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PETITIONER: NAVANEETHAMMAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ARJUNA CHETTY

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/09/1996

BENCH: N.P. SINGH, K. VENKATASWAMI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      The  plaintiff  Who  filed  a  suit  on  13.6.1962  for declaration of  her title  to  the  suit  property  and  for recovery of  possession is  the appellant  herein. The  suit property is  an extent  of 1.13  acre out  of 3.39  acres in Survey No.  330/2 in  Ulli Village,  Gudiyatham Taluk. North Arcot  District,   Tamil  Nadu.  It  was  purchased  by  the plaintiff under  registered sale  deed dated  21.3.1957 from one  Mohd.   Ghouse.  The  respondent  herein  who  was  the defendent in the suit admittedly was let in to possession of the suit property along with the  balance of above-mentioned Survey 330/2 as a tenant under a registered Lease deed dated 1.4.1935 The   vendor of the plaintiff after the sale issued a notice   to the defendant on 16.4.1957 intimating the fact of  sale to the plaiantiff. The defendant in his reply dated 27.4.1957 denied  his status  as lessee and his liability to pay rent.  He set up title in himself to  the suit property. The plaintiff  on his  part issued  a   notice on  10.5.1957 intimating the  defendant about  her   purchase and  calling upon him  to pay  rent in  future  as a lessee. As defendant set up title in himself, the   plaintiff was obliged to file the suit as stated above.      The suit  was resisted  on the  ground  resisted on the ground that  after the  expiry of  the registered  lease, he surrendered possession  of the  suit property  to  the  then landlord  and   thereafter,  since  it  was  under  nobody’s occupation, he  entered possession  in his own right and not as a  lessee and  he has not even paid rent to anybody after the   after  the expiration of lease. Further it was alleged that he  has plaintiff’s suit for recovery of possession was barred by  limitation. The Trial Court framed as many as six issues and  after examining  three witnesses  on the side of the   plaintiff and  five  witnesses  on  the  side  of  the defendant and  after perusing 13 documents filed on the side of the  plaintiff and  21 documents filed on the side of the defendant, it  found that  the plea  of  surrender  was  not established and defendant did not prescribe title by adverse possession. Accepting  the case  of the plaintiff, the trial court decreed  the suit  declaring that  the  plaintiff  was entitled to  the suit property and directed the defendant to

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surrender possession without any let or hindrance.      The defendant  aggrieved  by  the  decree  against  him preferred  an  appeal  to  the  learned  Subordinate  Judge, Tirupattur. Unfortunately, on account of certain lapses, The High Court  was  compelled  to  remand  the  matter  to  the Appellate  Court   on  three  occasions  Finally  the  First Appellate court  by  it  s  detailed  judgment  on  9.9.1976 confirmed the  decree of  the Trial Court and  dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendant.      Still aggrieved, the defendant preferred second  appeal No. 1801/76  in the  Madras High  Court. The  learned Single Judge of  the Madras High Court found  that the  Court below failed to  come to  correct conclusion  on the  basis of the evidence both oral and documentary placed before them and in a way  gone into  the evidence  onceover  and  reversed  the findings  rendered  by  the  Court  below  and  consequently allowed the  Second Appeal.  dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff.      Aggrieved   by the  judgment of  the  High  Court,  the present appeal  has been filed by the plaintiff appellant by Special Leave.      Mr. K. Rajendra Chowdary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant  submitted that  the High  Court exceeded  its jurisdiction  under   Section  100   CPC  in  reversing  the concurrent findings  of the  Courts below. He also submitted that the  High Court went wrong      in  placing the onus of proof regarding the character of possession of the suit land by the  defendant, on  the  plaintiff  when  admittedly  the defendant was  let into  the possession  as a tenant under a registered lease  deed of  the year  1935. The  High  Court, according to the learned counsel ought not to have discussed the issue  of adverse  possession with  reference to Article 139 of  the old  Limitation Act,  1908 as  no such  plea was taken in  the written  statement nor  any issue  was  framed concerning that.  He further  invited our  attention to  the well founded reasoning and the concurrent findings supported by evidence, of the lower Appellate Court which did not call for any  interference by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction under section  100 C.P.C.      Mr. R.  Sundarvardhan, Sr.  Counsel appearing  for  the defendant-respondent strongly  supported the judgment of the High Court  mainly on  the basis  of Article  139 of the old Limitation Act  which corresponds  to Article  67 of the new Limitation Act,  1963. According to the learned Sr. Counsel, it is an admitted fact that after the expiry of the lease in the year  1938, the  defendant never  paid any  rent for his continued possession in the suit property and in the absence of  any   exercise  of  ownership  by  the  landlord  for  a continuous   period of  over  twelve  years,  the  defendant prescribed title  by   adverse possession.  He  also  placed reliance on  the fact  of payment of kists (land revenue) to the suit  land by  the defendant. He submitted that the High Court has  given good  reasons for interfering under section 100 CPC  stating that  the findings  rendered by  the  Court below were not based on materials to sustain those  findings and therefore,  it must  be taken  that  the  findings  were rendered by  court below  based on no evidence. According to the learned  counsel on  the admitted  facts of  this  case, namely, that neither the lessor nor his legal representative having not  claimed any  rent continuously   for a period of twelve years  after the  expiry of the lease, Section 116 of the Transfer  of Property  Act would  not come to the aid of the lessor  or his  successors in  interest when  the tenant invokes the aid of Article 139 of the old Limitation Act. He wants the  Court  to  look  into  Article  139  of  the  old

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Limitation Act  alone for counting the  period of limitation imply from the expiry of the  date of the lease ignoring the hard fact  that the defendant continued  after the expiry of lease either  as tenant  holding over  or  as  a  tenant  by sufferance.      Mr.  Rajendra   Chowdary,  learned   counsel  for   the appellant     in  reply  submitted  that  in  terms  of  the registered  lease   deed,  the   lessee/defendant/respondent herein was  bound to  pay the  kists for  the suit  land and therefore, the  payment of  kists after  the expiry  of  the lease will  not make  any difference  in the  case. He  also contended that  the defendant  for the  first  time  set  up hostile title  in himself  only on  27.4.1957 in  his  reply notice. The suit filed in 1962 is well within time.      We have considered the rival submission.      Before  discussing   the  merits  of  respective  rival submission, it  is necessary  to bear in mind that the  case set  up   by  the   defendant     in  the  Trial  Court  was prescription  of   title   by   adverse   possession   after surrendering the  suit land  and again re-entering the same. No plea  contending that  the suit  was barred under Article 139 of the old Limitation Act was taken by the  defendant in the trial  court. Therefore,  there  was  no  necessity  for framing any  issue or  letting  in  oral  evidence  on  that aspect. This  aspect assumes  importance in  considering the evidence.      This Court,  time  without  number,  pointed  out  that interference with  the concurrent  findings  of  the  courts below by  the High  Court under  Section  100  CPC  must  be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High  Court  is  not  expected  to  re-appreciating  the evidence just to replace the findings for the lower courts.       Let us see whether the High Court on the facts of  his case  has   exceeded  its   jurisdiction  in  reversing  the findings of the lower Appellate Court by re-appreciating the evidence.      Before the Trial Court, the crucial issue was regarding adverse possession.  On that  issue, the  Trial Court  found that as  the tenant/defendant  came into  possession of  the land only  in pursuance  of the  lease  deed, his possession was merely  a permissive  one. It   was  further found  that there was  no evidence  before the  Trial Court to show that prior to  the date  of Exbt. A-6 (reply by defendant) he had never claimed  independent   title to  the suit property and had brought  that animus  to the notices to the land-lord or the successors  in title.  The Trial  Court also  noticed an important fact and observed as follows:      "In the  writte  statement,  it  is      stated that after the expiry of the      lease period  mentioned under Exbt.      A-3, he  had surrendered possession      of the  land and  that he again got      the possession  of the  land in his      own independant right and from that      date  onwards,   he  has   been  in      possession of the land continuously      uninterruptedly as the owner of the      lands. This claim  has been given a      go-by by him in his deposition."      The Trial  Court also  found that  in as  much  as  the defendant asserted  his independant  right in  the  land  in himself only  under Ext. A-6 dated 27.4.1957, his possession was not  adverse to  the owners of the land as the suit came to be filed within five years thereafter.      The First  Appellate  Court  framed  the  question  for

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consideration on ramand as follows:      "Whether,  having   regard  to  the      evidence, oral  or documentary  and      the probabilities  of  the    case,      there  could  be  an  inference  of      implied assent  by the land-lord to      the continuance  in  possession  by      the tenant after the termination of      the term under  Exbt. A-3".      In discussing the oral evidence, the first appellate court held as follows:      "Before    advertising    to    the      arguments  of  counsel  appear  for      both parties. I would like to refer      to the  oral evidence in this case,      plaintiff’s vendor  Mohamed  Ghouse      Sahib was  examined as P.W.I. He is      a retired  Post Master  and is aged      about  70   years.   His   definite      testimony is  that after the demise      of  Samad  Sahib,  he  (P.W.I)  and      Khader Sahib were collecting rents,      that the   there  were rent arrears      to  the   extent  of   Rs.200/-  or      Rs.250/-, that  they gave notice to      the  defendant   and   that   after      receipt   of    the   notice,   the      defendant was  paying some  amounts      in  instalments.   he  denied  that      after  the   expiry  of  the  lease      period in  Ex. A-3,  the  defendant      surrendered   possession   of   the      property  and   that  because   the      property remained  unoccupied,  the      defendant trespassed upon the lands      As rightly  pointed    out  by  the      learned counsel  for the plaintiff,      the evidence  of P.W. 1 with regard      to the  collection of  rents by him      and Khader  Sahib  and  payment  of      some amount  by  the  defendant  in      instalment   was not  challenged at      all in  cross-examination. In  this      connection. I  may  point  out  the      admission of the defendant as D.W.2      that there is no enmity between him      and P.W.1.  In the  absence of  any      motive. I  do not  understand as to      why  P.W.1  who  is  a  respectable      witness should  come and make false      statement in  Court so  far as this      aspect of  the case is concerned. I      see no  valid reason  to disbelieve      him in this respect."      Again in  para 12,  the lower  Appellate Court  held as follows:      "No doubt,  the defendant  as D.W.2      would  say  that  there  is  enmity      between him  and P.W.2. But on this      ground alone, the evidence of P.W.2      that he  had seen  P.W.1 and Khader      Sahib at the village when coming to      collect    rents(elicited    during      cross-examination)   cannot      be      rejected  as  false.  His  evidence

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    when considered alongwith the other      circumstance in  this case  appears      to   me    quite    probable    and      acceptable.   P.W.3,   Veeraraghava      Pillai  is   the  husband   of  the      plaintiff  and   karnam   of   Ulli      village for more than 30 years. His      definite  testimony   is  that  the      defendant was  a  tenant    holding      over of this land."      On a  perusal of the lower Appellate Court judgment, we find hat findings rendered by the lower Appellate court were very well  based on  materials  placed  before  it  and  the contrary  conclusion  reached  by  the  High  Court  is  not sustainable. The  lower Appellate  court in its judgment has appreciated all  relevant oral  and documentary evidence and observed as follows:      "On the  side of  the defendant, we      have the  evidence of  D.Ws. 1 to 5      of them  D.W.1 is  the Hand Writing      Expert     He  was   examined  with      reference to  Ex. A-4. His evidence      is not  relevant  for  our  present      limited enquiry. D.W. 3 Ramakrishan      is  a  resident  of  Ulli  village.      D.W.4 Mahadevan  is a  resident  of      Gopampatti. D.W. 5 Karunagaran is a      contractor   by    profession    at      Gudiyatham. There  three  witnesses      claim to  own lands  near the  suit      property. They   would say that the      defendant has  been  in  possession      and enjoyment  of the suit land for      the last  32 to  35 years. But they      are not  in a position to say as to      in  what   capacity  the  defendant      entered  into  possession  of  this      property. Their  evidence that  the      defendant    is    in    continuous      possession  and  enjoyment  of  the      suit lands  is of  no  significance      because the  admitted case  of  the      plaintiff  is that the defendant is      in possession  from 1935  but as  a      tenant holding  over. The  evidence      of   defendant   as   D.W.2   would      certainly  throw   some  light   in      deciding   the issue before us. For      better appreciation  I would prefer      to extract  the relevant  on by the      plaintiff.      "One Sahib  leased out the property      to  me  for  three  years  under  a      registered lease deed. I cultivated      the land for tow years. I the third      year the  Sahib took  me to P.W.3’s      house. My  father  accompanied  me.      P.W.3’s father  told  me  that  the      Sahib  would  not  come  thereafter      and the  lease deed  was  cancelled      and that  thereafter  I could enjoy      the land and I need not worry since      the former’s  son.  P.W.3  was  the      village karnam.  Thereafter, I  was      enjoying  the   land  without   any

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    interruption.  The     lessor,   my      father and  P.W. 3’s father went to      P.W.3 fathers’s house. At that time      P.W.3 was the village karnam. I was      sent for  about for  or five  hours      later. P.W.  3 was  not present  at      the time.  His father  told    that      they had  decided  that  the  lease      period  had   expired     and  that      thereafter I  could enjoy  the land      as my  own without  paying rent  to      anybody and  I should pay the kists      my self. At that time, including me      only four  ’ persons  were present.      The Sahib  was  then  present.  The      incident   took    place   at   the      beginning of  the third lease year.      I was  not asked to give any amount      in   pursuance of the decision. The      entire land  is wet  land. Even  at      that time  the land  was worth  two      thousand  rupees.  I  so  not  know      whether my  father gave  any amount      in pursuance   of  the decision.  I      did not   ask  him about  it. I did      not give  the rent  for  the  third      year.  From   the   date   of   the      registered  lease   deed  I  am  in      continuous    possession        and      enjoyment  of   the  land.  Due  to      forget fulness  I have   not stated      the above  incident in  my  written      statement and  also to  my  counsel      who gave  the reply  notice:  I did      not tell him that I had surrendered      possession   of    the   land   and      thereafter the land was in nobody’s      possession for some time and that I      again got  into possession  of  the      land"      Again in  paragraph 18,  the learned  Subordinate Judge held  as follows:      " As  already stated,  in the reply      notice Ex.  A-6  the  defendant  is      silent  about  his  induction  into      possession  of the suit property at      any time  as a  lessee, any alleged      surrender or his occupation finding      the property  lying unoccupied.  In      his written  statement his specific      case is  that at  the end  of  term      under     Ex.A-3   he   surrendered      possession of the suit property and      that     thereafter   he   was   in      possession of  the property  in his      own right.  A third  case  was  put      forward during  the  trial  through      the mouth  of  the    defendant  as      D.W.2, I  have already  adverted to      his evidence  in this respect. That      would show  that even at the end of      the second  year i.e.  in the  year      1937 and before the commencement of      the third  year, he  was  taken  to      P.W. 3’s  father’s house   by  some

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    Sahib  that  his  father  was  also      present and  that he  was  informed      that the  lease was  cancelled  and      that he  could enjoy the land as he      liked. It  has to  be noted    that      even  according   to   D.W.2   this      property was  worth   Rs.2000/-  at      that time.  It is  highly  unlikely      that no   prudent  man  would  have      given  up   his  right  in  such  a      valuable  property   in  favour  of      another   person   without      any      consideration. It  is not  the case      of the  defendant that  he had done      some services  to the family of the      original owners of this property or      that he  paid some    consideration      towards the  value of this property      and   that    because    of    such      consideration, he  was orally asked      by the  Sahib to  enjoy the land as      his own.  When in  the   year 1935,      the defendant  and Samad Sahib have      taken the   precaution  of  getting      lease  deed   registered,   it   is      unlikely that  the defendant  would      have failed  to obtain something in      writing  when  as  alleged  by  him      (D.W.2. the   Sahib  asked  him  to      enjoy the  land as  he liked saying      that the  lease was  cancelled.  As      already stated  the case set out by      the defendant  in his  reply notice      is  that   the  property   remained      unoccupied and  that so  he entered      into possession  and  occupied  it.      Having regard  to these  facts  and      having regard  to the  evidence  of      P.Ws. 1  to 3  with regard  to  the      collection   of   rents   and   the      property  as   a  tenant  and  also      having regard  to the probabilities      and circumstances  of this  case, I      find no difficulty in coming to the      conclusion that  there should  have      been  an   implied  assent  by  the      landlord  to   the  continuance  in      possession by  the defendant  after      termination of  the term  under Ex.      A-3".      In the light of these findings of the courts below, the High Court on re-appreciation of evidence found as follows:      "Thus there  is nothing  as and  by      way of  evidence which can be taken      to support  the contention  of  the      respondent that there was a tenancy      after the  expiry of  the  original      tenancy  in the year 1938"      "I have discussed the facts to show      that  there  are  no  materials  to      support the  findings of  the lower      Appellate Court  that there  was  a      continuation of  tenancy after  the      expiry of the original lease."

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     "That there must be some act which      evidence the lessor being agreeable      to the  tenant being  in possession      of the  property leased  so  as  to      infer an  assent. In the absence of      such a  conduct in  the present, it      is  not   possible  to   draw   the      inference that there was any assent      on the part of the plaintiff to the      defendant continuing  in possession      of the property."      In our  considered view  the lower  Appellate Court has fairly appreciated  the evidence in the above background and has reached  the conclusion  that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even assuming that another view is possible on a re-appreciation of  the same  evidence, that should not have been done  by the  High Court  as it cannot be said that the view taken  by the  First Appellate  Court was  based on  no material.      Article 139 of the old Limitation Act reads as follows: Article 139 ------------------------------------------------------ Description of       Period of     Time from which suit                 limitation    period begins to                                    run ------------------------------------------------------ By a landlord        Twelve years  When a tenancy is to recover                         determined. possession from a tenant ------------------------------------------------------      The date on which the tenancy is determined will be the date from which the period of limitation would  begin to run for the purpose of Article 139 of the  old Limitation Act.      One mode  of determining  tenancy under    Transfer  of Property Act  is by  way of surrender by the tenant. We have seen on  facts that  an attempt   was made by the defendant- respondent that  he had surrendered the  suit property after the expiry  of the  lease and thereafter re-entered the suit land and  continued in possession in his own right. However, this case was not  accepted by the trial court as well as by the appellate   court  for well-founded  reasons as  noticed above. That   being  the  position  the  possession  by  the defendant on the fact as found by the First Appellate Court, in  this  case,  after  the  expiry  of  the  lease  further continuance was only  permissive and will not give cause for prescribing title  by adverse  possession. Further,  for the first time,  while replying  to the  notice by the vendor of the plaintiff,  the defendant openly set up a  hostile title and the  suit having  been filed within five years therefrom is not barred by limitation.      In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the judgments of the courts below. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.