IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4701 OF 2008 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17588 of 2006)

Nune Prasad and Ors. ….Appellants

Versus

Nune Ramakrisna     ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

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2.  Challenge  in  this  appeal  is  to  the  judgment  of  a

learned Single Judge of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at

Hyderabad allowing the second appeal filed by the respondent

under  Section 100 of the  Code  of  Civil Procedure,  1908 (in

short 'CPC').

3. Factual background in a nutshell is as follows:

The appellant-plaintiff filed O.S. No.78 of 1990 before

the  Sub-Court,  Ramachandrapuram,  East Godavari  District,

Andhra Pradesh against the respondent-defendant. The Trial

Court by the judgment and order dated 27.06.1995 held that

the plaintiffs are the owners of the schedule property and they

being  the  owners  of  the  schedule  property  are  entitled  to

possession.  Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the Trial

court, the  respondent-defendant preferred  an appeal  in the

Court  of  Additional  District  Judge,  Rajahmundry,  East

Godavari District. By judgment and order dated 14.06.2001,

the first appellate court confirmed the Trial Court's judgment.

The respondent-defendant  preferred  a second appeal  under

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Section 100 C.P.C. before  the High Court of Andhra Pradesh

at Hyderabad, being Second Appeal No.512 of 2001.  By the

impugned  judgment,  the  learned  Single  Judge  allowed  the

second appeal and the judgments and decree  passed by the

courts below were set aside.

Though many points have been urged in support of

the appeal, the primary stand of the learned counsel for the

appellants  is  that  the  second  appeal  was  allowed  without

framing  any  substantial  question  of  law  as  mandated  by

Section  100  CPC.   Learned  counsel  for  the  respondent

submitted  that though the  High Court's  judgment  does  not

show  that  any  substantial  question  of  law was  framed  yet

learned Single  Judge  has allowed the appeal after analyzing

the factual position in the background of settled principles in

law.

4. Section 100 of CPC deals with "Second Appeal". The

provision reads as follows:

"Section 100-Second Appeal:   (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body

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of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in  appeal  by  any  Court  subordinate  to the  High  Court,  if  the  High  Court  is satisfied  that  the  case  involves  a substantial question of law.

(2) An  appeal  may  lie  under  this section from an appellate decree  passed ex parte.

(3) In an appeal under this Section, the  memorandum  of  appeal  shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. (4) Where  the  High  Court  is satisfied  that  a  substantial  question  of law  is  involved  in  any  case,  it  shall formulate that question.

(5) The  appeal  shall  be  heard  on the  question  so  formulated  and  the respondent  shall,  at  the  hearing  of  the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:

Provided  that  nothing in  this  sub-section  shall  be  deemed  to take  away  or  abridge  the  power  of  the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the  appeal  on  any  other  substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is  satisfied  that  the  case  involves  such question."

5. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the

High Court does not show that any substantial question of law

has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on

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the  question,  if  any,  so  formulated.  That  being  so,  the

judgment  cannot  be  maintained,  which  is  set  aside  and

remitted back to the High Court for proceeding in the matter

in accordance  with law and in terms of  observations  made

herein.      

6. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000 (1) SCC 434),

this Court in para 10, has stated thus:

"10.  Now  under  Section  100  CPC,  after  the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court  to  formulate  a substantial  question  of law and  it  is  not  permissible  to  reverse  the judgment of the  first appellate  Court without doing so."  

7. Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000 (3) SCC

708), this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High

Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of

law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:

"7. It  is  to  be  reiterated  that  under section  100  CPC  jurisdiction  of  the  High Court  to  entertain  a  second  appeal  is confined  only  to  such  appeals  which involve a substantial question of law and it

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does  not  confer  any  jurisdiction  on  the High Court to interfere with pure questions of  fact  while  exercising  its  jurisdiction under section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time  of  disposing  of  the  matter  the  High Court did not even  notice the question of law  formulated  by  it  at  the  time  of admission of the second appeal as there is no   reference  of  it  in  the  impugned judgment. Further, the fact findings courts after  appreciating  the  evidence  held  that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a  tenant  and  his  possession  was permissive  and there  was no pleading  or proof  as to  when  it  became  adverse  and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts  below  were  based  on  proper appreciation of evidence  and the  material on  record  and  there  was  no  perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the  defendant  got  the  possession  of  suit land  as  a  lessee  or  under  a  batai agreement  then  from  the  permissive possession  it  is  for  him  to  establish  by cogent  and  convincing  evidence  to  show hostile  animus and possession adverse  to the  knowledge  of  the  real  owner.  Mere possession for a long time does not result in  converting  permissive  possession  into adverse  possession (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994 (6) SCC 591). Hence the  High  Court  ought  not  to  have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below."

8. The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal and

Ors. v. Anupkumar and Ors. (2003 (1) SCC 430), Mathakala

Krishnaiah  v.  V.  Rajagopal  (2004(10)  SCC  676),  Smt.  Ram 6

Sakhi  Devi  v.  Chhatra  Devi  &  Ors.  (JT 2005  (6)  SC  167),

Sasikumar & Ors. v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair & Ors. (2005

(12)  SCC  588),  Gian  Dass  v.  The  Gram  Panchayat  Village

Sunner Kalan & Ors. (2006 (6) SCC 271),  Shah Mansukhlal

Chhaganial (d) through Lrs. V. Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (d)

through Lrs. (2006(13) SCALE 99).

9. The appeal  stands disposed  of  in the  above  terms.

There will be no order as to costs.  

……….………………….……….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

        ……..…………………………….J. (Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)

New Delhi, July 29, 2008

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