08 August 1995
Supreme Court
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NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE Vs DES RAJ .

Bench: HANSARIA B.L. (J)
Case number: C.A. No.-007018-007018 / 1995
Diary number: 78394 / 1991
Advocates: Vs MINAKSHI VIJ


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PETITIONER: NOTIFIED AREA COMMITTEE & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DES RAJ & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT08/08/1995

BENCH: HANSARIA B.L. (J) BENCH: HANSARIA B.L. (J) RAMASWAMY, K.

CITATION:  1995 SCC  (5) 317        JT 1995 (7)   161  1995 SCALE  (4)686

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                           JUDGMENT HANSARIA, J.      The point  for determination  in this  appeal is  as to whether land  included in  shamilat deh which had come to be vested in  the concerned Gram Panchayat by virtue of section 3(a) of  the Punjab  Village common  Land (Regulation)  Act, 1953 (for  short, ‘the   1953 Act’) got diversted because of what has  been mentioned  in the  proviso to  Rule 3  of the Punjab Gram  Panchayat Rules,  1965, framed  in exercise  of pwers  conferred   by  Punjab   Gram  Panchayat   Act,  1952 (hereinafter the ‘Panchayat Act’). 2. The facts lie in narrow compass and are not disputed. The same are  that the lands with which this appeal is concerned were being  used, to  start with,  for common  purposes like ‘gair mumkin  rasta’ and  ‘gao charand’,  but were  shown as shamilat deh  afterwards  and  came  to  be  vested  in  the concerned Gram  Panchayat pursuant to what has been provided in section  3 of the 1953 Act. Pursuant to what was provided in Haryana Municipal Common Land (Regulation) Act, 1974, the land was  mutated in the name of the appellant. As that Act, however, came  to be declared void by a Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana  High Court,  the respondents, who were the owners of the  lands earlier, filed a suit seeking declaration that the said  land got reverted to them because of what has been mentioned in  the aforesaid  proviso. The suit was dismissed by the  trial court,  whereupon the  plaintiffs preferred an appeal which  came to  be allowed  by Addl.  District Judge, Karnal. On  the appellant  approaching  the  High  Court  in second appeal,  the same  came to  be dismissed  in  limine. Hence this appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution. 3. There  being no  dispute as  to the  vesting of  the land pursuant to  1953 Act  in the  concerned Gram Panchayat, all that we  are required  to decide is whether the stand of the plaintiffs-respondents that  the same  got reverted  to them pursuant to what has been mentioned in the aforesaid proviso

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is correct or not. 4. To decide the aforesaid question, let Rule 3 of the Punjab Gram  Panchayat Rules,  1965 be noted, which reads as under:                "If the whole of Sabha area is      included in  Municipality, cantonment or      notified area  all rights,  obligations,      property, assets and liabilities if any,      whether arising  out of  any contract or      otherwise shall  vest in  the  Municipal      Committee, Cantonment  Board or Notified      Area Committee as the case may be.           Provided that the land, which vests      in  the   Panchayat  under   the  Punjab      Village Common  Lands (Regulation)  Act,      1961 or  the land management and control      of which  vests in  the panchayat  under      the  East   Punjab   Consolidation   and      Prevention of  Fragmentation 1948  shall      revert  to  the  co-sharers  and  owners      thereof." 5.  The  respondents’  first  contention  is  that  for  the appellant to  claim vesting  of the  land in  it, the  first requirement is  that the  whole of  the Sabha area must have been included in it. It is then urged that even if this part of the  requirement be held to be satisfied, because of what has been  stated in  the aforesaid  proviso,  the  land  did revert to  them. The  further leaf  of this argument is that the omission  of the  proviso  by  notification  dated  22nd December, 1976  cannot alter  the position  inasmuch as  the area of  village Gudha,  in which  the  land  is  admittedly situate, had  been declared  to be  part of notified area on 6.10.75; and  so, the  proviso operated  by its own force on that date,  because of which its omission later on could not alter the legal position. 6. Insofar  as the  first contention  is  concerned  ,  Shri Ashri, learned  counsel appearing for the appellants, brings to our  notice what  has been  stated in  sub-section (2) of section 8  of the  Panchayat Act,  which is in the following language:-                If the  whole of the area      of a  Gram Panchayat is included in      Municipality  cantonment,  notified      area or  small town  are, the  Gram      Panchayat shall  cease to  exit and      its assets and liabilities shall be      dispossed   of    in   the   manner      prescribed. If  a part of such area      is so  included,  its  jurisdiction      shall be reduced by that part."                         (Emphasis added) This shows  that the  only effect  of non-inclusion  of  the whole  of   the  area  of  a  Gram  Panchayat  is  that  the jurisdiction of  the concerned Notified Area Committee shall get reduced  and would  be confined to the part included. As in the  present case  there is nothing to show that the part of the  Gram Panchayat in which the suit land is situate had not been  included in the territorial area of the appellant- committee, the  first contention  advanced on  behalf of the respondents, which  had found  acceptance  with  the  courts below, cannot be regarded as legally sound. 7. The  second question is whether the aforesaid proviso can be called in aid by the respondents. It is apparent that the proviso deals  with the  land which had come to be vested in the  panchayat   under  the   Punjab  village   Common  Land

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(Regulation) Act, 1961, whereas the lands at hand came to be vested in  the concerned panchayat by the force of 1953 Act. It is  because of  this that  a submission  was advanced  on behalf of  the appellants  before the learned Addl. District Judge that  the proviso  has no  operation. This  contention was, however,  not upheld  because of what has been provided in section 16 of the 1961 Act which reads as below:           "Repeal and saving- The Punjab      Village Common  Lands  (Regulation)      Act, 1953  and  the  Pepsu  Village      Common lands  (Regulation) Act 1954      are hereby repealed:           Provided that anything done or      any action  taken under  any law so      repealedshall  be  deemed  to  have      done   or    taken      under   the      corresponding  provisions  of  this      Act and  shll  continue  to  be  in      force accordingly  unless and until      superseded by  anything done or any      action taken under this Act." 8. The  learned Addl.  District Judge  took the  view that as the 1953 Act  was repealed,  vesting of the land in the appellant can be said  to be  only under the 1961 Act because of the proviso to section 16.  According to  us, this  was a wrong view to be taken because the  proviso speaks  of things done or action taken under the 1953  Act and  allows them  to continue  in force  unless and until superseded  by anything  done or any action taken under the 1961 Act.  This proviso does not apply to rights which got vested by operation  of the   1953  Act. These  are protected by section 4(c) of the Punjab General Clauses Act, 1898, according to which, the repeal of an enactment does not affect, inter alia, any right acquired under the repealed enactment. As in the present case the Gram Panchayat  had acquired  the right  under the  1953 Act, its repeal by  1961 Act did not in any way affect the right which the Gram Panchayat  had acquired  over the lands in question. So, the proviso did not operate qua the lands at hand. 9. The  aforesaid being the legal position, we hold that what has been stated  in Rule  3 of the Punjab Gram Panchayat Rules either in its  main part  or in the proviso can not be called in the aid by the  respondents to  claim reversion of the lands to them. The contrary view taken by the two courts below is not sustainable in law. 10. The  appeal is,  therefore,  allowed  by  setting  aside  the impugned judgment as a consequence of which the suit filed by the respondents stands  dismissed. In  the facts and circumstances of the case, we, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.