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PETITIONER: OM PARKASH AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT14/12/1973

BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH PALEKAR, D.G. KRISHNAIYER, V.R.

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1202            1974 SCR  (2) 731  1974 SCC  (1) 623  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1980 SC1438  (18)

ACT: U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam 1959, ss. 365(4), 372(1) and 577  Modifications introduced in ss. 18- and 23 of the  Land Acquisition  Act-Validity  of-Starting point of  the  5-year period mentioned in s. 365(4).

HEADNOTE: Under  s.  42  of the U.P. Town  Improvement  Act,  1919,  a housing scheme, which included the appellants’ property, was published,  and  notice under s. 9 of the  Land  Acquisition Act,  1894, was issued by the Collector to  the  appellants. The  1919-Act.  having  been  repealed  by  the  U.P.  Nagar Mahapalika  Adhiniyam,  1959,  the  Improvement  Trust   was superseded  by the Mahapalika which took further  steps  for the  implementation of the scheme.  The Collector  gave  his award,  took  possession  of the  appellants’  property  and delivered  it  to the Mahapalika.  The  appellants  did  not accept the award and applied for a reference under s. 18  of the  Land Acquisition Act.  The matter was referred  to  the Tribunal  under  s. 372 of the Adhiniyam and  the  Tribunal, under  the proviso to the section, asked the  appellants  to deposit Rs. 900/- as security for costs. In  a  writ  petition  in the  High  Court,  the  appellants challenged  the  constitutionality  of  certain  provisions, whereby  ss.  18  and 23 of the Land  Acquisition  Act  were modified.   The  modifications were (a) the  addition  of  a proviso to s. 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, the effects of  which is that the 15% solatium over the  value  assessed which  is  awarded when land is acquired by  the  Government under  the Land Acquisition Act, will not be  admissible  if the  land is acquired for the purpose of a scheme under  the Adhiniyam;  (b) the addition of a new clause in s.  23,  the effect of which is that the potential value of the land, for example  as a building site, is to be ignored; and  (c)  the proviso  to s. 372(1) of the Adhiniyam (corresponding to  s. 18  of the Land Acquisition Act) under which no claim  shall be  entertained  by  the Tribunal unless  the  claimant  has deposited in Court, a sum not exceeding Rs. 7,000/- as fixed by the Tribunal as security for costs.

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The  High Court dismissed the petition, Allowing the  appeal to this Court, HELD  :  Whenever  land is  compulsorily  acquired  for  the Mahapalika-be it  for the purpose of scheme or for any  other  purpose-the acquiring authority is the Government.  The fact that  where land is acquired for a Scheme costing less than Rs. 10 lacs, the prior permission of the State is not, required makes  no difference.   The  caption of para 6 of Schedule IT  to  the Adhiniyam with its contents shows that the land has first to be  acquired  by  the  Collector  for  the  Government   and thereafter  it  is  transferred to  the  Mahapalika  by  the Government on payment of any further costs.  Further, s.  16 of  the Land Acquisition Act, which is not modified  by  the Adhiniyam,  provides  that  where the  Collector  makes  his award,  he may take possession of the land  which  thereupon vests absolutely in the Government. [736D] But  the  Government  can  acquire  land  either  under  the unmodified  Land  Acquisition  Act or  as  modified  by  the Adhiniyam.   In  the  first case, the land  owner  would  be entitled to better compensation, including 15% solatium  and the  potential  value  of the land; and  there  will  be  no impediment to approaching the Court under s. 18 of the  Land Acquisition Act, if he is dissatisfied with the  Collector’s award.  In the second case, the landowner would be under the disabilities  envisaged by the modifications  introduced  by the Adhiniyam. 732 Therefore, the impugned provisions enable the- Government to discriminate  and  could  not  be  justified  as  reasonable classification under any of the well-known tests.  [736F] Nagpur Improvement Trust and another v. Vithal Rao and Ors., [1973]1 S.C.C. 500. followed. But  the proviso added to s. 23(2) was deleted by  the  U.P. Amendment   Act   23  of  1961.   Since  the   question   of compensation  to the appellants is not past and closed,  but pending before the Tribunal, the Tribunal will have to  take cognizance  of  the, repeal and proceed as  if  the  proviso never  existed.  The repeal is final and  unconditional  and there  is nothing in the repealing Act which  saves  pending reference  from its operation.  The effect of the repeal  is to remove the disability to receiving the 15% solatium;  but the other two disabilities still subsist. [737H-738B] (2)  Section 365(4) of the Adhiniyam peremptorily requires a scheme  to  completed upto the date of the  award  within  a period  of  5  years.  The words "in so far  as  it  is  not inconsistent with the Provisions, of this Act" in s.  577(a) of  the Adhiniyam show that s. 365(4) applies to the  scheme in the instant case, Otherwise, it would lead to the  result that  fresh  schemes under the Adhiniyam must  be  completed with the time-limit, while older schemes under the  repealed Act could be left pending indefinitely. It could not however be contended by the appellants that the scheme  in the instant case was not so completed within  the requisite  time and that there-fore it has come to  an  end. [739G] Reading  cl. (a) of s. 577 along with cls. (b) and  (c)  and giving  it  a reasonable meaning with the aid of  the  legal fiction implicit in those clauses, the scheme in the instant case, though notified under s. 42 of the repealed Act, would in  view of the deeming provision in s. 577(b) be deemed  to have been notified under the Adhiniyam, on the date on which the  Adhiniyam  came  into  force;  and  the  5-year  period specified  in s. 565(4) would commence from that date.   The Collector’s  award being within 5 years from that date  must

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deemed to be within the prescribed time limit. [739H]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2413  of 1968. From  the judgment and decree dated the 19th March  1968  of Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 4473 of 1964. S.   K.  Mehta,  K. R. Nagaraja and M. Qamaruddin,  for  the appellants. G.   N.   Dikshit,  Ravinder  Bana  and  O.  P.  Rana,   for respondent No. 1. V.   N. Ganpule and P. C. Kapur, for respondent No. 2. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SARKARIA,   J.-This  appeal  by  certificate   against   the judgment,  dated March 19, 1968 of the Allahabad High  Court raises  questions  about the  constitutionality  of  certain modifications made in the Indian Land Acquisition Act,  1894 by the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 and the effect of the repeal of the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 on  the Mumfordganj  Housing Scheme which had been  notified,  under the repealed Act. Under  s.  42 of the U. P. Town Improvement Act  (Act  8  of 1919),  a  scheme known as Mumfordganj  Housing  Scheme  was published on 733 behalf  of  the Improvement Trust, Allahabad in  the  U.  P. Government  Gazette,  dated  June  17,  1944.    Appellants’ property known as Hanuman Bagh, bearing Municipal No. 25/13, Katra Road, Allahabad, was also included in the area covered by this scheme. On  September  6,  1955,  notice under  s.  9  of  the  Land Acquisition  Act, 1894, was issued by the Collector  to  the appellants.   Even  before the appellants  had  filed  their claim,  and before the Collector could make his award  under s.  11  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894,  U.P.   Town Improvement  Trust  Act  (No. 8 of 1918)  was  repealed  and replaced  by  U.P . Nagar Mahapalika  Adhiniyam,  1959  (for short,  the Adhiniyam) which came into force on February  1, 1960.   As  a  result  of  this  change  in  law,  the  Town Improvement  Trust was superseded by the  Nagar  Mahapalika, Allahabad,  which took further steps for  implementation  of the  scheme  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of   the Adhiniyam. Appellants  filed  their claim to  compensation  before  the Collector who gave his award on April 13, 1961.   Possession of  the  disputed property was taken and  delivered  by  the Collector to the Mahapalika on November 16, 1961. Appellants   did  not  accept  the  award,  and   on   their application  a reference under s.18 of the Land  Acquisition Act,  was made by the Collector to the Court on  January  3, 1962.   The  Court directed the appellants  to  deposit  Rs. 15001-  as  security  for costs.  The  time  for  depositing security was repeatedly extended and the appellants  deposi- ted  the security in installments.  Subsequently, the  Court returned  the  reference to the Collector and  refunded  the security, for the reason that the reference was addressed to the District Judge and not to the Tribunal.  The  Collector, again made the reference to the Tribunal, which,  purporting to act under s.372, Proviso, asked the appellants to deposit Rs. 900/-. as security for costs. During the pendency of the reference in the District  Court, the  appellants filed writ petition No. 4473 of  1964  under Article  226  of  the  Constitution in  the  High  Court  of

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Allahabad,   challenging   the  constitutionality   of   the provisions  of ss.372, 376 and Schedule 11 of the  Adhiniyam whereby  S.  23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  had  been modified,  on  the  ground  that  those  modifications  were violative  of  Article 14 of the  Constitution.   They  also assailed  the validity of the scheme on the ground  that  it had  not been completed within the time-limit  specified  in s.365  (4) of the Adhiniyam.  The writ petition was  opposed by  the State Government and the Mahapalika  (Respondents  1 and 2 respectively). The  Division  Bench  of the High Court  negatived  all  the contentions  canvassed before it and dismissed the  petition with  costs.  The Bench, however, granted a  certificate  of fitness of appeal to this Court ’Under Article 133(1)(a)  of the  Constitution.  That is how this appeal has come  before us. 734 Section 376 of the Adhiniyam provides               "For  the purpose of the acquisition  of  land               for the Mahapalika under the Land  Acquisition               Act,’  1894-whether under this Chapter or  any               other Chapter of this Act-               (a)   the  said  Act shall be subject  to  the               modifications  specified  in the  Schedule  to               this Act;               (b)               The modifications of the Land Acquisition Act,               the validity of which is in question are               (i)   The  Proviso  added  (vide  para  10  of               Schedule   11)   to  s.23(2)   of   the   Land               Acquisition Act, namely :               Provided that this sub-section shall not apply               to any land acquired under Chapter XIV of  the               Uttar  Pradesh  Nagar  Mahapalika   Adhiniyam,               1959, except-               (a)   land  acquired under sub-section (4)  of               s. 348 of that Adhiniyam, and               (b)   buildings  in the actual  occupation  of               the  owner  or occupied free of  rent  by  a               relative  of the owner, and  land  appurtenant               thereto, and               (c)   gardens  not let to tenants but used  by               the owners as a place of resort." The  effect of the addition of this Proviso to s. 23 (2)  of the Land Acquisition Act is that 15% solatium over the value assessed which is awarded when land is compulsorily acquired by  the Government under the Land Acquisition Act, will  not be  admissible if land is so acquired for the purpose  of  a scheme under Chapter XIV of the Adhiniyam.                (ii)  The new clause added   vide para  10(3)               of  Schedule  11) at the end of  s.  23,  Land               Acquisition Act, namely               "(2) for the purpose of clause first.-of  sub-               section (1) of this section-               (a)   the  market-value of the land  shall  be               the market value according to the use to which               the land was put at the date with reference to               which  the  market-value is to  be  determined               under that clause.........               (b) to (g) The effect of this modification is that the potential  value of the land e.g. as a building site, is to be ignored, 735               (iii) s.  372(1) provides that  "the  Tribunal               constituted under the Adhiniyam shall perform.

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             the  functions of the Court with reference  to               all acquisition of land for the Mahapalika for               the  purposes  of  this  Act  under  the  Land               acquisition Act, 1894".               ’The  validity  of the Proviso  to  this  sub-               section is in question.  The Proviso reads :               "Provided   that  no  such  claim   shall   be               entertained   by  the  Tribunal,  unless   the               claimant has deposited in Court such sum,  not               exceeding Rs. 7,000/- as the Tribunal may fix,               as security, for the costs, which in the event               of  the  claimants’  failure  way  be  awarded               against him." Mr. Mehta, learned Counsel for the appellant, contends  that the  modifications (i), (ii) and (iii) are covered  and  hit by th e ratio of this Court’s decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust and another V. Vithal Rao and ors.(1) On  the  other  hand, M/s.   Dikshit  and  Ganpule,  learned Counsel   appearing  for  the  State  and  the   Mahapalika, respectively  have tried to distinguish  Nagpur  Improvement Trust’s case on the ground that under the Nagpur Improvement Trust  Act, compulsory acquisition of land for all  purposes of  the  Trust had to be, made by  the  Government,  whereas under  the  Adainiyam the Mahapalika has plenary  powers  to acquire  land for the purpose of a scheme under Chapter  XIV of the Adhiniyam.  Stress has been laid on the fact that  no prior permission of the State Government is required for the issue of notifications under s. 357 and 363 of the Adhiniyam for compulsory acquisition of land for a Scheme costing less than  ten lakhs farmed under Chapter-XIV of  the  Adhiniyam. Further acquisition proceedings-it is argued-for  determina- tion of compensation are taken by the Collector, only as  an agent of the Mahapalika because after making the award,  the Collector  is  bound  under  s. 17-A (added  by  para  6  in Schedule  11) to the Land Acquisition Act) to make over  the land  acquired  to the Mahapalika.  It is  further  conceded that  the  modifications  to the  Land  Acquisition  Act  in question  in the Nagpur Improvement Trust case (supra)  were identical with the modifications (i) and (ii) above, made by s. 376 read with Schedule 11 of the Adhiniyam. Thus  the  first  question  for decision is  ;  who  is  the acquiring authority if the land is compulsorily acquired for the  purpose of a Scheme under Chapter XIV or for any  other purpose  of  the Mahapalika under s. 130 of  the  Adhiniyam? The,  answer must be obviously be that in either case it  is the  State Government who acquires the land.  The mere  fact that  where  the land is to be compulsorily acquired  for  a Scheme  costing  less than Rupees 10/- lakhs  under  Chapter XIV,  no  prior  permission of the .State  is  required  for issuing the necessary notifications under ss. 357 and  363 of  the  Adhiniyam (which take the  place  of  notifications under ’S. 4  and  6 of the Land Acquisition Act),  does  not mean that in such (1)  [1973] SCC 500. L748Sup.CI/74 736 cases,  acquiring  authority is the Mahapalika and  not  the State  GOVernment.  The matter has been put beyond doubt  by para 6 of Schedule II, which reads :               6.    Transfer  of  Land  to  Mahapalika-After               section  17 of the Land Acquisition  Act,  the               following  shall  be deemed  to  be  inserted,               namely :               17-A.  In every case referred to in section 16               or  section  17,  the  Collector  shall,  upon

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             payment of the cost of acquisition, made  over               charge  of  the  land  to  the  Mukhaya   Napr               Adhikari; and the land shall thereupon vest in               the  Mahapalika, subject to the  liability  of               the Mahapalika to pay any further costs  which               may   be   incurred   on   account   of    its               acquisition." The caption of this para read along with its contents  shows that the land has first to be acquired by the Collector  for the  Government  and  thereafter it is  transferred  by  the Government to the Mahapalika, only on payment of its  costs. In this connection it is important to recall the  provisions of s. 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which has not in any way been modified by the Adhiniyam.  According to s.  16 "when  the Collector has made his award under s. 11, he  may take  possession  of  the land which  shall  thereupon  vest absolutely  in the Government free from  all  encumbrances." Thus,  it is clear beyond all manner of doubt that  whenever land is to be compulsorily acquired for the Mahapalika-be it for  a  purpose of the Scheme under chapter XIV or  for  any other  purpose under s. 130-the acquiring authority  is  the Government.   There  is no material difference  between  the impugn  provisions of the Adhiniyam and those which were  in question  before  this Court in Nagpur  Improvement  Trust’s case  (supra).   The ratio of the aforesaid  case  therefore will  apply  fully to the impugned provisions  mentioned  at (i), (ii) and (iii). There can be no dispute that the Government can acquire land for  a public purpose including that of the  Mahapalika:  or other   local  body,  either  under  the   unmodified   Land Acquisition Act , 1894, or under that Act as modified by the Adhiniyam.   If it chooses the first course, then the  land- owners  concerned will be entitled to  better  compensation, including 15% solatium; the potential value of the land etc; nor  will  there be any impediment or  burdle-such  as  that enacted  by  s.372(1) of the Adhiniyam-in the, way  of  such land-owners,  dissatisfied  by  the  Collector’s  award,  to approach  the  Court  under  s.18  of  that  Act.   If   the Government,  for  the  same purpose,  resorts  to  the  Land Acquisition  Act  as modified by the  Adhiniyam,  the  land- owner(s) concerned will suffer from all the disabilities  or restrictions  envisaged by the modifications.  In this  way, the   impugned   legislation  enables  the   Government   to discriminate  in  the  matter  of  acquiring  land   between similarly situated land-owners. The  impugned  modifications do not satisfy the  well  known tests of reasonable classification which is permissible  for the  purpose  of  legislation.  It is  not  founded  on  any intelligible   differentia,  nor  has  this  differentia   a rational  nexus  with  the object  sought  to  be  achieved, namely, 737 compulsory  acquisition of land for a public purpose. it  is not necessary to dilate further on this point as this matter stands   concluded  by  this  Court’s  decision  in   Nagpur Improvement Trust’s case by the ratio of which we are bound. It will be sufficient to close, the discussion by extracting here  what  Sikri  C.J. speaking for  the  Court  in  Nagpur Improvement Trust’s case said:               "Can  the Legislature say that for a  hospital               land  will be acquired at 50% of  the  market               value,  for a school at 60% of the  value  and               for a Government building at 70% of the market               value ? All three objects are public  purposes               and  as far as the owner is concerned it  does

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             not  matter  to him whether it is  one  public               purpose  or the other.  Article 14 confers  an               individual  right  and in order to  justify  a               classification there should be something which               justifies   a  different  treatment  to   this               individual   right.   It  seems  to  us   that               ordinarily  a  classification  based  on   the               public   purpose  is  not  permissible   under               Article  14  for the  purpose  of  determining               compensation.  The position is different  when               the owner of the land himself is the recipient               of  benefits from an improvement  scheme,  and               the benefit to him is taken into consideration               in  fixing compensation.  Can  classifications               be  made on the basis of  authority  acquiring               the  land  ?  In  other  words  can  different               principles of compensation be laid if the land               is acquired for or by an Improvement Trust  or               Municipal  Corporation or the Government ?  It               seems to us that the answer is in the negative               because  as far as the owner is  concerned  it               does  not  matter to him whether the  land  is               acquired by one authority or the other.               It  is  equally immaterial whether it  is  one               Acquisition  Act  or another  Acquisition  Act               under  which  the land is  acquired.   If  the               existence  of two Acts could enable the  State               to  give  one owner different  treatment  from               another  equally  situated the  owner  who  is               discriminated    against,   can   claim    the               protection of Article 14." It  may,  however, be noted that the  impugned  modification (iii) that is, the Proviso added to s. 23 (2) was deleted by the  U.P. Amendment Act 23 of 1961 which came into force  on September 7, 1961. Mr. Mehta contends that since the Collector’s award, in  the present  case, was made when this Proviso was in force,  the appellants will continue to suffer under the liability  that had  arisen under the Proviso despite its deletion, even  in proceedings before the Tribunal. On  the  other.hand,  learned Counsel  for  the  respondents maintain that the effect of the repeal of this Proviso is to obliterate it altogether as if it never had existed. To us, the apprehension expressed by Mr. Mehta appears to be unfounded. The  Proviso  in question created only  a  disability.   The effect  of’  the  repeal is to  remove  that  disability  or restriction on the landowners’ right to receive 15 per  cent solatium  under  s.  23 (2) of  the  Land  Acquisition  Act. Further, the assessment of compensation is not a 738 matter  past and closed.  It is still pending in  ’reference before  the Tribunal.  The repeal is final and  conditional. There  is  nothing  in the repealing Act  which  saves  such pending  references  from  its  operation.   The   Tribunal, therefore,  will have to take cognizance of the  repeal  and for  the  purpose of disposing of the reference,  treat  the Proviso  as  having never existed.  Thus,  the  validity  or otherwise  of  modification (i) has become,  more  or  less, academic. The last contention of Mr. Mehta is that by virtue of s. 577 of  the  Adhiniyam,  the  provisions  of  s.  365(4)   which Peremptorily  requires  a Scheme to be completed up  to  the date of the award, within a period of five years, had become applicable  to the Mumfordganj Housing Scheme, also.   Since

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this  Scheme-proceeds  the argument has not  been  completed within  the  requisite time-limit it has come to an  end  by operation of law, with consequent release of the appellants’ property. Mr.  Dikshit contends that S. 365(4) cannot apply,  to  this Scheme,  because the U.P. Town Improvement Act,  1919  under which  it  was initiated had no such provision.   The  point pressed into argument is that so long as this Scheme is  not superseded by any notification or order tinder clause (a) to s.  577,  it will continue to be in force without  any  time limit. Mr.  Ganpule,  appearing  for the Mahapalika,  has,  in  the alternative  chosen to steer a middle course.  His stand  is that  even if s. 365(4), applies to this Scheme,  then  also the  time  limit of five years will start running  from  the date  of the commencement of the Adhiniyam i.e. February  1, 1960. In order to appreciate the contentions canvassed, it will be profitable to set out the material parts of s. 365(4) and s. 577, as they stood at the relevant time hereunder               "365(1)               (2)               (3)               (4)   All acquisition of land and interest  in               land  for  an  improvement  scheme  authorised               under this Chapter shall be completed at least               upto  the stage of making of awards  within  a               period  of  five years from the  date  of  the               notification  of the scheme under section  363               and   any  land  in  respect  of   which   the               acquisition is not so Completed and the  owner               and occupier thereof shall cease to be subject               to any liabilities under this Chapter               Provided that the State Government may in  any               particular  case  before the  expiry  of  such               period  and  for  reasons to  be  recorded  in               writing extend the period by one year.               739               Section 577               "     Continuation   of   appointments, taxes,               budget,  estimate,  .assessment  etc.-Save  as               expressly  provided by the provisions of  this               Chapter or by a notification issued under sec-               tion 579-                (a)  any       appointment,       delegation,               notification,  notice, tax, order,  direction,               scheme,  licence,  permission,   registration,               rule,  bye-law, regulation form made,  issued,               imposed   or  granted  under  as  it  is   not               inconsistent  with the provisions of this  Act               continue  in force until it is  superseded  by               any  appointment,  delegation,   notification,               notice,   tax,   order,   direction,   scheme,               licence, permission, registration, rule,  bye-               law, or form made, issued, imposed or  granted               under this Act or any other law as  aforesaid,               as the case may be;               (b)   any  notice or notification or  sanction               of   any  improvement  scheme  for  the   area               included  in  the City issued under  the  U.P.               Town Improvement Act, 1919 .... .... shall  be               deemed to have been issued under this Act, and               all further proceedings in furtherance of such               scheme may be taken accordingly-               (c)   all proceedings for acquisition of  land

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             whether   in  pursuance  of  any   scheme   of               improvement  or otherwise initiated under  the               U.P.  Town  Improvement  Act,  19  19  may  be               continued as if they had been initiated  under               this Act;               (d) to (g) The  interpretation  suggested by Mr. Dikshit  is  possible, only  if ,,we read clause (a) of s. 577 in isolation and  do not give full effect -to the words "in so far as it is  not inconsistent  with the provisions of this Act" occurring  in that  clause.  Such an interpret. we think,  .With  respect, will lead to manifest contradiction and absurdity.  It  will mean.that while fresh Schemes initiated under the  Adhiniyam must  be completed with speed within the,  prescribed  time- limit, far older schemes commenced under the repealed  Act,- where  the need ,.for expeditious disposal is the  greatest- can  continue  indefinitely for ,any length of  time.   This whimsical  construction can be avoided if ,,we  read  clause (a) along with clauses (b) and (c) of the same section, ;and give  it  a  reasonable meaning with the aid  of  the  legal fiction  implicit  in those clauses.   Thus  construed,  the Scheme  in the instant case, though notified under s. 42  of the  repealed  Act in 1944, would, in view  of  the  deeming provision  in clause (b) of s.. 577, be deemed to have  been notified under s. 363 of the Adhiniyam, on the date on which the Adhiniyam came into force i.e. on February 1, 1960.  The five-year period specified in s. 365 (4) therefore, will  be deemed to 740 have  commenced  from February 1, 1960.  The  Collector  had made his award on April 13, 1961, much within the time-limit prescribed by s. 365(4). In the-above view of the matter, we, negative the contention of, Mr. Mehta. For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  hold  that  the  impugned modifications  (i), (ii) and (iii) suffer from the  vice  of discrimination  and  as such, contravene  the  guarantee  of equal  protection  of laws enshrined in Article  14  of  the Constitution. In  the  result, we partly allow this appeal and  quash  the impugned  modifications of the Land-Acquisition  Act,  1894. The  appellant  shall .be entitled to  proportionate,  costs from the respondents.  The case being very old the  Tribunal shall do well to dispose of the reference pending before it, with utmost expedition. V.P.S.                     Appeal partly allowed. 741