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PETITIONER: NAUNIHAL KISHAN AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: R.   S. CH.  PRATAP SINGH AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/03/1963

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA DAS, S.K. SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M.

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1379            1964 SCR  (2) 293

ACT:  Displaced   Person-Debt-Adjustment-Usufructuary   mortgage- Whether  mortgagor a debtor-Scaling down of  mortgage  debt- Whether only in a suit for redemption of  mortgageTribunal’s jurisdiction-"   Value   of  the  lands"-How  to   be   com- puted--Whether  in  terms of market value  alone-Whether  in terms of comparable Standard acres-Displaced Persons  (Debts Adjustments) Act, 1951 (LXX of 1951) ss. 2 (6), 2 (9), 4, 5, 16, 29.

HEADNOTE: Both  the appellants as well as the  respondents  originally belonged  to that part of Punjab which is now  in  Pakistan. In  1933 respondent No. 2 effected an usufructuary  mortgage of  a certain land to the father of appellants Nos.  1 to  3 and  to  the 4th appellant’s father to secure a sum  of  Rs. 39,000/-.   Apart  from the provisions for  the  payment  of interest  the  mortgage deed also fixed a term of  10  years beyond which alone the mortgagee could sue for the  recovery of  the mortgage money.  Four years after the  execution  of the mortgage deed the mortgagor sold a major portion of  the property  to one Guranditta Ram.  Out of  the  consideration for  this  sale  a sum of Rs. 26,500/-  was  left  with  the transferee to be paid in discharge of the mortgage.This  sum was not paid to the mortgageeand thus the entire   mortgage amount remained outstanding.On the partition  of       the country  in 1947 both the mortgagoras well as the  mortgagee moved  into  India  and they  were  "displaced  persons".The mortgagor was as displaced person allotted agricultural land in  India on the basis of his original holding in  Pakistan. The  appellants as the mortgagees entitled to possession  of the lands were put in possession of this land. The respondents applied under s. 5 of the Displaced  Persons (Debts  Adjustment)  Act, 1951, to get  the  mortgage  debts adjusted  according to the provisions of s. 16 of  the  Act. Certain   objections  raised  by  the  appellants  to   this application were overruled and the mortgage debt was  scaled down.  An appeal was preferred to the Punjab High Court  and the  Single  judge  who heard the appear  dismissed  it.   A Letters  Patent  Appeal  preferred  by  the  appellants  was

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dismissed in limine, 294 and  a  certificate  of fitness was  refused.   The  present appeal is by way of special leave granted by this Court. The  first contention raised before this Court was that  the first respondent was not a "debtor" within the meaning of s. 2 (6) of the Act because there was no contractual  relation- ship  of debtor and creditor between him and  the  displaced creditor i. e. the appellants.  The next contention was that the liability under a mortgage debt could be scaled down and adjusted  under the Act only in a suit for redemption  filed by the creditor and that it was incompetent for a debtor  to invoke  the  jurisdiction  of the  tribunal  to  effect  the scaling  down by an application under s. 5. Finally  it  was argued  that under the proviso to s. 16 (4) of the  Act  the reduction  of the debt has to be in the game  proportion  as "the  value of the lands" allotted to the creditor in  India bears  to the "value of the lands" left by him  in  Pakistan and "value" according to the appellant meant market value. Held, that having regard to the terms of s. 16 (4) the  fact that  the security was by way of usufructuary  mortgage  and the debtor had the right to redeem were sufficient to enable the  beneficient provisions of the section being  attracted. Apart  even from the terms of s. 16 (4) the liability  under the  mortgage in favour of the appellant would  fall  within the  definition of s. 2 (6).  Even a usufructuary  mortgage, whatever its nature is within the definition of debt’  under s.  16  and  it  is wholly immaterial  whether  or  not  the creditor  is  entitled  to proceed  personally  against  the debtor and recover the amount of the mortgage. Lachhman  Singh v. Natha Singh and Ors., 1. L. R. 1941  Lah. 71,  Manubhai Mahijibhai Patel v. Trikamlal Laxmidas, I.  L. R. 1958 Bom. 1429, Lahori Lal v. Kasturi Lal (1956) 58 P. L. R.  331,  Rajkumari  Kaushalya Devi v.  Bawa  Pritam  Singh, [1960] 3 S. C. R. 570. Section  5  (1)  of  the Act enables a  debtor  to  make  an application to the tribunal for the adjustment of his debts. The  amount  due  on or secured by a mortgage  is  a  "debt" within  the meaning of s. 5 to settle which, an  application could  be  filed  and  the debt  being  a  secured  debt  as contemplated  by s. 16 (4) the applicants were  entitled  to have an adjustment in terms of that specified in the proviso to that section. Under the relevant rules the rehabilitation authorities  arc directed  to take into account the income yield of  the  two sets of land and thus the "value" of the land left behind in Pakistan  295 is  reflected  in ascertaining the  "standard  acres".   The nature  of the land left behind was taken into  account  and numerical  factors were prescribed based on  these  criteria for  ascertaining  the equivalent of those lands  in  India. When the proviso to s.   16 (1) spoke of value’ it must have bad  in  contemplation  the  value  as  determined  by   the procedure for fixing the same under the relevant rules.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 594 of 1960. Appeal  by  special leave  from  the  judgement   and  order dated  March  6, 1958, of the Punjab High Court  in  Letters Patent Appeal No. 6 of 1958. K.L.  Gosain,  C.  L. Sareen and R.  L.  Kohli,  for  the appellants.

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Roop Chand and Navnit Lal, for respondent No. 1. Naunit Lal, for respondent No. 2. 1963.   March, 13.  The judgment of the Court was  delivered by AYYANGAR  J.-The  facts necessary to appreciate  the  points involved  in  this  appeal  by  special  leave  against  the judgment of the High Court of Punjab are briefly these.   By a registered deed of mortgage dated March 6, 1933 Sham Singh who  is respondent No. 2 before us effected an  usufructuary mortgage of land measuring 7530 Kanals and 19 Marlas situate in  village  Mohanpur  in the District  of  Multan  (now  in Pakistan)  to the father of appellants 1 to 3 and  to  Topan Das--the  father of the 4th appellant.  The sum  secured  by the  mortgage  was  Rs. 30,000/-.  The  stipulation  in  the mortgage  was  that the income derived from  the  properties transferred  to the possession of the mortgagees was  to  be treated as interest on Rs. 10,000/- out of the principal sum and that the balance of Rs. 20,000/- was to carry a sum of 296 Rs. 1,650/- per annum as interest.  The deed further fixed a term  of 10 years beyond which the mortgagee could  sue  for the recovery of the mortgage-money.  Subsequent to the  deed of  mortgage, about 4 years thereafter,  the  mortgagor-Sham Singh  sold  a  major  portion  of  the  mortgaged  property consisting  of about 6,568 Kanals of land to Guranditta  Ram and  others.  Out of’ the consideration for this sale a  sum of Rs. 26,500/- was left with the transferee the same  being directed to be paid in discharge of the mortgage.  The  Sale to Guranditta Ram was subject to a preemption claim and pre- emptor  exercised his rights to obtain that relief.   Narain Singh-father  of  Partap Singh, the 1st  respondent-was  the preemptor and in a suit filed by him he obtained on February 16,  1940 a decree for sale in his favour by virtue  of  his right  of  preemption  and in pursuance of  this  decree  he obtained  symbolical possession of the land,  the  mortagees still  containing  to retain the actual  possession  of  the land.  The sum of Rs. 26,500/-retained with the vendee under the  sale by Sham Singh was not paid over to  the  mortgagee and  thus the entire amount of the  mortgage-money  remained outstanding. While things were in this state, the country was partitioned in  1947  and both the mortgagor as well as  the  mortgagees moved  into  India and they were "displaced persons"  .  The owners  of  the  property,  viz.,  the  original  mortgagor- respondent  No.2 Sham Singh and the pre-emptor-vendee  were, as displaced persons, allotted agricultural land in India on the  basis  of  their  original  holdings  in  Pakistan   in pursuance of the relevant rules under the Displaced  Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Rules.  The appellants  as the  mortgagees entitled to possession of the lands were  in June-July  1950, under these rules put in possession of  the properties   allotted  to  both  Sham   Singh-the   original mortgagor   as   well   as   of   Pratap   Singh-the   legal representative  297 of  the deceased pre-emptor (respondent No. 1).   The  total extent  of  land   which  the respondent  had  been  put  in possession was 51 standard acres and 9 units of land made up of  37.4 standard acres as being the property  belonging  to the  pre-emptorvendee (respondent No. 1) and  14.5  standard acres by virtue of the property allottable to Sham Singh the original mortgagor (respondent No. 2). The   Union  Legislature  enacted  in  November,  1951   the Displaced  Persons (Debts Adjustment) Act, 1951 (Act LXX  of 1951) which we shall hereafter refer to as the Act, being an

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Act to make provisions for the adjustment and settlement  of debts  due  by  displaced persons.  Section  5  of  the  Act enabled  an application to be made by a "’displaced  debtor" for  the  adjustment of his debts to a  Tribunal  which  was defined  as  meaning  "a civil  court  having  authority  to exercise  jurisdiction under the Act" for the adjustment  of the  debts due by the applicant.  Section 16 made  provision for the manner in which debts secured on immovable  property due by displaced debtors were to be reduced, settled and ad- justed.   Sham Singh as well as Pratap Singh  made  separate applications  under  s. 5 of the Act seeking to  obtain  the benefit of the settlement and adjustment provision contained in  its s. 16.  The two applications were, in view of  their having reference to the same mortgage debt, consolidated and were heard to ether by the Senior Sub-judge, Karnal who  was the  relevant  Tribunal under the Act.   Several  objections were   raised   by   the   mortgagee-appellants   to   these applications  but they were overruled and the mortgage  debt was  scaled  down under s. 16 and other  relevant  statutory provisions  which  were applicable in the  manner  we  shall detail later.  An appeal was preferred from this decision to the  High Court of Punjab but the same was dismissed by  the learned  Single judge.  A further appeal under  the  Letters Patent to a Bench of the High Court was 298 dismissed  in  limine  and a certificate  of  fitness  being refused,  the appellants applied to this Court  for  special leave and this being granted, the appeal is now before us. Before  we set out the grounds which have been urged  before us in support of the appeal it is perhaps convenient that we extract  the material portions of some of the provisions  of the Act on whose construction the appeal turns.  The Act, as we  stated,  earlier,  was enacted inter  alia,  for  making provision  for  adjustment and settlement of  debts  due  by displaced  persons.  A "’displaced debtor" is defined  as  a displaced person from whom a debt is due or is being claimed (s. 2 (9) ). We might add that it is common ground that both the appellant and the respondents are "displaced persons" as defined  in  the Act.  The word ,debt’ used in s. 2  (9)  is defined in s. 2 (6) thus :               "2.   (6).    ’debt’   means   any   pecuniary               liability,  whether  payable presently  or  in               future; or under a decree or order of civil or               revenue   court  or  otherwise,   or   whether               ascertained or to be ascertained Section  5 is the first of the sections in Chapter II  which is headed ’Debt Adjustment Proceedings’.  It reads :                "5. (1) At any time within one year after the               date on which this Act comes into force in any               local  area,  a displaced debtor may  make  an               application for the adjustment of his debts to               the Tribunal within the local limits of  whose               jurisdiction   he  actually  and   voluntarily               resides, or carries on business or  personally               works for gain ........... " Sub-section  (2)  and (3) of this section specify  what  the application under sub-s. (1) should contain but  299 these  need  not  detain  us.  The  next  section  which  is relevant,  having regard to the points raised before us,  is s. 16 which reads :               "16  (1) Where a debt incurred by a  displaced               person  is  secured by a mortgage,  charge  or               lien  on the immovable property  belonging  to               him  in West Pakistan, the Tribunal  may,  for

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             the purpose of any proceeding under this  Act,               require  the creditor to elect to  retain  the               security  or  to be treated  as  an  unsecured               creditor.               (2)   If  the  creditor elects to  retain  the               security, he may a ply to the Tribunal, having               jurisdiction  in  this behalf as  provided  in               section  10, for a declaration of  the  amount               due under his debt.               (3)   Where  in any case, the creditor  elects               to  retain  his  security,  if  the  displaced               debtor receives any compensation in respect of               any  such property as is referred to  in  sub-               section (1), the               creditor shall be entitled-               (a)   Where the compensation is paid in cash,               to a  first charge thereon :               Provided that the amount of the debt in               respect  of which he shall be entitled to  the               first charge shall be that amount as bears  to               the total debt the same proportion as the com-               pensation  paid  in respect  of  the  property               bears  to the value of the verified  claim  in               respect  thereof and to that extent  the  debt               shall be deemed to have been reduced;               (b)   where the compensation is by way of  ex-               change  of property, to a first charge on  the               property  situate in India so received by  way               of exchange :               300               Provided  that  the  amount  of  the  debt  in               respect  of which he shall be entitled to  the               first charge shall be that amount as bears  to               the  total  debt the same  proportion  as  the               value  of  the  property received  by  way  of               exchange  bears to the value of  the  verified               claim  in respect thereof and to  that  extent               the debt shall be deemed to have been reduced.               (4)Notwithstanding anything contained in  this               section, where a debt is secured by a mortgage               of agricultural lands belonging to a displaced               person  in West Pakistan and the mortgage  was               with  possession, the mortgagee shall,  if  he               has  been allotted lands in India in  lieu  of               the  lands  of which he was in  possession  in               West  Pakistan,  be entitled  to  continue  in               possession of the lands so allotted until  the               debt  is  satisfied from the usufruct  of  the               lands or is redeemed by the debtor :               Provided that in either case the amount of the               debt shall be only that amount as bears to the               total debt the same proportion as the value of               the  lands allotted to the creditor  in  India               bears to the value of the lands left behind by               him  in West Pakistan and to that  extent  the               debt shall be deemed to have been reduced.               (5)Where a creditor elects to be treated as               an  unsceured  creditor, in  relation  to  the               debt,  the provisions of this Act shall  apply               accordingly.  "               Section 29 (1) enacts               "29.  (1) On and from the 15th day of  August,               1947, no interest shall accrue or be deemed to               have accrued in respect of any debt owed by  a               displaced person, and no Tribunal shall allow

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              301               any  future interest in respect of any  decree               or order passed by it               Provided that-               (a)   where the debt is secured by the  pledge               of  shares, stocks, Government  securities  or               securities of a local authority, the  Tribunal               shall allow for the period commencing from the               15th day of August, 1947, and ending with  the               date of commencement of this Act, interest  to               the creditor at the rate mutually agreed  upon               or at a rate at which any dividend or interest               has  been  paid  or  is  payable  in   respect               thereof, whichever is less ;               (b)   in  any other case the Tribunal may,  if               it  thinks it just and proper to do  so  after               taking into account the paying capacity of the               debtor  as defined in section 32,  allow,  for               the  period mentioned in clause (a),  interest               at  a  rate not exceeding four per  cent,  per               annum simple." We  shall now proceed to detail the points that  were  urged before  us  by learned Counsel for the appellant :  (1)  The first   contention   raised  before  us  was   that   Pratap Singh---the representative of the purchaser of the equity of redemption-was not a "debtor" within s. 2 (6), because there was   no  contractual  relationship  between  him  and   the displaced creditor i. e., the appellants.  The argument  was broadly  on these lines : Section 2 (6) of the  Act  defined the word ’debt’ and the expression "debt’ is employed in  s. 2 (9) as also in s. 5 (1) under which the application giving rise  to  this  appeal  was  filed.   The  essence  of  that definition is that it involves     a pecuniary liability -on the part of the     ’debtor’ enforceable by a  creditor.Thus it   was urged that a mortgagor under a purely 302 usufructuary  mortgage where there was no personal  covenant to repay the loan, could not be said to be a debtor and  the amount secured under such a mortgage could not therefore  be a "debt" within the definition.  The position of a purchaser of  the  equity of redemption Vis-a-Vis the  mortgagee  was, learned  Counsel urged, similar.  He further urged that  the fact in the case of a purchaser of the equity of redemption, even if the mortgagee could bring a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-money and in enforcement of that liability  the mortgaged property could be sold was not sufficient to  make him  a debtor as according to him the absence of a  personal liability  to  discharge  the obligation out  of  his  other property not under mortgage was the essence of a debtor  and creditor  relationship under the definition.  In support  of this submission learned Counsel referred us to two decisions one  of  the Lahore High Court in Lachhman  Singh  v.  Natha Singh  (1),  and  the  other of the  Bombay  High  Court  in Manubhai  Mahijibhai  Patel  v.  Trikamlal  Lakshmidas  (2), turned on the meaning of the expression "debt’ in the Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act (Act VII of 1934) and it was held that  the  amount secured by a  pure  usufructuary  mortgage which  neither stipulated for the personal liability of  the obligor  to pay, nor conferred on the obligee the  right  to recover  the amount by the coercive machinery of law,  could not  be  called a ’debt’ in that essence of the  concept  of ’debt’  consisted in the personal liability of  the  obligor which  the obligee was entitled to enforce by action.   This decision,  even  apart from the terms of s. 16  of  the  Act which  in  terms includes an usufructuary  mortgage  in  the

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category  of "’a debt" for the purposes of the Act,  affords little  assistance to the appellant before us,  because  the mortgage  of  1933  in favour of the  appellant  contains  a covenant  on  the part of the mortgagor to  repay  the  debt after 10 years and in consequence the mortgagee was entitled to file a suit (1) I,L.R. 1941 Lah. 71,  (2) I.L,R. 1958 Bom, 1429  303 for the recovery of his debt and realise it from the sale of the  mortgaged  property and also obtain a  personal  decree under 0. XXXIV, r. 6 against the mortgagor-Sham Singh-though he  might not be entitled to a personal decree  against  the purchaser  of the equity of redemption.  The other  decision of the Bombay High Court dealt with the construction of  the Bombay  Agricultural  Debtors’ Relief Act and  the  headnote specifies the point decided as being that in the absence  of an  agreement  making a mortgagor personally liable  to  the mortgagee,  a purchaser of the equity of redemption was  not entitled to apply under s. 4 of that Act for the  adjustment of  the mortgage debt, inasmuch as such a mortgage debt  was not  "his  debt" within the meaning of s.  4.  This  extract sufficiently  shows  that decision turned  wholly  upon  the definitions contained in the enactment before the court  and could  not  be  called in aid as  laying  down  any  general propositions  of universal application.  On the other  hand, there  is  a  decision of the High Court of  the  Punjab  in Lahori Lal v. Kasturi Lal (1), in which the Bench held  that a  debt  as  defined  in  s. 2 (6)  of  the  Act  now  under consideration was not limited to personal liabilities only. We  consider  that the Act has not left the meaning  of  the expression  "debt" where such debt is secured by a  mortgage including  an usufructuary mortgage in any manner of  doubt, but   on  the  other  hand  by  making  specific   provision therefore,  has put beyond the pale of argument  that  these are  "debts" which could be scaled down under it.   We  have already  extracted  s.  16 of the  Act  which  contains  the provision for adjustment of debts where these are secured by mortgage  on immovable property.  As the property  which  is the  security for the mortgagee is situate in West  Pakistan sub-s.  (1)  applies which affords the  creditor  an  option either  to  retain  the  security or to  be  treated  as  an unsecured creditor. (1)  (1956) 58 P. L. R. 331, 304 It is common ground that the appellant desired to retain the security.   Sub-section  (2) therefore comes into  play  and enables the creditor to move the Tribunal for a  declaration regarding the amount due to him in respect of that mortgage. In  the  present  case the debtor himself  having  made  the application   under  s.  5,  there  was  no  need  for   any application  by the creditor.  The reliefs which a  creditor might obtain in case of his election to retain the  security are  set  out  in  sub-ss. (3) and  (4),  the  former  being applicable  to  simple mortgages and the  latter  where  the mortgage is usufructuary i.e., with possession.  Sub-scction (4) which is relevant to the mortgage debt involved in  this appeal runs :               "(4).   Notwithstanding anything contained  in               this  section,  where  a debt  is  secured  by               mortgage of agricultural lands belonging to  a               displaced  person  in West  Pakistan  and  the               mortgage  was with possession,  the  mortgagee               shall, if he has been allotted lands in  India               in  lieu  of  the lands of  which  he  was  in

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             possession  in West Pakistan, be  entitled  to               continue   in  possession  of  the  lands   so               allotted until tile debt is satisfied from the               usufruct  of the lands or is redeemed  by  the               debtor :-               Provided that in either case the amount of the               debt shall be only that amount as bears to the               total debt the same proportion as the value of               the  lands allotted to the creditor  in  India               bears to the value of the lands left behind by               him  in West Pakistan and to that  extent  the               debt shall be deemed to have been reduced." It  was not disputed that the debt due to the appellant  was secured by a mortgage of agricultural  305  lands  and that those lands belonged to a displaced  person from  West  Pakistan.It  was also  common  ground  that  the mortgage in favour of the appellant was with possession.  It ought to be mentioned that it wasby  virtue of  provisions on the lines of the opening words of sub-s. (4) contained in the rules and executive orders which were in force in  1950, that  the  appellant was put in possession of the  37.4  and 14.5  standard acres belonging respectively to Pratap  Singh and   Sham  Singh.   It  is  therefore  very  difficult   to appreciate  the  argument urged on behalf of  the  appellant that the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 16 are not attracted to the present case.  In the first place the words "and  the mortgage  is  with  possession" are  perfectly  general  and therefore apt and comprehensive enough to include not merely usufructuary mortgages in which there is personal  convenant on  the  part of the mortgagor to repay the debt,  but  also what  are  usually  termed  "pure"  usufructuary   mortgages containing no such personal covenant.  There is,  therefore, no  scope  for the argument based on the  analogy  of  other enactments  in which the word ’debt’ has been  construed  as indicating  the  necessity for a personal  liability  or  an obligation  to  repay  on the part of  the  debtor.   Having regard  to the terms of s. 16 (4) the security being by  way of usufructuary mortgage and the right of a debtor to redeem are  sufficient to enable the beneficient provisions of  the section  being attracted.  It is only necessary to add  that what might have been apparentfrom   what   we   have   said earlier, viz., (1) that the point based upon the  definition of a debt in s.2(6)is  wholly inapplicable to the  case  of Sham Singh,since the mortgage   itself contained a personal con(2)  that  even  in regard to  Pratap  Singh,  the  other applicant,  the  contention has a very  limited  application since  having regard to the personal covenant the  mortgagee had  a right to sue for the enforcement of his mortgage  and recover  the money from the sale of the mortgaged  property. So 306 that  apart even from the terms of s. 16 (4)  the  liability under the mortgage in favour of the appellant would squarely fall  within  the  definition in S.  (6).   The  matter  is, however, put beyond the range of controversy by the specific provision  in regard to all usufructuary mortgages by s.  16 (4)  of the Act.  In this connection we might refer  to  the decision  of this Court in Rajkumari Kaushalya Devi v.  Bawa Pritam  Singh (1), where it was ruled that  a  mortgage-debt was within the definition of the word ,debt’ in s. 2 (6)  of the  Act.  No doubt., that case was not concerned  with  the distinction between cases where the creditor has a right  to proceed personally against the debtor and cases where he has not, as in the case of a pure usufructuary mortgage, but the

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decision  is  useful  as  indicating  that  the   expression pecuniary liability’ in s. 2 (6) has to be understood not in isolation but with reference to other provisions of the  Act and  particularly s. 16.  We are, therefore, clearly of  the opinion  that  every  usufructuary  mortgage,  whatever  its nature, is within the definition of ’debt’ under the Act for the  purpose  of  scaling down under s. 16 and  that  it  is wholly immaterial whether or not the creditor is entitled to proceed personally against the debtor and recover the amount of the mortgage. (2)  The  next contention urged by the learned  Counsel  has been  less substance than the one we have just disposed  of. It  was said that the liability under a mortgage debt  could be scaled down and adjusted under the Act only in a suit for redemption filed by the creditor and that it was incompetent for  a debtor to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal  to effect  the  scaling down and adjustment by  an  application under  s.  5. We do not consider that this  argument  merits serious  consideration.  Section 5 (1) of the Act  which  we have extracted enables a "debtor" to make an application  to the  tribunal for the adjustment of his debts.  In  view  of what we have stated (1)  [1960] 3 S.C.R. 570,  307 earlier  the amount due on or secured by the mortgage  is  a "debt"  within  the  meaning  of S. 5  to  settle  which  an application could be filed and the debt being a secured debt answering  to the description contained in the main part  of s.  16  (4),  the  applicants  were  entitled  to  have   an adjustment in terms of that specified in the proviso to that section.   Though this point about the locus standi  of  the respondent-debtors   to  file  the  application   has   been persisted  in  by  the appellants at every  stage  of  these proceedings, we consider that there is no merit in it and it has  to be rejected on the plain terms of s. 5 read with  s. 16. (3)The  third  and  last objection urged  by  the  learned Counsel  turns on the language of the proviso to s.  16  (4) which we shall extract once again :               "Provided  that in either case the  amount  of               the debt shall be only that amount as bears to               the  total  debt the same  proportion  as  the               value of the lands allotted to the creditor in               India  bears  to the value of the  lands  left               behind  him in the West Pakistan and  to  that               extent  the debt shall be deemed to have  been               reduced." Learned  Counsel pointed out that the scaling down  effected in  the present case was on the following basis.  The  total mortgage-debt  under the mortgage deed was computed  at  Rs. 51,700/-calculating  interest as permitted by  the  relevant statutory provisions and taking into account s. 29 which  we have already extracted.  The correctness of this figure  was not disputed.  The quarrel of learned Counsel was in  regard to  what  follows  and that is stated in the  order  of  the Tribunal which has been confirmed by the appellate Court  in these terms :               "The total mortgaged land now belonging to the               petitioner (Pratap Singh) and respondent No. 5               (Sham Singh) has been assessed as               308               equivalent to 359 standard acres 14-3/4  units               (329  standard  acres  13-3/4  units  of   the               petitioner plus 22 standard acres 6-1/2  units               of  the respondent No. 5) and in lieu  thereof

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             the  mortgagors  have  been given  in  all  51               standard   acres   9  units   (37.4   to   the               petitioners and 14.5 to the respondent No. 5).               As  provided  under s. 16 (4) of the  Act  the               amount of the debt payable to respondents 1 to               4  has been reduced in the same proportion  in               which  the  land  has  been  allotted  to  the               mortgagors.   For the land belonging  to  them               the  mortgage debt amounting to  Rs.  51,700/-               when   reduced   to  this   proportion   comes               approximately to Rs. 7,420/-." It  is this reduction that learned Counsel complains as  not justified  by the proviso.  The argument is that  under  the proviso  to s. 16 (4) the reduction of the debt has to  bear the same proportion as "the value of the lands" allotted  to the creditor in India bears to "the value of lands" left  by him  in  Pakistan.   "Value", learned  Counsel  says,  means market  value.   It is urged that value of  neither  of  the lands was computed on that basis but that the Tribunal  took into  account merely the proportion between the two  extents or areas i.e., the standard acres left in Pakistan  compared to  the  standard acres allotted in India in  lieu  thereof. This  contention that the procedure adopted does not  accord with  the requirements of the proviso has been  rejected  by all the Courts and, in our opinion, correctly.  The  fallacy in the argument of learned Counsel consists in ignoring  the fact  that  in  computing  the  standard  acres  left  by  a displaced person in Pakistan the rehabilitation  authorities are, under the relevant rules and instructions, directed  to take into account the income yield of the two sets of  lands and thus the "value" of the land left behind is reflected in ascertaining the "standard acres." Thus though market  value in the sense of what a willing purchaser would pay for the  309 land  left behind was not ascertained-it was  obviously  not practicable to ascertain it-the rules etc., made  sufficient provision  for  such  a valuation to  be  reflected  in  the computation of the area to be allotted instead.  The  nature of  the  land left behind-whether  it  was  canal-irrigated, well-irrigated  or  dry or merely  rain-fed-was  taken  into account and numerical factors were prescribed based on these criteria for ascertaining the equivalent of those, lands  in India.   It was after such a computation was made  that  the 7531   Kanals  and  odd  of  land  which  belonged  to   the respondents  was equated to 359 and odd standard acres.   If therefore 359 standard acres were the equivalent in value of the land left behind, regard being had to the  circumstances we have indicated, there cannot be any complaint that  there has been a departure from the method of adjustment specified in the proviso to s. 16 (4) when the debt as ascertained and computed  in  accordance  with s. 29 of the  Act  and  other relevant  statutory provisions was scaled down under  s.  16 (4) by multiplying it by 51/359, or 1/7 th.  We are  further of  the opinion that when the provision in proviso to s.  16 (1)  spoke of "value" it must have had in contemplation  the value  as  determined by the procedure for fixing  the  same under the relevant rules for the computation of  equivalents of property of displaced persons left behind in Pakistan and the  allotment of evacuee property to them in India.   There is  no  substance, therefore, in this point  either.   These were the only points urged before us.  The appeal fails  and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 310

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