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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  1546 of 2006

PETITIONER: National Council for Teacher Education & Anr

RESPONDENT: Committee of Management & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/03/2006

BENCH: S.B. Sinha & P.P. Naolekar

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.24432 of 2005)

S.B. Sinha,  J.

                Leave granted.                  The first respondent herein is an institution which imparts teachers’  education.  The appellant is a statutory body.  It was created under the  National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 (’the Act’, for short).  The  Act was enacted with a view to achieve a planned and coordinated  development of the teacher education system throughout the country, regulate  and provide maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education  system and for matters connected therewith.  The appellant-Council was  constituted in terms of Section 3 of the said Act.                  Sub-Section 1 of Section 14 of the Act reads as under:          "14.(1) Every institution offering or intending to offer  a course or training in teacher education on or after the  appointed day, may, for grant of recognition under this  Act, make an application to the Regional Committee  concerned in such form and in such manner as may be  determined by regulations:

       Provided that an institution offering a course or  training in teacher education immediately before the  appointed day, shall be entitled to continue such course or  training for a period of six months, if it has made an  application for recognition within the said period and until  the disposal of the application by the Regional  Committee."

The Regulations making power by the Council has been provided for in  Section 32 of the Act.  The Regulations made in terms thereof were not to be  inconsistent with the provisions of the said Act and generally, to carry out the  provisions thereof.  Without prejudice to the generality of the said provisions,  in particular, in terms of sub-Section (2) of Section 32 the Regulations may  provide for all or any of the matters enumerated therein; Clause (e) whereof  reads as under:

"(e)    the form and the manner in which an  application for recognition is to be submitted under sub- section (1) of section 14;"

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Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said power, the Council framed  Regulations known as  ’The NCTE (Form of application for recognition, the  time limit of submission of application, determination of norms and standards  for recognition of teacher education programmes and permission to start new  course or training) Regulations, 2002.’  

Appendix 1-B of the said Regulations provides for a list of essential  documents which are required to be annexed with an application for grant of  recognition including permission for additional intake, some of which are:

"(ii)   "No Objection Certificate" from the State Govt./UT  Administration (in original).

(iii)   Copies of valid land documents along with a "Land  Title Certificate" by a local practising lawyer (As  per the format at Appendix 1-C).

(iv)    Copy of Approved Building plan."

Appendix 1-C mentioned in column (iii) of Appendix 1-B prescribes a  proforma in which an advocate is required to give a Title Certificate.   

The first respondent herein, in terms of the provisions of the said Act  and the Regulations framed thereunder, applied for grant of "No Objection  Certificate" (NOC) before the State of Uttaranchal.  The NOC was granted on  or about 23rd December, 2004.  An application thereafter was made by the first  respondent for grant of recognition for B.Ed. course in respect of the academic  year 2005-2006 before the appellant, which was admittedly received in its  office on 31st December, 2005.  In terms of the prescribed proforma for filing  such application, the following particulars of ’necessary infrastructure’ were  required to be furnished.  The particulars of the infrastructures required to be  furnished by the appellant are as under:

"3.1    Please indicate if land is available in the name of the  Institution, either on ownership or on long-term  lease basis.                  Land is available in the name of the institution on  long-term lease basis.  A copy of lease deed is  attached.

3.2     If the course is proposed to be started in a building  already constructed, following details/documents  may be furnished.                  (a)     approved building plan with the details of                  area floor/room wise.         (b)     total plinth area         (c)     completion certificate from the local authority.

3.3     If a building is yet to be constructed, the following  details/documents should be furnished.                  (a)     Site plan:            Site plan map attached         (b)     approved building plan with details of area                  floor/room wise:                Map attached.         (c)     date of commencement of construction:          8.11.2004"          The appellant, upon scrutiny of the said application, by its letter dated  27.4.2005, pointed out to the Principal of the first respondent-Institution that  the following essential documents had not been annexed thereto:

"2.     Legally valid land documents the Lease Deed

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submitted by the institution is not registered.  The  institution/society is required to submit the  registered lease deed in favour of society/institution  for a period of minimum 30 years.  

3.      Copy of the     building plan approved by the  competent authority.  The building plan submitted  by the institute is not approved by the competent  authority."

In response to the said letter, the first respondent, by its letter dated  9.6.2005 submitted:   

(1) lease deed purported to be in compliance of the said letter dated  27.4.2005 duly registered with the competent authority; and  (2) copy of the building plan approved by the competent authority.   

As the appellant, despite receipt of the said letter refused to accord  recognition to the first respondent-Institution for the academic year 2005- 2006, the respondent herein filed a writ petition before the Uttaranchal High  Court praying, inter alia, for the following reliefs:

"(i)    Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of  certiorari quashing the order dated 27.06.2005  passed by respondent no.1.

(ii)    Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of  mandamus directing the respondent no.1 and 2 to  grant recognition to start B.Ed. Course for the  Session 2005-2006 to the petitioners’ institution."

The learned Single Judge of the High Court, holding that the  Regulations made under Section 32 of the Act did not postulate any time limit  for filing an application for grant of recognition, directed:

"The learned counsel for the petitioners stated at bar that  counselling for B.Ed. will start after 15th October,  therefore, there is still time to consider for grant of  recognition before the new admission starts for the session  2005-06.  Since the application of the petitioners has not  been rejected, considering the public interest to be served  by the institution if the recognition is granted, it is  provided that the Regional Committee may consider for  grant of recognition to the petitioner-Institution before the  session starts, as the deficiencies have already been  removed after fulfilling the entire formalities as provided  under Sections 14 & 15 of the National Council for  Teacher Education Act, 1993."

Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of  the appellants would submit that the High Court committed a manifest error in  arriving at a conclusion that the provisions of the said Regulations are  directory in nature.  As the cut-off date is fixed for filing such application for  grant of recognition for each academic year, it was urged that no application  thereafter could have been entertained nor the first respondent could have  shown any indulgence to supply the essential documents more than six  months after the cut-off date.  It was argued that as the appellant-Council is  required to consider many applications for grant of recognition for the afore- mentioned course and the same being applicable to all the institutions situated  throughout the country, the High Court should not have issued the directions  in favour of the first respondent-Institution.   

Mr. Uday U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the

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respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the said Act having been  enacted in terms of Entry 66 in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the  Constitution of India, the institutions seeking recognition are required to  spend a huge sum for providing minimum infrastructure and the ’No  Objection Certificates’ was granted by the State only when it satisfied itself as  regard fulfilment of the said requirement in every respect.  According to the  learned counsel, it was well nigh impossible for the first respondent to submit  an application in the prescribed form before 31st December, 2004 as the NOC  was issued by the State only on 24.2.2004.  Drawing our attention to Note (1)  appended to Appendix 1-B, learned counsel urged that as the appellant was  enjoined with a duty to inform the institution in regard to respective applicants  about the deficiencies in the application, it cannot be said that the document of  title was essential in nature.  It was submitted that the first respondent has  substantially complied with the requirements of law as lawyer’s certificate, as  prescribed in Appendix 1-C had been annexed with the first application.  Mr.  Lalit furthermore submitted that a copy of the building plan could not have  been treated to be an essential document as the building in question is not  situate within an urban area and the same falls within the jurisdiction of a  Panchayat and thus, no sanction of the building plan was required in respect  whereof the necessary certificate has already been filed.  Institutions similarly  situated, it was also argued, having been granted recognition, there is no  reason as to why the impugned judgment could not be given effect to, argued  the learned counsel.

Before adverting to the rival contentions as noticed hereinbefore, we  may place on record that Mr. Lalit did not support the judgment of the High  Court as regard the reasons assigned therein.   

Regulations could be framed by the appellant under Sub-section (1) of  Section 32 read with Section 14 thereof.  Section 14, as noticed hereinbefore,  itself provides that the applications are required to be filed in such form and in  such a manner as was determined by the Regulations.  The Regulations could  have thus also been framed in terms of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the  Act.  We have, however, noticed hereinbefore that Clause (e) of Sub-section  (2) of Section 32 specifically refers to Section 14 of the Act for the purpose of  laying down the form and manner in which the applications for recognition  are required to be submitted.  The High Court was, therefore, entirely wrong  in arriving at the conclusion that the Council had no such power.  The  Regulations, having been validly framed, indisputably, were required to be  complied with.  The Council has a statutory duty to perform.  It is an  autonomous body.  Its jurisdiction extend to the entire territory of India except  the State of Jammu and Kashmir and in that view of the matter, it is  indisputably required to process a large number of applications received by it  from various institutions situate throughout the country.  Six month’s time, in  view of the statutory scheme, is necessary for processing the papers,  inspection of the institution and to take a decision on the basis of report  submitted pursuant thereto as to whether the institution in question, having  regard to Entry 66 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of  India, has the requisite infrastructural facilities for imparting education to the  teachers.   

For the afore-mentioned purpose, it is not necessary for us to determine  the question as to whether the provisions of the Regulations are imperative in  character or not.  There cannot, however, be any doubt or dispute that even if  they are directory in nature, substantial compliance thereof was necessary.  It  is no ground that such an application could not be filed by the first respondent  before 31st December, 2004 as it received the NOC issued by the State  Government.  In view of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations, it was  obligatory on the part of the first respondent to file an application, which was  complete in all respects.  It does not lie in the mouth of the applicant to state  that despite requirements of law it would not comply with the same.  It is not a  case where the requirements were not capable of being complied with.  The  first respondent was required to show that it has a legal and valid title in  respect of the land on which the building in question was required to be  constructed.  It was also required to furnish the copy of the building plan

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approved by the competent authority.  We have noticed hereinbefore that the  application form itself provides for as to what infrustructural facilities are  necessary for running the institution.  The infrustructural facilities required to  be provided must be commensurate with the requirements stated in the said  form itself.  One of them is to state the number of different rooms and their  respective sizes thereof available in the proposed institution.  So far as the title  over the land in question is concerned, it was stated by the respondent that the  land is available in the name of institution on a long-term basis.  It is not  disputed that copy of the registered Deed of Lease was furnished for the first  time by the first respondent on 9.6.2005.  Similarly, complete information as  to whether the building plan had been sanctioned or not was furnished only on  the said date.  We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned judgment  cannot be sustained.

We may notice that a Division Bench of this Court in Krishnasamy  Reddiar Educational Trust vs. Member Secretary, National Council for  Teacher Education & Anr. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 89, opined that :

"It was submitted that in the present matters, all the  appellants were applying for the first time and as such they  were required to follow the Regulations in force, operative  and applicable to fresh applications.  In such cases, Notes  (1) and (2) of Appendix 1-B (list of essential documents)  will apply.  Notes (1) and (2) read thus:

"(1)    If the application is found incomplete i.e. with all  the essential documents, the institution may be  asked to make good deficiencies in the application  on or before the last date prescribed in the  Regulations.

(2)     In the event when deficiencies in an application get  removed only after the last date, the application of  the institution shall be carried forward by the  Regional Committee for consideration for the  subsequent academic year i.e. for the course that  would be offered one year later."

In our view, the respondents are right in submitting  that there was delay on the part of the appellants.  In all the  three cases, applications were submitted without NOC  from the State Government.  It has come on record that  NOC was applied for belatedly.  The State Government  could not be blamed for not taking a decision on the  applications of the appellants as under Regulation 6 as  amended in 2003, it was required to dispose of such  applications within six months of the last date of receipt of  applications.  Even prior to the amended Regulation 6, it  was expected to take decision within "reasonable time"  (four months) as held in St. Johns Teachers Training  Institute.  As the appellants applied for NOC in the last  week of October 2003, they cannot make complaint that  the State Government delayed the matter.  Admittedly,  NOCs were submitted to the respondent after the last date  of application.  If in the above facts and circumstances,  recognition has been granted by the respondent on 28-10- 2004 by imposing a condition that it would be operative  from academic year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that the  respondent had acted illegally, arbitrarily or otherwise  unreasonably."

Submission of Mr. Lalit that the Institutions similarly situated were  recognised cannot be accepted for more than one reason.  No such plea was  raised before the High Court.  Before us a document has been filed by way of

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additional document without obtaining the leave of this Court.  The appellant  had not, thus, been given an opportunity to respond thereto.  In any event, the  concept of Article 14 carries a positive concept.  Only because some  illegalities had been committed by the Council in respect of another  institution, the same may not by itself be a ground for perpetrating the  illegality.

Reliance placed on Note (1) of Appendix 1-B by Mr. Lalit is again of  no importance as the same could be taken recourse to by the Council before  the expiry of the cut-off date, provided the application for grant of recognition  was filed on such a date which could have provided the Council to scrutinise  the same within a reasonable time.  A grant of NOC by the State is a condition  precedent for filing such an application as was observed in Krishnasamy  Reddiar Educational Trust (supra).  There is, thus, absolutely no reason as  to why the delay in filing the application should be condoned only because the  application has been filed seven days after the receipt of the NOC.

Before parting with this case, we may place on record that it is  categorically stated before us by Mr. Raju Ramachandran that the Council  carried forward the application of the Institution for consideration of the  subsequent academic year.  An inspection has already been carried out and the  eligibility of the first respondent to obtain such recognition shall be  determined within a period of eight weeks from date.  We place on record the  afore-mentioned submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf of the appellant.   

For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment is set aside.  The  appeal is allowed.   

No costs.