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PETITIONER: NOOKALA SETHARAMAIAH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KOTAIAH NAIDU & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 31/03/1970

BENCH: SHAH, J.C. BENCH: SHAH, J.C. HEGDE, K.S. GROVER, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1354            1971 SCR  (1) 153  1970 SCC  (2)  13  CITATOR INFO :  R          1972 SC1324  (11)

ACT: Mineral Concession Rules, 1949--Rules 28(1-A),  57(1)--Scope of--Failure   of   the  State  Government  to   dispose   of applications  for  grant  of mining lease  within  the  time prescribed  by  the rules--Whether the State  Government  is deemed to have refused the applications. Review--If Central Government court review under rule  57(1) decision  of  State Government to grant  leave  pursuant  to mandamus issued by High Court.

HEADNOTE: In  September,  1953,  the first respondent  applied  for  a mining lease for over 900 acres in the then Hyderabad State. He was granted a lease of about 57 acres in January, 1954 by an order of the State Government which was silent as regards the  other  areas included in his  application.   While  the respondent  kept  pressing’  for a lease  of  the  remaining areas,  the State Government began to grant, some  of  these areas to other persons including the appellant.  Meanwhile,, on  December  8,  1955, the  respondent  moved  the  Central Government  under Rule 57 of the Mineral  Concession  Rules, 1949,  seeking a direction to the State to grant to him  the lease  of  the  areas sought by him  and  to  stop  granting further areas to other applicants.  This review petition was dismissed  on  the  basis  that  the  order  of  the   State Government granting only 57 acres by implication amounted to a rejection of the respondent’s claim for the balance area. On  September  15, 1956, the Mineral Concession  Rules  were amended  and a new sub rule 28(1) (A) was  introduced  which provided  that  every  application under Rule  27  shall  be disposed  of within 9 months from the date of  its  receipt. The  amended Rule 57 provided that the failure of the  State Government   to  dispose  of  an  application   within   the prescribed period would be deemed to be a refusal to grant a lease and that the aggrieved person may, within two  months, apply  to  the Central Government for a review.   A  further amendment  of  Rule  57(2)  provided  that  any  application pending  with the State Government an 14th  September,  1956

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and remaining undisposed of on the 24th August, 1957,  shall be disposed of by the State Government within 6 months  from the latter date.  Prior to this amendment the respondent had filed another review petition before the Central  Government and  on September 26, 1957, that petition was  dismissed  by the  Government  as being premature; this was on  the  basis that  the respondent’s original application was  pending  on 31st  August,  1957, and the period of 6  months  from  that date,  as prescribed by the amended Rule 57(2) had  not  yet expired. The respondent then moved the High Court by a petition under Article  226.  making the State Government alone  party  and seeking  a writ of mandamus to the Government to dispose  of his application of September, 1953, expeditiously.  The High Court   allowed  this  petition  and  did  not  accept   the contention,  on behalf of the State Government that in  view of section 57(2) the respondent’s application must be L11Sup CI/11 154 deemed to have been rejected. it held that section 57(2) was intended to be for the benefit of the applicant and did  not relieve  the State Government from performing the  statutory function imposed on it under rule 17 of granting or refusing the licence.  During the pendency of the first petition, the respondent had also filed a second petition seeking the same relief and this was disposed of in August, 1959 on the basis of  a  statement by the Government Advocate that  the  State Government was prepared to dispose of the first respondent’s application on the merits without relying on rule 57(2). By  an order on May 27, 1961, the State  Government  granted on. mining lease to the, respondent all the areas for  which he  had  applied in September, 1953  excluding  those  areas which  had  been  earlier leased to  others.,  However.  the Central  Government allowed a review petition under Rule  57 filed by the appellant and set aside the order on the ground that  the  application  made by  the  appellant,  the  first respondent, as well as others which were pending before  the State Government ’should be deemed to have been rejected  on 1st March, 1958 in view of rule 57(2). The  1st  respondent then challenged this order  by  a  writ petition  in the High Court which was allowed and the  order was  quashed.   The court held that rule 57(2)  was  enacted only for the benefit of the applicants and did not take away the power of the State Government to dispose of applications even after expiry of the prescribed period; that in view  of the  Government Advocate’s concession the  State  Government Was   stopped   from  contending   that   the   respondent’s application of September, 1953 must be deemed to have  ’been refused;  and  furthermore  that  in view  of  the  writ  of mandamus  issued  in  the first  writ  petition,  the  State Government was bound to consider the application of the  1st respondent and the decision of the State Government taken in obedience to the order of the High Court could not have been set aside by the Central Government. HELD  :  (Per  Hedge and Grover, JJ);  The  appeal  must  be allowed (By the Court) (1) Reading rule 28 (1-A) and rule 57 (2)  together,  there  is no doubt  that  after  the  period prescribed, the State Government is incompetent to deal with the  applications’ pending before it.  The High  Court  was, therefore,  wrong  in holding that even  if  an  application stands rejected for failure to pass an order within the time prescribed,  the  State  Government has  power  to  issue  a licence. [164 C] Dey  Gupta  & Company vs.  State of Bihar A.I.R.  1961  Pat. 487; referred to.

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(2) There can be no estoppel against a statute.  Rule  28(1- A)  and  rule  57(2) are statutory  rules.   They  bind  the Government as much as they bind others.  The requirement  of those  rules  cannot  be waived by  the  State  Governments. Therefore the fact that the Government Advocate  represented to the Court that the 1st respondent’s application was still pending  could  not change the legal position nor  could  it confer  on  the  State  Government  any  power  to  act   in contravention of those rules. [165 A-B] (3)Per Hegde and Grover JJ.); As far as the State Government was  concerned  the  writ issued  was  binding  whether  the decision  rendered by the Court was correct in law  or  not; but  that  decision  could not bind  the  appellant  or  the Central  Government  who  were  not  parties  to  that  writ petition..  It was not a judgment in rem.  In  obedience  to the  writ  issued  by the court, the  State  Government  did consider the 155 application of the 1st respondent and granted him the  lease asked   for  by  him.   The  Central  Government  had   been constituted as the revisional authority under rule 57.  That authority  is  a quasi-judicial body  created  by  statutory rules.   It is bound by law to discharge the duties  imposed on   it by rule 57.  Therefore it had to obey the mandate of rule 57.  In so     doing  it  cannot be said  that  it  had infringed the mandamus issued by the High Court. [165 D-F] (Per Shah J, dissenting) : The appeal must be dismissed, Granting  that the High Court erroneously issued a  writ  of mandamus  directing  the  State Government  to  perform  its functions  it  was, not open to the  Central  Government  in effect to exercise appellate authority over the judgment  of the  High  Court.   To accede to  the  contention  that  the executive  has  the power,  when  exercising  quasi-judicial functions,  to sit in appeal over the decision of  the  High Court  is to destroy the scheme of division of powers  under our  Constitution.   There was no  distinction  between  the effect of an order made by the High Court and carried out by the State, and an order made by the High Court and confirmed in  appeal  by  this Court and carried  out  by  the  State. Article  141  of  the Constitution has no  bearing  on  that question.   If  this Court decided a question of law  or  of fact  or  a  mixed question of law and fact  arising  in  an appeal  against an order passed by the High Court in a  writ petition against the action of the State Government granting or refusing to grant a licence, it would not be open to  the Central  Government, hearing a review petition  against  the order  of the State Government in compliance with the  order of  this  Court, to set aside the order so as to  upset  the order of this Court. [156 H] It  is  well settled that a person who has not been  made  a party  to  a proceeding may still appeal with leave  of  the Appellate Court provided he might have properly been made ’a party  to the proceeding.  The appellant  could  undoubtedly have  been  made  a party to the petition  before  the  High Court.   He could, therefore, challenge the  correctness  of the  order  and  no objection could be  raised  against  the granting of leave to him to appeal on the ground that he was not a party to the writ petition. [157 F, 158 C] Re.  "B"  an Infant [1958] 1 Q.B. 12 C.A., The  Province  of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association I.L.R. [1949] Bom.  591; Ponnalagu v. State of Madras I.L.R.  [1953]  Mad. 808;  Pullayya v. Nagbhushanain I.L.R. 1962 A.P.  127  F.B.; referred to.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 2 1 21  and 2122 of 1969. Appeals  from the judgment and order dated July 18, 1969  of the  Andhra Pradesh High Court in W. P. Nos. 464 and 602  of 1965. D. Narasaraju, A. Subba Rao and K. R. Sharma, for the appel- lant (in both the appeals) M. C. Setalvad P. Parameswara Rao, V. Rajagopal Reddy, S, L. Setia  and  K.  C. Dua, for respondent No. 1  (in  both  the appeals). V.  A. seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for respondent No.  2 (in both the appeals). 156 P. Ram Reddy and A. V. V. Nair, for respondents Nos. 3 and 4 (in C.A. No. 2121 of 1969) and respondent No. 3 (in C.A. No. 2122 of 1969). The  Judgment  of  HEGDE and GROVER, JJ.  was  delivered  by HEGDE, J. SHAH, J. delivered a dissenting opinion : Shah,  J.  I  agree that Appeal No. 2122  of  1969  must  be dismissed.   I also agree that if the states to  dispose  of the application for grant of a mining lease within the  time prescribed  by the rules, the failure,results in refusal  to grant  the  lease.  The High Court was in error  in  holding that  in the absence of a provision enacting, that  even  if the application stands rejected for failure to pass an order within  the time prescribed, the State Government has  power to  issue a licence.  The High Court was again in  error  in holding  that  because of the representations  made  by  the State before Bhimasankaran, J., in Writ Petition No. 1237 to 1957 the State Government were estopped from contending that the  application was by the first respondent must be  deemed to have been refused. But  I  am unable to agree that the Central  Government  was competent  in exercise of its power of review,  against  the order  of the State Government made in compliance  with  the order of Basi Reddy, J. in Writ Petition No. 888 of 1957, to set  aside  the  order  so as in  effect  to  overrule  the, judgment of the High Court. The relevant facts may be recalled.  The Central  Government made  an  order  on  September  25,  1957,  in  the   review application  filed by the first respondent holding that  his application  was  premature and that it was  for  the  State Government  to dispose of the application within six  months of  August  31,  1957.   The  first  respondent  then  moved Petition No. 888 of 1957 for a mandamus directing the  State Government  to dispose of his application.  By  order  dated November 4, 1958, Basi Reddy, J., observed that r. 57(2)  as amended  by S.R.O. No. 2753 "is intended for the benefit  of the  applicant,  and does not relieve the  State  from  per- forming  the  statutory functions imposed on it  under  rule 17(1)  and 17(2) viz. of granting or refusing the  licence". The State Government then heard the application and  granted the mining lease for which the first respondent had  applied on  September  15, 1953.  Against that order  the  appellant moved  a review petition.  The Central Government  by  order dated February 15, 1965, allowed the review petition and set aside the grant in favour of the first respondent. Granting  that the High Court erroneously issued a  writ  of mandamus directing the State Government to perform its func- tions  it  was,  in my judgment, not  open  to  the  Central Government 157 in effect to exercise appellate authority over the  judgment

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of  the High Court.  If the order was erroneous it could  be set  aside  by an appropriate proceeding before  a  Division Bench-  of  the High Court or before this  Court.   But  the Central  Government had no power to set aside the  order  on the  view  that  the High Court  had  reached  an  erroneous conclusion.  To accede to the contention that the  executive has the power, when exercising quasi-judicial functions,  to sit  in  appeal over the decision of the High  Court  is  to destroy-the   scheme  of  division  of  powers   under   our Constitution.  I see no reason for making a distinction  be- tween  the  effect of an order made by the  High  Court  and carried  out  by the State, and an order made  by  the  High Court and confirmed in appeal by this Court and carried  out by  the State.  In my view Art. 141 of the Constitution  has no  bearing  on  that question.  If  this  Court  decided  a question  of law or of fact or a mixed question of  law  and fact  arising  in an appeal against an order passed  by  the High  Court  in a writ petition against the  action  of  the State Government granting or refusing to grant a licence, it would   not,  in  my  judgment,  be  open  to  the   Central Government,  hearing a review petition against the order  of the  State Government in compliance with the order  of  this Court,  to set aside the order so as to upset the  order  of this  Court.  That is so,; not because of Art. 14 1,  but  I because  neither  the  Legislature  nor  the  executive   is invested with powers to supersede judgments of Courts.   The Legislature  may if competent in that behalf change the  law but cannot supersede a judgment of the Court.  The executive has  no power to change the law, and no power  to  supersede the judgment of the Court. It  was, however, said that the appellant was not  impleaded as  a party to Writ Petition No. 888 of  1957, and he  could not  seek redress in a superior court against the  order  of Basi  Reddy,  J.  But  it is settled by  a  long  course  of authorities that a person who has not been made a party to a proceeding  may  still appeal with leave  of  the  appellate Court, provided he might have properly been made a party  to the  proceeding  : see Re.  "B " an Infant.(1).  In  In  re. Securitie Insurance Company(2) Lindley, L.J., observed at p. 413 :               "I  understand the practice to ’ be  perfectly               well settled that a person who is a party  can               appeal  (of  course within  the  proper  time)               without  any  leave,  and that  a  person  who               without  being a party is either bound by  the               order   or   is  aggrieved  by   it,   or   is               prejudicially  affected by it,  cannot  appeal               without  leave.  It does not require. much  to               obtain leave.  If a person alleging him- (1) [1958] 1 Q.B. 12 C.A. (2) [1894] 2 Ch. 410. 158               self to be aggrieved by an order can make  out               even  a  prima facie case why he  should  have               leave he will get it; but without leave he  is               not entitled to appeal." The rule has been accepted by the High Courts in India : see The Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile  Associa- tion;(1)  Ponnalagu v. State of Madras;(2) and  Pullayya  v. Nagbhushanam. (3) The appellant could undoubtedly have been made a party to  a petition  before  the  High  Court.  lie  could,  therefore, challenge  the correctness of the order made by Basi  Reddy, J.  No objection could be raised against the grant of  leave to  him to appeal ,on the ground that he was not a party  to

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the  Writ  Petition  No.  888  of  1957.   In  my  judgment, therefore, Appeal No. 2121 of 1967 must also fail. Hegde, J. These appeals by certificate arise from the common judgment  of the High Court of Judicature at Andhra  Pradesh in  Writ Petitions Nos. 464 and 602 of 1965.  The  appellant herein  was the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 602 of  1965 and the 5th respondent in Writ Petition No. 464 of 1965.  In this  case,  it will be convenient to formulate  the  issues arising for’ decision after setting out the relevant facts. Amrutham Kotaiah Naidu, the 1st respondent in these  appeals applied  for the grant of a mining lease in respect  of  915 acres and 18 cents of lands in Appalanarasinmhapuram  hamlet of  Cheruvumadhavaram  in  Khammameth  Teluqa  of   Warangal District of the then Hyderbad State, on September 15,  1953. After  production of agreement with the pattedars  lease  in respect of lands comprising 57 acres 25 Gunthas was  granted to him as per the order of the Director of Mines and Geology dated January 9, 1954.  That order is silent as regards  the other  areas  included in his application.   Thereafter  the respondent  was pressing the State Government to ,-rant  him on  lease the remaining areas included in  his  application. Meanwhile  on November 21, 1955, the appellant  applied  for the  grant  of a mining lease of a portion of the  area  for which the respondent had earlier submitted his  application. The  State  Government granted on mining  lease  to  various persons some of the areas in respect of which the respondent had asked for a mining lease.  Obviously aggrieved by  those grants the respondent moved (1) I.L.R. [1949] Bom. 591.   (2) I.L.R. [1953] Mad. 808. (3) I.LR. [1962] A.P. 127 F.B. 159 the  Central  Government  under  rule  57  of  the   Mineral Concession  Rules,  1949 (to be hereinafter referred  to  as ’rules  on  December 8, 1955, seeking a  directicon  to  the State Government to grant to him the lease asked for by  him by  his  application  of September  15,  1953.   He  further requested  the  Central  Government  to  direct  the   State Government  to stop granting further areas to  other  appli- cants in Appalanarasimhapuram village pending  investigation of   the  matter  and  pending  decision  of   the   Central Goverrunent.   Meanwhile  on December 27,  1955,  the  State Government  granted on mining lease 1 acre and 20  cents  of land  to the appellant from out of the area included in  the 1st respondents application.  On July 18, 1956, the  Central Government  dismissed  the review petition made by  the  1st respondent on December 8, 1955 with these observations               "Sir,               I  am  directed to refer to  your  application               dated  the 8th December, 1955, on the  subject               and to say that after careful consideration of               the   facts   stated  therein,   the   Central               Government  have come to the  conclusion  that               there is no valid ground for interfering  with               the  decision of the Government of  Hyderabad,               rejecting your application-for grant of mining               lease  for iron ore in Appanarasimhapuram  and               Raigudam villages, Khammameth district.   Your               application   for  revision   is,   therefore,               rejected.                                 Yours faithfully,                                 Sd/- G. C. Jerath,              Under Secretary to the Government of India." Evidently  the  Central, Government proceeded on  the  basis that the order of the State Government dated January 9, 1954 granting  57  acres  and  20  cents  of  land  to  the  1/st

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respondent,  by implication amounted to a rejection  of  his claim in respect of the other areas. Meanwhile  on  September 15, 1956, some of  the  rules  were amended.  After rule 28(1) anewsub-rule 28(1-A)was inserted. That sub-rule reads :               "Every  application  under rule  27  shall  be               disposed  of by the State Government within  9               months  from  the  date  of  receipt  of   the               application." At the same time rule 57 was also amended.  Amended rule  57 reads thus :               (1) "Application for review.-(1) Where a State               Government passes as under.-               (i)   refusing  to  grant  a  certificate   of               approval, prospecting license or mining lease; 160               (ii)refusing  to  renew  a  certificate   of               approval, prospecting license or mining lease;               (iii)  cancelling  a  prospecting  license  or               mining lease;               (iv)  refusing   to  permit  transfer   of   a               prospecting  license  or any right,  title  or               interest therein under clause (iv) of sub-rule               (1) of rule 23 or a niping lease or any right,               title or interest therein under rule 37,               it  shall communicate in writing  the  reasons                             for  such order to the person against whom  the               order  is passed and any person  aggrieved  by               such order may, within two months of the  date               of receipt of such order, apply to the Central               Government for reviewing the same.               (2)  Where  a State Government has  failed  to               dispose  of  an application for the  grant  or               renewal  of  a  certificate  of  approval   or               prospecting  license or a mining lease  within               the  period  prescribed  therefore  in   these               Rules, such failure shall, for the purpose  of               these  rules,  be deemed to be  a  refusal  to               grant  or renew such certificate,  license  or               lease,  as  the case may be,  and  any  person               aggrieved  by  such failure  may,  within  two               months  of the expiry of the period  aforesaid               apply to the Central Government for  reviewing               the case.               (3) An application for review under this  rule               may be admitted after the period of limitation               prescribed  under this rule, if the  applicant               satisfies  the Central Government that he  had               sufficient   cause   for   not   making    the               application within the said period." A  further amendment to that rule 57(2) was made  on  August 31, 1957.  The concerned notification No. S.R.O. 2753 reads               "In  exercise  of  the  powers’  conferred  by               section   5   of  the   Mines   and   Minerals               (Regulation  and Development) Act,  1948,  the               Central Government hereby makes the  following               further  amendment in the  Mineral  Concession               Rules, 1949, namely-               Provided  that  any such  application  pending               with   the  State  Government  on   the   14th               September,  1956, and remaining undisposed  of               on the 24th August, 1957, shall be disposed of               by the State Government within six months from               the latter date."

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On  April 16, 1957, the 1st respondent filed another  review petition  before the Central Government.  On  September  26, 1957, 161 that  petition  was dismissed by the Central  Government  as being premature.  The relevant portion of that order reads               "With reference to your application dated 16th               April,  1957,  on  the  above  subject,  I  am               directed  to  invite your  attention  to  this               Ministry’s  notification  No.,  MII-152(26)/57               dated the 21-8-57 (copy enclosed) amending the               Mineral  Concession Rules, 1949.  It  will  be               noticed  therefrom  that the  application  for               concessions received by the State Govt.  prior               to  the  4th  September,  1956  and  remaining               undisposed   of on the 31st August 1957  shall               be disposed of by them within six months  from                             the  latter date.  Your application fo r  review               is  therefore premature at this stage  and  in               case your application for Mining Lease is  not               disposed of by the State Government within the               prescribed period you may apply to the Central               Government at the appropriate time." While  making this order, evidently the  Central  Government had overlooked its earlier order dated July 18, 1956. After  the aforementioned order of the  Central  Government, the  1st respondent moved the High Court of  Andhra  Pradesh under Art. 226 of the Constitution in Writ Petition No.  888 of  1957 seeking a writ of mandamus to the State  Government of  Andhra Pradesh to dispose of his application  for  lease made on September 15, 1953, expeditiously.  To that petition he made only the State of Andhra Pradesh as the  respondent. Neither the Central Government nor the appellant herein were parties  to  that  petition.  That  petition  came  tip  for hearing  before Basi Reddy J. on November 4, 1958.   At  the hearing the learned Government Pleader who appeared for, the State  Government  conceded  that  the  application  of  the petitioner  for mining lease on September 15, 1953  had  not been  disposed  of  by the State Government  in  the  manner prescribed  by rule 17 of the ’Rules’ but he contended  that that  application  must be deemed to have been  rejected  in view  of  rule  57(2).  The  learned  judge  rejected  that, contention with the following observations:               "In  my  opinion  this  deeming  provision  is               intended for the benefit of the applicant  add               does  not  relieve the State  Government  from               performing the statutory functions imposed  on               it by rules 17(1) and 17(2) viz., of  granting               or  refusing  the  licence,  and  in  case  of               refusal  of recording in writing  the  reasons               for   the   refusal  and  of   refunding   the               application fee." He accepted the petition and issued the mandamus prayed for. 162 During  the pendency of the writ petition No. 888  of  1957, ,the 1st respondent filed another writ petition on  December 16,  1957 seeking the very relief that he had sought in  his earlier  writ ,petition.  That petition was disposed  of  by Bhimasankaram   J.   ,on  August  20,   1959,   with   these observations :               "It  is stated by the learned  3rd  Government               Pleader  that  the Government is  prepared  to               dispose  of the application of the  petitioner               on the merits without relying upon rule  57(2)

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             of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949. in  the               circumstances the petitioner does not want  to               press  his  petition.  The  writ  petition  is               accordingly dismissed.  There will be no order               as to costs." The  State  Government  by its order  dated  May  27,  1961, :granted on mining lease to the respondent all the areas for which he had applied an September 15, 1953 less those  areas which had been earlier leased out to others. Aggrieved  by  the  above order,  the  appellant  moved  the Central Government under rule 57 on July 7, 1961 for review- ing  the  said  order.  Even before that he  had  moved  the Andhra Pradesh High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution on  June 13, 1961 to issue a writ of mandamus to  the  State Government .to consider his application for mining lease  in preference to that of the 1st respondent as according to him the  1st respondent’s application should be deemed  to  have been  rejected  under rule 57(2).  The High  Court  rejected that  application observing that the appropriate course  for him was to move the Central Government under rule 57 against the order of the State Government.  Thereafter on 15-2-1965, the Central Government allowed the review petition filed  by the appellant and set aside the grant made in favour of  the 1st  respondent on May 27, 1961.  It came to the  conclusion that  the  applications  made  by  the  appellant,  the  1st respondent  as well as others which were pending before  the Andhra  Pradesh  Government should be deemed  to  have  been rejected  on  the  1st March 1958, in view  of  rule  57(2). Aggrieved  by  that  order the  1st  respondent  filed  Writ Petition No. 464 of 1965 praying that the High Court may  be pleased  to call for ’the relevant records from the  Central Government  by  issuing a writ of certiorari and  quash  the order of the Central Government and issue a further writ  to the Central Government and to the :State Government to grant the  lease asked for by him.  During ,the pendency  of  that petition the appellant filed Writ Petition ’No. 602 of  1965 seeking  a writ of mandamus against the Central  ’Government and  the State Government to grant him the mining lease  for which he had applied.  The High Court has allowed ’the  writ petition  filed by the 1st respondent and dismissed that  of the appellant.  Hence these appeals. 163 So  far as Civil Appeal No. 2122 of 1969 is concerned  there is  no  merit  in the same.  No ground in  support  of  that appeal  was  urged  before us.  Hence it  fails  and  it  is dismissed. In  Writ Petition No.. 464 of 1965 from which Civil  Appeal’ No. 2121 of 1969 arises, the High Court set aside the  order of the Central Government on various grounds and upheld  the grant made by the State Government in favour of the 1st res- pondent.   We shall now proceed to consider the  correctness of  the  reasons given by the High Court in support  of  its order. The  High  Court  was of the opinion  that  rule  57(2)  was enacted  only for the benefit of the applicants  for  lease, license  etc. so that they may have an early opportunity  to move the Central Government for appropriate orders.  In  the view  of  the High Court that rule does not take  away  the, power of the State Government to dispose of the applications made for mining lease etc. even after the period  prescribed expires.   In support of this conclusion, it relied  on  the decision  of  the Patna High Court in Dey Gupta and  Co.  v. State  of  Bihar and Anr.(1) as well as on the  decision  of Basi  Reddy  J. in Writ Petition No. 888 of  1957  to  which reference has already been made.  Neither the Patna decision

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nor  the  judgment of Basi Reddy J. nor the  decision  under appeal gives any cogent reason An support of the  conclusion that  the  deemed dismissal under rule’57(2) does  not  take away  the right of the State Government to grant  the  lease asked  for.   The  Patina  High  Court  in  support  of  its conclusion observed               "No  doubt,  reading rule  27(1-A)  with  rule               57(2)  of the Rules, it is clear that, if  the               State  Government  fails  to  dispose  of   an               application  for the grant of a  mining  lease               within nine months, it must be deemed to  have               been refused by it.               But this provision is made, in my opinion only               for the purpose of filing a review application               before  the  Central Government,  so  that  an               applicant desirous to have a mining lease  may               not  have  to wait unnecessarily  for  a  long               period  without any order being passed on  his               application.  That however, does not mean that               after  the lapse of nine months from the  date               of receipt of the application, the State Govt.               ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter so               as  not to pass any order on  any  application               after  the lapse of nine months from the  date               of its receipt.               The  expression  "deemed to be a  refusal"  in               rule 57(2) is only for the purpose of a review               application to (1)  A.I.R. 1961 Pat. 487. 164               be  filed before the Central  Government,  and               it-is  not  a part of rule 28(1-A).   In  this               view  of the matter the legality of the  order               passed  by  the State  Government  granting  a               mining  lease  to respondent No. 2  cannot  be               Challenged on the above ground." We think that these observations are not correct.  If it  is otherwise, even when a review petition is pending before the Central  Government under rule 57, the State Government  can make  an order on the application made and thus  compel  the parties  to file another review petition.  Further,  if  the Central  Government  gives  one  direction  ins  the  review petition  and  the State Government passes  an  inconsistent order  in  the  original  petition, there  is  bound  to  be confusion.  If we read rule 27(1A). and rule 57(2) together, there is hardly any doubt that after the period  prescribed, the  State  Government  is  incompetent  to  deal  with  the applications  pending before it.  According to  rule  57(2), where  a  State  Government  has failed  to  dispose  of  an application.  for  the grant of a mining  lease  within  the period prescribed therefor in the rules, such failure shall, for  the  purpose of the rules be deemed: to be  refusal  to grant the lease.  The rules referred therein include rule 28 as  well.   This deemed refusal, if read  with  the  mandate given  to the State Government under rule 28(1-A)  requiring it  to  dispose of the applications within 9 months  of  the receipt of those applications, there can be hardly any doubt that  if  the  State  Government does  not  dispose  of  the applications  within  the time prescribed, it is  deemed  to have refused those applications, for the purpose of rule  28 as  well as rule 57.  The High Court was wrong  in  thinking that  in  the absence of a provision  providing  for  deemed rejection  in rule 28(1-A), the contravention of  that  rule does not take away the jurisdiction of the State Government. That conclusion ignores the words in rule 57(2) that  deemed

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rejection  is ’for the purpose of these rules’.  In view  of those  words in rule 57(2), it was unnecessary for the  rule making   authority   to  prescribe  in   rule   28(1A)   the consequences  of the failure on the part of the  State  Gov- ernment to implement the mandate of rule 28(1-A).  Hence, in our  opinion,  the Central Government’s  decision  that  the applications  made by the appellant, the 1st respondent  and others  for  mining  lease should be  deemed  to  have  been refused  on  March 1, 1958 is correct.  Therefore  the  High Court  was  wrong  in  quashing the  order  of  the  Central Government on that ground. The High Court was also wrong in opining that in view of the representations  made  by  the  learned  Government  Pleader before Bhimasankaran J. on August 25, 1959, in Writ Petition No. 1237 of 1957, the State Government is estopped from con- 165 tending  that the application made by the 1st respondent  on September  15,  1953 must be deemed to  have  been  refused. There  can be no estoppel against a statute.   Rule  28(1-A) and  rule  57  (2)  are  statutory  rules.   They  bind  the Government as much as they bind others.  The requirement  of those  rules  cannot  be waived by  the  State  Governments. Therefore  the  fact  that the  learned  Government  Pleader represented to the Court that the petition filed by the  1st respondent on September 15, 1953 was still pending  disposal cannot change the legal position nor could it confer on  the State Government any power to act in contravention of  those rules. Yet  another ground relied on by the High Court is  that  in view  of the writ issued by Basi Reddy J. in  Writ  Petition No. 888 of 1957, the State Government was bound to  consider the  application  of the 1st respondent  and  therefore  the decision  of the State Government taken in obedience to  the order  of the High Court could not have been set aside   the Central  Government.   It is true that as far as  the  State Government is, concerned the writ issued was binding whether the  decision  rendered by the court was correct in  law  or not;  but  then  that  decision will  not  bind  either  the appellant  herein  or the Central Government  who  were  not parties to that writ petition.  It is not a judgment in rem. In  obedience to the writ issued by the court, of the  State Government   did  consider  the  application  of   the   1st respondent.   It  granted him the lease asked  for  by  him. Therefore  the  State  Government  has  complied  with   the direction  issued  to  it by the High  Court.   The  Central Government had been constituted as the revisional  authority under  rule  57.  That authority is  a  quasi-judicial  body created by statutory rules.  It is bound by law to discharge the  duties imposed on it by rule 57.  Therefore it  had  to obey the mandate of rule 57.  In so doing, it cannot be said that it had infringed the mandamus issued by the High  Court in  writ petition No. 888 of 1957 to which, as  pointed  out before, the appellant was not a party and the order made  in which could not be ’binding either on the Central Government or the appellant. For  the reasons mentioned above, we allow Civil Appeal  No. 2121  of 1969 and set aside the order of the High Court  and dismiss the writ petition No. 464 of 1965 but in the circum- stances  of the case, we make no order as to costs in  these appeals.                            ORDER In accordance with the opinion of the majority Civil  Appeal No.  2121  of 1969 is allowed and Civil Appeal No.  2122  of 1969 is dismissed.  No order as to costs in these appeals. R.K.P.S.

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