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PETITIONER: NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ALLIED MOTORS PVT. LTD. & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT17/10/1995

BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. BENCH: PUNCHHI, M.M. SINGH N.P. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  388            1995 SCC  Supl.  (4) 150  JT 1995 (7)   460        1995 SCALE  (6)37

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T Punchhi, J.      This appeal  by special  leave is  directed against the judgment and  order dated  May 21, 1981 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi passed in Letters patent Appeal No.121 of 1973, upturning the decision of a learned Single Judge, as a result of  which Civil Writ Petition No.653-D of 1963 stands allowed,  and   sequally  the  demand  of  Advertisment  Tax quashed.      The appellant  is the New Delhi Municipal Committee. In exercise of  its powers  under  the  provisions  of  Section 188(v) and  199 of  the  Punjab  Municipal  Act,  1911,  the committee   appellant,   after   following   the   statutory procedure, framed  Bye-laws, providing  for the  control and regulation of  advertisements, which  inter alia provided as follows:                   "Bye-laws      1. Every  person who  erects,  exhibits,      fixes, paints,  carries or  retains upon      or  over   any  land,   building,  wall,      scores, boarding,  structure or  vehicle      any advertisement  within the  limits of      the New Delhi Municipal Committee and as      mentioned in  the  Chief  Commissioner’s      notification No.F.3(56)/56-LSG dated the      23rd January  1958, shall  be liable  to      pay  advertisement   tax  on   the  same      according  to   the  schedule  of  rates      appended to  the said notification. This      schedule  of   rates  is  reproduced  in      Appendix ’A’ to these Bye-laws.      2.   No person  shall fix  up, erect  or      exhibit any advertisement without paying      the entire amount of tax due in advance.      3.        xxxxx

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    4.        xxxxx      5.        xxxxx      6.        xxxxx      7.    The  Tax shall  not be  payable on      the     following      categories     of      advertisements :      (Before 19.2.1971)  (After    ( 19.2.71)      (a) Name boards     Name boards display-      displayed by the    ed by the traders on      traders on their    their own   premises      own premises        provided they do not      provided the board  contain  any item of      is purely a name    advertisement  other      board and it does   than the name of the      not contain any     trade  that  may  be      item of advertise-  carried out  at  the      ment.               premises.      (b)  xxxxx      (c)  xxxxx      (d)  xxxxx      (e) Advertisement  which relates  to the      trade, profession or business carried on      within the land or building upon or over      which such advertisement is exhibited or      to any  sale or  letting of such land or      building or  any effects  therein or any      sale, entertainment  or  meeting  to  be      held on or upon or in the same.      Provided that  exemption under this item      shall apply  only to one board displayed      by the owner or his agent.      (f) Advertisement  which relates  to the      name of  the land  or building  upon  or      over   which    the   advertisement   is      exhibited or to the name of the owner or      occupier of such land or building.      (g)   xxxxx      (h)   xxxxx      EXPLANATION -  The  word  advertisement’      means any  word,  letter,  model,  sign,      placard,     notice,      device      or      representation, whether  illuminated  or      not,  in  the  nature  of  and  employed      wholly or  in part  for the  purpose  of      advertisement,      announcement      or      direction."      The writ-petitioners  before the  High  Court  are  the respondents herein.  The first respondent M/s. Allied Motors Pvt. Ltd.  carries on business of sale, purchase and repairs etc. of motor cars, Lambretta Scooters, and truck chasis and also  deals   in  the  sale  of  Burshane  Gas.  The  second respondent is its Managing Director. The third respondent is an Association of Traders having their business place in the territorial area  of  the  Committee.  The  Respondent  No.1 exhibits eight  neon signs  boards on  its  premises,  those being: 1.  "Allied   Motors  Private   Ltd.  "  Board  being  of  a paerticular size 2. "Perkings" Board being of a particular size 3. "Perkings"          " 4. "R.R."              " 5. "Bedford"           " 6. "Lambretta"         " 7. "Burshane"          " 8. "Gaskets"           "

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    In  view  of  exhibitilon  of  these  nenon-signs,  the appellant-Committee rasided a demand raised a demand against the said  respondents  for  payment  of  advertisement  tax. Feeling aggrieved,  the respondents  moved the High Court of Delhi by  was of  a writ petition challenging the imposition of tax  on a veriety of grounds. A learned Single Judge, who got to  grips with  the matter  posed  three  questions  for determination,   out   of   whom   two   relating   to   the constitutionality of  the measure  do not  survive  as  they stand dropped,  for they  were answered  against  the  writ- petitioners by  the learned  Single Judge and those were not raised again  before the  Letters Patent  Bench.  The  Third question was as follows:      "Whether the  Boards  displayed  by  the      Petitioners  are   not   "advertisement"      boards but  merely  sign-boards  of  the      items in which the petitioners deal"      Holding that  the boards  displyed by  the  respondents were in the nature of advertisments the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Before the Letters Patent Bench the third  question  got  subsided  and  then  came  to  the forefront claim  of  the  respondents  for  exemption  under clauses (a)  of Bye Law 7. The Letters Patent Bench accepted the appeal on the interpretaion given by it to clause (a) of Bye-Law 7  to the  effect that  the boards  displayed by the respondents were  purely nameboards,  containing no  item of advertisement  except   the  trade   name  of  the  articles suggested to  be offered  for sale.  This has  given rise to this appeal  by the  Committee as  the respondents now stand absolved from payment of tax.      Before we  garner our  minds to  discover  how  certain advertisements are  exempted from  taxation, it  needs to be priorly accepted  that those  would  be  advertisements,  as covered and  concerived  of  by  Bye-law    1.  If  the  act attracting taxation  does  not  come  within  the  scope  of ’advertisement’  within   the  meaning   of  Bye-law  7  any exemption from  payment of  tax on  exempted  advertisements does not  arise. But  if the  act comes  within the scope of advertisement, unguestionably and undeniably, then alone can resort  be   had  to  bye-law  7  to  discover  whether  the advertisement is  such a  one to  which any exemption can be attracted. It  is in  this light that we see that Clause (a) of Bye-law  7, provides  that tax  shall not  be payable  on nameboard displayed  by the  traders on  their own premises, provided the  board is  purely a  nameboard and  it does not contain any  item of  advertisement. It  is plain  therefore that it  shall intitially  by an  advertisement but would be exempted from  taxation if (i) is displyed by a trader, (ii) on his  own premises,  (iii) purely  as a name board as such and (iv)  on purity  maintained by  not containing any other item of  advertisement. That is the pre-amended Bye-law with which we   are  instantly concerned.  In contrast Clause (f) specifically takes  out advertisements  which relate  to the name of  the land or building upon or over which the name of the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited or  relating to  the name of the owner or occupier of such  land  or  building.  By  process  of  contrast  and exclusion, advertisements so exhibited, which related to the name of the land or builiding or to the name of its owner or occupier is a category apart and distinct from advertisement by   means    of   nameboards.   Even   distinct   are   the advertisements, as  conceived of in Clause (e) of Bye-law 7, which relate to the trade, profession or business carried on within  the  land  or  building  upon  or  over  which  such advertisement is exhibited or to any sale or letting of such

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land or  building  or  any  effects  therein  or  any  sale, entertainment or  meeting to  be held  on or  upon or in the same; provided  that exemption  under this  item shall apply only to one board displayed by the owner or his agent.           Such being  the state  of bye-laws,  we  would  be causing violence  to the  spirit of Clause (a) of of Bye-law 7, in splitting the expression "nameboard" into two separate words i.e. name and board and depleting the provision of its intent. Apparently this is a term of art, finding its way to the alleys  of law  by subordinate legislation. Necessarily, we need to seek help from English dictionaries and cannot go by  just   impressions.  According   to  The   Random  House Dictionary  of   the  English   language,   the   expression "name.board" (perhaps  hyphenated) means  a sign-board  that identifies  a  place  or  object;  it  is  a  name  painted, stenciled, etc.  on something,  as on  the side  of a  ship. (Name  +   Board).  According   to   Webster’s   Third   New International Dictionary, the word "nameboard" (as one word) is meant  as an  identifying signboard  (as for a station, a shop or  a ship) ; also an identifying name displayed (as on the side of a ship) other than on a board. The nameboard (be it called  a single word, or combination of two words, or an expression) thus  in the  English diction a distinct meaning which cannot  be mutilated  by splitting  the same  into two separate words  of ’name’  and  ’board’,  discovering  their individual meanings  and then tying them up. It would rather be safe  to rely on the aforesaid two dictionary meanings to deduce that  even though  under Clause  (a) of Bye-law 7 two words, i.e.  ’name’ and ’board’ are used in succession, what is intended  to mean  is that these go to make one word or a combined  word,   in  order   to  exempt   advertisement  by displaying  of   the  name-board   by  the   trader  on  his ownpremises, provided  the board  is purely a name-board and does not contain any item of advertisment. Significantly, in the in-built  proviso, the word "name-board" in its pristine purity, reflects  something more  than a  board and  in that manner distinctive. This adds to our analysis that the words ’name’ and  ’board’ are  not separate  so  as  to  be  given separate meanings  anf then  coalescing them  up. Rather, in our  view   the  name-board   is  one  word,  as  recognised separately, on  its own  strength, in  the dictionaries. And according to  those dictionaries,  the identifying  name  so displayed pertains  to the  place or object, not the name of the trade  or the owner. A name-board thus plays the part of the identifier, if the place/premises has a name, by display of such  name. To demonstrate and clarify it further, we say that if by means of paint or structural signs an identifying name  is  engrafted  over  a  building,  as  an  identifying measure, thenm  it is  a name board. because becoming a part of the  premises it  makes the premises self introductory by name.      The case  of the  respondents being that they use neon- lights to  disply the  names of  commodities they sell would fall since those advertisements cannot be called name-boards or even  as identifying  the name of any object in which the trader was  doing his  business  that  being  barely  barely descriptive of  the commodity.  It would  be more apt to say that the  name-board relates  to the  objest and  not to the subject. This  marked distinction  takes out the case of the respondents from  seeking exemption  under Clause (a) of By- law 7.  The Division  Bench of the High Court apparently was misled to  discover separate  meaning of the word ’name’ and then of  the word  ’board’ whereafter  to put  them  into  a combination, assigning  a  meaning  to  ’name-board’  as  if covering trade  description of  commodities offered for sale

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and granted  relief to  the responedents on that basis. This in our  view was a wrong approach leading the judgment to be view was  a  wrong  approach  leading  the  judgment  to  be vulnerable.      The respondents  did  not  claim  any  exemption  under Clause (e)  of  Bye-law  7.  The  said  provision  has  been adverted  earlier   in  passing.  It  is  to  be  seen  that advertisement  as  relating  to  the  trade,  profession  or business carried on within the land or building upon or over which such  advertisement is put are to be exempted. Equally exemption is  claimable for  such land  or building  or  any effects therein.  Like-wise  adertisments  relating  to  any entertainment or  meeting to  be held  on or  upon or in the same is  to be exempted; provided that exemption is valid to the owner  or agent  for one board. Thus advertisement which has nexus  with  the  trade  profession  or  business  would qualify for  exemption if  relating to  the named activites. The respondents succeeded before the Letters Patent Banch of the High Court only on the basis of clause (a) of Bye law 7. The bench  when called upon by the present appellant to give favourable interpretation to clause (a) of Bye laws 7 on the basis of  clause (e)  observed that  it appears to them that clause (e)  observed that it appears to them that clause (e) would apply  to those  adertisements which  relate (only) to the trade,  profession or  business or  something more  than mere name  boards. The  respondents herein  (the  appellants there-at) did  not build  their case on the envil of claiuse (e) of  Bye laws 7 and any attempt herein, in the absence of the views  of the  High Court, would negate proper handling. We would  therefore leave the matter at that. This course is all  the more necessary when there is an amendment in clause (a) of  Bye laws  7 effective  from 19-2-1971  whereunder  a name-boards remains  as such  displayable by  the traders on their own  premises provided  they do  not add  any item  of advertisement thereto  other than the name of the trade that may be  carried out at the premises. But, as said before, we are concerned with the period prior to that requiring us not to give a positive opinion.      For the  foregoin reasons we are of the considered view that the  judgment and  order of  the  Latter  Patent  Bench deserves to  be set aside. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside  the same  dismissing the  civil writ  petition of respondent 1  to 3,  upholding the  damand of  advertisement tax. Parties to bear their own costs throughout.