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PETITIONER: NASIK MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARBANSLAL LAIKWANT RAJPAL & ORS. ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/12/1996

BENCH: K. RAMASWAMY, G.T. NANAVATI

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                             with                Civil Appeal No..16851..../96             (Arising out of SLP (C) No.9487/95)                          O R D E R      Leave granted.      These appeals  by special leave arise from the judgment of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dated October 14,  1994,   made  in  W.P.  Nos.4023/89,  Proceedings  were initiated under  the Maharashtra  Regional &  Town  Planning Act, 1966,  (for short, the ’Act’), for framing a scheme and for acquisition  of the  land  in  that  behalf.  The  Final Development Plan was made on November 29, 1980. Notification under section  126(4) of  the Act was published on August 6, 1987. It.  was published  in the local newspaper on July 18, 1987 and  in the  village Chavadi  on September 25, 1987. It would  appear   that  subsequently,   after   Section   4(1) notification and  declaration under  Section 6  of the (Land Acquisition Act  1/1894) were  published, notice  was issued under Section 9 of the said Act on September 16, 1989. Award came to  be passed  on September  22, l989.  The respondents filed writ  petitions on  September 25,  1989. The award was published on  September 27,  1989. It  would appear that the Draft Plan  was issued  for reservation of certain lands for the public  purpose and  no objections  were filed.  In  the meanwhile, by  proceedings dated December 26, 1990, the same came to  be deleted  by publication  of the  notification on June 28,  1993 and Final Plan was published on September 30, 1993. On  a representation  made  by  the  Corporation,  the Government had  issued a  corrigendum  on  August  19,  1994 restoring the  status quo  ante with  a slight modification. The High  Court in  the impugned  order, while upholding the validity  of   the  notification   under  section  4(1)  and declaration under  Section 6  of the  Land Acquisition  Act, held that  the award  was not valid in law since there was a corrigendum issued  by  the  Government.  Consequently,  the procedure provided  under the  Act was  to  be  followed  by operation of  Section 37  of the  Act. Thus these appeals by special leave.      Mr. U.R.  Lalit, learned  senior counsel  appearing for the respondents, contends that once the reservation has been

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deleted,  status quo ante stands restored. As a consequence, the entire  process required under Section 28 and Section 31 read with  Section 37 requires to be followed. In this case, that  was not done. The High Court was right in quashing the award. We find no force in the contention.      It is  true that if any scheme is modified and the Plan has become  final, the procedure contemplated under Sections 28 and  31 read with Section 37 of the Act is required to be adopted. But  in this  case, it  is seen  that  as  per  the corrigendum what  has been  modified is that the entire site is  now   reserved  for   ’informal  housing’   and  stable. Originally, the entire area was reserved for stables and 100 wide road.  The reservation  was deleted  earlier, as stated above, and  western part was included in commercial zone and eastern part  was included  in the  residential zone  on the plan. In  view of  the fact  that  of  the  final  plan  was restored, though  a part  of it  is now  said to be used for residential purpose,  the question  is  whether  the  entire process of  the issuance  of the  notice  under  Section  28 involving consideration of the objections and passing of the final plan  after  consideration  is  required  to  be  gone through? It  is seen that by operation of Section 127 of the Act where  any land  is included  in any  of scheme as being reserved, allotted  or designated  for any purpose specified therein  or   for  the  purpose  of  Planning  Authority  or Development Authority or Appropriate Authority and the State Government is  satisfied that  the same land is needed for a public purpose  different from  any such  public purpose  or purpose of  the Planning  Authority,  Development  Authority Appropriate   Authority,    the   State    Government    may notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, acquire such land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, l894. Sub-section (3)  envisages that  on the  land vesting in the State  Government  under  Section  16  or  17  of  the  Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as the case may be, the relevant plan or scheme shall be deemed to be suitably varied by reason of acquisition of  the said  land. Thus  it could  be seen that once a  notification under  section 4(1)  was published  and declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act came to published,  the public purpose becomes conclusive and for any variation  without substantial  formalities, it  is  not necessary that  the entire  process of re-publication of the notification under  Section 28, finding having been recorded under both  the Section 31 read with Section 37, requires to be followed.  The view of the High Court, therefore, was not correct.      It is  then contended  by  Mr.  U.R.  Lalit,  that  the respondents had  not  been  given  the  information  of  the notification under  Section 9  of the  Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the  award is bad in law. We find no force in the contention. In  the absence  of notice  or failure  to serve notice, the  award does  not become invalid. Due to the fact that immediately  after the award and before the publication of the  award,  the  writ  petition  came  to  be  filed  on September 25,  1980, we  direct the  appellants to  make  an application within six weeks under Section 18(1) of the Land Acquisition   Act seeking  reference. The  land  Acquisition Officer is  directed to  refer the  matter to  the competent civil Court for disposal within two months according to law.      The appeals are accordingly allowed but without costs.