1

                 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10941­10942 OF 2013

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD.             …..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

HILLI MULTIPURPOSE COLD  STORAGE PVT. LTD.                   ……RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8343 OF 2014,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1083­1084 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1085­1086 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4473 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6095 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5485 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1964   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.20748 OF 2016]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10127 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10129 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1968   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.29264 OF 2016]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1969  OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.31190 OF 2016]

2

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1970    OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.36048 OF 2016]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10333 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1971  OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.1300 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10858 OF 2016,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1972  OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.35551 OF 2016]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1973   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.34843 OF 2016]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1974     OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.21388 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1975   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.13951 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1976   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.10796 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.780 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4457 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1977    OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.151 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1978    OF 2020,

3

[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.13567 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1979   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.3128 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1965  OF 2020

[ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.25849 OF 2016]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2339 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4510 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1980    OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.7225 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1981  OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.8435 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5219 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1982   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.14346 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5574­5575 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1983   OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.10544 OF 2017]

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7100 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5578­5579 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1984  OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.13962 OF 2017]

4

CIVIL APPEAL NO.10226 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.12456 OF 2017,

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1985­86  OF 2020, [ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION [C] NO.36314­36315 OF 2017]

J U D G M E N T

VINEET SARAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. The reference made to this Constitution Bench relates

to the grant of time for filing response to a complaint under the

provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short ‘the

Act’).  The first question referred is as to whether Section 13(2)

(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, which provides for the

respondent/opposite  party filing its response to the  complaint

within 30 days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days,

should be read as mandatory or directory; i.e., whether the

District Forum has power to extend the time for filing the

response beyond the period of 15 days, in addition to 30 days.

The  second question  which is referred is as to what would be

5

the commencing point of limitation of 30 days stipulated under

the aforesaid Section.

3. The first question was referred by a two judge Bench of

this Court vide an Order dated 11.02.2016 passed in Civil Appeal

No(s).1083­1084 of 2016,  M/s Bhasin Infotech and

Infrastructure  Pvt.  Ltd. versus  M/s  Grand Venezia  Buyers

Association (Reg), the relevant portion of which is as under:

“There is an apparent conflict between the decisions of this Court in Topline Shoes Limited vs. Corporation Bank [(2002) 6 SCC 33], Kailash Vs. Nankhu  [(2005)  4 SCC 480], Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India [(2005) 6 SCC 344] on the one hand and J.J. Merchant & Ors. Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi [(2002)  6 SCC 635 and NIA Vs. Hilli  Multipurpose Cold  Storage [2014 AIOL 4615]  on the other in so far as the power of the Courts to extend time for filing of written statement/reply to a complaint is  concerned.  The earlier mentioned line of decisions take the view that the relevant provisions including those of Order 8 Rule 1 of the Civil  Procedure Code, 1908 are directory in  nature  and  the  Courts concerned have the power to extend time for filing the written statement. The second line of decisions which are also of coordinate Benches

6

however takes a contrary view and hold that when it comes to power of the Consumer Fora to extend the time for filing a reply there is no such power.  

Since  the question that  falls  for determination here often arises before the Consumer Fora and Commissions all over the country it will be more appropriate if the conflict is resolved by an authoritative judgment. Further since the conflict is between Benches comprising three Judges we deem it fit to refer these appeals to a five­Judge Bench to resolve the conflict once and for all. While we do so we are mindful of the fact that in the ordinary course a two­Judge Bench ought to make a reference to a three­Judge Bench in the first place but in the facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the fact that the conflict is between coordinate Benches comprising three Judges a reference to three  Judges  may not suffice.”

4. The other question has been referred by another

Division Bench of this Court by an Order dated 18.01.2017

passed in this very appeal being  Civil Appeal No(s).10941­10942

of 2013, NIA Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd, the

relevant portion of the judgment is as under:

7

“……….what is the commencing point of the limitation of 30 days stipulated in Section 13 of the Act is required to be decided authoritatively. The declaration made in JJ Merchant’s case that the said period  is to  be reckoned from the date of the receipt of the notice by  the  opposite  party  or complaint under the Act requires in our humble opinion, a more critical analysis.”

5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at

length and have carefully gone through the records.  

6. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the

Consumer Protection Act, in paragraph 4, it has been specifically

provided that the Consumer Protection Act is “To provide speedy

and simple redressal to consumer disputes, a quasi­judicial

machinery is sought to be set up at the district, State and Central

levels…….”.  The Preamble of the Consumer Protection Act also

mentions that the Act  is  “to  provide for better  protection of the

interests of the consumers”.   The nomenclature of this Act also

goes to show that it is for the benefit or protection of the

consumer. From the above, it is evident that the Consumer

Protection Act has been enacted to provide for expeditious

8

disposal of consumer disputes and that, it is for the protection

and benefit of the consumer.     

7. Before we proceed to analyse and determine the

questions referred,  we may, for  ready reference, reproduce  the

relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and its

Regulations.  

“Section 13. Procedure on admission of complaint. –  

(1)  The District Forum shall, on admission of a complaint, if it relates to any goods,­  

(a) refer a copy of the admitted complaint, within twenty­one days from  the  date  of its  admission to the opposite party mentioned in the complaint directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum.

(b)………………….

(c)………………….

(d)………………….

(e)………………….

(f)………………….

(g)………………….

(2)  The District Forum shall,  if  the complaints admitted by it under section 12 relates to goods in

9

respect of which the procedure specified  in  sub­section  (1)  cannot be followed, or if the complaint relates to any services,­

(a)   refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum;

(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint, referred to him under clause (a) denies  or  disputes the  allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the District Forum shall proceed to settle consumer dispute,­

(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite party, where the opposite party denies  or  disputes the  allegations contained in the complaint, or

(ii) ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant where the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the Forum;

(c)  where the  complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the District  Forum may either dismiss

10

the complaint for default or decide it on merits.

(3)   No proceedings complying with the procedure laid down in subsections (1) and (2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. 1[(3A)  Every  complaint  shall  be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to decide the complaint within a period of three months from the date of receipt of notice by opposite party where the complaint does not require analysis or testing of commodities and within five months, if it  requires analysis or testing of commodities:

Provided that no adjournment shall  be ordinarily granted by the District Forum unless sufficient cause is shown and the reasons for grant of adjournment have been recorded in writing by the Forum:

Provided further that the District Forum shall make such orders  as to the  costs  occasioned by the adjournment as may be provided in the regulations made under this Act.

Provided also that in the event of a complaint being disposed of after the period so specified, the  District  Forum shall

1 Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, sec. 9 (w.e.f. 15­3­2003).

11

record in  writing, the reasons for the same at the time of disposing of the said complaint.]   2[(3B)  Where  during the  pendency of any proceeding before the District Forum, it appears to it necessary, it may pass such interim order as is just and proper in the facts  and circumstances  of the case.]

(4)  For the purposes of this section, the  District Forum shall have the same powers as  are vested in  a civil court under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:— (i) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any defendant or witness and examining the witness on oath; (ii) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence; (iii) the reception of evidence on affidavits; (iv)  the requisitioning of the report of the concerned analysis or test from the appropriate laboratory or from any other relevant source; (v)  issuing of any commission for the examination of any witness, and (vi) any other matter which may be prescribed.  5………………. 6……………….

2 Ins. by Act 62 of 2002, Sec. 9 (w.e.f. 15­3­2003).

12

7……………….

Section 15.  Appeal. — Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum  may prefer an appeal against such order to the State  Commission within  a  period of thirty days from the date of the order, in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal  after the  expiry  of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period;

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of that amount or twenty­five thousand rupees, whichever is less.”

Section­19. Appeals.—Any person aggrieved by an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers conferred by sub­clause (i) of clause (a) of section 17 may prefer an appeal against such order to the National Commission within a period of

13

thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that the National Commission may entertain an appeal  after the  expiry  of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:

Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the State Commission, shall be entertained by the National Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty­five thousand, whichever is less.

Section­24A. Limitation period.   

(1)  The District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall not admit a complaint  unless it is filed  within two years from the date on which the cause of action has arisen.

(2)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (1), a complaint may be entertained after the period specified in sub­section (1), if the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause

14

for not filing the complaint within such period:

Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless the National Commission, the State Commission or the District Forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for condoning such delay.”

(emphasis supplied)

Relevant  Provisions of the  Consumer Protection Regulations,

2005 are reproduced below:

“Reg.­10. Issue of notice   .­(1)  Whenever the Consumer Forum directs the issuance of a notice in respect of a complaint, appeal or revision petition, as  the case may be, to the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s), ordinarily such notice shall be issued for a period of 30 days and depending upon the circumstances of each case even for less than 30 days. (2)  When there is a question of raising presumption of  service,  30 days notice shall be required.  (3)  Whenever notices are sought to be effected by a courier service, it shall be ascertained that the courier is of repute.  (4)  Whenever appointing the courier for the purpose of effecting

15

service,  security deposit  may also be taken. (5)   Along with the notice, copies of the complaint, memorandum of grounds of appeal, petitions as the case may be and other documents filed  shall  be  served upon  the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s). (6)   After the opposite party or respondent has put in appearance, no application or document shall be received by the Registrar unless it bears an endorsement that a copy thereof has been served upon the other side.”

Reg.­14. Limitation. (1)   Subject to the provisions of sections 15, 19 and 24A, the period of limitation in the following matters shall be as follows:­ (i) Revision Petition shall be filed within 90 days from the date of the order or the date of receipt of the order as the case may be;  (ii) Application for setting aside the ex parte order under section 22A or dismissal of the complaint in default shall be maintainable if filed within thirty days from the date of the order or date of receipt of the order, as the case may be;  (iii) An application for review under sub­section (2) of section 22 shall be filed to the National Commission within 30 days from

16

the date of  the order or receipt of the order, as the case may be;  (iv) The period of limitation for filing  any application for  which  no period of limitation has been specified in the Act, the rules of these regulations shall be thirty days from the date of the cause of action or the date of knowledge.  (2)  Subject to the   provisions of     the Act, the Consumer Forum may condone the delay in filing an application or a petition referred to in sub­ regulation (1) if valid and sufficient reasons to its satisfaction are given.

Reg.­26. Miscellaneous.  (1)   In all proceedings before the Consumer Forum, endeavour shall be made by the parties and  their counsel to avoid the use of provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908):

Provided that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 may be applied which have been referred to in the Act or in the rules made thereunder.  (2)………………..  (3)………………..  (4)………………..  (5)………………..  (6)………………..”

(emphasis supplied)

17

Question No. 1: Whether the District Forum has power to

extend the time for filing of response to

the complaint beyond the period of 15

days, in addition to 30 days, as envisaged

under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer

Protection Act?  

8. A bare reading of Section 13(2)(a) of the Act makes it

clear that the copy of the complaint which is to be sent to the

opposite party, is to be with the direction to give his version of (or

response to) the case (or complaint) within a period of 30 days.  It

further provides that such period of 30 days can be extended by

the District Forum, but not beyond 15 days.  

9. Sub­Section 2(b)(i) of Section 13 of the Act provides for

a complaint to be decided on the basis of the response by the

opposite party and the evidence of the complainant and the

opposite party, where allegations contained in the complaint are

denied or disputed by the opposite party.   Sub­Section 2(b)(ii) of

Section 13 of the Act provides that where no response is filed by

the opposite party, the complaint may be decided ex parte on the

basis of evidence brought forth by the complainant.  

18

10. Sub­Section 2(c) of Section 13 of the Consumer

Protection Act further provides that where the complainant fails

to appear on the date of hearing before the District Forum, the

District Forum may either dismiss the complaint for default or

decide it on merits.  The aforesaid provision [sub­Section 2(c)] was

inserted by Act 62 of 2002, w.e.f. 15.03.2003.  Similarly, Section

(3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, which was also

inserted by Act 62 of 2002, provides for deciding every complaint

as  expeditiously  as possible  and  endeavour   shall  be  made to

decide the complaint within a period of three months from the

receipt of notice by the opposite party, and within five months, if

the complaint requires analysis or testing of commodities.  It also

provides that no adjournment shall ordinarily be granted by the

District Forum, and if the same is to be granted, costs may be

imposed, and further that reasons be recorded if the complaint is

disposed of after the time so provided.  

11. From the above,  it is clear that as mentioned in the

Statement of  Objects  and Reasons of the Consumer Protection

Act, the District Forum is to provide speedy disposal of consumer

disputes.  The same has been further reiterated by the legislature

by insertion of Section 13(2)(c) and 13(3A) by Act 62 of 2002.  

19

12. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly

contemplates where time can be extended by the District Forum,

and where it is not to be extended.  Like, under sub­Section (3A)

of Section 13, despite the best efforts of the District Forum, in

situations where the complaint cannot be decided within the

period  specified therein, the  same  can  be  decided  beyond the

specified period for reasons to be recorded in writing by the

District Forum at the time of disposing of the complaint. Meaning

thereby that the same would not be mandatory, but only

directory.   The  phrase “endeavour shall be  made”,  makes the

intention of the legislature evident that the District Forum is to

make every effort to decide the case expeditiously within time, but

the  same can also be decided beyond the  said period,  but for

reasons to be recorded.  

13. On the contrary, sub­Section (2)(a) of Section 13 of the

Consumer Protection Act provides for the opposite party to give

his response ‘within a period of 30 days or such extended period

not exceeding 15 days as may be granted by the District Forum’.

The intention of the legislature seems to be very clear that the

opposite  party would get  the  time of  30 days,  and  in addition

another 15 days at the discretion of the Forum to file its

20

response.  No further discretion of granting time beyond 45 days

is intended under the Act.   

The  question  of  natural justice is  dealt  with  by the

legislature in sub­Section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer

Protection Act, which clearly provides that “No proceedings

complying with the procedure laid down in the sub­Section (1) and

(2) shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the

principles of  natural justice have not  been complied with.”  The

legislature was conscious that the complaint would result in

being decided  ex parte,  or without the response of the opposite

party, if not filed within such time as provided under the

Consumer Protection Act, and in such a case, the opposite party

will not be allowed to take the plea that he was not given

sufficient time or that principles of natural justice were not

complied with.  Any other  interpretation would defeat  the very

purpose of sub­Section (3) of Section 13 of the Consumer

Protection Act.

14. The maximum period of 45 days, as provided under the

Consumer Protection Act, would not mean that the complainant

has a right to always avail such maximum period of 45 days to

file its response.   Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection

21

Regulations, 2005 clearly provides that ordinarily such notice to

the opposite party to file its response shall be issued for a period

of 30 days, but the same can be even less than 30 days,

depending upon the circumstances of each case.   

15. Now, reverting back to the provisions of the Consumer

Protection Act to consider  as  to whether the  provision of  sub­

Section 2(a) of Section 13 granting a maximum period of 15 days

in addition to 30 days has to be read as mandatory or not, we

may also consider the other provisions of the Consumer

Protection Act where the legislature intended to allow extension of

period of limitation.   

Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act provides for filing

of an appeal from the order of the District Forum to the State

Commission within a period of  30 days.  However, it leaves a

discretion with the State Commission to entertain an appeal filed

after the expiry of the said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that

there was sufficient cause for not filing it within the stipulated

period. Similarly, discretion for filing an appeal before the

National Commission beyond the period of 30 days has also been

provided under Section 19 of the Consumer Protection Act.  

22

Section 24A provides for the limitation period of 2 years for

filing the  complaint.  However,  sub­Section  (2)  of  Section 24A

gives a discretion to entertain a complaint even after the period of

2 years, if there is a satisfactory cause for not filing the complaint

within such period, which has to be recorded in writing.  

16. Regulation 14 of the Consumer Protection Regulations,

2005 also deals with limitation. In addition, the same provides for

limitation while dealing with appeals (under Section 15 and 19)

and complaint (under Section 24A).   Sub­Regulation (2) of

Regulation 14  provides for condonation of delay for sufficient

reasons to be recorded.

17. The legislature in its wisdom has provided for filing of

complaint or appeals beyond the period specified under the

relevant provisions of the Act and Regulations, if there is

sufficient cause given by the party, which has to be to the

satisfaction of the concerned authority. No such discretion has

been provided for under Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer

Protection Act for filing a response to the complaint beyond the

extended period of  45 days (30 days  plus  15 days).  Had  the

legislature  not  wanted to  make  such provision  mandatory  but

only directory, the provision for further extension of the period for

23

filing the response beyond 45 days would have been provided, as

has  been  provided for in the cases  of filing  of complaint  and

appeals.  To carve out an exception in a specific provision of the

statute is not within the jurisdiction of the Courts, and if it is so

done, it would amount to legislating or inserting a provision into

the statute, which is not permissible.   

By specifically enacting a provision under sub­Section

(3) of Section 13, with a specific clarification that violation of the

principles of natural justice shall not be called in question where

the procedure prescribed under sub­Sections (1) and (2) of

Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act has been followed or

complied with, the intention of the legislature is clear that mere

denial of further extension of time for filing the response (by the

opposite  party)  would not  amount  to denial  or  violation of the

principles of natural justice. This provision of Section 13(3)

reinforces the time limit specified in Section 13(2)(a) of the Act.

18. This Court in the case of Lachmi Narain vs Union of

India (1976) 2 SCC 953 has held that “if the provision is couched

in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the

use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative

of  the  interest  that the provision  is  to be mandatory”.   Further,

24

hardship cannot be a ground for changing the mandatory nature

of the statute, as has been held by this Court in  Bhikraj

Jaipurai vs Union of India AIR 1962 SC 113=(1962) 2 SCR 880

and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian (2004) 11 SCC

472.  Hardship cannot thus be a ground to interpret the provision

so as to enlarge the time, where the statute provides for a specific

time,  which, in  our  opinion,  has to  be  complied in letter  and

spirit.  

This  Court, in the  case of  Rohitash Kumar vs Om

Prakash Sharma (2013) 11 SCC 451 has, in paragraph 23, held

as under:

“23.   There may be a statutory provision, which causes great hardship or inconvenience to either the party concerned, or to an individual, but the Court has no choice but to enforce it in full rigor. It is a well settled principle of interpretation that hardship or inconvenience caused, cannot be used as a basis to alter the meaning of the language employed by the legislature, if such meaning is clear upon a bare perusal of the statute.   If the language is plain and hence allows only one meaning, the same has to be given effect to, even if it causes hardship or possible injustice.”

25

While concluding, it was observed “that the hardship caused to an

individual, cannot be a ground for not giving effective and

grammatical meaning to every word of the provision, if the

language used therein, is unequivocal.”

Further, it has been held by this Court in the case of

Popat Bahiru Govardhane vs Special Land Acquisition

Officer (2013) 10 SCC 765 that the law of limitation may harshly

affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its vigour

when the statute so prescribes and that the Court has no power

to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds, even if the

statutory  provision  may  cause  hardship  or inconvenience to  a

particular party.

19. The contention of the learned Counsel for the

respondent is that by not leaving a discretion with the District

Forum for extending the period of limitation for filing the

response before it by the opposite party, grave injustice would be

caused as there could be circumstances beyond the control of the

opposite party because of which the opposite party may not be

able to file the response  within the  period of 30  days  or the

extended period of 15 days.   In our view, if the law so provides,

26

the same has to be strictly complied, so as to achieve the object of

the statute.  It is well  settled that  law prevails over equity,  as

equity can only supplement the law, and not supplant it.  

This Court, in the case of Laxminarayan R. Bhattad

vs State of Maharashtra (2003) 5 SCC 413, has observed that

“when there is a conflict between law and equity the former shall

prevail.”   In  P.M. Latha vs State of Kerala  (2003) 3 SCC 541,

this Court held that  “Equity and law are twin brothers and law

should  be  applied  and interpreted equitably, but equity cannot

override  written or  settled law.”  In  Nasiruddin vs Sita Ram

Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577,  this Court observed that  “in a case

where the statutory provision is plain and unambiguous, the court

shall not interpret the same in a different manner, only because of

harsh consequences  arising therefrom.”  In  E.  Palanisamy vs

Palanisamy  (2003) 1 SCC 123,  it was held that  “Equitable

considerations have no place where the statute contained express

provisions.”   Further,  in   India House vs Kishan N. Lalwani

(2003) 9 SCC 393,  this Court held that  “The period of limitation

statutorily prescribed has to be strictly adhered to and cannot be

relaxed or departed from by equitable considerations.”

27

It is thus settled law that where the provision of the Act

is clear and unambiguous, it has no scope for any interpretation

on equitable ground.  

20. It is true that ‘justice hurried is justice buried’.  But in

the  same breath  it is  also  said that  ‘justice  delayed is justice

denied’.  The legislature  has  chosen  the latter,  and  for  a  good

reason.   It goes with the objective sought to be achieved by the

Consumer Protection Act, which is to provide speedy justice to

the consumer.   It is not that sufficient time to file a response to

the complaint has been denied to the opposite party.   It is just

that discretion of extension of time beyond 15 days (after the 30

days period) has been curtailed and consequences for the same

have  been provided  under  Section 13(2)(b)(ii)  of the  Consumer

Protection Act.   It may be that in some cases the opposite party

could face hardship because of such provision, yet for achieving

the object  of the Act,  which  is  speedy and simple redressal  of

consumer disputes, hardship which may be caused to a party has

to be ignored.   

21. It has been further contended that the language of

Section 13(2) of the Consumer Protection Act is  pari materia  to

Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short

28

‘the Code’) and if time can be extended for filing of written

submission in a suit under the aforesaid provision of the Code,

the same would apply to the filing of response to complaint under

the Consumer Protection Act as well, and hence the provision of

Section 13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act would be

directory and not mandatory.   

In this regard, what is noteworthy is that Regulation 26 of

the Consumer Protection Regulation, 2005, clearly mandates that

endeavour is to be made to avoid the use of the provisions of the

Code except for such provisions, which have been referred to in

the Consumer Protection Act and the Regulations framed

thereunder, which is provided for in respect of specific matters

enumerated in Section 13(4) of the Consumer Protection Act.  It is

pertinent to note that non­filing of written statement under Order

VIII  Rule 1 of  the Code is not  followed by any consequence of

such non­filing within the time so provided in the Code.   

Now, while considering the relevant provisions of the

Code, it is noteworthy that Order VIII Rule 1 read with Order VIII

Rule 10 prescribes that the maximum period of 120 days

provided  under  Order  VIII  Rule  1 is  actually  not  meant to  be

mandatory, but only directory. Order VIII Rule 10 mandates that

29

where  written statement is not filed  within the time  provided

under Order VIII Rule 1  “the court shall pronounce the judgment

against him, or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks

fit”.   A  harmonious  construction  of these  provisions is clearly

indicative of the fact that the discretion is left with the Court to

grant time beyond the maximum period of 120 days, which may

be in exceptional cases.  On the other hand, sub­Section (2)(b)(ii)

of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act clearly provides for

the consequence of the complaint to be proceeded  ex parte

against the opposite party, if the opposite party omits or fails to

represent his case within the time given.  

It may further be noted that in Order VIII Rule 10 of

the Code, for suits filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015,

a proviso has been inserted for ‘commercial disputes of a specified

value’  (vide Act 4 of  2016 w.r.e.f.  23.10.2015),  which reads as

under:  

“Provided further that no Court shall make an Order to extend the time provided under Rule 1 of this Order for filing the written statement”

From the above, it is  clear  that for  commercial  suits, time  for

filing written statement provided under Order VIII Rule 1 is meant

30

to be mandatory, but not so for ordinary civil suits.  Similarly, in

our considered view, for cases under the Consumer Protection Act

also, the time provided under Section 13(2)(a) of the Act has to be

read as mandatory, and not directory.

Once consequences are provided for not filing the

response to the  complaint  within the time  specified, and  it is

further provided that proceedings complying with the procedure

laid  down under  sub Section  (1) and  (2) of  Section 13  of the

Consumer Protection Act shall not be called in question in any

Court on the ground that the principles of natural justice have

not been complied with, the intention of the legislature is

absolutely clear that the provision of sub­Section 2(a) of Section

13 of the Act in specifying the time limit for filing the response to

the complaint is mandatory, and not directory.  

22. After  noticing  that there were delays  in  deciding  the

complaints by the District Forum, the legislature  inserted sub­

Section (3A) of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act

providing for a time limit for deciding the complaints. From this it

is amply clear that the intention of the legislature was, and has

always been, for expeditious disposal of the complaints.   By

providing for extension of time for disposal of the cases filed, for

31

reasons to be recorded,   the legislature has provided for a

discretion to the Forum that wherever necessary, the extension of

the time can be provided for, and where such further extension is

not to be granted  [as in the case of Section 13(2)(a)],   the

legislature has consciously not provided for the same, so as to

achieve the object of the Act.  

23. In  SCG Contracts (India)  Private  Limited vs  K.S.

Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited  (2019) 12 SCC

210,  this Court, was dealing with a case relating to the filing of

written statement under the Code, in respect of a case under the

Commercial  Courts  Act,  2015.  After  noticing the  amendments

brought in Order V Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 1 and Order VIII Rule

10 of the Code with regard to  ‘commercial disputes of specified

value’  under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 by way of

insertion of the Provisos in the aforesaid provisions, this Court

held that “….the clear, definite and mandatory provisions of Order

V read with Order VIII Rule 1 and 10 cannot be circumvented by

recourse to the inherent power under Section 151 to do the

opposite of what is stated therein”.   It was, thus, held that there

was no scope for enlarging the time for filing of written statement

beyond the period of 120 days in commercial suits, as the

32

provision with regard to such suits would be mandatory, and not

directory.   The said judgment has been affirmed by a Bench of

three Judges in Desh Raj vs Balkishan decided on 20.01.2020

in Civil Appeal No.433 of 2020.

24. In  Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. Vs Custodian

(2004) 11 SCC 472, this Court was dealing with the provisions of

the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in

Securities) Act, 1992, and the question was whether the Special

Court has power to condone the delay in filing the petition under

Section 4(2) of the said Act.   While holding, that the said

provision would be mandatory, it was held in paragraph 13 as

under:

“13. It is not for the courts to determine whether the period of 30 days is too short to take into account the various misfortunes that may be faced by notified persons who wish to file objections under  Section  4(2) of the  Act nor can the section be held to be directory  because  of such  alleged inadequacy of time.”

Then,  after  considering the decisions of this  Court in  Topline

Shoes Ltd. vs. Corporation Bank (2002) 6 SCC 33 and Dr. J. J.

33

Merchant vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi  (2002) 6 SCC 635, this

Court held that “the period for filing an objection in Section 4(2) in

the Act is a mandatory provision given the language of the Section

and having regard to the objects sought to be served by the Act.”

25. Certain other cases, which have been referred to by the

learned Counsel for the parties, have, in our considered opinion,

no direct bearing on the facts and issue involved in the present

case relating to the Consumer Protection Act, and thus, the same

are not being dealt with and considered here.  

26. We may now deal with the decisions rendered by this

Court, which have been referred to in the Reference Order.

27. Division Bench of this Court has referred this

Question, after observing that there is an apparent conflict

between the decisions of  this Court  in  Topline Shoes  (supra);

Kailash Vs. Nanhku  (2005)  4 SCC 480  and  Salem Advocate

Bar Association vs. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 on the one

hand;  and  Dr. J. J. Merchant  (supra)  and  NIA vs. Hilli

Multipurpose  Cold  Storage  (2015) 16 SCC 22,  on the other

hand.

34

28. In  Topline  Shoes  (supra),  a  Division  Bench of this

Court, while dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)(a) of the

Consumer Protection Act, has held that the said provision would

be directory and not mandatory.  While holding so,  the Bench

relied on the principles of natural justice, and also that no

consequence of non­filing of the response to the complaint within

45 days is provided for in the Consumer Protection Act.

In paragraph 8 of the said judgment, this Court held:

“It is for the Forum or the Commission to consider all facts and circumstances along with the provisions of the Act providing time­ frame to  file  reply,  as a guideline and then to exercise  its discretion as best as it may serve the ends of justice and achieve the object of speedy disposal of such cases keeping in mind the principles of natural justice as well”.

(emphasis supplied)

It is true that in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and

Reasons of the Consumer Protection Act, the legislature provided

that  “quasi–judicial  bodies will  observe  the principles of  natural

justice”,  however, the same is to be observed generally, and not

where the same is specifically excluded.   In the said judgment,

sub­Section (3) of Section 13 has neither been referred, nor taken

35

note of.  The same mandates that no proceedings complying with

the procedure laid down in sub­Sections (1) and (2) of Section 13

shall be called in question in any Court on the ground that the

principles of natural justice have not been complied with.   From

this it is evident that while considering the provisions of Section

13(2)(a) of the Consumer Protection Act, the law mandates that

the principles of natural justice cannot be said to be violated by

adopting the said procedure and that the time of 30 days plus 15

days provided for filing the response to the complaint would be

sufficient and final.  

In case of  Topline Shoes (supra),  this Court was also

of the view that in the Consumer Protection Act, “no consequence

is provided in case the time granted to file reply exceeds the total

period of 45 days”.   While observing so, the Bench did not take

into account the provisions of Section 13(2)(b)(ii) of the Consumer

Protection Act, which provides that where the opposite party fails

to file response to the complaint within the specified time

provided in Clause (a), “the District Forum shall proceed to settle

the consumer dispute……… on the basis of evidence brought to its

notice by the complainant……..”.  After the said judgment, by

Amendment Act  62 of  2002  (w.e.f.  15.03.2003), the legislature

36

has provided that the District Forum shall proceed to settle the

consumer dispute  “ex parte  on the basis of the evidence”.   The

word “ex parte” has been added by the Amending Act.  As we have

observed herein above, the consequence of not filing the response

to the complaint within the stipulated time is thus clearly

provided  for in the  aforesaid  sub­Section,  which has not  been

noticed by the Bench while deciding the aforesaid case.

29. In the case of Kailash vs. Nanhku (supra), this Court

was dealing  with an election trial  under  the  Representation of

People Act, 1951, and while considering the provision under

Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code, it held the same to be directory,

and not mandatory.  While holding so, the Court was of the view

that “the consequences flowing from non­extension of time are not

specifically provided”  in the Code.   The decision in the said case

has no bearing on the question under consideration, as the

present reference before us is under the Consumer Protection Act,

where, as we have already observed, consequences are specifically

provided for.  

In passing, in paragraph 35 of the said judgment, the

Bench referred to the case of  Topline Shoes  (supra), where the

provision of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act was

37

considered to be directory, and not mandatory.  In our view, the

same would not have the effect of affirming the decision of

Topline Shoes (supra) since the Court, in the aforesaid case, was

dealing with the provisions of the Code and not the specific

provisions of Consumer Protection Act.

We are thus of the opinion that  Kailash vs Nanhku

(supra)  has  not  overruled the  decision in  Dr.  J.  J.  Merchant

(supra)  with regard to the provision of the Consumer Protection

Act.

30. Again, in the case of  Salem Advocates Bar

Association  (supra),  this Court was dealing with a case under

Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and in paragraph 20, it has been

held as under:

“20.………The use of the word “shall” is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule

38

or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice.”

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to refer to the provisions of Order

VIII  Rule 1, along with Order VIII  Rule 10 of  the Code.   On a

harmonious construction of the said provision, it held that the

provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code would be directory,

and not mandatory.  Relevant paragraph 21 of the said judgment

is below:

“21. In construing this  provision, support can also be had from Order  8  Rule  10  which  provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under  Rule  1 or  Rule  9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court shall pronounce judgment against  him, or  make such other order  in relation to the suit  as  it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to the suit  as it  thinks fit.  In the context of the provision, despite

39

use of the word “shall”, the court has  been  given the  discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if the written statement is not filed  and instead  pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision  of  Order  8  Rule  1  and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 Order 8, the court in its discretion would have the power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of the period of 90 days provided in Order 8 Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order 8 Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety  days, further time cannot be granted. The court has wide power to “make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit”. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order  8 Rule 1  providing  for the upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory”.

As such in our view, the said judgment would hold the

field with regard to Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code and would not

be applicable to cases dealing with the provisions of Section 13(2)

of the Consumer Protection Act, or such other enactment wherein

a provision akin to Section 13(2) is there and the consequences

are also provided.

40

31. The case of Dr. J. J. Merchant  (supra)  is one relating

to the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, and has been

decided by a Bench of three Judges of this Court (which is after

the decision in the case of Topline Shoes (supra) was rendered).

In this case it has been held that the time limit prescribed for

filing the response to the complaint under the Consumer

Protection Act, as provided under Section 13(2)(a), is to be strictly

adhered to, i.e. the same is mandatory,  and not directory.   In

paragraph 13 of the said judgment, it has been held that:

“For having speedy trial, this legislative  mandate  of  not  giving more than 45 days in submitting the written statement or the version of the case is required to be adhered to.   If this is not adhered to, the legislative mandate of disposing of the cases within three or five months would be defeated.  

In the said case of  Dr. J. J. Merchant  (supra),  while

holding that the time limit prescribed would be mandatory and

thus be required to be strictly adhered to, this Court also

considered the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the

Consumer Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2002 (which was

subsequently enacted as Act 62 of 2002 and has come in force

41

w.e.f. 15.03.2003).   The salient features of the same  was  “to

provide simple, inexpensive and speedy justice to the

consumers……….”  and that “the disposal of cases is to be faster”

and after noticing that  “several bottlenecks and shortcomings

have also come to light in the implementation of various provisions

of the Act”  and with a view to achieve quicker disposal of

consumer complaints, certain amendments were made in the Act,

which included  “(iii) prescribing the period within which

complaints are to be admitted, notices are to be issued to opposite

party and complaints are to be decided”.  With this object in mind,

in sub­Section (2)(b)(ii) of Section 13, the opening sentence  “on

the basis of evidence”  has been substituted by  “ex parte  on the

basis of evidence”. By this amendment, consequences of not filing

the response to the complaint within the specified limit of 45 days

was to  be that the  District  Forum shall  procced to  settle the

consumer dispute ex parte on the basis of evidence brought to its

notice by the complainant, where the opposite party omits or fails

to take action to represent his case within time.   For achieving

the objective of quick disposal of complaints, the Court noticed

that sub­Section (3A) of Section 13 was inserted, providing that

the complaint should be heard as expeditiously as possible and

42

that endeavour should be made to normally decide the complaint

within 3 months, and within 5 months where analysis or testing

of commodities was required.   The Provisos to the said sub­

Section required that no adjournment should be ordinarily

granted and  if  granted, it  should  be  for  sufficient  cause  to  be

recorded in writing and on imposition of cost, and if the

complaint could not be decided within the specified period,

reasons for the same were to be recorded at the time of disposing

of the complaint.  

It  was  after observing so, and considering  aforesaid

amendments, this Court held that the time limit of 30 plus 15

days in filing the response to the complaint, be mandatory and

strictly adhered to.   

32. The decision of another Bench of three Judges in NIA

vs Hilli Multipurpose Coldstorage  (supra),  which has been

considered in the referring order was passed by a bench of two

Judges in the same case, after noticing a conflict of views in the

cases of  Dr. J.  J.  Merchant  (supra)  and  Kailash vs Nanhku

(supra).

After considering the provisions of the Code and

Consumer Protection Act, the reference was answered  “that the

43

law laid down by a three Judge Bench of this Court in  Dr. J. J.

Merchant (supra) should prevail”.   In coming to this conclusion,

the following was observed in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the said

judgment:

“25.   We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment delivered in  J.J.  Merchant  holds the field and therefore, we reiterate the view that the District Forum can grant a further period of 15 days to the opposite party for filing his version or reply and not beyond that.

26.   There is one more reason to follow the law laid down in J.J. Merchant.   J.J. Merchant was decided in 2002, whereas Kailash was decided in 2005. As per law laid down by this Court, while dealing Kailash, this Court ought to have respected the view expressed in J.J. Merchant as the judgment delivered in J.J. Merchant was earlier in point of time.   The aforesaid legal position cannot be  ignored by us and therefore, we are of the opinion that the view expressed in J.J. Merchant should be followed.”

33. Although, after the above decision, no further reference

was required to be made, but still we have proceeded to answer

44

the question referred to this Constitution Bench and are of the

considered opinion that the view expressed by this Court in the

case of Dr. J. J. Merchant (supra) is the correct view.

Question No. 2: What would be the commencing point of

limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of

the Consumer Protection Act, 1986?  

34. The question for determination is whether the

limitation under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act for

filing the response by the opposite party to the complaint would

commence from the date of receipt of the notice of the complaint

by the opposite party, or the receipt of notice accompanied by a

copy of the complaint.  

35.  In paragraph 12 of the judgment dated 04.12.2015, of

three Judge Bench of this Court, in this very case of NIA vs. Hilli

Multipurpose Cold Storage  (supra),  while referring to the

commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13(2) of

the Consumer Protection Act, it has been held that  “The whole

issue centres round the period within which the opponent has to

give his version to the District Forum in pursuance of a complaint,

45

which is admitted under Section 12 of the Act.   Upon receipt of a

complaint by the District Forum, if the complaint is admitted under

Section 12 of the Act, a copy of the complaint is to be served upon

the opposite party and as per the provisions of Section 13 of the

Act, the opposite party has to give his version of the case within a

period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the

complaint.”

36. However, another two judge Bench of this Court, by an

Order  dated 18.01.2017 passed  in  this  very Appeal  being  Civil

Appeal No(s).10941­10942 of 2013,  NIA Vs. Hilli Multipurpose

Cold Storage, has expressed the view that the declaration made

in Dr. J. J. Merchant’s case to the effect that the said period is

to be reckoned from the date of receipt of notice by the opposite

party or complaint under the Act,  requires a more critical

analysis.   The bench thus opined that  “what is the commencing

point of the limitation of 30 days stipulated in Section 13 of the Act

is required to be decided authoritatively”. It is thus that this

question has been placed before us for an authoritative decision.

37. For  deciding this  question,  we  may first  analyse the

relevant provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and the

46

Regulations framed thereunder. Sub­Sections (2)(a) and (2)(b) of

Section13 of the Consumer Protection Act specify that  it is the

copy  of the complaint  which is to given to the  opposite  party

directing him to give his version of the case within a period of 30

days or such extended period, not exceeding 15 days. As such,

from the aforesaid provision itself, it is clear that it is the copy of

the  admitted  complaint  which  is to  be  served,  after  which  the

period to file the response would commence.  

Further, Regulation 10 of the Consumer Protection

Regulations, 2005 also specifies the procedure of issuing notice,

which should be accompanied by copy of the complaint.

Regulation 10(5) clearly mentions that “along with the notice,

copies of the complaint, memorandum of grounds of appeal,

petitions as the case may be and other documents filed shall be

served upon the opposite party(ies)/respondent(s)”.  The same

would also make  it  clear that it is  on service  of  a  copy of the

complaint that the period of limitation for filing the response by

the opposite party shall commence.  

38. Even in the Code of Civil Procedure, Order VIII Rule 1

prescribes that the written statement shall be filed by the

defendant within 30 days from the receipt of the “summons”.

47

“Summons” has been defined in Order V Rule 1 of the Code and

Rule 2 provides that  “Every summon shall be accompanied by a

copy of the plaint.”   While considering the aforesaid provisions, a

two judge Bench of this Court in the case of  Nahar Enterprises

vs Hyderabad Allwyn Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 466 has, in paragraph 8,

9 and 10, held as under:  

(8)  The learned counsel appears to be correct.   When a summons is sent calling upon a defendant to appear in the court and file his written statement, it is obligatory on the part of the court to send a copy of the plaint and other documents appended thereto, in terms of Order 5 Rule 2 CPC. (9)  Order  5  Rule  2  CPC reads as under: “2. Copy of plaint annexed to summons. – Every summon shall be  accompanied by a copy of the plaint.” (10)  The learned Judge did not address itself the question as to how a defendant, in absence of a copy of the plaint and other documents, would be able to file his written statement…………………….……..”  

39. Even  in Arbitration and Conciliation  Act,  1996,  sub­

Section (5) of Section 31 provides that “after the arbitral award is

48

made, a signed copy shall be delivered to each party”.  An

application for setting  aside the  arbitral award is to  be  made

under Section 34 of the said Act.  The delivery of the award sets in

motion the limitation for challenging the award under Section 34

of the said Act. While interpreting the nature and scope of Section

31(5) of the said Act, a three Judge Bench of this Court in Union

of India vs Tecco Trichy Engineers & Contractors,  (2005) 4

SCC 239, has, in paragraph 6, held as under:

(6)  Form and contents of the arbitral award are provided by Section 31 of the Act. The arbitral award drawn up in the manner prescribed by Section 31 of the Act has to be signed and dated. According to sub­section (5), “after the arbitral award is made, a signed copy shall be  delivered to each party”. The term “party” is defined by clause (h) of Section 2 of the Act as meaning “a party to an arbitration agreement”. The definition is to be read as given unless the context otherwise requires. Under sub­section (3) of Section 34 the limitation of 3 months  commences from  the  date on which “the party making that application” had received the arbitral award. ……………”

From the above, what we  notice is that wherever limitation is

provided, either for filing response/written statement or filing an

49

appeal, it is the copy of the plaint or the order/award which is to

be served on the party concerned after which alone would

commence the period of limitation.  

40. Now reverting to the provisions of the Consumer

Protection Act, a conjoint reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub­

Section (2) of Section 13 would make the position absolutely clear

that the  commencing point  of limitation of  30  days,  under the

aforesaid provisions, would be from the date of receipt of notice

accompanied by a copy of the complaint, and not merely receipt of

the notice, as the response has to be given, within the stipulated

time, to the averments made in the complaint and unless a copy of

the complaint is served on the opposite party, he would not be in a

position to furnish its reply. Thus, mere service of notice, without

service of the copy of the complaint, would not suffice and cannot

be the commencing point of 30 days under the aforesaid Section of

the Act. We may, however, clarify that the objection of not having

received a copy of the complaint along with the notice should be

raised on the first date itself and not thereafter, otherwise if

permitted to be raised at  any point later  would defeat  the very

purpose of the Act, which is to provide simple and speedy

redressal of consumer disputes.

50

41. To  conclude,  we  hold that  our  answer to the first

question  is that the District Forum has no power to extend the

time for   filing  the  response  to   the    complaint   beyond  the

period  of  15  days   in   addition  to  30  days  as  is  envisaged

under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection

Act;  and  the   answer  to  the  second  question  is  that  the

commencing point of limitation of 30 days under Section 13 of the

Consumer Protection Act would be from the date of receipt of the

notice accompanied with the complaint by the opposite party, and

not mere receipt of the notice of the complaint.

This Judgment to operate prospectively.   

The referred questions are answered accordingly.  

………………………………..J.                                                [Arun Mishra]

………………………………..J.                                               [Indira Banerjee]

………………………………..J.                                         [Vineet Saran]

51

………………………………..J.                                                [M. R. Shah]

………………………………..J.                                              [S. Ravindra Bhat]

New Delhi Dated: March 4, 2020