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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4876 of 2007

PETITIONER: Niyamat Ali Molla

RESPONDENT: Sonargon Housing Co-operative Society Ltd. & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/10/2007

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No.10373 of 2006)

S.B. Sinha, J.

1.      Leave granted. 2.      Respondent No.1 filed a suit for declaration and possession as also for  damages in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division) at Baruipur, 24- Parganas (South) in the State of West Bengal.  An ex-parte decree was  passed against the appellant herein who was arrayed as defendant No.6 in  the suit.  In the plaint, the suit property was described as under : \023That within the township area 2.09 acres  comprising of R.S. Dag Nos.340, 341, 342, 343  and 344 of Mouza Tegharia morefully described in  the Schedule \023A\024 hereunder written and  hereinafter referred to as the suit property, is  situated.\024

3.      Plaintiff claimed title over the suit property on the basis of purchases  made under two registered deeds of conveyances dated 27.1.1968  comprising of 12 shares of Plot No.340, 341, 342 and 343 of Mouza  Tegharia admeasuring 1.39 acres from defendant No.1 and his three sisters.   However, in the Schedule of Property, described in the schedule to the  plaint, it was stated : \023All that         acres of land now developed for  Housing Township appertaining to Rs.Dag No.  under Khatian Nos.      of Mouza Tegharia, J.L.  No.6, lying and situate within Sonargaon Park,  P.S. Sonarpore, District South 24 Parganas  (South).\024

4.      A decree was passed wherein again the same Schedule of Property  was described as the property involved in the suit.  It was directed: \023The plaintiff do get a decree for declaration of  title and permanent injunction against the  defendants in respect of the suit property.         It is declared that the plaintiff has right, title  and interest in the suit property.         Defendants are restrained by an order of  permanent injunction from disturbing or  interfering with the peaceful possession of the  plaintiff over the suit property in any way or in any  manner whatsoever.  The other prayer of the  plaintiff is refused in view of my discussion made  in the body of judgment.\024

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5.      Appellant herein did not file any written statement in the said suit.   He, however, examined himself as a witness.  He did not prefer any appeal  against the said judgment and decree.  The said decree indisputably has been  affirmed upto this Court.   6.      An application for amendment of the plaint as also of the decree  containing the Schedule describing the said property was, however, filed on  27.6.2000, inter alia, stating : \023That both parties went on trial and adduced both  oral and documentary evidence in respect of the  suit property and there was never any dispute as to  the identity of the suit of the suit property. That at the time of drafting of the plaint through  inadvertence the total area of the Land, R.S. Plot  Number and Khatian Number have not been  mentioned in the Schedule of the Plaint through  inadvertence. That it is an accidental error. That it is a clear case of misdescription of the suit  property and no prejudice will be caused to the  defendant if the plaint and the decree are amended  at this stage.\024

7.      On the said averments, the proposal for amendment which was made  is as under :       \023In the Schedule of the Suit Property described in  the plaint in the 1st line after the word \023All that\024  the figure \0232.09\024 shall be inserted. In the schedule of the suit property described in the  plaint in the 2nd line after the word \023R.S. Dag  Number\024 the following plot number 340, 341, 342,  343 and 344\024 shall be inserted. In the schedule of the suit property described in the  plaint in the 3rd line after the word \023Khatian  Numbers\024 following Khatian Number shall be  inserted \02380, 310, 83\024.\024

8.      An objection was filed to the said application for amendment by the  appellant, inter alia, contending : \023Whereas after decree in the suit, plaintiff filed an  application under Section 151 of CPC stating that  the plaintiff claimed title on the basis of two deeds  of conveyances by purchase from heir of Dilbahar  Molla and Malekjan Bibi wife of Dolbahar Molla  with the prayer to add different Schedule of  property with a new case, which is not permissible  in law.  As such plaintiff\022s application is liable to  be dismissed summarily.\024

9.      It was urged that the application for amendment, if allowed, would  give rise to substitution of one property in place of another, particularly,  having regard to the change in the J.L. number.   10.     The said objection of the appellant was, however, rejected by the  learned Executing Court.  The said order has been upheld by the High Court. 11.     Mr. Chinmoy Khaladkar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,  would submit that having regard to the fact that the sisters of the defendant  No.1 who were owners of the property had not been impleaded as parties in  the suit and an ex parte decree was obtained by the respondent against the  appellant herein, an irreparable injury would be caused to him if the  application for amendment is allowed. 12.     Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the  respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the court\022s power to amend a

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decree is not only confined to a clerical or arithmetical error but also the  pleadings of the parties, if a mistake had occurred in the pleadings and the  same is continued.  Reliance in this behalf has been placed on Bela Debi v.  Bon Behary Roy & Ors. [AIR 1952 Cal. 86].  It was furthermore urged that  the suit being for enforcing a sale deed, the Dag and Khatian number stated  in the plaint was determinative as regards identification of the property.  J.L.  number, it was urged, has nothing to do with the identification of the  property or the village in which it is situated.  It was pointed out that the  plots in question had also been ordered to be mutated in favour of the  respondent.  Even an Advocate-Commissioner had also been appointed who  has also submitted a report.   13.     In this appeal an application for impleadment has been filed by one  Niyamat Ali Molla.  It has been contended therein that the said applicant  was not impleaded as a party in the proceedings although he had been in  possession of the property in question.  It was submitted that the applicant  has been seriously prejudiced by reason of the impugned order as he had  acquired lawful interest in J.L. No.52 appertaining to R.S. Khatian No.80,  R.S. Dag No.340, 341 and 342 which had been recorded in his name in the  finally published revisional survey settlement record of rights.  In the said  application, it has also been claimed that the applicants had been in  possession of the said property. 14.     Respondent is said to have purchased the property by reason of two  sale deeds of sale dated 27.1.1968.  Properties described in the first deed of  sale are as under : \023 \021ka\022 schedule particulars of the property 1.      In the District of 24 Pargana is under Police  Station and sub-registry office \026 Sonarpur,  Pargana \026 Medanmalla at Mouza Teghari,  village, included in Touzi No.294 having Ryoti  Mukarari right, under Khatian No.80, out of  1.36 decimals of land in one jama bearing  annual rent of Rs.5-10-10 pics 1.02 decimals of  land bearing proportionate rent of Re.0.26 paise  J.L. No.52 Re.Sur No.126 Khatian No.8 owner  \026 West Bengal Govt.  There is no other  cosharer.  In dag No.340 three hundred forty  .79 decimals N \026 other Mouza In dag No.342  three hundred forty two .24 decimals N \026 Farez Khatian No. \026 81 In dag no.341 three hundred forty one .33 decimals  N \026 Alta Bibi  Total 1.36 one acre thirty six decimals. Out of that in 12 annas share 1.02 one Acre two  decimals of land

2.      In the said Police Station at the said Mouza  included in the said Touzi, under the said  owner, having Ryot Stitiban right, under part  Khatian 310 from Khatian No.200 out of 19  decimals in one plot . 37 decimal being  proportionate annual rent .75 paise.  There is no  other cosharer. In dag No.343 three hundred forty three out of 49  decimals Danga land 37 decimals of land.  There is  no other cosharer.\024  

15.     In the second deed of sale, the property of transferor has been  described as : \023 \021ka\022 schedule particulars of the property 1.      In the District of 24 Parganas under Police  Station and sub registry office \026 Sonarpur,  Pargana \026 Medanmalla, at Mouza \026 Teghari,  village, included in Touzi No.294 Re.Sur  No.126, J.L. No. \026 52 having Ryoti Mokarari  right under Khatian No.80, out of 1.36 decimals

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of land in our jama bearing annual rent of Rs.5- 10-10 pies 34 decimals of land bearing  proportionate rent of Re.1.42 paise owner \026  West Bengal Govt.  There is no other cosharer.  In dag no.340 three hundred forty  .79 decimals  N \026 other Mouza In dag No.342 three hundred forty two .24  decimals N \026 Farez. Khatian No. \026 81 In dag no.341 three hundred forty one .33  decimals N \026 Alta Bibi Total 1.36 one Acre thirty six decimals Out of that in 4 annas share .34 thirty four  decimals of land.                          

2.      In the said Police Station, at the said Mouza,  included in the said Touzi under the said owner,  having Ryot Stitiban Right, under part Khatian  310 from Khatian No.200 twelve decimals of  land bearing annual rent of .25 paise.  There is  no other cosharer. In dag No.343 three hundred forty three .49  decimals Danga land out of that in 4 annas share  12 decimals of land under two khatians total 46 decimals forty six  decimals Particulars of property mentioned in Schedule  \021kha\022 In the District of 24 Parganas, under Police Station  and sub-registry \026 Sonarpur, Pargana \026 Medan  Malla, at Mouza \026 Teghari village included in  Touzi No. \026 294, J.L. No. 52 Re. Sur No.126,  having Korfa possessory Right, in one jama under  Khatian No. \026 83, .24 twenty four decimals of land  bearing annual jama of Rs.14.00 owner West  Bengal Government.  There is no other cosharer. In dag No.344 three hundred forty four Danga 24  twnty four decimals N. Sudhir and others. In two schedules total land .70 seventy decimals. The Society will bear the cost of Registration of  this Deed of Sale.\024

16.     Respondent herein had filed an application in the said suit for  injunction.  An affidavit in opposition thereto was filed therein by the  defendant No.4 stating it was stated : \023That before dealing with the plaintiff\022s  allegation paragraphwise, these defendants state  the facts of this case as follows : a)      That .79 dec. in dag No.340, .33 dec, in  Dag No.341, .24 dec, in Dag No.342 .49  dec in Dag No.343 originally belonged to  Alta Bibi and the same has been correctly  recorded in C.S. R.O.R. from her the same  was inherited by Bibijan Bibi wife of  Dilbahar Molla, During his life time said  Bibijan Bibi transferred .79 dec in Dag  No.340, .24 in Dag No.342 and .33 in Dag  No.341 by an oral Heba in favour of  Dilbahar Molla and in terms with the said  oral Heba, the possession of the said  properties were delivered in favour of said  Dilbahar Molla, remain in possession of  the said properties as the absolute owner  thereof denying everybody else\022s right,

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title and interest thereon.  In the R.S.  R.O.R., the said Dilbahar Molla has been  recorded as Rayat Mokrari Sattiban.  In  respect of .49 dec in Dag No.343, said  Dilbahar inherited from said Bibijan Bibi  his wife on her demise 1/4th share under  the Mohammedan law and thus said  Dilbahar became owner in respect of .12  dec.  The same is also correctly recorded in  R.S. R.O.R. b)      That in Dag No.344 said Dilbahar Molla  had .24 dec, land and the same is also  correctly recorded in R.S.R.O.R. c)      That after the demise of Bibijan Bibi, the  first wife of Dilbahar, said Dilbahar  married Malekjan Bibi and by a registered  deed of conveyance said Dilbahar Molla  transferred .70 dec. in favour of his wife  Malekjan Bibi out of his total property, i.e.  .79 dec in Dag No.340, .33 dec in Dag  No.341, .24 dec in Dag No.342, .12 dec in  Dag No.343 and .24 dec in Dag No.344  total being 1.72. d)      Subsequently, said Dilbahar Molla died  leaving behind one son and two daughters  through the first wife, Second wife and  three sons and two daughters through the  second wife.  Thus out of remain 1.02 dec  of Dilbahar, the second wife Malekjan Bibi  had 8th each son had 7/48th and each  daughter had 7/96.  The cosharers of the  said property have never partitioned the  same and they are in joint possession  thereof.\024

17.     What was, therefore, denied and disputed was the claim of the  plaintiffs-respondents in respect of purchase of the property from Niyamat  Ali and others.  Similar statements were also made in the written statement.   From a perusal of the judgment passed by the Assistant District Judge, 24  Parganas, Baruipur in Title Suit No. 144 of 1993, it appears that the  possession and title of defendant No.4 had been taken into consideration  therein.  No issue was framed in regard to identification of the said property.   The learned Judge held : \023On perusal of the same, I am of the view that the  plaintiff has title as well as possession in the suit  property and the defendants have failed to prove  their possession and title in the suit property.  In  view of the documentary evidence adduced by the  plaintiff, the R.S.R.O.R. appears to be erroneous  and baseless.  The defendants have no right to  interfere with the peaceful possession of the  plaintiff over the suit property.  To my mind, it is a  fit and proper case where the plaintiff can get  decree for declaration of title and permanent  injunction and nothing more.\024

18.     Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to  correct its own error in a judgment, decree or order from any accidental slip  or omission. The principle behind the said provision is actus curiae nemenim  gravabit, i.e., nobody shall be prejudiced by an act of court.   19.     Code of Civil Procedure recognises the inherent power of the court.  It  is not only confined to the amendment of the judgment or decree as  envisaged under Section 152 of the code but also inherent power in general.   The courts also have duty to see that the records are true and present the  correct state of affair.  There cannot, however, be any doubt whatsoever that

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the court cannot exercise the said jurisdiction so as to review its judgment.   It cannot also exercise its jurisdiction when no mistake or slip occurred in  the decree or order.  This provision, in our opinion, should, however, not be  construed in a pedantic manner.  A decree may, therefore, be corrected by  the Court both in exercise of its power under Section 152 as also under  Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Such a power of the court is  well recognized. 20.     In Samarendra Nath Sinha & Anr. v. Krishna Kumar Nag [(1967) 2  SCR 18, this Court held : \023Now it is well settled that there is an inherent  power in the court which passed the judgment to  correct a clerical mistake or an error arising from  an accidental slip or omission and to vary its  judgment so as to give effect to its meaning and  intention.  \023Every court,\024 said Bowen L.J. in  Mellor v. Swira [30 Ch. 239] \023has inherent power  over its own records so long as those records are  within its power and that it can set right any  mistake in them.  An order even when passed and  entered may be amended by the court so as to carry  out its intention and express the meaning of the  court when the order was made.\024  In Jankirama  Iyer v. Nilakanta Iyer [AIR 1962 SC 633] the  decree as drawn up in the High Court had used the  words \023mesne profits\024 instead of \023net profits\024.  In  fact the use of the words \023mesne profits\024 came to  be made probably because while narranting the  facts, those words were inadvertently used in the  judgment.\024

21.     The question came up for consideration before the Calcutta High  Court in Bela Debi (supra), wherein it was held  \023It will thus be seen that there is a diversity of  judicial opinion as to how far a Court can go in  rectifying its own decree. Where, of course, the  amendment is in order to carry out its own  meaning, there is no doubt about the power of  the Court in effecting such corrections (see In  re St. Nazaire Co., (1879) 12 ch. D. 88; Preston  Banking Go. v. Allsop, (1895) 1 Ch. 141). Nor  can it be disputed that it has power to rectify  mistakes which are of a ministerial kind (see  Mellor v. Swire, (1885) 30 Ch. D 239). But the  difficulty arises when it is found that the  mistake is not one of the Court but is a mistake  of the parties themselves. Mistakes in the  description of properties in deeds, is illustrative  of this kind of mistake. It is the parties who  have made the mistake, and the mistake is  continued in the pleadings and the decree.  According to one view, section 152 is confined  to acts of the Court and, therefore, mistakes of  parties made in the pleadings or deeds and  documents evidencing the transaction cannot be  corrected {Ramchander Sarup v. Mazhar  Hussain, A. I. R. (6) 1919 ALL 264). The  second view is that under this section and  section 151, plaint, judgment and decree all can  be amended (see Shiam Lal v. Mt. Moona  Kuar, A.I.R. (21) 1934 Oudh 352 at p. 354;  Ram Chandra v. Jamna Prosad, A. I. R. (22)  1935 oudh 92). A third view is that it is  permissible under such circumstances to amend  the decree and it is unnecessary to amend the  plaint (Badri Pande v. Chhangur Pandey/ A. I.

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R. (20) 1933 all 102; Jamini Bala Biswas v.  Bank of Chettinad Ltd., A. I. R. (22) 1935  Rang. 522 at p. 523). Lastly, there is the view,  which I have already noted, which goes to the  extent of holding that the Court cannot only  rectify pleadings and decrees but rectify  documents evidencing the transactions  themselves, upon which the suit was founded.       I shall now state, what in my opinion, is the true  meaning of section 152, Civil P. C. I am not in  favour of giving a narrow construction to  section 152. I do not agree that section 152  must necessarily refer to an ’accidental slip or  omission’ of the Court itself, or its ministerial  officers. It does not say so in the section itself,  and should not be interpreted as such. Where it  is the Court’s own accidental slip or omission,  or that of its ministerial officers, there can be no  doubt that the section applies. But it gives  power to rectify any accidental slip or omission  in a judgment, decree or order, and might  include an accidental slip or omission traceable  to the conduct of the parties themselves. But it  must be an ’accidental slip or omission’. A  mistake made by the parties in a, deed upon  which the suit is founded, and repeated in the  judgment, decree or order, may or may not be  an ’accidental slip or omission.’ Where it is  clear, that such is the case, then I do not see  why the Court cannot set it right. In doing so,  what is going to be rectified is, the judgment  decree or order, and it is not at all necessary to  rectify either the pleadings or the deed. In  making such corrections, however, the Court  can only proceed on the footing that there could  be no reasonable doubt as to what it really  intended to say in its judgment decree or order.  It cannot go into any disputed questions. If  there is a particular description of a property in  a deed, and a suit has been instituted on the  strength of that description, and a decree  passed, it is not permissible in proceedings  under section 152 to go into disputed questions  as to what property was intended to be dealt  with, by the parties in the deed. I agree with  Gentle C. J. that such a question can only be  dealt with, in appropriate proceedings under the  Specific Relief Act (see T. M. Ramakrishnan  Chettiar v. G. Ramakrishnan Chettiar, A. I. R.  (35) 1948 Mad. 13). But it may so happen that  the mistake is so palpable that nobody can  possibly have any doubt as to what the parties  meant or what the Court meant when it passed  its judgment, decree or order. For example,  suppose in a conveyance a property is described  as ’24 Chowringhee Road, Bhawanipur’. It  would be clear to everybody what property was  meant, and it cannot be seriously doubted that  in abating that the property was in  ’Bhawanipur’, the parties had committed an  ’accidental slip or omission’. In such a case, I  would not go to the extent of holding that the  Court has no power to correct the judgment,  decree or order which has repeated the.

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mistake. In doing so, the Court need not correct  the pleadings or the document but its own  decision. In my opinion, it is not necessary in  such a case to amend the pleadings or to rectify  the deed, therefore, no question arises as to  whether the Court has power to do so. It is,  however, quite clear that such cases must be of  rare occurrence, and the scope thereof is  severely limited. The power cannot be extended  to the resolving of controvertial points, and a  decision as to what the parties intended or did  not intent to do. Apart from this exceptional  case, I hold that the Court cannot correct errors  anterior to the proceedings before it. For such a  purpose, the proper proceeding is by way of a  suit under section 31, Specific Relief Act. To  this extent, I agree respectfully with the view  enunciated by Gentle C. J. in T. M.  Ramakrishnan Chettiar v. G. Radhakrishnan  Chettiar, A. I. R. (35) 1948 Mad. 13 and the  view expressed by Young J. in Shujaatmand  Khan v. Gobind Behari, A. I. R. (21) 1934  ALL. 100 (2). Applying these principles to the  facts of this case, I think that the rectification  asked for is impossible. If there has been a  mistake in the original agreement it is a mistake  which is fundamental, and it is impossible  without going into evidence, to decide as to  what the parties meant. There are facts in  favour of the contention put forward by either  party and I cannot describe it as an error (if  there is at all any error) as can be called "an  accidental slip or omission" as contemplated in  section 152. In any event, such slips or  omissions cannot be rectified in proceedings  under section 152 or even under S. 151 of the  Code.\024

22.     We, with respect, agree with the aforenoticed view. 23.     In Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan v. Hari Prasad Bhuyan & Ors. [AIR 2003  SC 371, this Court opined that when a decree had been drawn up by the  High Court, the Court can take recourse to Section 152 of the Code stating : \023In our opinion, the successful party has no other  option but to have recourse of Section 152 of CPC  which provides for clerical or arithmetical  mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders or errors  arising therein from any accidental slip or  omission being corrected at any time by the Court  either on its own motion or on the application of  any of the parties. A reading of the judgment of the  High Court shows that in its opinion the plaintiffs  were found entitled to succeed in the suit. There is  an accidental slip or omission in manifesting the  intention of the Court by couching the reliefs to  which the plaintiffs were entitled in the event of  their succeeding in the suit. Section 152 enables  the Court to vary its judgment so as to give effect  to its meaning and intention. Power of the Court to  amend its orders so as to carry out the intention  and express the meaning of the Court at the time  when the order was made was upheld by Bowen  L.J. in re Swire; Mellor V. Swire, (1885) 30 Ch.  D. 239, subject to the only limitation that the  amendment can be made without in justice or on

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terms which preclude injustice. Lindley L.J.  observed that if the order of the Court, though  drawn up, did not express the order as intended to  be made then "there is no such magic in passing  and entering an order as to deprive the Court of  jurisdiction to make its own records true, and if an  order as passed and entered does not express the  real order of the Court, it would, as it appears to  me, be shocking to say that the party aggrieved  cannot come here to have the record set right, but  must go to House of Lords by way of appeal.\024

24.     The same Bench again in Pratibha Singh & Ors. v. Shanti Devi Prasad  & Anr. [AIR 2003 SC 643] held : \023When the suit as to immovable property has been  decreed and the property is not definitely  identified, the defect in the court record caused by  overlooking of provisions contained in Order 7  Rule 3 and Order 20 Rule 3 of the CPC is capable  of being cured. After all a successful plaintiff  should not be deprived of the fruits of decree.  Resort can be had to Section 152 or Section 47 of  the CPC depending on the facts and circumstances  of each case -- which of the two provisions would  be more appropriate, just and convenient to  invoke. Being an inadvertent error, not affecting  the merits of the case, it may be corrected under  Section 152 of the CPC by the Court which passed  the decree by supplying the omission.  Alternatively, the exact description of decretal  property may be ascertained by the Executing  Court as a question relating to execution, discharge  or satisfaction of decree within the meaning of  Section 47 CPC. A decree of a competent Court  should not, as far as practicable, be allowed to be  defeated on account of an accidental slip or  omission. In the facts and circumstances of the  present case we think it would be more appropriate  to invoke Section 47 of the CPC.\024

25.     In State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh [AIR 2003 SC 4179], however, it  was held : \023Section 152 provides for correction of clerical or  arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or  orders or errors arising therein from any accidental  slip or omission. The exercise of this power  contemplates the correction of mistakes by the  Court of its ministerial actions and does not  contemplate of passing effective judicial orders  after the judgment, decree or order. The settled  position of law is that after the passing of the  judgment, decree or order, the same becomes final  subject to any further avenues of remedies  provided in respect of the same and the very Court  or the tribunal cannot, on mere change of view, is  not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments,  decrees and orders earlier passed except by means  of review, if statutorily provided specifically  therefor and subject to the conditions or limitations  provided therein. The powers under Section 152 of  the Code are neither to be equated with the power  of review nor can be said to be akin to review or  even said to clothe the Court concerned under the  guise of invoking after the result of the judgment  earlier rendered, in its entirety or any portion or

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part of it. The corrections contemplated are of  correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes  and not all omissions and mistakes which might  have been committed by the Court while passing  the judgment, decree or order. The omission  sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of  the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 as if it  is looking into it for the first time, for which the  proper remedy for the aggrieved party if at all is to  file appeal or revision before the higher forum or  review application before the very forum, subject  to the limitations in respect of such review. It  implies that the Section cannot be pressed into  service to correct an omission which is intentional,  however erroneous that may be. It has been  noticed that the courts below have been liberally  construing and applying the provisions of Sections  151 and 152 of Code even after passing of  effective orders in the lis pending before them. No  Court can, under the cover of the aforesaid  sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its  original judgment, decree or order. Similar view  was expressed by this Court in Dwaraka Das v.  State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. and  Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho  (2001 (4) SCC 181).\024

26.     It is not a case where the defendants could be said to have been  misled.  It is now well settled that the pleadings of the parties are to be read  in their entirety.  They are to be construed liberally and not in a pedantic  manner.  It is also not a case where by reason of an amendment, one  property is being substituted by the other.  If the Court has the requisite  power to make an amendment of the decree, the same would not mean that it  had gone beyond the decree or passing any decree.  The statements  contained in the body of the plaint have sufficiently described the suit lands.   Only because some blanks in the schedule of the property have been left, the  same, by itself, may not be a ground to deprive the respondents from the  fruit of the decree.  If the appellant herein did not file any written statement,  he did so at its own peril.  Admittedly, he examined himself as a witness in  the case.  He, therefore, was aware of the issues raised in the suit.  It is stated  that an Advocate-Commissioner has also been appointed. We, therefore, are  of the opinion that only because the JL numbers in the schedule was  missing, the same by itself would not be a ground to interfere with the  impugned order.   27.     So far as the application for impleadment of the applicants are  concerned, they being not parties to the suit are not bound by the decree.   They would, thus, be entitled to take recourse to such remedies which are  available to them in law including filing of an application under Order 21  Rules 97 and 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if any occasion arises  therefor.  As and when the said applicants take recourse to law, the same has  to be determined in accordance with law. 28.     This appeal and the application for impleadment are dismissed  accordingly.  It would, however, for the Executing Court to consider at the  time of execution of the decree to ascertain whether there exists any  difficulty in executing the decree or not.  In the facts and circumstances of  the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.