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PETITIONER: NIRANJAN PATNAIK

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SASHIBHUSAN KAR & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT11/04/1986

BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) BENCH: NATRAJAN, S. (J) ERADI, V. BALAKRISHNA (J)

CITATION:  1986 AIR  819            1986 SCR  (2) 470  1986 SCC  (2) 569        1986 SCALE  (1)877  CITATOR INFO :  D          1987 SC 294  (24,47)  R          1987 SC1436  (14)  R          1990 SC1737  (14)

ACT:      Constitution  of  India,  Art.  136/Criminal  Procedure Code, 1973,  s. 482  - High Court making disparaging remarks against prosecution  witness -  Expunction of by the Supreme Court.      Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 : s. 8 - Prosecution witness - Immunity of from prosecution under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.      Prevention of  Corruption  Act,  1947,  s.  4(1)/Indian Penal Code,  1860, s.  161 -  Accused not denying receipt of money/seizure of currency notes from his possession - Burden of proof - Whether shifts to the accused.      Criminal trial  - Evidence  pertaining  to  a  previous offence not  subject-matter of the charge - Whether needs to be critically examined.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  was a licensee of an iron ore mine where P.W.2 was  employed as his manager. The first respondent was the Senior  Mining Officer  for the  area. On a complaint by the manager  that the  first respondent  had been extracting illegal gratification at the rate of rupees one thousand per month during January, February and March 1979 from P.W.2 for allowing mining  operations to  be carried on peacefully and suddenly raised the demand to rupees two thousand per month, a trap  was laid by the vigilance police and marked currency notes of  the value  of rupees  two thousand tendered to the first respondent  were recovered  from his  brief case.  The receipt of  the illegal  gratification was denied by him but no  explanation  was  offered  for  the  possession  of  the currency notes.      Before the  trial court  the defence  of the  accused - first respondent,  was that  the money  was given  by way of donation for  the welfare  projects launched  by the  Mining Officers’ Club. The appellant was cited as a prosecution 471 witness  (P.W.8)  to  corroborate  the  testimony  that  his manager had  informed him  of having  parted with  a sum  of

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rupees three  thousand to  the first  respondent during  the first three  months of 1979, and subsequently about the trap that had  been laid.  The trial  court rejecting the belated explanation of  the first  respondent found him guilty under s. 5(2)  read with  s.5(1)(d) of  the Act  and s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code, and convicted and sentenced him.      The High  Court while  setting aside the conviction and sentence  of   the  first   respondent,  observed  that  the appellant  and   his  manager   being  accomplices   to  the commission of the crime, having willingly played the role of bribe givers  for three  months, the evidence of these self- condemned persons,  who, on  their own  showing  had  thrown moral scruples and sense of honesty, if they had any, to the winds, would  be unworthy of credit without corroboration in material particulars.      In his  appeal to  this  Court  by  special  leave  the appellant (P.W.8)  sought expunction of the aforesaid highly derogatory remarks  made against  him  by  the  High  Court, contending that  the failure of the Court to apply the legal presumptions against  the first  respondent led  it  to  the making of  uncalled for  caustic comments  against him,  and that the  receipt of  bribe during  the earlier  months  not being the subject matter of the charge there was no need for the Court  to have  critically examined  the evidence of the appellant on that aspect of the matter.      Allowing the appeal, the Court, ^      HELD: 1.  Harsh and  disparaging remarks  are not to be made against  persons and  authorities whose  conduct  comes into consideration  before courts of law unless it is really necessary for  the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof to animadvert on that conduct. [483 B]      State of  U.P. v.  Mohammad Naim,  [1964] 2 S.C.R. 363; R.K. Lakshmanan  v. A.K.  Srinivasan & Anr., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 204 and  Panchanan Banerji  v.  Upendra  Nath  Bhattacharji, A.I.R. 1927 All. 193, referred to.      In  the  instant  case,  the  derogatory  remarks  made against 472 the appellant  were neither  justified nor called for. These shall stand  expunged from the judgment under appeal. Having regard to the hearsay nature of evidence of the appellant it was not  at all  necessary for  the appellate  court to have castigated him.  Even assuming  that a serious evaluation of the evidence  of the  appellant was  really called  for, the remarks of the court should have been in conformity with the settled  practice   to  observe   sobriety,  moderation  and reserve. The  higher the  forum and  the greater the powers, the greater the need for restraint and the more mellowed the reproach should be. [483 B-E]      2. There  was no need whatever for a minute examination of the  appellant’s testimony  or a  critical inquisition of his character  and conduct.  The judgment of acquittal could have as well been rendered with reference to the failings in the evidence  of P.W.2  and the  acceptable features  in the explanation of the first respondent. [480 D]      What fell  for consideration  by the  court was not the receipt of  money during the previous months but whether the sum of  two thousand  rupees, which was admittedly recovered from the  first respondent,  had been received by him by way of bribe  or by  way of  donation. For this limited question the appellant was not a material witness. [479 G; 478 D; 480 A]      3. Section  8  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act confers immunity  from prosecution  under  s.  165A  of  the

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Indian Penal  Code on persons who figure as witnesses in any proceeding against  a public servant for an offence under s. 161 or  s. 165  of the  Code or under s. 5(2) or s. 5(3A) of the Act. Where the evidence relating to receipt of bribe has a material  bearing on the case the obligation to deny those allegations rests  with the  accused.  Though  the  rule  of presumption contained  in s. 4(1) does not apply to a charge under s.  5(2) read  with s.  5(1)(d)  of  the  Act,  it  is certainly attracted  to a  charge under  s. 161 of the Code. Failure of  the appellate  court in  the  instant  case,  to appreciate this  legal position  at the  outset to  a  large extent distorted  the perspective  to be  taken in the case. [477 B, 478 D-E, 477 F, 477 G, 477 A]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Criminal Appeal No. 421 of 1985 473      From the  Judgment and  Order dated 26th April, 1985 of the Orissa High Court in Crl. A.No. 31 of 1982.      F.S. Nariman,  Mrs. Uma Mehta Jain, S.K. Bagga and Miss Mona Mehta for the Appellant.      K. Parasaran,  Attorney  General,  T.S.  Krishnamoorthy Iyer, A.K.  Ganguly, C.V.  Subba Rao, Probir Palit, P. Gaur, Umesh B.  Bhagat, Jitendra  Sharma and  R.K. Mehta  for  the Respondents.      Mrs. M.  Karanjawala, Vinoo  Bhagat and  A.K. Panda for the interveners.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      NATARAJAN, J.  A peculiar  feature of  this  appeal  by special leave is that it is not an appeal against conviction or against  acquittal but  one preferred  by  a  prosecution witness for  expunction of several highly derogatory remarks made against  him by  a learned  Judge of  the High Court of Orissa while  allowing Criminal Appeal No. 31 of 1982 on the file of the High Court of Orissa. Shri Niranjan Patnaik, the appellant before  us was  examined as P.W. 8 in the trial of T.R. Case  No. 6  of 1980  on the  file of the Special Judge (Vigilance), Sambalpur  against the  first  respondent.  The trial ended  in conviction  against the first respondent and when the  appeal filed  by him  came to be heard by the High Court the  appellant had  become a  Cabinet Minister  in the State of  Orissa. On account of the disparaging remarks made by  the   Appellate  Judge   the  appellant   tendered   his resignation and  demitted office  for maintaining democratic traditions. It  is in that backgroud this appeal has come to be preferred.      Pursuant to  a trap laid by the Vigilance Police on the complaint of  the appellant’s  Manager,  Gopi  Nath  Mohanty (P.W.2) the  first respondent  was arrested  on 26.4.79  for having accepted a bribe of Rs. 2,000 from Gopi Nath Mohanty. The marked  currency notes  M.Os. V  to XXVI  were recovered from the brief case M.O. II of the first respondent prior to the  arrest.   The  prosecution  case  was  that  the  first respondent had  been extracting illegal gratification at the rate of Rs. 1,000 474 per month  during the months of January, February and March, 1979 from  Gopi Nath  Mohanty but  all of a sudden he raised the demand to Rs. 2,000 per month in April 1979 and this led to Gopi  Nath Mohanty  laying information (Exhibit I) before the Superintendent  of Police  (Vigilance).  Acting  on  the report, a  trap was  laid on  26.4.79 and  after  Gopi  Nath

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Mohanty had  handed  over  the  marked  currency  notes  the Vigilance  party   entered  the  office  and  recovered  the currency notes  from the  brief case  and arrested the first respondent. The  first respondent denied having received any illegal gratification  but offered  no explanation  for  the presence of the currency notes in his brief case.      Eleven witnesses including the appellant who figured as P.W.8  were  examined  by  the  prosecution  and  the  first respondent  examined   three  witnesses  D.Ws.  1  to  3  to substantiate the  defence set  up by him, viz., that the sum of Rs. 2,000 had been paid by way of donation for conducting a drama  and publishing  a souvenir  by the Mining Officers’ Club and  also towards donation for Children’s Welfare Fund. The Special Judge accepted the prosecution case and held the first respondent guilty under Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d)  of   the  Prevention   of  Corruption   Act,   1947 (hereinafter referred  to as  the ‘Act’)  and Section 161 of the Indian  Penal  Code  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the ‘Code’). The  Special Judge  awarded a  sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year for the conviction under the first charge but  did not  award any  separate  sentence  for  the conviction under Section 161 of the Code.      Against  the   conviction  and   sentence   the   first respondent preferred  Criminal Appeal  No. 31 of 1982 to the High Court  of Orissa. A learned Judge of the High Court has allowed the  appeal holding  that the  prosecution  has  not proved its  case by  acceptable evidence  and  besides,  the first respondent’s  explanation for  the possession  of  the currency notes appeared probable. While acquitting the first respondent the  learned Judge  has,  however,  made  several adverse remarks about the conduct of the appellant and about the credibility of his testimony and it is with that part of the judgment we are now concerned with in this appeal.      Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned counsel for the appellant 475 argued that  the appellant’s  limited role  in the  case has been unnecessarily  and unjustly  magnified by the Appellate Judge and  furthermore the  legal presumptions  against  the first respondent  have been  failed to  be applied and these errors have  led the  learned Judge  to  make  uncalled  for caustic comments  against the appellant. Mr. Nariman further argued that  it was  not at  all necessary  for the  learned Judge to  have dwelt at length on the value of the testimony of the  appellant for  allowing  the  appeal  of  the  first respondent.  Mr.  K.  Parasaran,  learned  Attorney  General participated in  the debate pursuant to the notice issued to him and  rendered assistance  by placing  before us  certain earlier decisions  laying down the principles to be followed if adverse  comments are  to be made by courts affecting the character and  reputation of  litigants witnesses  and third parties. Mr.  Jitender Sharma, learned counsel for the first respondent did  not advance  any arguments as no disturbance of the  acquittal of  the first  respondent by the Appellate Judge is sought for in the appeal.      Having regard  to the limited scope of the appeal it is not necessary  for us  to traverse  at length  or  refer  in detail the circumstances under which a trap was laid and the first respondent  was arrested.  Suffice it to say that Shri Niranjan Patnaik,  the appellant was the licensee of an Iron Mine known  as Murgabada  Mines at  Joda. Gopi  Nath Mohanty (P.W.2) had been employed by him as Manager of the Mines and he was  attending to  the affairs  of the  Mines. The  first respondent who  was the  Senior Mining  Officer for Joda had insisted on  payment of Rs. 1,000 to him for allowing mining operations to be carried on peacefully and Gopi Nath Mohanty

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had complied  with the demand and paid Rs. 1,000 every month during January  to March,  1979. Unexpectedly when the first respondent raised  the demand  to Rs.  2,000 per  month Gopi Nath Mohanty  reported the  matter to  the Superintendent of Police (Vigilance)  and on  his instructions a trap was laid on 26.4.79  and marked  currency notes  M.Os.V to  XXVI were passed on to the first respondent and thereafter the raiding party consisting  of  the  Inspector  of  Police,  Vigilance (P.W.10) and  an Executive  Magistrate (P.W.9) recovered the money from  the first respondent and arrested him. The first respondent was  subjected to  a chemical  test of having his hands washed  with sodium  carbide  solution.  The  solution turned pink  in colour  establishing his  having handled the marked currency  notes treated  earlier with phenolphthalein powder. 476      The appellant  was cited  as a  prosecution witness  to speak to  the fact  that  his  Manager,  Gopi  Nath  Mohanty (P.W.2) had  informed him in March 1979 of his having parted with a  sum of  Rs. 3,000  to the first respondent by way of bribe during the first three months of 1979 and subsequently about the  trap that had been laid for the first respondent. The appellant  was not, therefore, a material witness in the case and had only been cited to corroborate the testimony of Gopi Nath  Mohanty in some measure. As he was not a material or crucial witness the appellant did not evince any interest in the trial of the case. He, therefore, failed to appear in court in  spite of  being summoned  to attend  the court  on 3.2.81 and  again on  6.3.81. His  disregard of  the summons from court  led to  a third  summons being issued on 17.8.81 with a  warning that  if he  failed to  appear in  court  on 7.9.81 he  would be  compelled to attend court by means of a warrant. It was on such compulsion the appellant appeared in court on  7.9.81 and gave his testimony. These facts are not controverted by  anyone but  even so the appellant has filed an  affidavit   before  this  court  to  substantiate  these matters.      As earlier stated the first respondent did not deny his receiving the  currency notes  from Gopi Nath Mohanty or the recovery of  the notes  from  his  brief  case  M.O.II.  He, however, stated  that the money was given by way of donation for the  welfare projects  launched by  the Mining Officers’ Club. Of the three defence witnesses examined by him D.Ws. 1 and 3  were Mines Inspectors while D.W.2 was a Peon attached to the  office of  the first  respondent. D.Ws. 1 and 3 had, however, to  admit that the records produced to substantiate the case  of donation  had been  prepared  after  the  first respondent had  been arrested  and released  on bail and the writings were made to the dictation of the first respondent.      The Trial  Judge while  assessing  the  merits  of  the prosecution case  took note of the fact that since the first respondent did  not deny the receipt of money or the seizure of the  currency notes  from him the burden of proof shifted to him  under Section 4(1) of the Act. The Special Judge was of the view that the explanation of the first respondent was belated and, therefore, was not believable or acceptable and hence he convicted and sentenced him. 477      The learned  Appellate Judge,  while dealing  with  the appeal has  failed to  take note of Section 8 of the Act and secondly he has given recognition to the rule of presumption contained in Section 4(1) of the Act only at a belated stage of the  judgment. These  factors  have  to  a  large  extent distorted the perspective to be taken in the case. Section 8 of the  Act which  is extracted  below confers immunity from

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prosecution under  Section 165A  on persons  who  figure  as witnesses in  any proceeding against a public servant for an offence under  Section 161  or Section  165 or under Section 5(2) or Section 5(3A) of the Act.           "Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for           the time  being in  force, a  statement made  by a           person in  any proceeding against a public servant           for an offence under Section 161 or Section 165 of           the Indian Penal Code, or under sub-section (2) or           sub-section (3A) of Section 5 of this Act, that he           offered  or  agreed  to  offer  any  gratification           (other than  legal remuneration)  or any  valuable           thing to  the public  servant, shall  not  subject           such person to a prosecution under Section 165A of           the said Code."      Oversight of  this provision  has  made  the  Appellate Judge conclude  that the  appellant and  Gopi  Nath  Mohanty (P.W.2) are  as much  guilty as  the first respondent in the commission of  the offences  and as  such they  stand  self- condemned as  accomplices to  the crime  and furthermore the two of  them stood exposed to prosecution under Section 165A of the Code.      In so far as the rule of presumption under Section 4(1) is concerned  the learned  Judge has  no doubt recognised in the later  portion of  the judgment that even though Section 4(1) would  not apply  to the charge under Section 5(2) read with Section  5(1)(d) of  the act it would undoubtedly stand attracted to  the charge  under Section  161 of the Code. If the learned Judge had visualized this position at the outset itself there  would  not  have  been  any  necessity  for  a microscopic examination  of the evidence of the appellant or for making  sweeping remarks  against him.  Mr. Nariman  is, therefore, justified  to some extent in contending that even though the  Appellate Judge  was aware  that for  the charge under 478 Section 161  of the  Code the  first respondent was under an obligation to  rebut the  legal presumption  raised  against him, the  learned Judge  has recognised  this position  only after devoting  the earlier  portion  of  the  judgment  for decrying the  appellant and  Gopi Nath  Mohanty  for  having willingly played the role of bribe-givers.      Yet another  serious infirmity  in the  judgment of the Appellate Judge is that the learned Judge has castigated the appellant and  Gopi Nath  Mohanty for having given bribes of Rs. 1,000 per month for three months to the first respondent and decried  both of  them for  putting forth  a false  case while at  the same time holding that the receipt of bribe of three thousand  rupees is  not the  subject-matter of charge and as  such the first respondent was under no obligation to disprove the evidence of the appellant and Gopi Nath Mohanty on that aspect of the matter. Since the payment of Rs. 3,000 during the  earlier months  was not  the  subject-matter  of charge there  was no need or necessity for the learned Judge to have  critically examined  the evidence  of the appellant and  Gopi  Nath  Mohanty  on  that  aspect  of  the  matter. Conversely if  the learned  Judge  felt  that  the  evidence relating to  those payments  had a  material bearing  on the case he should not have absolved the first respondent of any obligation to  deny those  allegations. The  error that  has crept in  because of  the different standards adopted can be seen  from  the  conflicting  expressions  in  the  judgment extracted as under :      In para 12 of the judgment it is stated as below :-           "The statements  made by  Mr. Patnaik  (P.W.8) and

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         his  Manager   (P.W.2)  with   regard  to  willing           participation in  the matter  of payments of bribe           money to the appellant would bring about their own           condemnation. These  two  persons,  on  their  own           showing, were  bribe-givers. A bribe-giver must be           condemned as much as bribe-taker. Givers of bribe-           amounts  to   public  servants   are   undoubtedly           accomplices    to     the     crime..........Being           accomplices to  the commission of crime because of           their statements  of payments  of bribe  moneys to           the appellant  for three  months, the  evidence of           these self-condemned  persons, who,  on their  own           showing, 479           had thrown moral scruples and sense of honesty, if           they had  any, to  the winds  for which instead of           refusing to meet the demand of the appellant, they           had willingly paid bribe amounts for three months,           would be  unworthy of credit without corroboration           in  material   particulars  and  through  reliable           sources."      However, in para 16 of the judgment it is held that the first  respondent  was  under  no  obligation  to  meet  the allegations relating to the payment of Rs. 3,000 to him. The relevant portion is worded as follows :           "He had  neither been  charged under  Section 5(2)           and 5(1)(d) of the Act or under Section 161 of the           Code for  receiving illegal  gratification  during           the months  of January  to March, 1979 and had not           been asked  to meet  these allegations.  No person           can be  condemned unheard  and for that reason the           appellant could  not be  condemned on the basis of           the statements made by P.W.2 and P.W.8 that he had           been paid  bribe amount  for 3  months @ Rs. 1,000           per month."      Nevertheless the  learned Judge  has again  reverted to his original perspective and commented in para 17 as under :           "If as  submitted by  the defence, the evidence of           P.Ws.2 and 8 with regard to the monthly payment of           bribe  money   @  Rs.  1,000  per  month  and  the           increased demand  of Rs. 2,000 is not accepted for           the aforesaid  reasons, it  would expose the utter           falsity of the evidence of P.Ws. 2 & 8."      Over and  above all these, the learned Judge has failed to consider  whether a detailed examination of the testimony of the appellant was really called for in order to allow the appeal  of   the  first   respondent  and   set  aside   his convictions. From  what has  already been  stated it will be apparent that  what fell for consideration was whether a sum of Rs.  2,000 which  was admittedly recovered from the first respondent had  been received  by him  by way of bribe or by way of donation. 480 For this  limited question  the appellant was not a material witness in  the case.  It was  only his  Manager, Gopi  Nath Mohanty  (P.W.2)  who  claimed  to  have  made  the  earlier payments to  the first respondent as well as to have given a report and  participated in  the trap  proceedings when  the first respondent  raised the  demand of bribe from Rs. 1,000 to Rs.  2,000 per  month. The  assumption of  the  Appellate Judge that  Gopi Nath Mohanty would not have paid any sum of money to  the first  respondent or given the F.I.R. (Exhibit P-1) against  him without securing the prior approval of the appellant is  only based  on conjecture and not on evidence. The learned  Judge has  also overlooked  the fact  that  the

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appellant had  not exhibited  any anxiety  to depose against the first  respondent and  on the  other hand he appeared in court and  gave evidence  only after  being  warned  in  the summons issued  for the  third time  that a warrant would be issued against  him if  he failed to respond to the summons. If all  these factors  had been perceived it would have been clear  that   there  was  no  need  whatever  for  a  minute examination of  the  appellant’s  testimony  or  a  critical inquisition of his character and conduct and the judgment of acquittal could have as well been rendered with reference to the failings  in the  evidence of  Gopi Nath Mohanty and the acceptable  features   in  the   explanation  of  the  first respondent for  his possession of the currency notes M.Os. V to XXVI series.      The defective  approach made by the Appellate Court has resulted  in   paragraphs  9  to  17  being  devoted  to  an evaluation and  criticism of the appellant’s evidence out of the total  36 paragraphs contained in the judgment. In these paragraphs the  Appellate Judge  has severely criticised the appellant and has made harsh remarks which are now sought to be expunged. They are extracted below :           "These two  persons, on  their own  showing,  were           bribe-givers.....   Being   accomplices   to   the           commission of crime because of their statements of           payments of  bribe moneys  to  the  appellant  for           three months,  the evidence  of  these  two  self-           condemned persons,  who, on their own showing, had           thrown moral  scruples and  sense of  honesty,  if           they had  any, to  the winds  for which instead of           refusing to meet the demand of the appellant, they           had 481           willingly paid  bribe-amounts  for  three  months,           would be  unworthy of credit without corroboration           in  material   particulars  and  through  reliable           sources." (Para 12)           "....in which  case both  P.Ws.2 and  8  would  be           liable for  abetment of  commission  of  the  said           offence by  the appellant...  The acts  of P.Ws. 2           and 8  would also  be culpable under Section 165-A           of the Code....both P.Ws.2 and 8 were liable to be           punished under  Section 165-A  of  the  Code.  The           investigating agency  did not  choose to prosecute           the appellant  and P.Ws. 2 and 8 for commission of           these offences." (Para 13)           "Undoubtedly, P.Ws.2  and 8  belong to  the  first           category." (Para 14)           "....these two accomplices, namely..." (Para 15)           "While, as  observed by  me, P.Ws.  2 and  8  have           condemned themselves  as habitual  bribe-givers by           their own  statements and  for this,  they have to           blame none but themselves." (Para 17)      It will  be apposite to mention here that the appellant has nowhere  stated in  his evidence  that Gopi Nath Mohanty made the  payment of  Rs. 3,000  for  the  three  months  in question after  obtaining his permission or approval. On the other hand  he has only deposed that in March 1979 Gopi Nath Mohanty had  informed him  of the  payment of these amounts, and in order to balance the accounts he had given directions for the  amount being  shown  as  impressed  cash  with  the Manager. The  Appellate Judge  has  also  proceeded  on  the assumption that the appellant was holding a public office at the relevant  time while  in fact  the appellant had neither joined  the  Ministry  nor  even  became  a  Member  of  the Legislative Assembly  when the  first respondent was trapped

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and arrested.      We may now refer to certain earlier decisions where the right of  courts to  make free  and  fearless  comments  and observations on  the one hand and the corresponding need for maintaining sobriety, moderation and restraint regarding the 482 character, conduct  integrity, credibility  etc. of parties, witnesses and others are concerned.      In The  State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 363 it was held as follows :           "If there  is one principle of cardinal importance           in the administration of justice, it is this : the           proper freedom  and  independence  of  Judges  and           Magistrates must  be maintained  and they  must be           allowed to  perform  their  functions  freely  and           fearlessly and  without undue  interference by any           body, even  by this  court. At the same time it is           equally  necessary   that  in   expressing   their           opinions Judges  and Magistrates must be guided by           considerations of justice, fairplay and restraint.           It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations           defeat the  very purpose  for which they are made.           It has  been judicially  recognised  that  in  the           matter  of   making  disparaging  remarks  against           persons or  authorities whose  conduct comes  into           consideration before  courts of law in cases to be           decided by  them, it  is relevant  to consider (a)           whether the  party whose conduct is in question is           before  the   court  or   has  an  opportunity  of           explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there           is evidence  on record  bearing  on  that  conduct           justifying the  remarks; and  (c)  whether  it  is           necessary for  the decision  of the  case,  as  an           integral  part  thereof,  to  animadvert  on  that           conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial           pronouncements must  be judicial  in  nature,  and           should  not   normally   depart   from   sobriety,           moderation and reserve."      Vide also in R.K. Lakshmanan v. A.K. Srinivasan & Anr., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 204 wherein this ratio has been referred to.      In Panchanan  Banerji  v.  Upendra  Nath  Bhattacharji, A.I.R. 1927 Allahabad 193 Sulaiman, J. held as follows :           "The High Court, as the supreme court of revision,           must be  deemed to  have power  to see that Courts           below do  not  unjustly  and  without  any  lawful           excuse 483           take away the character of a party or of a witness           or of a counsel before it."      It is, therefore, settled law that harsh or disparaging remarks are  not to  be made against persons and authorities whose conduct  comes into consideration before courts of law unless it  is really necessary for the decision of the case, as an  integral part  thereof to animadvert on that conduct. We hold  that the adverse remarks made against the appellant were neither justified nor called for.      Having regard  to the limited controversy in the appeal to the  High Court and the hearsay nature of evidence of the appellant it  was not  at all  necessary for  the  Appellate Judge to  have animadverted  on the conduct of the appellant for  the  purpose  of  allowing  the  appeal  of  the  first respondent. Even  assuming that  a serious evaluation of the evidence of  the appellant  was really  called  for  in  the appeal the  remarks of the learned Appellate Judge should be in conformity with the settled practice of courts to observe

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sobriety, moderation  and reserve.  We need only remind that the higher the forum and the greater the powers, the greater the need  for restraint  and the  more mellowed the reproach should be.      As we  find merit  in the contentions of the appellant, for the  aforesaid reasons,  we allow  the appeal and direct the derogatory  remarks made  against the  appellant set out earlier to stand expunged from the judgment under appeal. P.S.S.                                       Appeal allowed. 484