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PETITIONER: NAROTTAMDAS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/04/1964

BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS BENCH: GUPTA, K.C. DAS GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1964 AIR 1667            1964 SCR  (7) 820

ACT: Wages-Law  passed  fixing  rates of  minimum  wages  retros- pectively Effect of-Validity-Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Act 11 of  1948)-Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation Act,  1961 (Act  23 of 1961), s. 31A-Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4  of 1962-Madhya  Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act,  1962  (Act No.  16 of 1962), ss. 2,3 and 4-Constitution of India,  Art. 19(1)(f) and (g).

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was  the  manager of  a  Bidi  counting  and labelling  factory.   In 1951, the State of  Madhya  Pradesh fixed   rates  of  minimum  wages  payable  to  workmen   in accordance  with  the provisions of the Minimum  Wages  Act, 1948.   These  rates were revised in the year 1956  and  new rates  were  notified by the Government  by  a  notification dated  December  30, 1958 directing that these  rates  would come into force from January 1, 1959.  The validity of  this notification  was successfully challenged by  the  appellant before   the  High  Court.   To  meet  the   situation   the Legislature  enacted  the  Minimum Wages  Act,  1961  giving effect to the impugned notification.  On challenge ,of  this Act by the appellant and other Bidi manufactories, the  High Court allowed the applications and restrained the Government from  giving  effect to the impugned  notification.   There- after, the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 1962 was passed fixing   rates  of  minimum  wages   retrospectively.    The ordinance  was later replaced by an Act, the Madhya  Pradesh Minimum  Wages  Fixation  Act, 1962.  On  challenge  of  the validity  of this Act by the appellant, the High Court  held the  Act  to be valid ,and disallowed the  application.   In this  Court  the validity of the Act was challenged  on  the ground (1) that in enacting the Act of 1962 the  Legislature was  not  exercising its independent legislative  power  but only  validating  the notification dated December  30,  1958 which  it  was  not  competent to do,  (2)  that  by  giving retrospective  effect to the: rates of wages fixed  by  this Act  the  State  had put unreasonable  restrictions  on  the appellant’s fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) & (g) and

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(3)  that by making the provisions of ss. 20 and 22  of  the Central  Act of 1948 applicable to the wages now  fixed  the Act had contravened Art. 2b(1) of the Constitution. Held:(i)   The   contention  that  the  Act   was   not independent  legislation cannot be accepted.  Section  2  of the  Act merely says that the expressions used in  this  Act shall  have the same meaning for the purpose of this Act  as defined in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948.  The definition of expressions used in an Act with reference to another Act  is a  well  known  device  in  legislative  practice  generally adopted  for  the  sake of brevity.   The  definition  would remain effective even after the other Act with reference  to which  the definition was given ceases to exist.  This  fact of  defining  expressions in an Act with reference  to  some other  Act cannot therefore have the effect of  making  this Act dependent on such other Act. 821 It  is  clear  from  s.  3 of  the  impugned  Act  that  the legislature was fixing for itself the minimum rates of wages in certain ,scheduled employments.  The fact that the  rates mentioned  in the Table appended to the Act happened  to  Le the  same  as the rates fixed  elsewhere  cannot  reasonably justify  a conclusion that the validation of the  old  rates was being affected.  Independent legislation does not  cease to be so, merely because its effect is the same as it  would have been if a validating Act had been passed. (ii)The retrospective operation of legislation is a relevant circumstance   in  deciding  its  reasonableness.   It   is, however, not necessarily a decisive test.  Section 3 of  the Act does not make the new rates of wages payable on the  1st January  1959.  The proviso to s. 4 is a clear statement  of the legislature’s intention that it is on the 21st June 1962 that the rates which had become enforceable under s. 3  with effect   from   1st  January  1959  became   payable.    The appellant’s  apprehension that he might be made  liable  for payment  of  compensation under s. 20(3) or  to  prosecution under  s.  22 of the Minimum Wages Act 1948 as a  result  of mere passing of the Act must therefore be held to be ground- less.   The  contention therefore that ss. 3 and  4  of  the impugned   Act  impose  unreasonable  restrictions  on   the appellant’s fundamental rights must be rejected. Rai  Ramkrishna  v.  State of Bihar, [1964]  1  S.C.R.  897, applied. (iii)On a proper construction of ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act, the attack on the validity of the section on the ground of  a contravention of Art. 20(l) of the  Constitution  must also fail.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 221 of  1964. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated September 5,  1963 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc.  Petition No.  334 of 1962. M.   C. Setalvad, B. V. Shukla, Rameshwat- Nath, S. N. Andley,and P. L. Vohra, for the appellant. B.   Sen and I. N. Shroff, for the respondents. April 21, 1964.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS  GUPTA,  J.-This  appeal  raises  the  question  of  the validity  of the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation  Act, 1962 (Act No. 16 of 1962).  The appellant is the Manager  of a Bidi counting and labelling factory of M/s.  Mohanlal Har- govindas, Jabalpur, who are engaged in the trade of purchase and  sale of Bidi in the State of Madhya Pradesh  and  other

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States of India.  In 1951 the State of Madhya Pradesh  fixed rates  of minimum wages payable to workmen engaged  in  Bidi making manufactories.  This was done in accordance with  the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (Central Act 11 of 1948).   These  rates of minimum wages were revised  in  the year 1956 by a notification of the Madhya Pradesh Government dated the 23rd February 1956.  New rates of minimum 822 wages  for workmen engaged in the Bidi making  manufactories were  notified  by  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Government  by   a notification dated the 30th December 1958.  The notification directed that these rates would come into force from January 1,  1959.   The validity of this  notification  was  however successfully challenged by the present appellant before  the Madhya Pradesh High Court.  To meet the situation the Madhya Pradesh  Legislature  enacted  the  Minimum  Wages   (Madhya Pradesh Amendment and Validation) Act, 1961-(Madhya  Pradesh Act  No. 23 of 1961).  Section 31A which was  introduced  by this  Act  into the Central Act (No.  11 of  1948)  provided that  the rates of minimum wages fixed or revised under  the notification  of the 30th December 1958 "shall be and  shall always be deemed to have been validly fixed and revised  and shall  be  deemed to have come into force on the  date  men- tioned   in  the  said  notification,  notwithstanding   any judicial   decision  to  the  contrary  or  any  defect   or irregularity in the constitution of the Advisory Board under s.  7  of  the  principal Act read  with  s.  9  thereof  or publication  of  the  notification in the  Gazette  or  non- compliance  with any other requirement of law and shall  not be called in question in any court merely on the ground that there  was  failure  to comply with the  provisions  of  the principal Act." The  appellant and some other Bidi manufactories  of  Madhya Pradesh challenged the validity of this Act before the  High Court by petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution.   The High  Court allowed the applications, struck down s. 31A  as invalid  and  restrained the Government from  enforcing  the section and from giving effect to the impugned notification dated the 30th December, 1958. The  High Court gave its decision on the 2nd May  1962.   On the  21st  June 1962 the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No.  4  of 1962  was  passed fixing rates of minimum  wages  retrospec- tively.   The  Ordinance was later replaced by an  Act,  the Madhya Pradesh Minimum Wages Fixation Act, 1962.  On the 5th October 1962, the appellant made an application to the  High Court  of Madhya Pradesh under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of  the Constitution  challenging  the  validity  of  this  Act  and praying for a declaration that the Act is ultra vires,  void and  inoperative  and a writ in the nature of  mandamus  re- straining the State of Madhya Pradesh and the other  respon- dents  from giving effect to or enforcing the provisions  of the Act.  The High Court has held that the Act is valid  and has  disallowed his application.  Against that decision  the present appeal has been preferred. The  challenge to the validity of the Act is based on  three principal grounds.  The first is that in enacting Act No. 16 823 of 1962 the Madhya Pradesh Legislature was really not  exer- cising its independent legislative power but only validating the  notification dated the 30th December 1958 which it  was not  competent to do.  The second ground is that  by  giving retrospective effect to the rates of wages fixed by this Act the   State  has  put  unreasonable  restrictions   on   the appellant’s fundamental rights under Art. 19(l)(f) & (g)  of the  Constitution.   The last ground on which  the  Act  was

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challenged as invalid is thatby making provisions of s.  20 and s. 22 of the Central Act  No.  11 of 1948 applicable  to the wages now fixed the Act   has contravened Art. 20(1)  of the Constitution. The impugned Act is a short Act of five sections only.   The first  section  giver, the title of the Act  and  the  fifth section repeals the Ordinance to replace which this Act  was passed.   Three  remaining  sections are  in  the  following words: -               "2.  The  expression  used  in  this  Act  and               defined in the minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI  of               1948),  in  its application to  the  State  of               Madhya   Praderh  shall  have   the   meanings               assigned to them in the said Act.               3.    Notwithstanding anything contained in s.               5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948),               in  its  application to the  State  of  Madhya               Pradesh  (hereinafter referred to as the  said               Act) or any other provisions contained therein               relating  to  the  fixation  or  revision   of               minimum   rates   of   wages   in    scheduled               employments and any judgment, decree or  order               of  any  court to the  contrary,  the  minimum               rates  of wages in respect of  employments  in               items  2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and I 1 in Part I  and               in  respect  of employment in Part 11  of  the               Schedule  to the said Act shall be  and  shall               always,  in  respect of  each  employment,  be               deemed  to be as specified in  Table  appended               hereto and it is hereby enacted that the  said               minimum  rates of wager, shall be  payable  by               the employer in the said scheduled employments               and  be  enforceable against him  with  effect               from  the 1st January 1959, as if  the  provi-               sions  herein contained have been in force  at               all material times.               4.    The  provisions of section 4-A,  section               5A, in so far               as they relate to revision of minimum rates of               wages, and of sections 12 to 30-A of the  said               Act, and the rules made thereunder shall apply               to minimum rates of wages specified in section               3 as they apply to minimum wages in respect of               scheduled employments fixed in accordance with               the said Act;               824               Provided  that with respect to claims  arising               out  of  payment  of minimum  rates  of  wages               specified in section 3 pertaining to a  period               prior to the publication of the Madhya Pradesh               Minimum  Wages Fixation Ordinance, 1962 (4  of               1962)  in the Gazette, the period of one  year               referred  to  in  the first  proviso  to  sub-               section  (2)  of section 20 of  the  said  Act               shall  be  counted with effect from  the  21st               June, 1962, the date of the publication of the               said Ordinance in the Gazette." It  is not disputed that the Madhya Pradesh legislature  had the legislative competence to make a law as regards  minimum wages  under  Entry  24 of List III  (Sch.   Seventh).   Mr. Setalvad contends that this power of independent legislation was not really exercised by the legislature and that in  the guise of independent legislation it has in substance  passed a   validating  Act,  after  an  attempt  to  validate   the notification  of  the 30th December, 1958, had  failed.   In

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support   of  his  argument  that  it  is  not   independent legislation  Mr. Setalvad laid stress on the language of  s. 2.  That  section merely says that the expressions  used  in this Act shalt have the same meaning for the purpose of this Act as defined in the Minimum Wages Act of 1948.   According to  the learned counsel, this shows that this was  really  a dependent  and not independent legislation.  We can find  no substance  in this argument.  The definition of  expressions used  in an Act with reference to other Act is a well  known device  in  legislative practice generally adopted  for  the sake of brevity.  The definition would remain effective even after  the other Act with reference to which the  definition was   given  ceases  to  exist.   This  fact   of   defining expressions  in  an  Act with reference to  some  other  Act cannot  therefore  have the effect of making  this  Act  de- pendent on such other Act. Mr. Setalved next urged that quite clearly the object of  s. 3 was to validate the minimum rates of wages as fixed by the notification dated the 30th December 1958 and nothing  more. As we read the section we find that it merely fixed wages in respect of certain employments at the rates mentioned in the Table  appended to the Act.  We are informed that the  rates mentioned  in  the Table are identical with the  rates  men- tioned  in the notification dated the 30th  December,  1958. The effect of enactment of s. 3 would therefore be the  same as  if the notification of 1958 had been validated.  To  say that, however, is not to say that this Act has validated  or that  even  it  seeks to validate  the  30th  December  1958 notification.  On the face of it the legislature was  fixing for  itself the minimum rates of wages in certain  scheduled employments.   That is stated in the preamble and  is  plain from s. 3 itself.  The fact 825 ,that rates mentioned in the Table appended to the Act  hap- pened  to  be  the same as rate;-,  fixed  elsewhere  cannot reason,ably justify a conclusion that the validation of  the old rates was being affected.  Independent legislation  does not cease to be so, merely because its effect is the same as it would have been if a validating Act had been passed.  The contention  that  this Act was not  independent  legislation cannot therefore be accepted. Nor is it possible to accept the argument that the Act is an unreasonable  restriction  on  the  appellant’s  fundamental rights  under  Art. 19(1)(f) and (g)  of  the  Constitution. Restriction  there undoubtedly is, but we are not  satisfied that the restriction is unreasonable.  Section 3 of the  Act makes  the  new rater, of wages effective from January  1  , 1959.  Section 4 makes the various provisions of the Central Act No. 11 of 1948 available for revision and enforcement of the  rates as specified in s. 3. The consequence is that  if an  employer  does  not  pay  the  rates  as  specified,  an application  may  be made under s. 20 of Act 11 of  1948  to enforce such payment.  He will be liable also to prosecution and penalties under s. 22 of the Act.  What according to the learned  counsel  makes the Act unreasonable  is  that  such application  can be made and such prosecution and  penalties can  be imposed even in respect of the past period-from  1st January  1959 upto the date of the Act.  How is it  possible for  the  employer, it is urged, to pay such  arrears  which might  amount  in many cases to considerable sums  of  money when  the  accounts  for the past  years  had  been  closed, profits  had been distributed and the available surplus  had either been spent  or invested in other ways? We  have no hesitation in agreeing to the  proposition  that the  retrospective  operation of legislation is  a  relevant

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circumstance   in  deciding  its  reasonableness.   It   is, however,  clearly established by a long series of  decisions of this Court that this is not necessarily a decisive  test. We may mention in this connection the decision of this Court in Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar(1).  There the Court had to consider the question whether the retrospective operation of  the Bihar Taxation of Passengers and Goods  (Carried  by Public  Service  Motor  Vehicles)  Act,  1961  put  such  an unreasonable   restriction   on   the   fundamental   rights guaranteed  under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g) of the  Constitution as   to  make  the  Act  invalid  to  the  extent   of   its retrospective operation.  The Bihar Finance Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XVII of 1950) had imposed a tax on passengers and  goods carried  by public service motor vehicles in Bihar.   In  an appeal  arising  out of a suit filed by the  passengers  and owners  of  goods, this Court struck down Part 111.  of  the -,aid Act as unconstitutional.  This judgment was pronounced on the 12th (1)  [1964] 1 S.C.R. 897. 826 December 1960.  Then an Ordinance, viz., Bihar Ordinance No. 11 of 1961 was issued on August 1, 1961.  By this  Ordinance the  material  provisions of the earlier Act  of  1950  were validated  and brought into force retrospectively  from  the date when the earlier Act had purported to come into  force. Subsequently,   the  provisions  of  this   Ordinance   were incorporated  in the Bihar Taxation on Passengers and  Goods (Carried  by  Public  Service  Motor  Vehicles)  Act,  1961. Section  23  of  the  Act provided  that  any  amount  paid, collected  or  recovered  or purported to  have  been  paid, collected   or  recovered  as  tax  or  penalty  under   the provisions  of  Part III of the Bihar Finance Act,  1950  or rules  made thereunder during the period beginning with  the first  day of April 1950 and ending on the thirty first  day of  July 1961, shall be deemed to have been validly  levied, paid,  collected or recovered under the provisions  of  this Act.   It  was urged that this retrospective  operation  for such a long period like 10 years itself made the  provisions unconstitutional.   In repelling this contention,  Gajendra- gadkar, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court  observed thus: -               "If  a  statute passed by the  legislature  is               challenged  in proceedings before a court  and               the challenge is, ultimately sustained and the               statute  is  struck down, it is  not  unlikely               that  the judicial proceedings, may  occupy  a               fairly  long  period and the  Legislature  may               well  decide  to await the final  decision  in               said   proceedings   before   it   uses    its               legislative powerto cure the alleged infirmity               in the earlier Act.  In such a case, if  after               the  final judicial verdict is  pronounced  in               the matter the legislature passes a validating               Act, it may well cover a long period taken  by               the  judicial proceedings in court and yet  it               would  be inappropriate to hold  that  because               the  retrospective  operation  covers  a  long               period, therefore, the restriction imposed  by               it is unreasonable." These   observations  which  were  made  in  respect  of   a validating  Act apply fully to a legislation as in  the  Act now under consideration. It  is not also possible to accept the picture presented  by Mr.  Setalvad  of the employers’ financial  difficulties  in making payment for the past period as a fair  representation

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of  the true facts.  For practically the entire period  from the  1st  April  1959 to the date of  the  present  Act  the employers had before, them the provisions of what  purported to be a good law requiring them to pay at these very  rates. As   good  businessmen  they  are  expected  to  have   made provisions 827 for payments on these very rates, even though they  intended to challenge the validity of the previous Act and ultimately succeeded  in that attempt.  We are not prepared to  believe that  such provisions are not generally made.  The  hardship which according to Mr. Setalvad the employers would have  to face in making the payments for the past periods is, in  our judgment, more imaginary than real. But, urges the learned counsel, s. 3 of the Act while giving to the rates of wages fixed by the Act retrospective  effect from  the 1st January 1959 has also made wages at these  new rates  payable on January 1, 1959 for the past period.   The result of this, according to the learned counsel, is that as soon as an application is made under s. 20 of Act 11 of 1948 the employer would be liable not only to pay the arrears  of wages  but also compensation as provided in sub-s. 3  of  s. 20.   Sub-section  3 of s. 20 of Act 11  of  1948  provides, inter alia, that the minimum wage authority may direct:               "In the case of a claim arising out of payment               of  less  than  minimum rates  of  wages,  the               payment to the employee of the amount by which               the  minimum wages payable to him  exceed  the               amount   actually  paid,  together  with   the               payment of such compensation as the  Authority               may  think  fit, not exceeding ten  times  the               amount of such excess." It  has further provided that the authority may direct  pay- ment  of such compensation in cases where the excess or  the amount  due is paid by the employer to the  employee  before the disposal of the application. If the legal position were as urged by the learned  counsel, that  s. 3 made the new rates of wages for the  past  period payable on January 1, 1959 or the apprehension that the  em- ployer  might be made to pay heavy compensation may well  be true.   Another consequence of that legal position would  be that the employer would also be liable to prosecution  under s.   22  of  the Act for his omission to pay on  January  1, 1959  the rates which were fixed first by the Ordinance  and then by the impugned Act.  We are satisfied however that  s. 3  of the impugned Act does not make the new rates of  wages payable   on   the  1st  January  1959.   The   words   used are......... and it is hereby enacted that the said  minimum rates of wages shall be payable by the employer in the  said scheduled  employments and be enforceable against  him  with effect  from  the  1st January 1959, as  if  the  provisions herein contained have been in force at all material  times." By these words, it is urged on behalf of the appellant,  the legislature  not only made the minimum wages effective  from the 1st January 1959 but also made them payable on that date for the past period.  In other words, the sentence is sought to be read as saying:- 828 "the  said  minimum rates of wages shall be payable  by  the employer in the said scheduled employments with effect from, 1st  January 1959 and shall be enforceable against him  with effect  from  1st  January  1959."  If  that  had  been  the intention  of the legislature the appropriate words  to  use would  have been "the said minimum rates of wages  shall  be payable  by the employer in the said  scheduled  employments

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and  enforceable  against him with effect from  1st  January 1959."  No purpose would be served by the word  "be"  before the  word "enforceable" if the phrase "with effect from  the 1st  January 1959" was intended to apply both  to  "payable" and  to " enforceable".  The very fact that the  legislature took care to say "be enforceable" in the latter part of  the sentence  shows clearly that while it was intended that  the new  rates  would be enforceable against the  employer  with effect  from  the  1st  January  1959  no  date  was   being prescribed  by s. 3 as regards the date on which  it  became payable. An  examination  of s. 4 of the Act further makes  it  clear beyond any reasonable doubt that it was the intention of the legislature  that new rates became payable only on the  21st June  1962,  the date of the publication  of  the  Ordinance which  was  later  replaced by the  Act.   Section  4  makes applicable  to the minimum rates of wages as fixed by s.  3, the  provisions of s. 4A and s. 5 of the Minimum  Wages  Act (Act  11  of 1948), that is, the provisions as  regards  the revision  in future of the rates fixed by the impugned  Act, and of sections 12 to 30A.  Among the sections thus included is therefore s. 20 which prescribes the procedure for claims arising  out  of payment of less than the minimum  rates  of wages.   The  first  proviso  to  sub-section  2  of  s.  20 prescribes   a   period  of  limitation  within   which   an application  on  such  claims has to be  made.   The  period prescribed  is one year from the date on which  the  minimum wages  became  payable.   It  was  thus  necessary  for  the legislature  when giving retrospective effect to  the  rates fixed  by s. 3 of the impugned Act to indicate the  date  on which  the new rates would become payable.  This  indication is clearly given by the proviso to s. 4. The proviso  (which has already been set out) is in these words: -               "Provided that with respect to claims  arising               out  of  payment  of minimum  rates  of  wages               specified in s. 3 pertaining to a period prior               to  the  publication  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh               Minimum  Wages Fixation Ordinance 1962  (4  of               1962)  in the Gazette, the period of one  year               referred  to  in  the first  proviso  to  sub-               section  (2)  of section 20 of  the  said  Act               shall  be  counted with effect from  the  21st               June 1962, the date of publication of the said               Ordinance in the Gazette." 829 The above provision that "the period of one year referred to in the first proviso to sub-section (2) of s. 20 of the said Act shall be counted with effect from the 21st June 1962" is a clear statement of the legislature’s intention that it  is on  the  21st  June 1962 that the  rates  which  had  become enforceable  under  s. 3 with effect from 1st  January  1959 became  payable.  That is how the High Court  has  construed the  section  and  in  our  judgment  that  construction  is correct.  The appellant’s apprehension that he might be made liable  for  payment of compensation under s.  20(3)  or  to prosecution under s. 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948  (Act 11  of 1948) as a result of the mere passing of the  Act  is therefore groundless. It  is clear that the duty to pay at these rates arose  only on  and  from  the 21st June 1962 and no  liability  to  pay compensation under s. 20(3) or to prosecution under s. 22 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 would arise if payment was  made on the 21st June 1962. It  was then urged that it would be unreasonable  to  expect the  employer  to be able to make such payment on  the  21st

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June  1962, the date of publication of the Ordinance.   Some time  would elapse, it is pointed out, before  the  employer could  acquaint himself with the detailed provisions of  the Act  and  some  further  time  in  making  arrangements  for payment;  there  was thus the risk of an  application  being made against him under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and an order directing him to pay compensation.  While there is  no  doubt  a theoretical possibility  of  such  a  thing happening, the risk appears to us practically  non-existent. It  is  to  be noticed that it  is  discretionary  with  the minimum  wage  authority  to make an order  for  payment  of compensation.   It is very unlikely that the authority  will in  the use of his discretion make an order for  payment  of compensation  when he finds that the employer has  made  the payment  within  a few days after the 21st June  1962.   The risk  of prosecution under s. 22 because of failure  to  pay exactly  on  the  21st June 1962 is  even  less.   But  such prosecution,  it may be pointed out, will be entertained  by courts only after an application under s. 20 as regards  the facts had been made and partly succeeded and the appropriate Government or an officer authorised by it has sanctioned the making of a complaint.  It does not appear to us likely that prosecution  will  be  launched because of  failure  to  pay exactly on the 21st June 1962.  The contention that s. 3 and s. 4 of the impugned Act impose unreasonable restrictions on the   appellant’s  fundamental  rights  must  therefore   be rejected. The  last ground urged in support of the appeal. viz.,  that the impugned Act contravenes Art. 20(t) of the Constitution, is  based on the assumption that the new rates of wages  be- came payable on the 1st January 1959 even as regards the 830 past  period.  If that assumption were correct it  would  no doubt be also correct to say that the combined effect of ss. 3 and 4 of the impugned Act was to make the employer  liable to conviction for offences for violation of a law which  was not  in  force  at the time of the  commission  of  the  act charged.   We  have already held however that  on  a  proper construction of ss. 3 and 4, the new rates of wages for  the past  period became payable not on the 1st January 1959  but on  the 21st June 1962.  The attack on the validity  of  the sections  on  the ground of Art. 20(l) of  the  Constitution therefore fails. All  the  points raised in the appeal fail.  The  appeal  is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 831