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PETITIONER: NIRMAL KANTI ROY, GANESH LAL MOONDRA & ORS.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL, S. DASGUPTA AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/04/1998

BENCH: CJI, K.T. THOMAS, S. RAJENDRA BABU

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             WITH               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 476 OF 1998       [Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1705 of 1997]                      J U D G E M E N T Thomas J.      Leave granted      A two  judge bench  has  referred  these  cases  to  be decided by  a larger  bench upon  a contention that there is conflict between  the ratio  in State  of  West  Bengal  vs. Falguni Dutta  and others  [1993 (3)  SCC 288]  and that  in Durgesh Chandra  Shah vs.  Vimal Chandra  Shah [1996(1)  SCC 341]. The  question relates to the interpretation of Section 167(5) of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure as amended by the State of West Bengal.      Section 167  of the  Code of  Criminal  Procedure  (for short  the   ’Code’)  fixes     certain  time  schedule  for production of  the arrested  accused before  the Magistrate, for detention  of the  accused in  custody after remand, for completion of  investigation into different offences and the consequential orders  to be passed in a case where such time schedule is  not adhered  to etc.  West  Bengal  Legislative Assembly has incorporated some amendmendments in sub-section (5) and  sub-section (6)  of Section  167 of the Code as per West Bengal  Act 24  of 1988.  By such  amendment those sub- sections now read as follows: -      "(5) If, in respect of -      (i)   any   case   triable   by   a      Magistrate as  a summons  case, the      investigation  is   not   concluded      within a period of six months, or      (ii) any  case exclusively  triable      by a  Court of  Session or  a  case      under Chapter  XVIII of  the Indian      Penal  Code   (45  of   1860),  the      investigation  is   not   concluded      within a period of three years, or      (iii) any  case  other  than  those      mentioned in  clauses (i) and (ii),      the investigation is  not concluded      within a  period of two years, from

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    the data  on which  the accused was      arrested or  made  his  appearance,      the Magistrate  shall make an order      stopping further investigation into      the offence and shall discharge the      accused unless  the officer  making      the  investigation   satisfies  the      Magistrate that for special reasons      and in the interests of justice the      continuation of  the  investigation      beyond  the  periods  mentioned  in      this sub-section is necessary.      (6)  Where   any   order   stopping      further   investigation   into   an      offence has  been    made  and  the      accused has  been discharged  under      sun-section (5),  the Session Judge      may, if  he  is  satisfied,  on  an      application   made    to   him   or      otherwise,       that       further      investigation  into   the   offence      ought to  be made, vacate the order      made  under   sub-section  (5)  and      direct further  investigation to be      made into  the offence  subject  to      such directions with regard to bail      and  other   matters  as   he   may      specify."      The facts  in the  criminal appeal arising from Special Leave Petition  (Criminal) No.1609  of 1997 Nirmal Kanti Roy vs. State  Of West  Bengal are the following:  Appellant was involved as  accused in an offence under Section 409, Indian Penal Code. During investigation of the  case he applied for and got  a pre-arrest  bail order  and  surrendered  himself before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Sealdah on 18.3.1993 and was released on bail. As the investigation was not completed  within two years therefrom, he moved the said Magistrate on  22.9.1995 for  discharging him as provided in Section 167(5)  of the  Code. The  Magistrate dismissed  the application pointing out that the case was triable only by a Special judge  under the  West Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court  Act 1949)  (For short ’the Special Court Act 1949’) and  hence an  order stopping  investigation and  the consequent discharge  order under  Section 167(5)  could  be passed only  by  that  Special  Judge  concerned.  Appellant challenge that  order in  revision  before the High Court of Calcutta. A  learned Single  Judge of  the High Court, while dismissing the  revision, held  that  the  Additional  Chief Judicial Magistrate  was competent  to pass  the order under Section 167(5) of the Code despite ouster of his jurisdiction to try the offence as per the Special Court Act 1949. Nonetheless, learned Single Judge granted further time to the Investigating Officer, on an application filed by him in that  behalf as the said officer satisfied the High Court that he  could   not complete  the investigation  within the time schedule  on account  of his  falling sick by jaundice. Charge-sheet was however filed within the extended time.      The question  raised is  whether time  could have  been extended without  the Investigating  Officer moving for such extension before the expiry of the period.      There is no dispute that clause (iii) in Section 167(5) of the  Code would  apply to  the facts  of this case as the offence under Section 409 I.P.C. was  neither triable by the Magistrate as  a summons  case nor  exclusively triable by a Court of  sessions, but  triable only  by a Special Court in

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view of the Special Court Act 1949. There is also no dispute that the  Charge-sheet was  not submitted  within two  years "from the date on which the accused was arrested or made his appearance." This Court has held in State Of West Bengal vs. Pranab Ranjan Roy [JT 1998 (2) SC 364] that:      "The words ’made his appearance’ in      Section 167(5)  are used along with      the  preceding   words  which    by      themselves form  into  a  composite      collection as  thus: ’From the date      on which  the accused  was arrested      or made  his appearance. It must be      noted that  the purpose of the sub-      section  is   to  impose   a   time      schedule    for    completion    of      investigation   and    such    time      schedule  is   to  commence  either      ’from the  date of  arrest  of  the      accused or  the date  when he  made      his appearance in Court." So the  two years  period mentioned  in clause (iii) must be reckoned  from   18.3.1993  on   which  date  the  appellant surrendered himself in Court.      The  order  stopping  further  investigation  into  the offence and  the consequential  order of  discharge are  not intended to  be automatic  sequel to the failure to complete investigation within  the period  fixed in  the sub-section. The succeeding  words in the sub-section confer power on the Court to  refrain from  stopping such  investigation if  the Investigating Officer satisfies the Magistrate of the fusion of two  premises (1)  that in  the interest of justice it is necessary to  proceed  with  the  investigation  beyond  the period shown  in the  sub-section and  (2)  that  there  are special reasons to do so.      A reading of sub-section (6) further shows that even in a case  where  the  order  stopping  investigation  and  the consequent discharge  of accused  has been  made that is not the last  word on  it because  the sub-section opens another avenue for   moving the Sessions Judge. If the Session Judge is satisfied  that "further  investigation into  the offence ought  to   be  made"   he  has   the  power  to  allow  the investigation to  proceed. Hence  we take  the view that the time   schedule shown   in Section 167(5) of the Code is not to  be treated with rigidity and it is not mandatory that on the expiry  of the  period indicated  therein the magistrate should   necessarily pass  the order  of  discharge  of  the accused.  Before  ordering  stoppage  of  investigation  the magistrate shall  consider whether,  on the  facts  of  that case, further  investigation would  be necessary  to  foster interest of  criminal justice. Magistrate at that stage must look into  the record  of  investigation  to  ascertain  the progress  of   investigation   thus   for   registered.   If substantial part  of investigation  was by  then  over,  the magistrate should seriously ponder over the question whether it would   be  conducive to  the interest of justice to stop further investigation and discharge the accused.      Section 167(5)  without West  Bengal Amendment  is only bereft of  the duty  cast on  the  Court  to  discharge  the accused. A two judge bench of this Court, while dealing with the un-amended  sub-section, has  considered  the  situation where the  Magistrate stopped investigation on the expiry of six month.  State of  West  bengal  vs.  Falguni  Dutta  and another [1993(3) SCC 288] this Court held thus:-      "If  the   investigation  has  been      stopped  on   the  expiry   of  six

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    months or  the extended  period, if      any, by  the Magistrate in exercise      of power  conferred by  sub-section      (5) of Section 167 of the Code, the      investigation comes  to an end and,      therefore, on the completion of the      investigation    Section     173(2)      enjoins upon  the officer in charge      of the  police station to forward a      report  in   the  prescribed  form.      There is  nothing in sub-section(5)      of Section  167 to  suggest that if      the  investigation   has  not  been      completed within the period allowed      by that sub-section, the officer in      charge of  the police  station will      be absolved from the responsibility      of filing  the police  report under      Section 173(2)  of the  Code on the      stoppage  of   the   investigation.      Therefore, the  Special  Court  was      competent to  entertain the  police      report restricted  to  six  months’      investigation and  take  cognizance      on the basis thereof."      In Durgesh  Chandra Saha  vs. Bimal  Chandra  Saha  and Others [1996  (1) SCC  341] the situation considered was one relating to  Section 167(5)  of the  Code as  amended by the West  Bengal   Act.  The   two-judge  Bench  held  that  the consequences envisaged in the sub-section would not befall a case where  investigation was completed and charge-sheet was laid,  albeit  it  was  only  after  expiry  of  the  period specified in the sub-section.      In our   opinion  there  is  no  conflict  between  the aforesaid two  decisions and  the ratio  was applied  on the factual position  in each  case. Nor  is it at variance with the view which we have expressed above.      The fact  situation in the other appeal, arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)  No.1705 of  1997 (Ganesh Lal Moondra & Others vs. S.  Dasgupta and  another), is  different. In  that case appellant  was   involved  in   an  offence   under  Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of  the Essential  Commodities Act,  1955 (’E.C. Act’ for  short) for  contravention  of  Clause  17  of  the Textile Control  Order, 1988. FIR in that case was longed on 27.8.1991. Appellant  appeared in  the court  on 26.11.1993, and was  enlarged on bail on the same date. The charge sheet was laid on 6.1.1995.      Obviously the  investigation was  completed before  the expiry of  two years  from the  date of  appearance  of  the accused and  hence there  is   no  scope  for  invoking  the consequences mentioned in Section 167(5)(iii) of the Code as per WB  amendment. But  the contention advanced in that case before  the   High  Court   was  that  the  court  has    no jurisdiction to  take cognizance  of the offence in  view of the bar  contained in  Section 468  of the Code, which reads thus:      "468.  Bar   to  taking  cognizance      after  lapse   of  the   period  of      limitation.   -   (1)   Except   as      otherwise  provided   elsewhere  in      this  Code,  no  Court  shall  take      cognizance of  an  offence  of  the      category specified  in  sub-section      (2), after the expiry of the period      of limitation.

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    (2) The  period of limitation shall      be -      (a) six  months, if  the offence is      punishable with fine only;      (b) One  year, if  the  offence  is      punishable with  imprisonment for a      term not exceeding one year;      (c) three years, if  the offence is      punishable with  imprisonment for a      term exceeding  one  year  but  not      exceeding three years."           [Sub-section   (3)    is   not      relevant here.]      When appellant  challenged the order by which the court took cognizance  of the  aforesaid offence  the  High  Court proceeded on the assumption that the offence under Section 7 of the  E.C. Act  is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 2 years and therefore found that the period of limitation is  3 years  from the  date of  offence. But  the aforesaid assumption  made  by  the  High  Court  is  on  an erroneous  basis   because   the   offence   under   Section 7(1)(a)(ii) is punishable with imprisonment which may extend up to 7 years. That sub-clause is extracted below:      "7.Penalties.- (1) If any person      contravenes any order  made under      section 3, -      (a) he shall be punishable,-      (i) in  the case  of an  order made      with reference  to  clause  (h)  or      clause (I)  of sub-section  (2)  of      that section, with imprisonment for      a term  which   may extend  to  one      year and  shall also  be liable  to      fine, and      (ii)  in  the  case  of  any  other      order, with imprisonment for a term      which shall  not be less than three      months but  which   may  extend  to      seven  years   and  shall  also  be      liable to fine."       Appellant  endeavoured in  the High Court to show that the said  offence is punishable only up to two years, on the strength of the proviso to clause (f) in Section 12-AA(1) of the E.C.  Act. That  section stipulated  that when a Special Court is  constituted  under  Section  12-A  for  any  area, therefore    all     offences    under    the    E.C.    Act committed within  that area shall be triable by that Special Court. Clause  (f)   of Section  12-AA(1) says that all such offence shall be tried in a summery manner. The proviso that clause read thus:      "Provided that  in the  case of any      conviction in a summery trial under      this section,  it shall  be  lawful      for the  Special Court  to  pass  a      sentence of imprisonment for a term      not exceeding two years."       The  contention is  that the  aforesaid limit fixed by the Parliament  would have the effect of altering the extent of punishment   for  the offence under Section 7 of the E.C. Act to  imprisonment for  a period  of two  years. We cannot agree that  the effect  of the  said proviso  was  to  amend section 7  by making  the offence  punishable only up to two years.  The   effect  of   the  proviso   is  to  limit  the jurisdiction of  the Special  Court in  awarding   sentence. That is  different from  understanding  the  extent  of  the

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sentence, whether the offence had been reduced by Parliament through a process other than amendment of the provision. One has to look at the punishing provision to know the extent of the sentence  prescribed and  not at  the limit  fixed for a particular court  in the  matter of  awarding sentence; e.g. Section 326  of the  Indian Penal Code deals with an offence punishable with  imprisonment for  life or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years. But that offence is triable by  a magistrate  of first class, the upper limit of whose  powers   in  the   matter  of  awarding  sentence  is restricted   by Section  29(2) of  the Code  as 3  years. By reason of that Section it cannot be assumed that the offence under Section  326 IPC  is punishable only with imprisonment for 3 years.      A Division  Bench of  the Patna High Court had occasion to consider  the same  question whether  the  offence  under Section 7  of E.C. Act is punishable only up to two years on account of  Section  12-AA  of  that  Act  and  consequently whether a  case relating  to that  offence became  a summons case. In  Ram Chandra  Pansari vs.  State of Bihar 1989 Crl. Law Journal  1988 =  Patna   Law Journal Report 623, learned Judges negatived  this contention.  We quote, with approval, the following passage from the said decision:      "The maximum sentence of 7 years as      provided under Section 7 of the Act      and the  proviso to  clause (f)  to      section 12AA  imposing a limit of 2      years imprisonment  on the power of      the  Special   Judge  has   to   be      harmoniously construed and I do not      find any difficult in the same. The      offence continues  to  attract  the      maximum sentence  of 7  years.  But      the Special  Judge trying  the case      does not  have the  jurisdiction to      impose a  sentence of  more than  2      years. This does not  mean that the      offence itself  is punishable  by 2      years. It  only means that although      the  offence  is  punishable  by  7      years but  the trial  court  cannot      give a  sentence beyond 2 years and      if this  construction is given then      both section  7 and  the proviso to      clause  (f)  to  section  12AA  get      their full play."      AS the offence under Section 7A(1)9(ii) of the E.C. Act is punishable  with imprisonment  up to  7 years the offence would not attract the bar of limitation under Section 468 of the Code.  It is,  therefore, unnecessary for us to consider whether the  curative provision  in Section  473 of the Code should have been  invoked.      In the result we dismiss both the appeals.