIL APPEAL No. 1710 OF 1981      From the judgment and Decree dated the 13th March, 1981 of the  Allahabad High  Court in  Writ Petition  No. 6167 of 1979.                             AND       SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 3573 OF 1979 494      From the judgment and order dated the 3rd January, 1979 of the  Allahabad High  Court in  Civil Revision No. 3714 of 1978.      G.L.Sanghi, Mrs.  A. Verma  and  D.N.  Mishra  for  the Appellant in CA. No. 1314 of 1978.      J.P. Goyal,  S.Markandeya and  C.K.Ratnaparkhi for  the Respondent in CA. 1314 of 1978.      A.K. Srivastava for the Appellant in CA. 1710/80.      R.B. Mehrotra for Respondent in CA. 1710/80.      Pramod Swarup  and Mrs. S. Markandeya for the appellant in CA. 2436 of 1980.      S.N. Kacker  and K.K  Gupta for  the Respondent  in CA. 2436 of 1980.      P.R.Mridul, Praveen  Jain  and  K.B.  Rohatgi  for  the Petitioner in SLP (Civil) No. 3573 of 1979      R.H. Dhebar for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MISRA J. The first two appeals by special leave and the third by  certificate and the special leave petition raise a common question of law and, therefore, we propose to dispose of them by a common judgment.      The pattern of facts in all these cases is similar. We, therefore set out the facts of Civil Appeal No. 1314 of 1978 to bring out the point for consideration in these matters.      The appellant Om Prakash Gupta is a tenant of a shop on a monthly  rent of Rs. 150/-.The respondent-landlord filed a suit for  the eviction  of the tenant on the ground that the

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U.P.  Urban  Buildings  (Regulation  of  Letting,  Rent  and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Act 13 of 1972 and hereinafter referred to as  ’the Act’)  did not  apply to the shop and the tenant was liable  to eviction.  The  Judge,  Small  Causes  Court, Mainpuri decreed the suit on the finding inter alia that the construction of  the shop  in suit was completed in the year 1967 and 495 that ten years having not elapsed since then, the provisions of the  Act did not apply to the case. The defendant went up in revision  under section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act  against the  judgment and  decree of  the  trial Court  but   the  same   was  substantially  dismissed.  The defendant thereupon  filed a  revision under  section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code in the High Court which came up for hearing before  a learned  Single  Judge  who  remitted  the following issue to the trial court:           "On what date was the construction of the building      in dispute  completed within  the meaning  of section 2      (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,      Rent and  Eviction) Act,  1972, and deemed to have been      completed  as   contemplated  by   Explanation  I   (a)      thereto."      The Judge Small Causes Court by his order dated 26th of November 1977 returned the following finding:           "The construction  of the  disputed shop  will  be      deemed to  have been completed on the date of the first      assessment i.e.  1.4.68 within the meaning of section 2      (2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972."      The finding  returned by  the trial court was sought to be challenged on behalf of the tenant on the ground that the date of  occupation should  be  taken  to  be  the  date  of completion of  the construction of the shop and not the date of the  first assessment.  In Tilak  Raj v.  Sardar Devendra Singh,(1) a  learned Single Judge of the same High Court had the occasion to consider section 2 (2) of the Act. He held:           "It is  apparent  from  this  provision  that  for      purposes of  this Act, a building is to be deemed to be      constructed, if  it is  subject to  assessment, on  the      date with  effect from  which the  first assessment  is      made.  It   is  immaterial  whether  the  building  was      constructed actually  prior to that date or it had come      into occupation  prior to that date. The law recognised      for the purposes of this Act, the date of assessment as      the date  of the  completion of  the building. There is      thus no error in the judgment of the court below." 496      The learned  Single Judge  before whom  the revision in the instant case came up for hearing doubted the correctness of the above decision. He, therefore, referred the case to a Division Bench.      There is  no dispute  that the  first assessment of the shop took  place on  1st of  April, 1968.  It is also not in dispute that  the shop  in  question  was  occupied  by  the defendant on 16th of June, 1967, and prior to his occupation the shop  was in  occupation of  another tenant  for about a month and  a half.  The  appellant  sought  the  benefit  of section 39  of the  Act on  the ground  that if  the date of occupation was taken to be the date of the completion of the construction of  the shop,  then ten  years  having  elapsed during the  pendency of  the revision before the High Court, the Act  would be  applicable. The  Division Bench, however, over-ruled the contention of the appellant and held that the construction of the shop in question would be deemed to have been completed  on 1st of April 1968 and, therefore, the Act

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would not be applicable to the building till the date of the decision of  the revision  on March  23, 1968. The defendant undaunted by the failure came to this Court to challenge the judgment of the High Court.      Mr. G.L.  Sanghi, senior  counsel.  appearing  for  the appellant   strongly    contended   that    on   a   correct interpretation of  sub-section (2)  of section  2,  the  Act would be  applicable to  the shop  in question.  It would be appropriate at  this stage  to extract  sub-section  (2)  of section 2  of the  Act insofar  as it  is material  for  the purposes of the case:           "Except as  provided in sub-section (5) of section      12, sub-section (1-A) of section 21, sub-section (2) of      section 24,  sections 24A,  24B, 24C or sub-section (3)      of section  29, nothing  in this  Act shall  apply to a      building during  a period of ten years from the date on      which its construction is completed:           Explanation I.  For  the  purposes  of  this  sub-           section:           (a)   the construction  of  a  building  shall  be                deemed to  have been completed on the date on                which the  completion thereof  is reported to                or otherwise  recorded by the local authority                having jurisdiction  and in  the  case  of  a                building subject  to assessment  the date  on                which the first assessment thereof 497                comes into  effect, and  where the said dates                are  different,  the  earliest  of  the  said                dates, and in the absence of any such report,                record or assessment, the date on which it is                actually occupied  (not including  occupation                merely for  the purposes  of supervising  the                construction or  guarding the  building under                construction) for the first time :.."      The precise  contention on  behalf of  the appellant is that the  exemption created  by this  sub-section  does  not embrace buildings  constructed prior  to the  enforcement of the Act.  In support  of his  contention, Mr. Sanghi, relied upon Rattan  Lal Shinghal  v. Smt.  Murti Devi.(1)  The same contention was  raised by  him  in  that  case  also  and  a Division Bench  of this  Court accepted  the contention  and held that Act 13 of 1972 was prospective and applied only to buildings brought into being de novo after the Act came into force. In  that case there is no discussion except this bald observation. This  Court in a subsequent case Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati(2)  held to  the contrary. It is on this account that the  present appeals  were referred  to a larger Bench. There is  no ambiguity in the language of sub-section (2) of section 2  and in  the absence  of any ambiguity there is no question of  taking any  external aid for the interpretation of  the   sub-section.  In   plain  words   the  sub-section contemplates that  the Act  shall not  apply to  a  building during a  period of  ten years  from the  date on  which its construction is completed. It nowhere says that the building should have  been constructed  after the  enforcement of the Act and  to interpret  it in the way the learned counsel for the appellant  seeks to  interpret it,  we would  be  adding words  to   the  sub-section,   which  is  not  permissible. Primarily the language employed is the determining factor of the intention of the legislature. The first and primary rule of construction  is that  the intention  of the  legislature must be  found in  the words used by the legislature itself. The question of interpretation arises only when the language is ambiguous and, therefore, capable of two interpretations.

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In the  present case  the language  of  sub-section  (2)  of section 2  of the  Act is explicit and unambiguous and it is not capable of two interpretations. 498      As a second limb to the first argument, it is contended that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date  of occupation on 16th of June, 1967 and not on the date of  the first  assessment, and  that if this be so, the appellant would  be entitled to the benefit of section 39 of the Act  on the date when the revision came to be decided by the  High  Court  on  23rd  of  March,  1978.  In  order  to appreciate this  argument it  will be  expedient to refer to Explanation I  to sub-section  (2) of  section 2  which  has already been  extracted. Explanation  I  provides  that  the building shall  be deemed to have been completed on the date on which  completion thereof  is reported  to  or  otherwise recorded by  the local  authorities having jurisdiction, and in case  of a  building subject  to assessment  the date  on which the  first assessment  thereof comes  into effect  and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and  in the  absence of  any such  report, record  or assessment, the  date on  which it is actually occupied  for the  first  time.  A  perusal  of  Explanation  I  makes  it abundantly clear  that the date of occupation would be taken to be  the date  of completion of the construction only when there is  no report  or record  of  the  completion  of  the construction or  no assessment,  thereof. If  there is    an assessment, as  in the  present case  it is,  it will be the date of  the first assessment which will be deemed to be the date of  completion of  the construction and in that view of the matter  the building had not become more than ten years’ old on  the date when the revision came to be decided by the High Court,  and therefore  there was  no question of giving the benefit of section 39 of the Act to the appellant.      Further, in  order to  attract section 39 the suit must be pending  on the  date of commencement of the Act which is 15th of  July, 1972  but the suit giving rise to the present appeal was  filed on  23rd of  March, 1974  long  after  the commencement of  the Act.  There is  yet another  reason why section 39  will have no application to the present case. In view of  sub-section (2)  of section 2 of the Act the Act is not applicable to a building which has not a standing of ten years and  if the Act itself was not applicable, it would be absurd to  say that  section 39 thereof would be applicable. Considered from  any angle the Act has no application to the present case  and the  appellant  could  not  be  given  the benefit of section 39. The suit has, therefore, been rightly decreed by the courts below.      We find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr. Sanghi.  The counsel  for the  appellants in  the  other appeals and 499 the petitioner  in the  special leave  petition, adopted the arguments of Mr. Sanghi.      For  the  foregoing  discussion  the  appeals  and  the special leave  petition are dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.      We, however,  direct that the order of eviction in each case shall  not be  executed before  30th of  June, 1982  on condition that each of the appellants in the appeals and the petitioner  in   the  special   leave  petition   files   an undertaking in  this Court  within four  weeks from today to the following effect:           1.    that  he will  hand over vacant and peaceful                possession  of   the  suit  premises  to  the

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              landlord-respondent  on  or  before  30th  of                June, 1982;           2.   that he will pay to the respondent arrears of                rent, if any, within a month from today;           3.    that  he will  pay to  the respondent future                compensation for  use and  occupation of  the                suit premises  for each calendar month by the                10th of the succeeding month; and           4.    that  he will not induct any other person in                the suit premises as a sub-tenant or licensee                or in any other capacity whatsoever.      We further  direct that  in default  of compliance with any one  or more  of the conditions of the undertaking or if the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated time, the decree of eviction shall become executable forthwith. N.V.K.                                     Appeal dismissed. 500