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PETITIONER: NITYANANDA M. JOSHI & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/04/1969

BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BENCH: SIKRI, S.M. BACHAWAT, R.S. RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:  1970 AIR  209            1970 SCR  (1) 396  1969 SCC  (2) 199  CITATOR INFO :  F          1977 SC 282  (10,11,21)  F          1985 SC1279  (3)  D          1987 SC2195  (7)

ACT: Industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Applications for  computing  benefit  of  holidays  in  terms  of  money- Maintainability. Indian Limitation Act (36 of 1963), Art. 137-Applications to Labour Court-If covered by Article.

HEADNOTE: The   appellants   (employees  of  the   respondent)   filed applications against the respondent, under s. 33C(2) of  the Industrial  Disputes  Act, 1947, for computing in  terms  of money,  the  benefit  of holidays, and  for  recovering  the amount.  The Labour Court dismissed the applications insofar as  the  claim was for a period beyond three years,  on  the ground  that the applications were barred under Art. 137  of the Limitation Act, 1963. In   appeal  to  this Court, the  respondent  supported  the order of dismissal  also on the ground that the applications were not maintainable under   s.  33C(2) because,  the  sub- section does not indicate the mode in which  the question as to the amount at which the benefit should be computed, may be decided. HELD  : (1) The applications fell squarely within s.  33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.  Under the sub-section,  the rule-making  authority has to make a suitable provision  for indicating the mode in which the money-value of the  benefit should be computed.  Such a provision is made in r. 62(2) of the   Industrial  Disputes  (Central)  Rules,  1957,   which prescribes   the   form   for  the   application   for   the determination of the amount. [398E-H] (2)  The  scheme of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is  that it  only deals with applications to ordinary courts and,  as the  Labour Court is not such a court, it erred  in  holding that  the  applications  were  barred by  Art.  137  of  the Limitation Act. [397G-H; 398A-B] [The ground of decision in Town Municipal Council, Athani v.

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The Presiding Officer.  Labour Court, Hubli, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51 that applications to courts under provisions of law other than  those  off the Civil Procedure Code are  not  included within Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, doubted. [398B- C]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION    Civil Appeals Nos. 301 to 319 and 1105 of 1969. Appeals by special leave from the order dated April 16, 1968 of   the   Central  Government  Labour  Court,   Bombay   in Applications Nos.  LCB-28 of 1965 etc. Madan Mohan, for the appellants (in all the appeals). 397 C.   K.  Daphtary,  O.  P. Malhotra and  K.  L.  Hathi,  for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 (in all the appeals). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Sikri,  J.  These  appeals by  special  leave  are  directed against  the order of the Central Government  Labour  Court, Bombay,   holding  that  the  applications  filed   by   the appellants  against the Life Insurance Corporation of  India under  s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,  were barred  under art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963,  insofar -as the claim was for period beyond three years.  In holding this  the  Labour Court followed the decision  of  the  Full Bench  of  the Bombay High Court in The Manager M/s.  P.  K. Porwal  v. The Labour Court(1).  The Bombay High Court  held that  applications filed under s. 33C(2) of  the  Industrial Disputes Act prior to its amendment by Central Act XXXVI  of 1964 were governed by the period of limitation laid down  in art.  137  of  the Limitation Act, 1963,  and  this  article applied   to  applications  under  laws  other  than   those contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. This Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The  Presid- ing  Officer, Labour Court, Hubli ( 2 ) has  dissented  from the decision of the Bombay High Court and has held that art. 137  of  the  Limitation  Act,  1963,  does  not  apply   to applications under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. This  Court gave two reasons for coming to this  conclusion. The  first ground was that in spite of the changes  made  in the  Indian  Limitation  Act, 1963, no  drastic  change  was intended in the scope of art. 137 so as to include within it all -applications irrespective of the fact whether they  had any  reference to the Code of Civil Procedure or not.   This Court  held that in spite of the changes the  interpretation of  art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, by this  Court  in Bombay  Gas  Co.  Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva  and  Others(3)  would -apply to art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.  The  second ground given by this Court was that it is only  applications to Courts that are intended to be covered under art. 137  of the Limitation Act, 1963. In  our  view  art. 137 only  contemplates  applications  to Courts.   In  the  Third Division of  the  Schedule  to  the Limitation  Act, 1963, all the other applications  mentioned in  the various articles are applications filed in a  court. Further  s. 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for  the contingency  when the prescribed period for any  application expires  on a holiday and the only contingency  contemplated is "when the court is closed".  Again under s. 5 it is. (1)  70 Bom.  L.R. 104. (2) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51. (3)  [1964] 3 S.C.R. 709. 398

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only a court which is enabled to admit an application  after the prescribed period has expired if the court is  satisfied that  the applicant had sufficient cause for not  preferring the  application.   It seems to us that the  scheme  of  the Indian   Limitation   Act  is  that  it  only   deals   with applications to courts, and that the Labour ,Court is not  a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. It is not necessary to express our views on the first ground given by this Court in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. The Presiding  Officer Labour Court, Hubli(1).  It seems  to  us that   it   may  require   serious   consideration   whether applications  to courts under other provisions,  apart  from Civil  Procedure Code, are included within art. 137  of  the Limitation Act, 1963, or not. The  learned  counsel for the respondent contends  that  the appeals should fail on -another ground.  He says that  these applications  were filed under S. 33C(2) of  the  Industrial Disputes  Act,  while they should have been filed  under  S. 33C(1).   He further says that, at any rate, no  application can  be filed under S. 33C(2) because the  sub-section  does not mention how the question is to be   decided.   There  is no force in these submissions. It is plain from the wording of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2) of s.   33C that the former sub-section deals with cases  where money is  due  to  a  workman  from  an  employer  under   a settlement  or an award or under the provisions  of  Chapter VA,  while  the latter subsection deals with cases  where  a workman  is entitled to receive from the employer any  money or  any benefit which is capable of being computed in  terms of  money.  In the present case applications were filed  ’by the employees against the respondent for computing in  terms of  money  the benefit of holidays and  for  recovering  the amount.   This case falls squarely within sub-s. (2)  of  S. 33C.  -There  is  no award or  settlement  under  which  the benefit of holidays  ’had already been computed. It  is true that sub-s. (2) of S. 33C does not indicate  the mode ’in which the question as to the amount of money due or as  to the amount at which the benefit should  be  computed, may  be  decided.  But the sub-section had left  it  to  the rule-making authority to make a suitable provision.  This is indicated by the expression "subject -to any rules that  may ’be  made  under this Act" in sub-s. (2) of S.  33C.   Rules have  been  made  and r. 62(2) of  the  Industrial  Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957, provides               "Where  any workman or a group of  workmen  is               entitled  to  receive from  the  employer  any               money or any benefit which is capable of being               computed in terms of money, the workmen or the               group of workmen, as the               (1)   [1970] 1 S.C.R. 51.                                    399               case may be, may apply to the specified Labour               Court in Form K-3 for the determination of the               amount due or, as the case may be, the  amount               at which such benefit should be computed." According  to  this  rule an application  in  Form  K-3  can clearly be made. In  the result the appeals are allowed and the order of  the Labour Court set aside insofar as the Labour Court held that the  applications were barred by art. 137 of the  Limitation Act.   The  Labour Court will now pass the  final  order  in accordance  with  law.  The appellants will be  entitled  to their costs, one hearing fee. V.P.S.                    Appeals allowed. 400

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