http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 8  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  3142-43 of 2002

PETITIONER: National Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors.

RESPONDENT: M/s Haribox Swalram & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/04/2004

BENCH: S. Rajendra Babu & G.P. Mathur.

JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT

(With CA No.3144 of 2002)

G.P. MATHUR,J.

       These appeals by special leave have been preferred against the  judgment and order dated 4.8.2000 of a Division Bench of Calcutta High  Court, whereby the appeal  preferred by respondent nos. 1 and 2 was  allowed,  the order dated 11.4.1997 of the learned single Judge dismissing  the writ petition was set aside and the writ petition was disposed of with  certain directions.   2.      The respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed the writ petition praying that a writ  of mandamus be issued  commanding the appellant herein to produce the  entire records relating to the withholding of delivery of goods pursuant to  the contracts mentioned in Annexure-A to the writ petition and also to  deliver the goods mentioned in Annexure-A upon adjustment of advance  payment made by them.  A further prayer was made that the  appellants  herein be directed to take a final decision as envisaged in the letter dated  24.10.1989 (Annexure \026A to the writ petition) and an injunction be issued  restraining the appellants from transferring, dealing with or disposing of  goods pursuant to the contracts mentioned in Annexure-A in any manner  without keeping the goods which are to be supplied to writ petitioner no.1. 3.      The case set up in the writ petition is as follows. The writ petitioners  had been purchasing various quantities of cloth from Finlay Mills Limited  and Gold Mohur Mills Limited, both situate in Bombay.  The petitioners  entered into contracts specified in Annexure-A to the writ petition and made  advance payment against the same.  The concerned mills supplied and  delivered the goods to the petitioners from time to time but a substantial part  of the contract remained unexecuted.  By the letter dated 26.9.1993 the mills  were requested to take necessary steps for immediate delivery of the goods,  in respect whereof payment had already been made.  The mills vide their  letter dated 29.9.1993 intimated that deliveries could not be effected as the  banking transaction and accounts of the mills had been frozen, but assured  that arrangements were being made to deliver the goods as early as possible.   The management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government on  18.10.1993 under Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management)  Ordinance, 1983 which was subsequently replaced by Textile Undertakings  (Taking Over of Management) Act, 1993 on 25.12.1993.  The Central  Government constituted National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra)  Limited for the purpose of managing the textile undertakings which in turn  as  additional custodian took over the management of the two textile  undertakings.  The writ petitioners, thereafter approached the appellants for  release of the goods and one bale of contractual specification was delivered  but 12 bales were detained by the Excise Authorities,  as a consequence  whereof the same were not delivered. The National Textile Corporation  (South Maharashtra) vide their letter dated 15.3.1984 requested the Officer  on Special Duty of taken over mills including Gold Mohur Mills  and Gold

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 8  

Mohur Mills to furnish particulars in prescribed proforma to enable it to take  up the matter with the Central Government for taking action under section  11(1) of the Act for the purpose of cancelling or varying any contract or  agreement entered prior to pre-take over period which action had to be taken  on or before 14.4.1984.  After giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to  the parties concerned. the textile mills called upon the writ petitioners to  verify the pre-take over  contracts and joint meetings took place for the said  purpose  and the matter was referred back to the Officer on Special Duty.   The writ petitioners then vide their letter dated 13.10.1984 requested the  Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation (South  Maharashtra) Ltd. to deliver the balance quantity of cloth in terms of the  pending contracts and to adjust all sums of money which had been paid by  way of advance.  The appellants sent a reply on 7.11.1994 stating that (1) all  the outstanding contracts had been cancelled on the date of take over as they  were not binding upon them; (2) the deposits that were made with the  erstwhile management were not  specifically marked towards any of invoice  of packed  material and as such could not be adjusted against any future  delivery and the writ petitioners will have to claim this amount from the  erstwhile management since the custodian is prohibited from discharging  any liability pertaining to pre-take over period; and (3) there were no  invoices against which payments were received from the petitioners prior to  take over and as such the question of effecting delivery of paid stocks did  not arise.  The writ petitioners made several representations and they were  informed by the letter dated 4.10.1989 that the matter relating to delivery of  cloth in pursuance of pre-take over contracts was under active consideration.   However, no delivery was effected.  The writ petition was thereafter filed in  December, 1989 seeking the reliefs  mentioned in the earlier part of the  judgment.      4.      The writ petition was contested on behalf of the appellants herein and  the Principal Officer of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra)  Ltd. filed a detailed counter-affidavit.  Certain  pleas  taken in para 3 of the  counter affidavit have an important bearing and therefore the same is being  reproduced below: "Para3. At the outset I state as follows :- a)      The writ petition being directed to obtain specific  performance of the disputed contracts and further  claiming a decree for the same which can and should be  obtained by filing a regular suit, further the same being   concerned with very many  disputed questions of facts,  this application to by pass the said usual procedure of suit  is not maintainable and ought to be dismissed on that  ground.

b)      The contract in question admittedly having been entered  into at Bombay, with companies situate at Bombay,  relating to goods to be delivered from Bombay and the  payment in respect thereof were required to be made at  Bombay and some part whereof having in fact been paid  at Bombay, the entirety of the cause of action being the  subject matter of the writ petition had arisen, if at all,  within the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.    Accordingly the instant writ petition seeking to enforce  such cause of action which has arisen wholly outside the  said jurisdiction is not enforceable at the High Court at  Calcutta, neither the High Court of Calcutta has  jurisdiction over the same.   Hence, the application is  misconceived and not maintainable.

c)      Admittedly, the cause of action contained in the writ  petition having arisen in 1983 when the Take Over Act  came into force and sought to be enforced in 1989 after  expiry of long six years, is clearly belated.   The  applicant being also guilty of latches no relief should be  granted in a writ petition which only helps the vigilant  but not the ident.   Besides, the application is also barred

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 8  

by the law of limitation and ought liable to be rejected."  

       It was further pleaded that on the appointed date no goods  manufactured, earmarked and ready for delivery as claimed by the writ  petitioners were lying and as such there was no question of delivery of any  remaining goods under any alleged contract.  Whatever goods were  delivered to the writ petitioners, the same had been earmarked for them as  invoices in respect whereof had already been issued for which payments had  been received earlier and title in respect whereof had already  passed on to  the writ petitioners.  Similar procedure had been adopted in respect of many  others and cloth was delivered to them which were lying manufactured in  their account.  However, there was no liability to deliver any further goods.   The respondents had not received any advance payment as alleged by the  writ petitioners.  It was further pleaded that the respondents under the  provisions of the Act were not liable to deliver any further goods under any  alleged contract for the pre-take over period in respect whereof no title had  passed on to the writ petitioners.  It was specifically denied that other  dealers, similarly situate, had been delivered any goods in respect of pre-take  over contracts and a uniform principle was adopted in this regard.  No  invoices had been raised in respect of any alleged balance goods of a pre- take over period. It was also pleaded that the payments, if any, alleged to  have been made by the writ petitioners were in fact made to the erstwhile  company and the writ petitioners were at liberty to recover the same from  them but the respondents were not liable to pay back any amount or to  deliver any goods.  It was also asserted that the respondents had been  discharged of every liability of any kind for the pre-take over period.  The  other allegations made in the writ petitions were also denied. 5.      After exchange of affidavits the hearing of the writ petition  commenced before a learned Single Judge on 14.6.1990 and finally  judgment was reserved on 5.12.1990.  However, after considerable period of  time the writ petition was released by the learned Single Judge.  Thereafter  sometime in 1995 the writ petitioners made a prayer to file a supplementary  affidavit for the purpose of  bringing on record a letter dated 24.10.1989  allegedly written by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, National Textile  Corporation which was addressed to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Textile,  Government of India.  The prayer was strongly opposed on behalf of the  appellants herein.  The learned Single Judge by his order dated 17.1.1995  granted permission for filing of a supplementary affidavit  and affidavit-in- opposition, if any.  Thereafter, the writ petitioners filed an affidavit annexing  therewith a copy of a letter dated 24.10.1989 purported to have been written  by Mr. Sundaram Chairman-cum-Managing Director, National Textile  Corporation to Shri Saptharishi, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Textile,  Government of India.  The letter makes a reference to the representation  made by the writ petitioners and two other firms regarding delivery of cotton  fabrics by Finlay Mills and Gold Mohur Mills against pre-take over  contracts.  It states that the matter had been examined at their end and the  position of contract balance as per the party and the contract balance as per  the mills was as detailed in Annexure-A enclosed to the letter.  It is further  mentioned therein that the position could not be certified as absolutely  correct as most of the original records and documents were in possession of  CBI. It goes on to say that after taking over of the  management, all the  contracts for  supply had not been subsequently cancelled and/or varied by  the Additional Custodian at any time. If the request was to be considered, all  parties similarly situated will have to be treated on the same footing and  accordingly deliveries to the extent of Rs.101.72 lakhs  will have to be  effected to 224 parties of eight taken-over textile  mills without receiving  any demand.  At the end of the letter it is stated that though the party had  raised a dispute  promptly  the question whether a parties’ claim had to be  acceded to now after a lapse of six years  raised a point of proprietary and  also  loss of Rs. 40.70 lakhs to NTC.  In the concluding portion of  the letter  it is mentioned that although the party had raised a fairly arguable case, the  best course of action would be to obtain a judicial pronouncement in the  matter so as to avoid any possible future objection from audit or from  propriety angle.  In the Annexure to the letter  the credit balance of the writ

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 8  

petitioners as on 18.10.89 was shown as Rs.10,47,145.33 as against Finlay  Mills  and Rs.21,89,056.26 as against Gold Mohur Mills. 6      An affidavit in reply was  filed to the aforesaid supplementary affidavit  and it was submitted that the writ petitioners were put to strict proof of the  letter dated 24.10.1989 as the same was alleged to have been given to them  by Mr. Sundaram without disclosing the reason for doing so. The letter was  a confidential internal communication and there was no occasion for Mr.  Sundaram to hand over a copy of the same to the writ petitioners especially  when he (Mr Sundaram) had left employment of National Textile  Corporation  (South Maharahstra) Ltd. in December, 1992.  The letter was at   best comment or opinion of Mr. Sundaram and was contrary to the opinion  of the Attorney-General to the effect that the alleged contracts were not  genuine.  A copy of the opinion of the Attorney-General was also annexed.  It was also pleaded that the Government of India had not accepted   the  alleged claim of the writ petitioners and had in fact launched prosecution  against the Principal Officer of respondent no.4 for giving delivery of  stocks  to several parties after the date of taking over.  It was further pleaded that the  letter cannot be taken as an admission of the alleged claim of the writ  petitioners under any circumstances. 7.      The learned Single Judge held that the contract sought to be relied  upon by the writ petitioners was doubtful as it did not signify the assent of  the concerned mills.  Whether sale contracts were made in the manner  indicated and were acted upon by the mills concerned was a question of fact  which had to be established by evidence.  There was no evidence on record  of the case  to establish the contract.  Similarly no attempt had been made by  the writ petitioners to establish independently that a sum in excess of Rs. 40  lakhs was lying to the credit of the concerned mills.  In fact there was no  assertion to that effect  in the writ petition and no particulars of such  advance had been furnished. It was also held that the respondents in the writ  petition  were not in  picture at the time the invoices, which had been relied  upon, were prepared and it was the management which was in control of the  concerned mills before the take over period and therefore in such  circumstances it was obligatory on the part of the writ petitioners to prove  the facts  but no attempt  to that effect had been made except relying upon  the letter of the concerned mills of September, 1983.  The learned Single  Judge also held that he had directed the writ petitioners to produce the  original of the pending contracts but they failed to comply with the said  direction.  They merely handed over a zerox copy of the contract of sale of  cotton cloth which only contained the  signature of the buyer and not of the  seller.  This zerox copy produced  was of a printed  proforma wherein the   words "The Gold Mohur" had been typed before the printed words "Mills  Ltd."  Even this document did not  make any mention of any payment  having been  made by way of advance nor it mentioned that any credit  balance lying with the mills should be appropriated towards the contract.   The learned Judge further held that the respondents had disowned their  obligation to deliver the goods in November, 1984 but the writ petition was  filed after more than five years and even if the period of limitation was taken  to be that of a civil suit, the writ petition was barred by limitation.  The  learned Judge then considered in detail the effect of   sub-section (7) of  section 3, and sections 6 and 11 and other provisions of the Act and held that  all contracts relating to the management of the business and all contracts  relating to the management of the  affairs of the Textile Undertaking stood  terminated on the appointed day and consequently the Central Government  or the Custodian were neither obliged to discharge the contractual  obligations by effecting deliveries, nor they were obliged to give any  adjustments of the advances said to have been made.  Regarding the letter  dated 24.10.1989 it was held that the letter itself mentions that the facts  stated therein could not be verified as most of the original records and  documents had been seized and were lying in possession of CBI.  That apart,  the object of the letter was not to admit any liability or obligation but an  opinion was expressed that the best course of action was  to obtain a judicial  pronouncement in the matter.  Finally, the learned Single Judge held that the  entire cause of action accrued in Bombay and therefore the High Court of  Calcutta had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. On these findings  the writ petition was dismissed.  

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 8  

8.      Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned Single  Judge  the writ petitioners preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of  the Calcutta High Court.  The Division Bench held that Calcutta High Court  had the jurisdiction to hear the matter as part of cause  of action accrued  there.  On merits it was held that  ordinarily a writ of mandamus cannot be  issued for  specific performance of a contract yet there is no absolute bar in  doing so.  The Bench went on to hold that whether in fact there existed any  contract or not would be a question of fact and having regard to the fact that  the State has a statutory duty to perform the contract the appeal was disposed  of with the following direction:         "In a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion  that interest of justice would be subserved if the present  incumbent of the post of Chairman-cum-Managing  Director gives an  opportunity of hearing to the  petitioners and try to sort out the differences before the  parties across the table.  We do not intend to go into the  merit of the matter so as to arrive at a finding one way or  the other as to whether the existence of contract had been  proved or not but by  moulding the reliefs, we are of the  opinion that even if it be found that it is not possible for  the respondent no.2 to supply the goods to the petitioners,  we have no doubt in our mind that in the event it is found  that a sum of Rs.40 lakhs is lying in its hand, steps  should be taken for its refund as expeditiously as possible  and upon payment of interest @ Rs.12% p.a."

9.      Shri Kirit N. Raval, learned Solicitor General appearing for the  appellants, has strenuously urged that no part of cause of action had accrued  in Calcutta as the Textile Mills were situate in Bombay and supply was to be  made ex-factory at Bombay and the alleged payment by the writ petitioners  was also made at the said place.  It has thus been urged that it is not a case  where even a part of cause of action may have accrued in the State of West  Bengal which could enable the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ  petition and to grant any relief to the writ petitioners.  Shri G.C.Bharuka,  learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents herein (writ petitioners)  has submitted that the writ petitioners were carrying on  business at Calcutta,   the letters  were sent by them from Calcutta and replies to the same had also  been received by them at Calcutta and therefore part of cause of action had  accrued in the State of West Bengal and consequently the view taken by the  Division Bench of the High Court that it had jurisdiction to entertain the writ  petition was perfectly correctly.             10.     Under Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is  empowered to issue writs, orders or directions to any Government, authority  or person exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the  cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,  notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the  residence of such person is not within those territories.    Cause of action as  understood in the civil proceedings means every fact which, if traversed, it  would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a  judgment of the Court.   To put it in a different way, it is bundle of facts  which taken with law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief  against the defendant.  In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. AIR 2002 SC  126 in the context of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it has been  explained that each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso  facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action  within the Court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such  which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case.    Facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do  not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the  Court concerned.   A similar question was examined in State of Rajasthan v.  M/s Swaika Properties AIR 1985 SC 1289.   Here certain properties  belonging to a company which had its registered office in Calcutta were  sought to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice under Section 52 of the  Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served upon the company at  Calcutta.   The question which arose for consideration was whether the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 8  

service of notice at the head office of the company at Calcutta could give  rise to a cause of action within the State of West Bengal to enable the  Calcutta High Court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where challenge to  acquisition proceedings conducted in Jaipur was made.   It was held that the  entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under  Section 152 of the Rajasthan Act arose within the territorial jurisdiction of  the Rajasthan High Court and it was not necessary for the company to plead  the service of notice upon them at Calcutta for grant of appropriate writ,  order or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the  notice issued by the Rajasthan Government under Section 52 of the Act.   It  was thus held that Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the  writ petition.     11.     The question of jurisdiction was considered in considerable detail in  Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu 1994 (4) SCC 711  and it was held that merely because the writ petitioner submitted the tender  and made representations from Calcutta in response to an advertisement  inviting tenders which were to be considered at New Delhi and the work was  to be performed in Hazira (Gujarat) and also received replies to the fax  messages at Calcutta, could not constitute facts forming an integral part of  cause of action.   It was further held that the High Court could not assume  jurisdiction on the ground that the writ petitioner resides in or carries on  business from a registered office in the State of West Bengal. 12.     In the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the  supply of cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay.   According  to the writ petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay.   The  learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the  Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.   The  Division Bench has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded  contract had come into existence which could be cancelled only after giving  an opportunity of hearing and consequently the question of revocation of the  contract at its Calcutta address would constitute a cause of action.   In our  opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law.    It was nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had  initiated any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the  writ petitioner for cancellation of the contract.   In fact, it is stated in para 18  of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure  prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract.   Regarding the  jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in  para 73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under : "73.      Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all  accounts at the aforesaid place of business within the  jurisdiction.    Your petitioner states that by reason of the  aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its  said place of business within the jurisdiction.   All notices and  correspondences referred to herein-above addressed to your  petitioner has been received by your petitioner at your  petitioner’s place of business within the jurisdiction.   In the  circumstances this Hon’ble Court has the jurisdiction to  entertain the present application."

       As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ petitioner carries on  business at Calcutta or that the reply to the correspondence made by it was  received at Calcutta is not an integral part of the cause of action and,  therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ  petition and the view to the contrary taken by the Division Bench cannot be  sustained.   In view of the above finding, the writ petition is liable to be  dismissed.  However, in order to avoid any further harassment to the parties  and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine the matter on merits as  well. 13.     Chapter II of the Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management)  Act, 1983 deals with Taking Over Of The Management Of Certain Textile  Undertakings.  Sub-section (1) of Section 3 lays down that on and from the  appointed day, the management of all the textile undertakings shall vest in  the Central Government.   Sub-section (7) of Section 3 is important and it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 8  

reads as under : Section 3 (7):      For the removal of doubts, it is hereby  declared that any liability incurred by a textile company in  relation to the textile undertaking before the appointed day shall  be enforceable against the concerned textile company and not  against the Central Government or the Custodian.

       This provision is very clear and says in no uncertain terms that any  liability incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking  shall not be enforceable against the Central Government or the custodian.    The effect of this provision was examined in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh  v. National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. 1996 (1) SCC 313  where the question of payment of gratuity of a workman who left the  employment just a few months before "the appointed day" came up for  consideration.   It was held that the language of sub-section (7)  of Section 3  is clear and unambiguous inasmuch as in the said provision it has been  declared that any liability incurred by the textile company in relation to the  textile undertaking before the appointed day shall be enforceable against the  textile company concerned and not against the Central Government or the  Custodian.   It was also held that the words "any liability" in sub-section (7)  of Section 3 are of wide amplitude to cover every liability that was incurred  by the textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the  appointed day. The Court thus rejected the contention that sub-section (7) of  Section 3 must be so construed as to exclude its applicability in respect of  liability for payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act.   The  Court also examined the provisions of the Textile Undertakings  (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1995 (Ordinance No.6 of 1995) which was later  on replaced by the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1995) and  held as under :         "The provisions of Ordinance 6 of 1995 also show that  the liabilities for the period prior to the take-over of the  management are to be discharged from the amount payable to  the owner of the textile undertaking for the acquisition of the  undertaking and not by the NTC.   It is, therefore, not possible  to uphold the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that  NTC is liable in respect of the gratuity amount payable under  the Payment of Gratuity Act to Respondent 2."

14.     The legal position is, therefore, absolutely clear that any liability  incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the  appointed day cannot be enforced against the Central Government or the  Custodian.   According to the case set up by the writ petitioners, money was  paid by them to the two textile mills before the appointed day but they had  failed to supply the cloth.  Assuming the aforesaid position to be correct,  after receipt of money, the textile mills having incurred a liability, were under  an obligation  to supply the cloth to the writ petitioners.   On the facts  pleaded, the liability had been incurred by the textile company and  consequently it could not be enforced against the Central Government or the  Custodian.   We are thus unable to accept the view taken by the Division  Bench of the High Court that it was not a liability of the textile company.    15.     In paras 7 and 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the appellants before  the High Court, the correctness of Annexure A was specifically denied.   In  paras 15 and 16 it was categorically pleaded that on the appointed day no  goods manufactured and earmarked for the writ petitioners were lying in the  mills.   In paras 21, 22, 24 and 27 receipt of payment allegedly made by the  petitioners was also denied.   The appellants herein having specifically denied  receipt of any payment or existence of any manufactured and earmarked  cloth for the writ petitioners on the appointed day, no relief could have been  granted to the writ petitioners in proceedings under Article 226 of the  Constitution.   The writ petition raised highly disputed questions of fact  which, as rightly observed by the learned Single Judge, could be proved by  leading evidence in a properly constituted suit and was not a matter to be  investigated in a writ petition.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 8  

16.     The appellants herein had also disputed the correctness of the letter  allegedly written by Mr. V. Sundaram, Chairman-cum-Managing Director of  NTC to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Textiles, Government of India on  24.10.1989.   It is noteworthy that though the letter is of October 1989 but the  same was filed along with the supplementary affidavit on 27.1.1995 i.e. more  than 5 years after filing of the writ petition which had been filed in  December, 1989.   Mr. Sundaram had left the employment in 1992.   As the  letter shows, it was an internal correspondence between the Chairman of  National Textile Corporation and Joint Secretary, Ministry of Textiles,  Government of India.   The letter does not show that its copy was sent to  anyone else much less to the writ petitioners.  In para 4 of the supplementary  affidavit filed by Mahender Kumar Goenka, it was stated that on his request  Mr. Sundaram was kind enough to hand over a copy of the said letter dated  24.10.1989 to the petitioner.  It is extremely difficult to believe that though  Mr. Sundaram left the employment in 1992, but he was keeping a copy of the  said letter with him and handed over the same to Shri Goenka in 1995.   Shri  Sundaram, who  was an IAS Officer holding a very responsible post of  Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation, is not  expected to keep private copies of official documents nor to hand over the  same to a private party.  We are, therefore of the opinion that the view taken  by the learned Single Judge that the said document is of extremely suspicious  character and could not be taken into consideration is perfectly correct. 17.     We are also in agreement with  the view taken by the learned Single  Judge that the writ petition which was filed in December 1989 was highly  belated as the claim of the writ petitioners had been categorically refuted by  the letter dated 7.11.1990 by the Director Finance on behalf of National  Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra). The petition was therefore liable to  be rejected on this ground alone.   That apart, the prayer made in the writ  petition is for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the appellant herein  to supply the goods (cloth). It is well settled that in order that a mandamus be  issued to compel the authorities to do something, it must be  shown that there  is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal  right under the Statute to enforce its performance.  The present is a case of  pure and simple business contract. The writ petitioners have no statutory right  nor any statutory duty is cast upon the appellants whose performance may be  legally enforced.  No writ of mandamus can, therefore, be issued as prayed  by the writ petitioners. 18.     For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the writ  petition filed by the respondent herein was wholly devoid of merit and the  same was rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.    The appeal is accordingly allowed.   The judgment and order of the Division  Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 4.8.2000 is set aside and that of the  learned Single Judge restored.  The appellant will be entitled to their cost  here as well as in the High Court.