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PETITIONER: NAWABKHAN ABBASKHAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/02/1974

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR 1471            1974 SCR  (3) 427  1974 SCC  (2) 121  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1981 SC 818  (19)  D          1988 SC1531  (193)

ACT: Bombay Police Act, 1951, Sections 56 and 142-Prosecution for contravention  of externment order-Pending trial High  Court quashing the order under Art. 226-Effect of quashing-if void ab initio-Natural justice.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was prosecuted under s. 142  of  the  Bombay Police  Act,  1951 on contravention of an  externment  order issued under s. 56 of that Act.  During the pendency of  the criminal trial, the High Court, in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, quashed the order of externment on  the ground  that no opportunity to show cause was given  against allegations relating to areas where the acts were alleged to have  been  committed.  In criminal trial, the  trial  court acquitted  the appellant.  On appeal by the State  the  High Court convicted the appellant.  It held that the accused had re-entered  the  forbidden area during the currency  of  the order.  The High Court was of the view that the quashing  of the  order  by  the  court  did  not  render  the  order  of externment void ad initio but it only invalidated the  order with effect from the date of the issue of the writ  quashing the order. On  the  question whether the externment order  having  been quashed  by  the  High  Court during  the  pendency  of  the criminal trial the order had become void ab initio and there being no quit order there was no offence. Allowing the appeal, HELD  : that an order which infringed a fundamental  freedom passed  in violation of the audi alteram partem rule  was  a ’nullity.   A  determination is no determination  if  it  is contrary to the constitutional mandate of Art. 19.  On  this footing  the  externment  order was of  no  effect  and  its violation  was no offence.  Any order made  without  hearing the  party affected is void and ineffectual to bind  parties from  the beginning if the in jury is to a  constitutionally guaranteed right.  May be that in ordinary legislation or at common  law  a Tribunal having Jurisdiction and  failing  to hear  the parties may commit an illegality which may  render

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the  proceedings  voidable  when a direct  attack  was  made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review, but nullity is the  consequence of unconstitutionality and so the order  of an administrative authority charged with the duty of comply- ing  with  natural justice in the exercise of  power  before restricting  the fundamental right of a citizen is  void  ab initio and of no legal efficacy.  The duty to hear  menacles his   jurisdictional  exercise  and  any  act  Is,  in   its inception, void except when performed in accordance with the conditions laid down in regard to hearing. [432 G. 436 F] An  order  which is void may be  directly  and  collaterally challenged in legal proceedings.  An order is null and  void if  the  statute clothing the administrative  tribunal  with power  conditions it with the obligation to hear,  expressly or by implication.  Beyond doubt an order which infringes  a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi  alteram partem rule is a nullity.  When a competent court holds such official act or order invalid, or sets it aside, it operates from nativity, that is, the impugned act or order was  never valid. [439 F] In  the present case a fundamental right of  the  petitioner had been encroached upon by the Police Commissioner  without due  hearing.   The  Court quashed that  order.   The  legal result  Is that the accused was never guilty of flouting  an order which never legally existed. [439; D-E] [The  Court  did not express its final opinion on  the  many wide  ranging problems in public law of illegal  orders  and violation thereof by citizens.] [439 E] 428

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 1970. From  the  judgment  and order dated March 5,  1970  of  the Gujarat  High Court at Ahmedabad in Criminal Appeal No.  673 of 1968. S.   K. Dholakia, for the appellant. G.   A. Shah and M. N. Shroff, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA IYER, J. The appeal before us raises a thorny  issue of some importance which may be epigramatically expressed as when  has the citizen the discretion to disobey an  order  ? When  is a determination not a determination ?  This  riddle has  to  be solved in the foggy legal light  of  conflicting decisions and academic opinions, Indian and  Anglo-American. To  appreciate the contention urged in the case a few  facts must be narrated. Section  56  of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, (the  Act,  for short),  empowers  a  Police  Commissioner  to  extern   any undesirable  person  on  grounds set  out  therein  and  the petitioner  fell  victim  to  such  a  direction  issued  on September  5, 1967.  On contravention of that order  he  was prosecuted  under Sec. 142 of the Act but was acquitted  by. the  trial Court.  The State appealed with success, for  the High  Court  held  that  the  accused  had  re-entered   the forbidden  area during the currency of the order.   What  is crucial for this case is whether the externment order having been  quashed  by  the  High Court under  Art.  226  of  the Constitution  on  July 16, 1968-during the pendency  of  the criminal trial-it had become void ab initio and there  being thus no quit order in law there was no offence.  The learned Judge rejected this effect of the writ issued under Art. 226 and  convicted the accused.  His reasoning,  invigorated  by

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surgical imagery, flowed thus:               "Now the contravention took place on September               17,  1967  whereas  the  externment  order  in               question  has  been  quashed  about  one  year               thereafter  on July 16, 1968.   The  question,               therefore,  is : can a person against whom  an               order  of externment under section 56  of  the               Bombay Police Act has been issued disobey  the                             said   order  and  contravene  the   d irections               contained    therein    with    impunity    if               subsequently  the  order is quashed ?  If  the               argument  of  the learned counsel were  to  be               accepted, though the externment order held the               field and had not been quashed at the material               time, no offence would be committed in view of               the  subsequent  quashing of  the  order.   In               other  words,  though the order had  not  been               declared  invalid  at  the  material  time   a               contravention thereof would not constitute  an               offence.   A distinction in my opinion has  to               be  drawn between an order which is ab  initio               void  and  an  order  which  is   subsequently               quashed on account of some technical defect or               irregularity.   If  the order  was  ab  initio               void. if it was a nullity from the, inception,               if it was a still born child, the matter would               have stood on a different               429               footing.   In the present case the  child  was               alive and kicking and apparently healthy.   It               has subsequently died during the course of  an               exploratory  operation.   The order  has  been               held  to  be  invalid and is  quashed  on  the               ground that it cannot be sustained on  account               of  some  defect,  infirmity  or  irregularity               which  has  been subsequently  discovered.  it               cannot  be  said that the order  was  void  ab               initio.  The order of the High Court passed on               July  16,  1968  does not  render  the  order,               nullity  from its very inception.  It  is  not               retroactive.  it does not render the order  of               externment  "non  est".  What it  does  is  to               invalidate it with effect from the date of the               issue of the writ quashing the said order.  If               the argument of the learned counsel were to be               sustained  it  would result  in  an  anomalous               situation.    The  externment  order  can   be               violated  with impunity if a  subsequent  writ               petition is allowed and the order is  quashed.               The  contravention, however, would  constitute               an  offence if the writ petition is  rejected.               It is not possible to take a view which  would               result in such an anomalous situation.   There               is no principle in upholding the  respondent’s               claim that he has a right to violate an  order               passed by an authority having jurisdiction  to               pass  it, if subsequently he can persuade  the               court  that  there was an in built  lacuna  or               latent  defect  in the said order.   In  other               words he claims to have the right to judge for               himself whether the order is legal or not  and               in  anticipation  of the court  upholding  his               contention,  the  right to  violate  it  with,               impunity.   Be it realised that  these  powers

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             are  vested into the administration to  enable               it to take prophylactic action to protect  the               society  from imminent dangers.  These  powers               cannot  be  allowed-to  be  robbed  of   their               potency  at  the  sweet  will  of  the  person                             proceeded   against   in  anticipation    of   a               subsequent favourable verdict of the court." There  are some untoward potentialities and legal  anomalies visualised by the learned Judge which lend assurance to  the juridical concept that an order or act quashed by a court is valid until judicially set aside or declared void.  We  have to  examine the validity of this temporary validity  imputed to an otherwise bad order.  When does a bad order become bad ? Violation of natural justice is the vice of the order  which was  defied  by  the accused.  We will  first  set  out  the relevant  provision in he Act and the ground of decision  in the  writ petition, shorn of unnecessary portions.   Section 56 reads:--               "Whenever  it shall appear in  Greater  Bombay               and  other areas for which a Commissioner  has               been   appointed  under  section  7   to   the               Commissioner  and  in other area or  areas  to               which    the   State   Government   may,    by               notification in the Official Gazette,  extend,               the  provisions of this section’, to the  Dis-               trict   Magistrate,  or   the   Sub-Divisional               Magistrate  specially empowered by  the  State               Government  are  that  behalf  (a)  that   the               movements or acts of any person are causing or               calculated               Sup.  CI/74               430               to cause. alarm, danger or, harm to person  or               property,  or  (b) that there  are  reasonable               grounds  for  believing that  such  person  is               engaged  or  is about to be  engaged  in  the,               commission  of an offence involving  force  or               violence   or  an  offence  punishable   under               Chapter  XII, XVI or XVII of the Indian  Penal               Code, or in the abetment of any such  offence,               and  when  in  the  opinion  of  such  officer               witnesses are, not willing to come forward  to               give evidence in public against such person by               reason  of  apprehension  on  their  part   as               regards   the  safety  of  their   person   or               property, or (c) that an outbreak of  epidemic               disease is likely to result from the continued               residence  of  an immigrant the  said  officer               may, by an order in writing duly served on him               or by beat of drum or otherwise as he  thinks.               fit,  direct  such person or immigrant  so  to               conduct  himself  as shall seem  necessary  in               order  to  prevent violence and alarm  or  the               outbreak  or  spread  of such  disease  or  to               remove  himself  outside the area  within  the               local limits of his jurisdiction (or such area               and  any  district or districts, or  any  part               thereof,  contiguous thereto) by  such  route,               and  within such time as the said officer  may               prescribe  and not to enter or return  to  the                             said area (or the area and such contig uous dis-               tricts, or part thereof, as the case may  be),

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             from which he was directed to remove himself." The   vital  freedom  guaranteed  under  Art.  19   of   the Constitution  becomes  a fleeting fragrance if a  police  or magisterial officer can whisk you away by a more  executive- than-judicial    fiat.     This   strange    power,    whose constitutionality is not challenged before us, is  hopefully fettered in its exercise by Section 59 which runs thus :-               "(1)  Before an order under section 55, 56  or               57  is passed against any person  the  officer               acting  under any of the said sections or  any               officer above the rank of an Inspector  autho-               rised by that officer shall inform the  person               in  writing  of  the  general  nature  of  the               material allegations against him and give  him               a  reasonable  opportunity  of  tendering   an               explanation  regarding them.  If  such  person               makes  an application for the  examination  of               any witness produced by him, the authority  or               officer    concerned    shall    grant    such               application; and examine such witness,  unless               for  reasons  to be recorded in  writing.  the               authority  or officer is of opinion that  such               application   is  made  for  the  purpose   of               vexation or delay.  Any written statement  put               in  by  such person shall be  filed  with  the               record  of  the case.  Such  person  shall  be               entitled   to   appear  before   the   officer               proceeding  under this section by an  advocate               or  attorney for the purpose of tendering  his               explanation and examining the witness produced               by him.               (2)   The  authority  or  officer   Proceeding               under subsection (1) may,  for the purpose  of               securing the attendance of any person  against               whom  any order Is proposed to be  made  under               section  55, 56 or 57, require such person  to               appear before               431               him  and  to  pass a  security  bond  with  or               without  sureties for such  attendance  during               the inquiry.  If the person fails to pass  the               security  bond as required or fails to  appear               before  the  officer or authority  during  the               inquiry, it shall be lawful to the officer  or               authority  to  proceed with  the  inquiry  and               thereupon  such  order as was proposed  to  be               passed against him may be passed." The  externment  order  was subject to  this  obligation  of judicialisation.   Mr. Justice Bhagwati (as he then was)  in quashing the order reasoned:-               "The show cause notice started with a  general               allegation  that the petitioner was  desperate               and  dangerous  man and  was  committing  acts               involving  force  and  violence  This  general               allegation  was then particularised  and  four               different kinds of acts were specifically  set               out  in  clauses  1 to 4  with  an  overriding               statement  that these different kinds of  acts               were  committed by the petitioner  during  the               period from January 1967 upto the date of  the               show  cause  notice  in  "the   aforementioned               localities",  i.e.  the  localities  known  as               Narol,   Dani  Limda  Jamapur,  Chandola   and               Benrampura localities situate within the limit               of  Kagdapity,  Gaikwad Haveli  and  Maninagar

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             Police Stations    None of the allegations  in               the show cause notice contained any  reference               to  the  area  round  about  these   specified               localities  and the petitioner  was  therefore               not  called  upon to meet  any  allegation  in               regard to the ’area round about the  specified               localities.  Even so, the Deputy  Commissioner               of  Police relied on material which  purported               to  show  that the petitioner  was  guilty  of               different kinds of act in the area  roundabout               the  specified localities and acting  on  such               material   proceeded  to  hold  that  he   was               satisfied  that the petitioner Was engaged  in               the  commission  of acts involving  force  and               violence The externment order is so far as  it               was  based on the satisfaction of  the  Deputy               Commissioner of Police that the petitioner was               engaged  in the commission. of acts  involving               force  and violence and acts punishable  under               Chapter XVI and XVII of the Indian Penal  Code               in  the roundabout area within the  limits  of               Kagdapity, Gaikwad Haveli and Maninagar Police               Stations  was, therefore, clearly  beyond  the               scope   of   the  show  cause,   notice.    No               opportunity   to   show  cause   against   any               allegation  relating  to the  roundabout  area               within the limits of Kagdapity, Gaikwad Haveli               and Maninagar Police Stations was afforded  to               the  petitioner and the externment order  must               therefore be held to be invalid.               There  is  also a second ground on  which  we-               must hold the externment order to be  invalid.               It  is  well settled that it  is  a  mandatory               requirement  of section 56 that the  externing               authority must from a subjective opinion  that               witnesses are,               not willing to come forward   to give evidence               in public against               432               the person sought to be externed by reason  of               apprehension  on  their part  as  regards  the               safety  of  their person  or  property.   This               requirement  is clearly not satisfied  in  the               present  case  it is clear  that  the  opinion               formed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police is               only as regards the witnesses who are  victims               of  the said incidents and not as regards  the               other  witnesses.  This opinion would  clearly                             not  be the requisite opinion contempl ated  by               the mandatory requirement of section 56.               We  therefore allow the petition and make  the               rule  absolute by issuing a writ quashing  and               setting  aside the externment order passed  by               the Deputy Commissioner of Police against  the               petitioner." This  judgment  is  now final and binds  State  and  subject alike.  But does the demolition of the externment order take effect  retroactively  ?   If it does, the  accused  is  not guilty; if not, he is. The  constitutional perspective must be clear  in  unlocking the  mystique  of ’.Void’ and  ’viodable’  vis-a-vis  orders under  the  Act.  The Act is a constraint on  a  fundamental right  and so the scheme of Art. 19 must be  vividly  before our  minds  if  extraordinary  controls  over  human  rights

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statutorily  vested  in administrative tribunals are  to  be held  in  constitutional  leash.  Freedom  of  movement,  of association,  of  profession  and  property,  are   founding commitments  and severe restraints thereon must be  strictly construed,  not  in the name of natural  justice-an  elusive phrase-nor  in literal loyalty to Section 59 but in  plenary allegiance  to  the paramount law.  The restriction  on  the fundamental  right  must be reasonable and the  harsher  the restriction  the heavier the onus to  prove  reasonableness. The  High Court in Special Criminal Application 18  of  1969 held  the basic condition clamped on the authority  to  hear and   be   satisfied   According  to   the   ’due   process’ prescriptions of Section 59 had been violated and the  order was  liable to be quashed.  In short, the finding ’Was  that the deprivation of the petitioner’s fundamental right having been  effected  in  a  mode  which  is  not  reasonable,  as statutorily  expressed in Section 59 of the Act, is  illegal and    unconstitutional.     Once    the     jurisprudential underpinnings of Section 56 and 59 of the Act are seen,  the invalidatory effect is plain.  An unconstitutional order  is void, consequential administrative inconveniences being  out of  place  where an  administrator  abandons  constitutional discipline and limits of power.  What about the peril to the citizen  if  an  official,  in  administrative   absolutism, ignores the constitutional restrictions on his authority and condemns  a person to flee his home ? A determination is  no determination  if  it  is  contrary  to  the  constitutional mandate of Article 19.  On this footing the externment order is of no effect and its violation is no offence. Unfortunately, counsel overlooked the basic link-up  between constitutionality and deviation from the audi alteram partem rule in this jurisdiction and chose to focus on the familiar subject of natural justice as an independent requirement and the illegality following upon its non-compliance.  In Indian constitutional  law,  natural justice does not exist  as  an absolute jural value but is humanistically read by 433 courts into those great rights enshrined in Part III as  the quintessence  of reasonableness.  We are not unmindful  that from  Seneca’s Medea, the Magna Carta and Lord  Coke,to  the constitutional  norms  of modem nations  and  the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights it is a deeply rooted  principle that  ’the  body  of  no  free  man  shall  be  taken,   nor imprisoned,  nor disseised, nor outlawed, nor  banished  nor destroyed  in any way’ without opportunity for  defence  and one of the first principles of this sense of justice is that you  must not permit one side to use means of influencing  a decision which means are not known to the other side. Now, we may as well examine the invalidatory consequence  of violation    of   natural   justice   on   a    judicialised administrative act like the externment order under Sec.  56. The wider questions of error versus excess of  jurisdiction, declaration  of  invalidity as distinguished  from  voidable orders  being avoided, order void ab initio and  valid  tilt voided   retroactively   by  competent  tribunal   and   the directory-mandatory and ministerial-Judicial dichotomies and allied  problems, present, on current precedents, a  picture of juristic jungle and need not be ordered into a garden for the  limited  purposes of this case.  A  learned’author  has cynically  said : ’The case law, however, affords the  usual spectacle  of anarchy upon which order can hardly be  super- imposed’. Here, a tribunal, having jurisdiction over area, person  and subject matter, has exercised it disregarding the obligation to  gave  a real hearing before condemning.  Does  it  spell

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death to the order and make it still-born so that it can  be ignored,  defied or attacked collaterally ? Or does it  mean nullifiability, not nullity, so that before disobeying it  a court  must declare it invalid ? Or, the third  alternative, does  it  remain  good and binding though  voidable  at  the instance of a party aggrieved by a direct challenge ? And if a court voids the order does it work retroactively ? All these lines of approach have received judicial blessings from  the  House of Lords in the landmark case of  Ridge  v. Baldwin.(2)  The  legal choice depends not so much  on  neat logic but the facts of life-a pragmatic proposition.   Where the   law  invests  an authority with power  to  affect  the behaviour  of others what consequence should be  visited  on abuse  or wrong exercise or power is no abstract theory  but experience   of  life  and  must  be  solved  by   practical considerations  woven into legal principle.  Verbal  rubrics like   illegal,   void,   mandatory,   jurisdictional,   are convenient  cloaks  but  leave the ordinary  man,  like  the petitioner  here,  puzzled about;  his  remedy.   Rubinstein poses the issue clearly :-               "How  does  the  validity or  nullity  of  the               decision affect the rights and liabilities  of               the  person  is concerned?   Can  the  persons               affected   by  an  illegal  act   ignore   and               disregard  it  with impunity ?  What  are  the               remedies  available to the aggrieved  parties?               When  will  the courts recognize  a  right  to               compensa-               (1)   Jurisdiction And Illegality-Rubinstein.               (2)   [1963] 2 All E.R. 66.               434               tion for damage occasioned by an illegal act ?               All  these questions revert to the  one  basic                             issue;  has  the  act  concerned  ever   had  an               existence or is it merely a nullity ?               Voidable   acts  are  those  that,,   can   be               invalidated  in  certain  proceedings;   these               proceedings are, especially formulated for the               purpose    of   directly   challenging    such               acts......  On the other hand, when an act  is               not merely voidable but void, it is a  nullity               and  can be disregarded and impeached  in  any               proceedings,before  any court or  tribunal               and whenever it is relied upon.In   other               words, it is subject to ’collateral attack’." Kelson’s view, when a court holds an act a nullity, is  that it is not a declaration of nullity; it is a true  annulment, an annulment with retroactive force’. Even  so, the dilemma of the petitioner is, if an  authority in  excess or error of jurisdiction directs an illegal  act, should  the  citizen  suffer it until upturned  in  a  legal proceeding  directly  or collaterally ? Can  he  resist  the injury  even if the seat of authority simulates  validity  ? The eloquent words of Wedderburn quoted by Rubinstein in the context of nullity is pertinent:--               "What is a sentence ? It is not an  instrument               with a bit of wax and the seal of a court  put               to  it;  it  is not  an  instrument  with  the               signature  of  a  person  calling  himself   a               register;  it  is not such a quantity  of  ink               bestowed  upon  such a   quantity  of  stamped               paper : a sentence is a judicial determination               of a cause agitated between real parties, upon               which a real interest has been settled,."

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Illegal  acts  of authorities, if can be  defied   on  self- determined  voidnes, startling consequences will follow,  as the  High  Court  apprehends.  A detenu will  beat  back,  a builder  will  put his wall on the forbidden line,  a  court officer will meet with physical resistance, all because  the order  is, on the view of the affected party, a nullity  and is  later proved so before a court.  Not every action  by  a Government  agency  carries with it the force  of  law’  and naturally what should he do if he concludes that the  action is  invalid?  Should he disobey, face penal proceedings  and get  his.  viola’tion  legitimated by Court ?  Is  there  no alternative  to  breaking the law or ’order  to  expose  the lawlessness of the law or order?  A recent book (’Discretion to Disobey’ by Kadish and Kadish(1) establishes this line of thought  from  Benjamin  Courtis,  a  former  Supreme  Court justice,  who  argued to the Senate on behalf  of  President Andrew Jobnson(sic) during the latter’s impeachment trial  a century ago :               "I  am  aware that it is asserted  to  be  the               civil and moral duty of all men to obey  those               laws  which have been passed through  all  the               forms  of  legislation until they  shall  have               been  decreed by judicial authority not to  be               binding; but this is too broad a statement  of               the civil and moral duty incumbent               (1)  A Study of Lawful Departures from  Legal.               Rules  P. 105 1973-Stanford University  Press,               California, U.S.A.               435               either   upon   private  citizen   or   public               officers.   If this is the, measure,  of  duty               there never could be a judicial decision  that               a  law is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it  is               only  by disregarding a law that any  question               can be raised judicially under it.  I  submit-               to  senators  that not only is there  no  such               rule  of civil or moral duty, but that it  may               be and has been a high and patrotic duty of  a               citizen  to raise a question whether a law  is               within the Constitution of the country " On  this  view  it  is almost  as  though  the  Constitution contained  the words to be found in the constitution of  one contemporary  German  state : "It is the right and  duty  of every  man  to resist  unconstitutionally  exercised  public power." More  apposite to the present case are these remarks of  the same authors:--               "If  a  policeman,  in  the  exercise  of  his               office, orders a Black person to leave a  park               in a Southern town, is the citizen obliged  to               obey  the  policeman’s order  and  wait  until               later to invoke some, remedy to challenge fits               validity    ?    Can    the    citizen     be,               constitutionally  convicted,  of  some   crime               based on his refusal to obey the,  policeman’s               order, even if a court should later  determine               that the order was unconstitutional?  Not long               ago  the  Supreme Court considered  just  this               case.   It  had little difficulty  reaching  a               decision.   The  order  was  found  to  be  an               unconstitutional violation of the  defendant’s               rights  first  because  it  was  designed   to               enforce racial discrimination in the park, and               second because it was based on the possibility               of  unlawful  troublemaking by  others  rather

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             than  on any wrongdoing by the defendant.   So               much  was sufficient to require a reversal  of               the  defendant’s conviction : "Obviously,  one               cannot  be  punished for failing to  obey  the               command  of  an  officer if  that  command  is               itself  violative  of the  Constitution.   The               policeman’s order was treated like a statute :               obedience  to an unconstitutional order of  an               official  is  not required,  even  though  the               order  has  not yet been ruled  invalid  by  a               court.  The citizen is at liberty to make  his                             own  judgment of the order’s validity  and  to               act accordingly.  If he turns out to be wrong,               of course, be is answerable.  But if he  turns               out  to be right, he is not answerable in  any               way  and not for disobeying the  order,  since               the order was invalid, and not for undertaking               himself  to decide in advance that  the  order               was  invalid, since he was at liberty to  make               that decision.               Where  the  situation  escalates  into  active               resistance  and  perhaps  the  use  of  force,               typically  involved in cases of resistance  to               unlawful  arrest or to the execution  of  some               process, such as serving a search warrant, the               ’interest  in  the  physical  welfare  of  the               policeman and the citizen (as well as  others)               may often produce a contrary answer.   Indeed,               an  increasing number of jurisdictions  afford               no right to resist an arrest made under colour               of  authority,  even if the  arrest  is  later               determined  to  be invalid.   The  citizen  is               obliged in this circum-               436               stance  to  yield and submit his case  to  the               courts.   As the Model Penal  Code  concludes,               "It  should  be possible to  provide  adequate               remedies   against  illegal  arrest,   without               permitting  the arrested person to  resort  to               force-a  course  of action  highly  likely  to               result in greater injury even to himself  than               the detention." The  law in this area is full of alarming conundrums  hardly resolved by academic writing or judicial dicta. We may narrow down the scope of the discussion by  confining it  to breaches of the audi alteram partem rule.  Does  this defect  go to jurisdiction?  Perhaps not all  violations  of natural justice knock down the order with nullity.  In Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal(1) bias or pecuniary interest in the judge was held to render the proceedings voidable, not void. It must be conceded that even this proposition is not out of the penumbra of doubt and dispute (vide A.I.R. 1958 S.C.  P. 86).   Formalistic  moulds will not solve  these  issues  of life.  and  juristic policy enacted with  clarity  into  the statute book is the necessity of this lawless region of  the rule  of law.  The common man and the Courts are  confronted with   issues  we  have  touched  upon;  and,  against   the background of processual guarantees under the  Constitution, the   law   of  jurisdiction  and  illegality  has   to   be legislatively   settled,  not  as  logical   extensions   of juridical  doctrine  but  empirical  formulations  based  on experience.  Grave implications of law and order lurk behind this murky branch of public law. Where  hearing is obligated by a statute which  affects  the

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fundamental right of a citizen, the duty to give the hearing sounds  in constitutional requirement and failure to  comply with  such  a  duty  is fatal.   May  be  that  in  ordinary legislation or at common law a Tribunal, having jurisdiction and  failing to hear the parties, may commit  an  illegality which  may  render the proceedings voidable  when  a  direct attack is made thereon by way of appeal, revision or review, but nullity is the consequence of unconstitutionality and so without   going  into  the  larger  issue  and  its   plural divisions,  we  may roundly conclude that the  order  of  an administrative authority charged with the, duty of complying with  natural justice in the exercise of power  before  res- tricting  the fundamental right of a citizen is void and  ab initio of no legal efficacy.  The duty to hear manacles  his jurisdictional  exercise and any act is, in  its  inception, void except when performed in accordance with the conditions laid  down in regard to hearing.  May be, this is a  radical approach,   but   the   alternative   is   a   travesty   of constitutional guarantees, which leads to the conclusion  of post-legitimated disobedience of initially  unconstitutional orders.  On the other hand law and order will be in jeopardy if the doctrine of discretion to disobey invalid orders were to prevail.  As Learned Hand observed :-               "The   idea  that  you  may  resist   peaceful               arrest....  because  you are in  debate  about               whether it is lawful or not, instead of  going               to  the authorities which can  determine  (the               question  is) not a blow for liberty  but,  on               the contrary, a blow for attempted anarchy." (1)[1852] 3 H.L.C. 759. 437 The  opposite  view is expressed by the  California  Supreme Court  in  a  case  where one Yick  came  into  the  country unlawfully  but  was  held by  the  deputy  sheriff  without authority.   He  escaped and his abettor in the  escape  was convicted but in appeal the Court held :-               "An  escape  is  classed as  a  crime  against               public  justice, and the law, in declaring  it               to  be  an offense, proceeds upon  the  theory               that the citizen should yield obedience to the               law; that when one has been, by its  authority               or  command, confined in a prison, that it  is               his  duty to submit to such confinement  until               delivered by due course of law.  But when  the               imprisonment  is  unlawful, and  is  itself  a               crime.  the  reason which  makes  flight  from               prison  an offense does not exist.  In such  a               case the right to liberty is absolute, and  he               Who regains it is not guilty of the  technical               offense of escape." American  case-law is conflicting and  doubtful  expressions like  "void on its face" "transparently invalid"  have  been used.  We must remember the words of Justice Frankfurter "If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is law, every  man can.  That means first chaos, then tyranny".   We dwell on these possible views to underscore the difficulties of solution. English  Judges  also have not been  uniform.  Granting  the order  against  a party to be void, does it have  to  be  so declared  by  a  court at his instance of  can  the  citizen interpret  for himself and act on the basis  of  invalidity. The  problem  was considered by the  Judicial  Committee  in Fernado’s(1)  case  where a minister dissolved  a  municipal council without opportunity to be heard. Lord Upjohn  stated the position thus:--

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             "Apart   altogether   from   authority   their               Lordships would be of opinion that this was  a               case  here the Minister’s order  was  voidable               and  not a nullity. Though the council  should               have been given the opportunity of being heard               in its defence, if it deliberately chooses not               to  complain  and  takes no  step  to  protest               against its dissolution, there seems no reason               why any other person should have the right  to               interfere. To take               a simple example to which their Lordships will               have to    advert in some detail presently, if               in  Ridge v. Baldwin the appellant Ridge,  who               had been wrongly dismissed because he was  not               given   the  opportunity  of  presenting   his               defence,  had preferred to abandon  the  point               and accept the, view that he had been properly               dismissed,  their Lordships can see no  reason               why  any other person, such, for example,as  a               rate  payer of Brighton should have any  right               to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the  chief               constable of brighton. As a matter of ordinary               common  sense,    with all  respect  to  other               opinions  that  have  been  expressed,  ’if  a               person  in the position of Mr. Ridge  had  not               felt sufficiently aggrieved to take any action               by  reason  of the failure to afford  him  his               strict right               (1)   L.R. [1967] 2 A.C. 337, 352  (Darayappah               V. Fernando)               438               to  put  forward a defence, the order  of  the               watch  committee should stand and no one  else               should  have  any right  to  complain    Their               Lordships  deprecate the use of the word  void               in  distinction  to the word voidable  in  the               field  of law with which their  Lordships  are               concerned  because, as Lord  Evershed  pointed               out  in  Ridge  v. Baldwin  quoting  from  Sir               Frederick Pollock, the words void and voidable               are imprecise and apt to mislead." In Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) Lord Reid and Lord Hodson  opted for  ’nullity’, Lord Evershed and Lord Devlin supported  the ’voidable’  theory and Lord Morris of Broth-Y-Gest struck  a practical note in between.  The learned Lord said :-               "It  was  submitted that the decision  of  the               watch  committee  was voidable but  not  void.               But this involves the inquiry as to the  sense               in which the word "voidable", a word  deriving               from the law of contract, is in this connexion               used.   If  the  appellant had  bowed  to  the               decision  of the watch committee and  had  not               asserted that it was void, then no occasion to               use  either word would have arisen.  When  the               appellant  in  fact  at  once  repudiated  and               challenged  the decision, so claiming that  it               was  invalid,  and  when  in  fact  the  watch                             committee   adhered  to  their   decis ion,   so               claiming  that  it was valid, only  the  court               could  decide  who  was  right.   If  in  that               situation  it was said that the  decision  was               voidable.  that was awaited.  But if and  when               the  court  decides  that  the  appellant  was               right, the court is deciding that the decision

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             of  the watch committee was invalid and of  no               affect and null and void.  The word "voidable"               is,  therefore, apposite in the sense that  it               became necessary for the appellant to take his               stand  :  he was obliged to  take  action  for               unless he did the view of the watch committee,               who were in authority, would prevail.  In that               sense  the  decision of  the  watch  committee               could be said to be voidable."               In  Spackman  v. Plumstead Board  of  Works(1)               (181), Lord Selborne said :-               "There would be no decision within the meaning               of  the statute if there was anything of  that               sort done contrary to the essence of justice."               In  1959  A. C. 83 Lord  Somervell  of  Harrow               highlighted   the   dilemma  of   ’void’   and               ’voidable’ in these effective words :-               ’Is  a man to be sent to prison on  the  basis               that  an order is a good order when the  court               knows   it  would  be  set  aside  if   proper               proceedings were taken ?  The distinction bet-               ween void and voidable’is by no means a  clear               one..." The  test  of ex-facie illegality or bad on its face  or  in Lord  Radcliffe’s words ’it bears no brand of invalidity  on its forehead’, is also un work able in the work-a-day  world of law.  Error of jurisdiction and error (1)  (1885) 10 A.C. 229. 439 within jurisdiction, have, been suggested as a means to  cut the  Gordian Knot.  Many great writers have dealt  with  the subject but few have offered a fair answer to the  question, is a determination a determination. at all when made without a statutory hearing and when is it void and to what  extent? Decisions are legion where, the conditions for the  exercise of  power  have been contravened and the  order  treated  as void.  And when there is excess or error of jurisdiction the end  product is a. semblance, not an actual order,  although where   the  error  is  within  jurisdiction  it  is   good, particularly  when  a  finality clause  exists.   The  order becomes  ’infallible in error’, a peculiar legal  phenomenon like  the  hybrid  beast of  voidable  voidness  for  which, according  to  a  learned author, Lord  Denning  is  largely responsible.    The   legal   chaos  on   this   branch   of jurisprudence   should  be  avoided  by   evolving   simpler concepts,  which  work  in practice  in  Indian  conditions. Legislation,  rather than judicial law-making will meet  the needs  more adequately.  The only safe course, until  simple and  sure  light is shed from a legislative source,  is  to. treat  as  void  and ineffectual to bind  parties  from  the beginning, any order made without hearing the party affected if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed right.  In other  cases, the order in violation of natural  justice  is void  in the limited sense of being liable to be avoided  by court with retroactive force. In  the present case, a fundamental right of the  petitioner has been encroached upon by the police commissioner  without due,  hearing.  So the Court quashed it-not killed  it  then but  performed the formal obsequies of the order  which  had died  at  birth.  The legal result is that the  accused  was never  gulity  of  flouting an  order  which  never  legally existed. We  express  no  final  opinion  on  the  many  wide-ranging problems  in  public law of illegal  orders  and  violations thereof by citizens, grave though some of them may be.   But

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we  do hold that an order which is void may be directly  and collaterally  challenged in legal proceedings.  An order  is null  and  void if the statute clothing  the  administrative tribunal  with  power conditions it with the  obligation  to hear, expressly or by implication.  Beyond, doubt, an  order which infringes a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule is a nullity.  When a competent court  holds such official act or order invalid, or sets  it aside,  it operates from nativity, i.e. the  impugned  actor order   was  never  valid.   The  French  jurists  call   it L’indevistence  or outlawed order (p.127) Brown and  Garner, French  Administrative Law) and could not found  the  ground for  a prosecution.  On this limited ratio the appellant  is entitled to an acquittal.  We allow his appeal. P.B.R. Appeal allowed 440