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PETITIONER: NEW PRAKASH TRANSPORT CO.  LTD.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NEW SUWARNA TRANSPORT CO.  LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 30/09/1956

BENCH:

ACT: Road Transport-Application for stage carriage  Permit-Police report-Procedure-Appellate  Authority, if bound  to  adjourn proceeding   suo  mctu-Failure  Of  natural   Justice--Motor Vehicles Act (II, Of 1939), ss. 47, 48, 64, 68.

HEADNOTE: Rules of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions of  statutory  bodies  and  the  rules  prescribed  by   the legislature  under which they have to act, and the  question whether in a particular case they have been contravened must be judged not by any preconceived notion of what they may be but in the light of the provisions of the relevant Act. Case-law discussed. The provisions of ss. 47, 48, 64 and the rules framed  under s.  68  of the Motor Vehicles Act make it  abundantly  clear that  a  Regional  Transport  Authority  and  an   Appellate Authority in hearing an appeal, function in a quasi-judicial capacity  and not as courts of law and are not  required  to record  oral  or documentary evidence and,  in  deciding  as between  the rival claims of applicants for  stage  carriage permits,  what they are required to do is to deal with  such claims  in a fair and just manner.  The Act, however,  amply provides for the safeguarding of their interests. Veerappa  Pillai  v. Raman & Raman Ltd, [1952]  S.C.R.  583, referred to, 99 Consequently, in a case where the Regional Transport  Autho- rity refused to grant a permit to an applicant on account of an adverse police report and the Appellate Authority granted the  same  on the basis of a further report by  the  police, whereby all material allegations against him were  withdrawn and  nothing was said against his rival which would  require to  be controverted by him, and the Chairman read  out  such report at the hearing of the appeal without any objection by any of the interested parties or any request for adjournment and a Division Bench of the High Court in appeal,  reversing the decision of a single judge made under Arts. 226 and  227 Of the Constitution, held that the rules of natural  justice had been contravened by reason of the failure on the part of the  Appellate Authority to adjourn the proceeding suo  motu in order to afford the rival claimant an opportunity to meet the  revised police report, its decision was  erroneous  and must be set aside. Held,  further, that the reading out of the contents of  the poiice  report by the Chairman at the hearing of the  appeal was  enough compliance with the rules of natural justice  as there was nothing in the rules requiring a copy of it to  be furnished to any of the parties.

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 74 of 1956. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  22,  1955, of the Nagpur High  Court  in  Letters Patent Appeal No. 2 of 1955. C.K.  Daphtary, Solicitor-General for India, J. N.  Bannerji and P. C. Agarwala, for the appellant. M.C.  Setalvad, Attorney-General for India and  Naunit  Lal, for respondent No. 1. 1956.   September  30.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court   was delivered by SINHA  J.-This  is  an  appeal by  special  leave  from  the judgment and order, dated September 22, 1955, passed by  the Letters  Patent  Bench of the Nagpur  High  Court  reversing those  of a single Judge of that Court, dated  December  13, 1954,  refusing  to  issue  a  writ  in  the  nature  of   a certiorari. The  facts  of this case lie in a short compass and  may  be stated  as follows: The Suwarna Transport  Company  Limited, which  will  be referred to as the first respondent  in  the course  of  this judgment, held seven  permits  for  running buses on the Buldana-Malkapur route, as the 100 sole operator on that route.  It applied for another  permit for  the  same  route.   The  appellant,  The  New   Prakash Transport  Co.  Ltd.,  as also  another  party,  called  the Navjivan Transport Service (not cited in this Court) applied for  a similar permit on that route.  On May 26,  1953,  all the  three applicants aforesaid were heard by  the  Regional Transport   Authority  of  Amraoti,  which  is   the   third respondent  in  this Court, in connection  with  the  permit applied for.  Consideration of the several applications  was postponed,  but a resolution was passed to the  effect  that "No  one  service should have monopoly  on  Buldana-Malkapur route."  On March 30, 1954, another meeting of the  Regional Transport Authority took place and the first respondent  was granted   the  permit.   The  appellant’s  application   was rejected  on the ground that the police report  was  against it.   The  appellant preferred an appeal  to  the  Appellate Authority  (constituted under R. 73 of the  Motor  -Vehicles Act), Madhya Pradesh, Nagpur, which is the second respondent to this appeal.  The appellant challenged the correctness of the  police  report against it and applied to  the  District Superintendent  of  Police personally to  verify  the  facts stated  in  the  first  report on the  basis  of  which  the appellant’s  application  for permit had been  rejected,  as aforesaid.   The  police made a further  report,  which  was placed before the second respondent.  That further report by the  police was read out to the parties by the  Chairman  of the  Appellate Authority at the time of the hearing  of  the appeal.   At the hearing no objection appears to  have  been raised  by any of the parties to the course adopted  by  the second  respondent.  By its order dated July 29,  1954,  the second   respondent  set  aside  the  order  of  the   third respondent, allowed the appeal and ordered the permit to  be issued  to  the appellant.  The first respondent  moved  the High Court at Nagpur for a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 of  the Constitution, substantially on two grounds,  namely, (1)  that  the  order passed by the  second  respondent  was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record, and (2) that it contravened the’ principles of natural  justice. The  first  ground was founded on the  allegation  that  the

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second 101 respondent had misread the police report, and the second  on the allegation that the revised report by the police had not been shown to the petitioner who had been afforded no " real and effective opportunity to deal with the report or to meet any  relevant  allegations made therein, and to  study  that report and make his submissions in regard thereto before the appeal was decided." The appellant and the second respondent showed  cause  against the rule issued by  the  court.   The appellant  while  showing  cause, admitted  that  the  third respondent had rejected its application on the basis of  the police  report  dated  March 27, 1954, which  "was  full  of mistakes  and  falsehoods,"  that  it  moved  the   District Superintendent  of Police personally to verify the  contents of  the said report and that the fresh report  submitted  by the police after due verification had absolved the appellant from  the allegations of misconduct contained in  the  first report.  It also controverted the ground that there was  any mistake  apparent  on  the face of the  record.   The  fresh report  submitted  by the police after verification  at  the appellant’s  request was received by the  second  respondent and  the  Chairman read the same during the hearing  of  the appeal  and  that, therefore, it was wrong to  suggest  that there had been a failure of justice,.  The second respondent also showed cause and corroborated the appellant’s statement that the first police report had been subsequently  modified by the District Superintendent of Police by the report dated May  13, 1954, which showed that the previous report  was  " based on some misunderstanding." It was also stated that the report was actually read out to the parties by the  Chairman while the appeal was being heard. The petition under Arts. 226 and 227 made, as aforesaid,  by the  first  respondent  was heard by  a  single  Judge  (Mr. Justice  V.  R. Sen) who by his orders  dated  December  13, 1954, discharged the rule with costs.  In the course of  his judgment the learned Judge after’ referring in detail to the orders of the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, that is  to say, the second and third respondents, observed  that there was no substance in the contention that the procedure                             102 adopted  by  the  Appellate Authority  was  opposed  to  the principles  of  natural  justice and  had  operated  to  the prejudice  of  the first respondent; and that there  was  no error apparent on the face of the record.  The learned Judge also  pointed out that when -the report was brought  to  the notice of the first respondent, it did not indicate that  it wished to controvert the report. The  first respondent preferred an appeal under the  Letters Patent and repeated its grounds of attack against the orders of  the  Appellate  Authority.  The appeal was  heard  by  a Division  Bench consisting of Chief Justice Hidayatulla  and Mr.  Justice S. P. Kotwal.  The Letters Patent Bench  seemed to be inclined to negative the plea that there was a mistake apparent  on  the face of the record and  pointed  out  that though the language used by the second respondent was  ambi- guous  and not quite accurate, it was possible to  take  the view  that it had in fact considered the  subsequent  police report  when  it observed that the  police  bad  practically absolved  the  appellant from all blame except  on  a  minor question,  not necessary to be referred to in  detail  here. On  the  second ground it differed from the  learned  single Judge  and  came  to  the  conclusion  "that  the  Appellate Authority  erred in rushing through without giving a  proper and effective chance to the appellant to state its case." In

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the  result  it  granted a writ quashing the  order  of  the Appellate Authority and directing it to rehear the appeal in the  light  of the observations made in the  course  of  the judgment. The  appellant made an application to the High Court  for  a certificate  of  fitness for appeal to this  Court.   Having been unsuccessful there, the appellant came up to this Court and obtained special leave to appeal. The only question which requires determination by this Court is  whether  or  not there has been  a  failure  of  natural justice in this case as a result of the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority.  On this question there has been  a marked  difference of opinion in the two stages of the  case in the High Court.  It has been 103 argued  on behalf of the appellant that the Appeal Bench  of the Nagpur High Court has erred in coming to the  conclusion that  in  the circumstances of this case, there has  been  a failure of justice, in disagreement with the learned  single Judge who was clearly of the opposite opinion.  It has  also been argued that there are no well defined criteria by which this  question falls to be determined.  It depends upon  the terms  of the legislation creating the statutory body  which has  to function according to its obligations laid  down  in the  statute.  If it has done all that was required  by  the law  to  do,  it cannot be said that it has  failed  in  the discharge  of  its  statutory  duty.   In  this   connection reference was made to the provisions of ss. 47, 48 and 64 of the  Motor Vehicles Act read along with the  relevant  rules framed under s. 68 of the Act.  On behalf of the respondents it  was  argued that it had no opportunity of  studying  the subsequent  police report and of making submissions  thereon with  the  result that there has been a failure  of  natural justice  in the sense that the respondent had been  deprived of  a fair and full opportunity of being heard.  Though  the High Court on appeal did not base its decision on the  other question,  namely, whether there was any error  apparent  on the  face  of the record, it was sought to  be  argued  that there was an error in the order of the second respondent  in so  far  as it made reference to only the first  report  and read into it the maatter contained in the subsequent report. At the outset we may observe that, in our opinion, there  is no substance in the second ground sought to be  resuscitated in this Court by the learned counsel on behalf of the  res-. pondent.   Error apparent on the face of the record  in  the context of this case must mean an assumption of facts  which are not borne out by the record.  We are not concerned  with other  grounds which may in the context of  each  particular case  support a contention of error apparent on the face  of the  record.  In this case if there was any such  error,  it was  with reference to the two police reports.  As  observed by  the  Appellate  Bench  of the  High  Court,  though  the language  used  by- the Appellate Authority with  regard  to strict 104 grammatical  construction  may  refer to  the  first  police report,  it was difficult to hold that the matters  referred to  in the order challenged before the High Court  were  not contained  in the subsequent report submitted by the  police at the instance of the appellant.  The judgment under appeal did  not  take  the view that there  was  any  such  mistake apparent  on the face of the record as was contended for  on behalf  of the first respondent.  We have been  referred  to the  orders  of  the  Appellate Authority  as  read  by  the Appellate  Bench of the High Court and, in our  opinion,  no

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such  mistake  has been shown to have  vitiated  the  orders impugned before the High Court. Coming back to the question whether or not there has been  a failure  of  natural  justice, we  may  shortly  review  the relevant provisions of the statute in order to find out  the obligations  imposed  upon  the  Appellate  Authority  while disposing  of  an  appeal from the orders  of  the  Regional Transport  Authority.   The matters to be  considered  by  a Regional Transport Authority at the time of disposing of  an application  for a stage carriage permit are set out  in  s. 47.  They include the interest of the public generally,  the adequacy of existing road transport service and the benefits to any particular locality.  The Authority is also  enjoined to  take  into  consideration any  representations  made  by persons  already providing road transport  facilities  along the  proposed  route  or by any local  authority  or  police authority within whose jurisdiction the proposed route lies. Section  48 empowers a Regional Transport  Authority,  after taking  into  consideration matters set forth in s.  47,  to restrict  the  number  of  stage  carriages  and  to  impose conditions  on stage carriage permits.  Section 64  provides for right of appeal against specified kinds of orders passed by  the  Provincial or Regional Transport Authority  to  the "prescribed  authority".  It also in terms provides that  on an appeal being filed to the prescribed authority, it  shall give  the appellant and the original authority, that  is  to say, the authority against whose orders the appeal had  been brought., "an opportunity of being heard." Section 64  which creates  the  right of appeal does not in terms speak  of  a like 105 opportunity  being  given to the persons  against  whom  the appeal  had been filed.  But r. 73 framed by the  Government in  pursuance of its rule-making power conferred by  s.  68, lays  down that the authority to decide’ an  appeal  against the orders of a Regional Transport Authority under s. 64  of the  Act  shall  be  the Chairman and  two  members  of  the Provincial  Transport Authority.  The rule further  provides that on receipt of an appeal, the Chairman shall appoint the time  and  place for hearing the appeal and shall  give  not less than thirty days notice to the appellant, the  original authority,  and "any other person interested in the  appeal" and  on  such  appointed or  adjourned  date  the  Appellate Authority "shall hear such persons as may appear and,  after such  further  enquiry, if any, as it  may  deem  necessary, confirm,  vary,  or set aside the order  against  which  the appeal is preferred and make any consequential or incidental order  that may be just or proper".  It will. thus  be  seen that  though the substantive section creating the  right  of appeal does not in terms create any right in a respondent to be  heard,  the  rules framed providing  for  the  procedure before  the Appellate Authority contemplate that  sufficient notice  shall be given to " any other person  interested  in the appeal" which expression must include persons other than the  appellant who may be interested in being heard  against the  points  raised in support of the appeal.   Neither  the sections  nor  the rules framed under  the  Act  contemplate anything like recording oral or documentary evidence in  the usual  way  as  in  courts of  law.   Besides,  the  parties interested  in the grant of stage carriage permits or  those interested against it, the police authority of the  locality is also entitled to be heard both at the original stage  and at the appellate stage. Thus the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed  thereunder with   particular  reference  to  the   Regional   Transport

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Authority  and  the Appellate Authority do  not  contemplate anything  like a regular hearing in a court of justice.   No elaborate  procedure  has  been prescribed  as  to  how  the parties interested have to be 14 106 heard in connection with the question, who is to be  granted a  stage  carriage permit.  The judgment of the  High  Court under appeal has made copious quotations from the  decisions of the House of Lords and the Court of Appeal in support  of its  conclusion that the principles of natural  justice  had not  been sufficiently complied with in the present case  by simply reading out the subsequent police report at the  time the Appellate Authority was hearing the appeal.  The learned Judges  of the Appeal Court have observed that the  contents of a long report such as the second report was, could not be carried  in one’.-, head.  They also observed that in  order to  present  its case effectively the first  respondent  was entitled  not only to have the report read out but  also  to study  it so that it could understand it and state its  case fully  and effectively before the Appellate  Authority.   We have to examine those several precedents relied upon by  the High  Court to see how far its conclusions are supported  by authority.  But before we do that, it has got to be observed that the question whether the rules of natural justice  have been observed in a particular case must itself be judged  in the  light of the constitution of the statutory  body  which has  to function in accordance with the rules laid  down  by the legislature and in that sense the rules themselves  must vary.  The Regional Transport Authority is charged with  the duty  of granting or refusing a stage carriage permit,  only to  mention  the  matter  with  which  we  are   immediately concerned.   In  that connection the statute  requires  that authority  to have regard to the matters set forth in s.  47 of  the  Act, as already indicated.   The  police  authority within  whose  local jurisdiction any part of  the  proposed route   lies,  has  also  been  given  the  right  to   make representations.   But  the police report submitted  to  the Regional Transport Authority or to the Appellate  Authority, if  it  requires  the  police authority to  do  so,  is  not intended  to be anything more than an expression of  opinion by  an  authority interested in the maintenance of  law  and order,  with  particular  reference to the  question  as  to whether  any of the applicants for a permit had anything  to its credit or discredit as 107 supplier  of transport facilities.  Such a report  is  meant more  for the use of the authority in making or  refusing  a grant than for the use of the several applicants or any  one of them.  In other words, it is in the nature of information supplied  by the police in order to assist the authority  in making up its mind.  In the present case when the subsequent police  report  was read out by the  Chairman,  neither  the appellant  nor the first respondent, nor for the  matter  of that  any of the other parties, raised any objection to  the use  of  that document or asked for an  adjournment  on  the ground either that it had been taken by surprise or that  it had  materials  to offer in opposition to the  report.   The learned Judges of the High Court have observed in the course of their judgment under appeal that though it is the essence of  the business of tribunals like the one under the  -Motor Vehicles   Act  to  transact  business  expeditiously,   the business of the authority would not have suffered much if  a copy  of the report had been given to the parties  concerned and  the case adjourned for a short time.  It  appears  that

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-no such adjournment had been prayed for on behalf of any of the  parties  who,  it  appears,  had  been  represented  by counsel.  But then the High Court has observed further  that "the duty is laid not upon counsel who appears but upon  the tribunal  which  administers justice.  It  is  incumbent  on every  tribunal which - acts judicially to see that  justice is  not  only  done but is seen to be done,  arid  that  the elementary  rule  of natural justice of giving  a  fair  and proper hearing to every one concerned is followed.  We think that  the  Appellate  Authority  erred  in  rushing  through without  giving  a  proper  and  effective  chance  to   the appellant to state its case." In our opinion, the High Court has   made   a  number  of  assumptions  in   making   those observations  which  do not appear to be  justified  by  the scheme  of the legislation we are dealing with or by  any  a priori  considerations  of what has  been  characterized  as "natural  justice".   The  tribunal  in  question  was   not administering  justice  as  a court  of  law,  though  while deciding as between the rival claims of the applicants for a permit it had to deal with them in a fair and just manner. 108 But a tribunal even acting " judicially " is not obliged  to grant  an  adjournment suo motu without any  application  on behalf  of  any of the parties interested.  We do  not  find that  any  of the parties made at that  time  any  grievance about the procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority.  But the question appears to have been raised for the first  time before  the  High  Court after the  Appellate  Tribunal  had decided  to  grant  the permit to the  appellant.   In  this connection  it has also to be observed that  the  subsequent police  report had said nothing directly against  the  first respondent  which it would be interested  in  controverting. The subsequent police report had only withdrawn some of  the adverse comments against the conduct of the appellant  which had  been found to have been made under a  misunderstanding. But   the  subsequent  report  still  contains  some   minor complaints  against  the  appellant.   Those  matters   were apparently  considered by the Appellate Authority not to  be so  serious as to stand in the way of the appellant  getting the  permit, especially when that authority  had  previously decided upon the policy that monopoly of supplying transport facility should not be allowed to continue in favour of  the first respondent.  Hence, in our opinion, there was  nothing in  the  rules requiring a copy of the police report  to  be furnished  to  any  of  the  parties,  nor  was  there   any circumstance necessitating the adjournment of the hearing of the  appeal,  particularly  when  no  request  for  such  an adjournment had been made either by the first respondent  or by  any  other  party.  At that time  none  of  the  parties appears  to have made any grievance about the police  report only  being  read at by the Chairman or any request  for  an adjournment  in order to adduce evidence pro and  con.   The rules  framed under Chapter IV for "the conduct and  hearing of the appeals that may be preferred under this chapter  (s. 68  (2) (b)) " do not contemplate any such facilities  being granted  to the parties, though it is open to the  Appellate Authority to make any such " further enquiry, if any, as  it may deem necessary." But  the  High Court Bench appears to have, taken  the  view that, rule or no rule, request or no request for an 109 adjournment,the  rules of natural justice made it  incumbent upon the Appellate Authority to stay its hands in order that "  a  proper  and effective chance was given  to  the  first respondent to state its case." There was not much of a  case

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to state because, each party applying for the permit must be presumed  to  have  pressed its  claim  upon  the  Appellate Authority.   We  have therefore to  examine  the  precedents discussed in detail in the judgment under appeal to see  how far  the Appellate Bench was justified in holding  that  the rules of natural justice had been contravened by the  Appel- late Authority. The earliest decision of the House of Lords brought to our notice   in  this  connection  is  the  case   of   Spackman v.Plumstead  Board of Works (1).  In that case the  question arose  on  a  prosecution  for infringement  of  an  Act  of Parliament making provision for fixing the " general line of buildings   "   in   a  road.   The   certificate   of   the superintending architect as to the general line of buildings came  in for discussion as to whether the architect,  before deciding as to how the general line has to be fixed, had  to hear the parties concerned.  In that connection the Earl  of Selborne, L.C., made the following observations :- "  No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to  how the  person  who is to decide is to proceed,  the  law  will imply  no  more than that the  substantial  requirements  of justice  shall  not be violated.  He is not a judge  in  the proper  sense of the word; but he must give the  parties  an opportunity of being heard before him and stating their case and  their view.  He must give notice when he  will  proceed with  the matter, and he must act honestly  and  impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons, to whom the authority is not given by law.  There must be no Malversation of any kind.  There would be no decision within the  meaning of the statute if there were anything  of  that sort   done   contrary   to   the   essence   of    justice. But it appears to me to be perfectly consistent with reason, that the statute may have intentionally (1)  [1885] 10 A.C. 229, 240. 110 omitted  to provide for form, because this is a, matter  not of a kind requiring form, not of a kind requiring litigation at  all, but requiring only that the parties should have  an opportunity  of submitting to the person by  whose  decision they  are  to  be  bound such  considerations  as  in  their judgment ought to be brought before him.  When that is done, from  the  nature of the case no further  proceeding  as  to summoning the parties, or as to doing anything of that  kind which a judge might have to do, is necessary." Another  leading case on the subject is the decision of  the House of Lords in the well-known case of Board of  Education v.  Rice (1).  Their Lordships in that case had  to  discuss the  duty  of  the  Board of Education under  s.  7  of  the Education Act, 1902.  Lord Loreburn, L.C., in the course  of his  speech referred to the provisions of the Act  and  made the following observations as to the duty to decide  certain questions relating to nonprovided schools:- " Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they  have not originated, the practice of imposing upon  department.,; or  officers  of State the duty of deciding  or  determining questions of various kinds.  In the present instance, as  in many  others,  what comes for determination is  sometimes  a matter  to be settled by discretion, involving no  law.   It will,  I suppose, usually be of an administrative kind;  but sometimes it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact,  or  even depend upon matter of law  alone.   In  such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the  law and  also  to ascertain the facts.  I need not add  that  in doing  either they must act in good faith and fairly  listen to  both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one  who

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decides anything, But I do not think they are bound to treat such  a  question as though it were a trial.  They  have  no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnesses. They  can  obtain information in any way  they  think  best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view." (1)  [1911] A.C. 179,182. How  far judicial opinion may vary as to the content of  the rule of natural justice is amply illustrated by the case  of Rex  v.  Local Government Board, Ex parte  Arlidge  (1),  at different stages.  The rule nisi for a certiorari was  first heard  by Ridley, Lord Coleridge and Bankes, JJ.   The  case related  to the powers of the, Local Government Board  under the  Housing, Town Planning, etc.  Act, 1909 (9 Edw.  7,  c. 44)  refusing  to terminate its orders closing  a  dwelling- house as unfit for habitation and the procedure for  hearing an  appeal  against such an order.  Section 29  of  the  Act provided that such an appeal shall be heard and disposed  of according to the procedure laid down by the Local Government Board, provided that the rules shall provide that the  Board shall  not dismiss any, appeal without having first  held  a public local inquiry.., It was unanimously held by the Court discharging the rule that the Local Government Board was not bound  to hear the appellant or any one on his behalf  after the report of the inspector on the public local inquiry  had been received, before dismissing the appeal.  At the  public local inquiry the owner of the house affected by the closing order had been represented.  But at the time the appeal  was finally  disposed of, there was no hearing of the  appellant or  his  representative  as in a court of  law.   The  Court repelled  the argument that the appellant had a right to  be heard by the Local Government Board and to know the contents of the report made by the inspector who had held the  public local  inquiry.  Rely Vingmainly upon the judgment  of  Lord Loreburn,  L.C,  in the case of Board of Education  v.  Rice (supra),  the Court decided that the procedure indicated  by the  rules  framed under the statute in  question  had  been followed  and that there was no other or further  obligation on  the  Board to hear the appellant  either  personally  or through his representative or counsel, because there was  no indication  in the statute to that effect.  The  matter  was taken in appeal in Rex v. Local Government Board, Ex parte A rlidge  (2), and the Court of Appeal by a majority  (Vaughan Williams and Buckley, L.JJ., Hamilton, L.J. dissenting (1) [1913] 1 K.B, 463. (2) [1914] 1 K. B. 16o, 112 allowed  the  appeal  holding that it was  contrary  to  the principles  of  natural justice that the Board  should  have dismissed the appeal without disclosing to the appellant the contents of their inspector’s report and without giving  the appellant  an opportunity of being heard in support  of  the appeal.   They, therefore, quashed the order dismissing  the appeal.  The majority judgment pointed out that the Act  and the rules framed thereunder except for certain matters  were silent  as to the procedure and that in the absence of  such specific  provisions the non-disclosure of  the  ‘nspector’s report  was  contrary to principles of  natural  justice  on which  English  law  is based.  It  further  held  that  the appellant  before  the Board was entitled to a  hearing  and that as the appellant had not the opportunity of seeing  and considering the report and the documents which the  deciding authority had before it, the appellant had been denied  full opportunity  of  being  heard.  It went  to  the  length  of

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observing  that  the  nondisclosure of the  report  and  the documents  which were taken into consideration by the  Board when   the  disclosure  had  been  asked  for,  was   itself inconsistent  with natural justice.  Hamilton, L.J., in  his dissenting  judgment  pointed  out that the  report  of  the inspector  in the case, as in other Government  departments, is only a statement of facts made for the information of the officials of the department and that it could not be assumed that   the  legislature  meant  all  such  reports   to   be communicated  to those interested where it does not say  the contrary.  He further pointed out that the practice was  the other  way, namely, to specify how and to whom such  reports were  to  be  communicated, (when they are  intended  to  be communicated at all.) Dealing with the question how far  the requirements of natural justice had been fulfilled, the Lord Justice  observed at p. 199 that "It has often been  pointed out  that the expression (natural justice) is sadly  lacking in  precision." Then he referred to a number  of  precedents dealing  with the question of natural justice as to how  the connotation   of  the  expression  differed   in   different contexts.  He further observed at pp. 201 & 202: - 113 "  The Local Government Board here is a statutory  tribunal, anomalous as compared with common law Courts, created by the Legislature for a special class of appeals and endowed by it with the power of formulating its own procedure." He  also adopted the dictum of Loreburn, L.C., in  Board  of Education v. Rice (supra) that the Board must " act in  good faith and fairly listen to both sides." Against  the judgment of the majority of the Court  quashing the  determination of the appeal by the Board there  was  an appeal   to  the  House  of  Lords.   The  House  of   Lords unanimously  adopted  the opinion of Hamilton,  L.J.  (later Lord Sumner), allowed the appeal and set aside the  majority decision. [Vide Local Government Board v. Arlidge (1)].   In the  course of his speech Viscount Haldane, L.C.,  made  the following observations:- " My Lords, when the duty of deciding an appeal is  imposed, those  whose duty it is to decide it must act judicially.  , They  must deal with the question referred to  them  without bias,  and  they  must  give to  each  of  the  parties  the opportunity  of  adequately presenting the case  made.   The decision must be come to in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility  of a tribunal whose duty it is to  mete  out justice.  But it does not follow that the procedure of every such tribunal must be the same." His  Lordship adopted the dictum of Lord Loreburn, L.C.,  in the  leading  case of Board of Education  v.  Rice  (supra). Lord  Shaw  in his speech made  the  following  observations which  are very apposite to the facts and  circumstances  of this case:- " The judgments of the majority of the Court below appear to me,  if  I may say so with respect, to be dominated  by  the idea  that  the  analogy of judicial  methods  or  procedure should apply to departmental action.  Judicial methods  may, in  many points of administration, be  entirely  unsuitable, and produce delays, expense, and public and private  injury. The department must obey the statute." (1)  [1915] A.C. 120, 132. 15 114 He further observed at p. 138 as follows " And the assumption that the methods of natural justice are ex  necessitate  those  of  Courts  of  justice  is   wholly unfounded.   This  is  expressly  applicable  to  steps   of

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procedure  or  forms  of pleading.  In so far  as  the  term ’natural  justice’ means that a result or process should  be just,  it  is a harmless though it may  be  a  high-sounding expression; in so far as it attempts to reflect the old  jus naturale it is a confused and unwarranted transfer into  the ethical  sphere of a term employed for  other  distinctions; and,  in so far as it is resorted to for other purposes,  it is vacuous." Lord  Parmoor  in his speech also reiterated  the  principle governing  the  procedure of a quasi  judicial  tribunal  in these words:- " Where, however, the question of the propriety of procedure is  raised  in a hearing before some tribunal other  than  a Court  of  law there is no obligation to adopt  the  regular forms  of legal procedure.  It is sufficient that  the  case has  been heard in a judicial spirit and in accordance  with the principles of substantial justice." Another recent decision of the House of Lords in the case of General  Medical Council v. Spackman (1) was relied upon  by the  High Court in the judgment under appeal.  In that  case the  General Medical Council, which had been  constituted  a domestic forum to determine whether a case had been made out for striking off the name of a medical practitioner from the medical  register " for infamous conduct in  a  professional respect," was the appellant before their Lordships, and  the respondent  had  been found guilty by the Divorce  Court  of having  committed adultery.  In the proceedings  before  the Medical  Council the medical practitioner proceeded  against desired to call fresh evidence on the issue of adultery  and requested  the  Council to rehear that issue.   The  Council declined to reopen the issue and to hear fresh evidence  and directed his name to be erased from the register.  The Court of  Appeal unanimously affirmed the view of  the  dissenting Judge in the Court of first instance that there had been no (1)  [1943] A.C. 827. 115 "  due  inquiry " as required by s. 29 of the  Medical  Act, 1858.   The Appeal Court set aside the majority decision  of Viscount  Caldecote, C.J., and Humphreys, J., who  had  held that  the  requirements  of the law had  been  satisfied  by adopting  the judgment and decree of the Divorce Court.   On appeal  by  the Medical Council to the House of  Lords,  the House unanimously agreed with the unanimous decision of  the Appeal  Court and held that the requirement of  due  inquiry enjoined  by  the  Act creating the Tribunal  had  not  been satisfied.  Viscount Simon, L.C., examined the provisions of the  Act  and the relevant rules and pointed out  that  they require  the practitioner proceeded against " to  state  his case,  and  to produce the evidence in support of  it."  The Lord  Chancellor in the course of his speech  observed  that the  General Medical Council was not a judicial body in  the ordinary sense, was master of its own procedure and was  not bound by strict rules of evidence.  It was bound to  satisfy the  requirements of the law and the rules made  thereunder. The  Council  had  to decide on sworn  testimony  after  due inquiry.   He  also adopted the language of  Lord  Loreburn, L.C.,  in the aforesaid case of Board of Educatian  v.  Rice (supra).  Lord Atkin in the course of his speech pointed out that  the rules under the Act provided that the Council  was bound,  if  requested,  to hear all the  evidence  that  the practitioner  charged wished to bring before them.  He  also pointed  out the antithesis between convenience and  justice by  saying  "  convenience  and justice  are  often  not  on speakin-  terms."  His  Lordship  further  pointed  out  the difference between the procedure which may be prescribed  in

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respect  of  different  tribunals which  were  creations  of statutes, in these words:- "  Some  analogy  exists,  no  doubt,  between  the  various procedures  of this and other not strictly judicial  bodies, but I cannot think that the procedure which may be very just in  deciding  whether to close a ,school  or  an  insanitary house is necessarily right in deciding a charge of  infamous conduct  against  a professional man.  I  would,  therefore, demur  to  any suggestion that the words of  Lord  Loreburn, L.C.,  in  -Board  of Education v.  Rice  (supra)  afford  a complete guide to 116 the General Medical Council in the exercise of their duties. As  I  have  said, it is not correct that I  they  need  not examine witnesses.’ They must examine witnesses if tendered, and  their own rules rightly provide for this.   Further  it appears  to me very doubtful whether it is true  that  ’they have no power to administer an oath’." It  may  be  noticed that the Lords who  sat  on  that  case particularly emphasized the requirements of the law as  laid down  in  the statute and the rules framed  thereunder.   In view  of those statutory provisions they found it  necessary to uphold the decision of the Court of Appeal which had  set aside  the judgment and orders of the King’s Bench  Division which  had taken the con tarry view, to the effect that  the decree in the Divorce Court was conclusive evidence on which the  Medical  Council  could act.   The  case  is  therefore authority  for  the proposition that the  rules  of  natural justice have to be inferred from the nature of the tribunal, the  scope  of  its  enquiry  and  the  statutory  rules  of procedure  laid  down  by  the  law  for  carrying  out  the objectives of the statute. There  is  another class of cases which lay down that  if  a person is to be deprived of his professional status, he must be  heard and be given effective opportunity of meeting  any allegation  made against him on the question of his  fitness to  pursue his profession.  If the tribunal  constituted  by the  statute in question to decide about the fitness  of  an individual  to pursue that profession, decides  against  him without giving him an opportunity of meeting any allegations against him bearing on his capacity or qualification for the profefession to which he claims admission, it has been  held that  it  was improper for the tribunal acting in  a  quasi- judicial  capacity to act to his prejudice upon evidence  or adverse report without his having an opportunity of  meeting such  relevant allegations made against him.  To that  class belongs  the case of R. v. Architects Registration  Tribunal (1).  In that case the King’s Bench Division issued an order of certiorari to, quash (1)  [1945] 2 A.E.R. 131. 117  the  tribunal’s decision refusing  an  application  for registration as an architect. The cases of Leeson v. General Council of Medical  Education and  Registration  (1), and Allinson v. General  Council  of Medical  Education and Registration (2) also belong to  that category.   They deal with the power of the General  Council of Medical Education under the Medical Act (21 & 22 Viet. c. 90) to strike off a medical practitioner for  unprofessional conduct.  Those were cases in which the Medical Council  had to  function  as a quasi-judicial body and  had  to  proceed according  to  the procedure laid down in the  rules  framed under  the Act aforesaid.  They had therefore  to  function, not  exactly  as courts of law, but  as  domestic  tribunals created  by  the  statute  to  function  according  to   the statutory  rules in a fair and just manner, that is to  say,

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that  they  should have no personal interest  in  the  con;, troversy  and should have given a full and fair  opportunity to the person proceeded against to place his case before the tribunal. Another class of cases is illustrated by the decision of the Court  of Appeal in R. v. Archbishop of  Canterbury(3).   In that  case the Archbishop of Canterbury reviewing the  order of the Bishop refused to approve the clerk presented by  the patron  to a benefice.  Acting under s. 3 of  the  Benefices (Exercise of the Rights of Presentation) Measure, 1931,  the Court  repelled the argument on behalf of  the  disappointed patron  that  as  the decision  involved  a  deprivation  of property rights there was an obligation upon the  Archbishop to  act in a quasijudicial manner.  Lord Greene,  M.R.,  who delivered the judgment of the Court, observed that there was no  " justification for regarding the matter when  it  comes before  the  Archbishop as in any sense, or  by  any  remote analogy,  a his inter parties".  Hence the Court on  a  true construction  of a. 3 of the Measure came to the  conclusion that  the  Archbishop  was not required  to  arrive  at  his decision by conducting a quasi-judicial enquiry.  This case, therefore, is an authority for the (1)  [1890] 43 Ch.  D. 366. (2)  [1894] 1 Q.B. 750. (3) [1944] 1 A.E.R. 179. 118 proposition   that  simply  because  property   rights   are involved, the authorities charged with the duty of  deciding claims  to such rights are not necessarily, apart  from  the provisions  of the statute, required to function  as  quasi- judicial tribunals. As  already  pointed  out, the Appellate  Authority  had  to function in a quasi-judicial capacity in accordance with the rules made under the Motor Vehicles Act.  That Act has  made ample  provisions  for safeguarding the interests  of  rival claimants  for  permits.   The provisions of  the  Act  were examined  in detail by a Bench of five Judges of this  Court in  the case of Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman  Ltd.  (1). This  Court examined elaborately the provisions of  the  Act vis-a-vis  the authorities created by the Act to  administer its  provisions  relating  to the grant  of  stage  carriage permits.  It also examined how far the High Court exercising its  special  powers to issue writs under Art.  226  of  the Constitution  could interfere with the orders made by  those authorities.  In the course of its judgment this Court  made the  following  observations  at page 596,  which  are  very relevant to the present purpose :- "  Thus we have before us a complete and precise scheme  for regulating the issue of permits, providing what matters  are to be taken into consideration as relevant, and  prescribing appeals  and  revisions from subordinate  bodies  to  higher authorities.  The remedies for the redress of grievances  or the correction of errors are found in the statute itself and it is to these remedies that resort must Generally be bad." Keeping in view the observations of this Court quoted  above and  the  principles  of natural justice  discussed  in  the several  authorities  of the highest Courts in  England,  we have to see how far the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and the rules framed thereunder justify the criticism of the High  Court that the Appellate Authority did not  give  full and effective opportunity to the first respondent to present his  point  of view before it.  As  already  indicated,  the statutory (1)  [1952] S. C. R. 583. 119

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provisions  do  not  contemplate that  either  the  Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority had to record evidence  or  to proceed as if they were  functioning  as  a court  of  law.   They had to decide  between  a  number  of applicants as to which of them was suitable for the grant of the fresh permit applied for.  They took into  consideration all  the relevant matters and came to their  decision  which has  not  been attacked as partial or  perverse.   The  only ground which survived before the Appellate Bench of the High Court  was that the requirements of natural justice had  not been satisfied.  The only question that we have to determine is  whether the Appellate Authority was justified  in  using the second report made by the police, though it had not been placed  into the hands of the parties.  That report did  not directly   contain   any  allegations  against   the   first respondent.  Hence there was nothing in that report which it could be called upon to meet.  The only effect of the report was   that  many  of  the  objections  raised  against   the suitability  of  the  appellant had been  withdrawn  by  the police  on  further  consideration of  their  records.   The police report is more for the information of the authorities concerned  with the granting of permits than for the use  of the  several applicants for such permits.  In  our  opinion, therefore,  the fact that the Appellate Authority  had  read out the contents of the police report was enough  compliance with the rules of natural justice.  We have also pointed out that  no  grievance  was  made at  the  time  the  Appellate Authority  was  hearing the appeal by any  of  the  parties, particularly by the first respondent, that the second report should not have been considered or that they wished to  have a  further  opportunity of looking into that report  and  to controvert any matter contained therein.  They did not  move the Appellate Authority for an adjournment of the hearing in order  to  enable it to meet any of the statements  made  in that  report.   But the learned counsel for  the  respondent suggested that the requirements of natural justice could not be  waived by any of the parties and that it  was  incumbent upon the Appellate Authority to observe the so-called  rules of natural justice.  In our 120 opinion,  there is no warrant for such a proposition.   Even in  a  court  of law a party is not entitled  to  raise  the question  at  the appellate stage that he should  have  been granted  an  adjournment which he did not pray  for  in  the court  of  first instance.  Far less, such a  claim  can  be entertained  in  an appeal from a tribunal which  is  not  a court  of  justice, but a statutory body  functioning  in  a quasi judicial way. For  the  reasons aforesaid, in our  opinion,  the  judgment under  appeal is erroneous and must be set aside and we  are further  of  the opinion that the judgment  of  the  learned single  Judge of that Court had taken the more correct  view of  the legal position.  The appeal is  accordingly  allowed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed. 121