http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: NARESH CHANDRA GANGULI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND OTHERS(and connected petition)

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 20/05/1959

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L. GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N.

CITATION:  1959 AIR 1335            1960 SCR  (1) 412

ACT:  Preventive Detention--Object and ground of such  detention- Distinction--Ground  Meaning of--Copy of order to be  served on  detenu-Contents-Preventive  Detention Act,  1950  (4  Of 1950), ss . 3,7.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was detained under s. 3(1)(a)(ii) of the  Pre- ventive Detention Act, 1950.  The copy of the grounds of the order of detention served on him stated that he was detained as  he  had  been  acting  in  a  way  prejudicial  to   the maintenance of public order as evidenced by the  particulars stated  in its four paragraphs.  Paragraph 1  stated,  inter alia,  that the appellant had, in a meeting of the  refugees vilified  the Prime Minister of India for his  unsympathetic attitude  towards  the sufferings of the refugees  and  gave expression  to violent feelings regarding his  person  while referring to the recent Nehru-Noon Pact; paragraph 2  stated that  he called upon the members of his party to build up  a strong  movement against the implementation of the pact  and tried to rouse passion by alleging the Prime Minister had no sympathy for West Bengal; paragraph 3 stated that at another meeting  he  denounced  the pact and stressed  the  need  of forming  a  militia with the youths of the country  for  the safety of the people living in border areas and paragraph 4, that he intended -to proceed to Delhi on the date mentioned, and  was likely to instigate plans endangering the  personal safety  of  the  Prime  Minister.  The  High  Court,  on  an application  under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code of  Criminal Procedure  for the issue of a writ of habeas  corpus,  while upholding  the  order  of  detention,  held  that  the  said paragraphs  were  really not the grounds  of  detention  but merely  pieces  of  evidence on which  the  only  ground  of detention,  namely,  acting in a manner prejudicial  to  the maintenance of public order, was based, that paragraph 4 was merely  an inference of fact having a bearing on the  ground of detention.  It was contended, inter alia, on appeal  that paragraph  4 was extremely vague and devoid of  particulars, and  that  the allegations made had no  rational  connection

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

with the objects mentioned in s. 3 of the Act and so he  was deprived  of his right to make an effective  representation. All this was, however, denied on behalf of the State. Held,  that  the High Court had  overlooked  the  difference between  the objects of detention specified in cls. (a)  and (b)  of s. 3(1) of the Act and the statement of facts  which constitute the grounds envisaged by S. 7 of the Act. 412 Sections 3 and 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, read together,  contemplate that the copy of the order passed  by the  detaining  authority  under S. 3(2) Of the  Act  to  be served on the detenu should contain, (1) a preamble reciting in terms one or more of the sub-clauses of cls. (a) and  (b) of  s.  3(1)  as  its object or  objects,  (2)  the  grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely, the conclusions of fact, which led to the passing of the order of detention, informing  the detenu  as to why he was detained, and (3)  particulars,  if and  where necessary, but not those referred to  in  sub-ss. (3) and (4) Of s. 3 of the Act. In the instant case, however, the error of confusion made by the  High  Court could not invalidate its  order  since  the grounds  of  detention, characterised by the High  Court  as recitals  of fact, read together, were in no way  ambiguous, indefinite  or  irrelevant to the object of  the  detention, namely, the maintenance of public order and did not  deprive the detenu of his right of representation. The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhay Vaidya [1951] S.C.R. 167, considered. Dwarka  Das  Bhatia v. The State of  Jammu  Kashmir.  [1956] S.C.R. 948, held inapplicable.

JUDGMENT:    CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.  59 of 1959. Appeal  from  the judgment and order dated  the  January  8, 1959, of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Misc.  Case No. 126 of 1958.                             AND                   PETITION No. 51 OF 1959.   Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights.  Veda  Vyasa, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, for the  appellant and petitioner.  B. Sen and P. K. Bose, for the respondents.  1959.  May 20.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by  SINHA  J.-This appeal, on a certificate of fitness  granted by the Calcutta High Court, is directed against the order of that   Court,   dated   January,  8,   1959,   in   Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 126 of 1958, refusing to issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus in respect of one Ram  Prasad Das   (who   will  hereinafter  be  referred  to   as   ’the petitioner’).  This Court, by an order 413 dated  April 20, 1959, directed that the application of  the petitioner under Art. 32 of the Constitution, for a  similar writ  in respect of the same person, be posted  for  hearing immediately after the aforesaid criminal appeal, and that it shall  not  be  necessary that the  petitioner  be  produced before  this  Court at the time of the hearing of  the  writ petition.  Hence, both the matters, relating as they do,  to the  same subject-matter, have been heard together and  will be disposed of by this judgment. It  appears  that  Naresh  Chandra  Ganguli,  an   advocate,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

practising  in the Calcutta High Court, made an  application under ss. 491 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as a  friend, on behalf on the petitioner, in detention in  the Dum Dum Central Jail in 24 Parganas, under the orders of the Government of West Bengal.  The application was made to  the Calcutta High Court on the following allegations: The  peti- tioner is the Secretary of the West Bengal Committee of  the Bharatiya  Jana  Sangha,  one  of  the  four  big  political parties, as recognized by the Election Commission of  India. On  or  about  October 7, 1958, towards  evening,  when  the petitioner was coming out of the Basanta Cabin, a tea stall, at the crossing of the College Street and Surya Sen  Street, after  having addressed a meeting at the College Square,  he was stopped on the street by the police and was taken to the office  of the Special Branch (Police) on Lord  Sinha  Road. From  there, he was sent to the Dum Dum Central Jail,  where he  was  served  with an order. being  Order  No.  83  dated October  7,  1958,  purporting  to have  been  made  by  the Commissioner  of Police, Calcutta, under the  provisions  of the Preventive Detention Act (No.  IV, of 1950) (hereinafter referred to as ’the Act’).  The order is in these terms:- " ORDER Dated 7-10-58.  No. 83. Whereas  I am satisfied with respect to the person known  as Sri  Ram  Prasad  ]-)as, son of late  Bepin  Behari  Das  of Village  P-S-P Dist. and of 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane,  Calcutta that  with a view to preventing him from acting in a  manner prejudicial 414               to  the  maintenance  of Public  Order  it  is               necessary so to do.               Now  therefore  in  exercise  of  the   Powers               conferred  by Section 3(2) of  the  Preventive               Detention  Act 1950 (IV of 1950) 1  made  this               order  directing that the said Sri Ram  Prasad               Das be detained.                     Given under my hand and seal of office.                       Sd/- Illegible,                       Commissioner of Police, Calcutta." On  or about October 8, 1958, the petitioner was served,  in the Dum Dum Central Jail, with a further order, being  Order No. 85 dated October 8, 1958, which is as follows:                 " Government of West Bengal.                Office   of  the  Commissioner   of   Police,               Calcutta.               Dated 8-10-58.               No. 85.               Grounds  for  detention under clause  (ii)  of               clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3  of               the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV  of               1950).               To               Sri  Rain Prasad Das S/O Bepin Behari Das,  of               6, Muralidhar Sen Lane, Calcutta.               You  are  being  detained in  pursuance  of  a               detention  order  made in  exercise  of  power               conferred by Section 3(2) (c) of the P.D.  Act               1950  (Act IV of 1950) on the ground that  you               are  acting  in a manner  prejudicial  to  the               maintenance  of public order, as evidenced  by               the particulars given below:-               1.That  on 13-9-58 you attended a  meeting  of               Eastern  Indian  Refugee Council held  at  the               Refugee  office at’ 6 Murlidhar Sen  Lane  and               vilified  Prime  Minister  of  India  for  his

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

             allegedly  turning  a deaf ear to  the  untold               miseries  of the refugees and while  referring               to  the  recent agreement  between  the  Prime               Ministers  of  India and Pakistan  you  vented               feelings   of  violence  against   the   Prime               Minister of India by emphasising that in order               to  save the refugees and the  territories  of               the   Indian  Union,  Sri  Nehru   should   be               murdered,  if  necessary and so  the  need  of               another Nathuram Godse was felt now.               415               2.    That   in  course  of  discussion   with               members  of  your  party  on  17-9-58  at   6,               Murlidhar Sen Lane, you stated that the Indian               Prime  Minister had made a Present of  certain               Indian  enclaves to Pakistan in  pursuance  of               the  policy  of  appeasement  which  has  been               initiated  by  the  Late  Mahatma  Gandhi  and               called  upon  the members to build  uP  strong               movement against the implementation of Nehru-               Noon Pact.  You also tried to. rouse  passions               by alleging that the Indian Prime Minister had               no sympathy for West Bengal.               3.    That  on  26-9-58 you  attended  another               meeting  of the South Durtolla Branch  of  the               Jana  Sangha at Jatin Mitter Park,  where  you               denounced the aforesaid agreement between  the               two  Prime Ministers and stressed the need  of               forming  a  militia  with the  youths  of  the               country for the safety of the people living in               border areas and urged all to enrol themselves               for the said purpose.               4.    That  you intend to proceed to Delhi  on               9-10-58  and that you are likely to  instigate               plans which may adversely affect the  personal               security of the Prime Minister of India.               Your  action above is bound to result  in  the               maintenance    of    public    order     being               prejudicially affected.               You  are hereby informed that you may  make  a               representation to the State Government against               the    detention   order   and    that    such               representation  should  be  addressed  to  the               Assistant  Secy.  Home  (Special)  Department,               Government  of  West  Bengal,  and   forwarded               through the Supt. of the Jail in which you are               detained as early as possible.               You are also informed that u/s 10 of the  P.D.               Act  1950  (IV  of 1950)  the  Advisory  Board               shall,  if you desire to be heard hear you  in               person  and that if you desire to be so  heard               by the Advisory Board you should intimate such               desire  in- your representation to  the  State               Government.                         Sd/- Illegible,                        Commissioner of Police, Calcutta,"               416               On  or about October 11, 1958, the  petitioner               was  served  with another order  which  is  in               these terms:                   " Government of West Bengal.                     Home Department, Special Section.                     Order                     Calcutta, 11-10-58.               No. 1882 H. S.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

             In exercise of the power conferred by  Section               3(2)  of the Preventive Detention  -Act,  1950               (IV  of  1950),  the Governor  is  pleased  to               approve  order No. 83 dated the  7-10-58  made               under  Section  3(2) of the said  Act  by  the               Commissioner  of  Police,  Calcutta  directing               that  Sri  Ram Prasad Das son  of  Late  Bepin               Behari Das of 6, Murlidhar Sen Lane,  Calcutta               be detained.                           By order of the Governor.                           Sd/- Illegible,                     Dy. Secty. to the Govt. of West Bengal." The petitioner made a representation in writing against  the order  of  detention  aforesaid, denying  and  refuting  the grounds  of his detention, set out above.   He  particularly denied  the allegation contained in ground No. 1  aforesaid, as  totally false, and stated that there was no meeting,  as alleged, on September 13, 1958, and that he had not made any speech attributed to him in the said ground.  He also denied that he had advocated in any meeting for the formation of  a militia, as alleged.  But he claimed that he had a right  to express his views about the policy of the Government or  the Prime  Minister, relating to Pakistan and/ or  about  Nehru- Noon  Pact or similar other Agreements.  He denied  that  he indulged in any violent speeches, or that he tried to  rouse passions.  His further contention was that the ground No.  4 was extremely vague in the absence of any particulars  about how,  where  and when and in what manner, he was  likely  to instigate  any  plan  which  was  to  adversely  affect  the personal  security of the Prime Minister of India,  and  the nature or particulars of any such contemplated plan. In  his application to the High Court, the  petitioner  also submitted that the grounds supplied to him, had 417 no   rational connection with the objects mentioned in s.   3 of the Act, and that, therefore, he was deprived of    his right to make an effective representation.  He also  alleged that  he  was a member of a political party opposed  to  the party  in power, and held definitely pronounced views  about the  failure  of  the Government to tackle  the  problem  of refugees,  as  also  about  the  relationship  between   the Government and the State of Pakistan.  He also claimed to be a leader of the refugees, and as such, had been relentlessly criticising  the  policies of the  present  Government.   He further asserted that the order of detention passed  against him,  was  a  clear case  of  political  victimisation.   He alleged further that the order of detention, on the face  of it,  was  malafide,  and was a  clear  infringement  of  his fundamental  right  to freedom of  speech  and  association, guaranteed by the Constitution.   On  November 28, 1958, the petitioner was brought  to  the Writers’  Buildings  in  Calcutta,  and  placed  before  the Advisory Board as constituted under the Act.  The petitioner was heard in person by the Advisory Board on that date,  and on  the  next  day, that is, November 29,  1958,  after  the hearing  by the Advisory Board, another order,  being  order No.  1967  H.  S.,  dated November 29,  1958,  made  by  the Governor   of  West  Bengal,  was  issued,  confirming   the aforesaid  order of detention No. 83 dated October 7,  1958, set  out  above, and continuing the  petitioner’s  detention till the expiration of 12 months from the date of detention. On  those allegations, the petitioner submitted to the  High Court  that the orders aforesaid, relating to his  detention in the Dum Dum Central Jail, were"’ illegal, invalid,  ultra vires, void and inoperative."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

An affidavit in opposition, on behalf of the State of  West Bengal  and  other  opposite parties, was sworn  to  by  the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta-opposite party No. 3 in the case- In the aforesaid affidavit, the deponent averrred that he was satisfied on the records and materials placed  before him  that  the petitioner was a person likely to  act  in  a manner  prejudicial to the maintenance of public order,  and that with a view to preventing him from doing so, it 418 was necessary to make the order of detention on the  grounds mentioned in the Order No. 85 dated October 8, 1958 (set out above).   He  also  averred that  the  orders  of  detention aforesaid, together with the grounds and all other  relevant particulars, were reported by him to the Government of  West Bengal,  which,  after  duly  considering  the  same,   duly approved of the orders of detention.  It was also stated  in the affidavit that the petitioner personally appeared before the  Advisory Board on November 28, 1958, and  the  Advisory Board,  upon  a consideration of the records  and  materials placed  before  it,  and  the  representation  made  by  the petitioner,  and  after hearing the  petitioner  in  person, reported  to  the  Government’ of West Bengal  that  in  the opinion  of the Advisory Board, there was  sufficient  cause for  the -detention of the petitioner.  The Commissioner  of Police  further  stated in the affidavit that  he  had  duly passed and signed the orders of detention after  considering the  records and materials in respect of the petitioner,  in exercise  of the powers conferred under the Act,  bona  fide and without any malice whatsoever, on being satisfied  about the  necessity  of the said orders of  detention.   He  also stated  that  he  denied  all statements  of  facts  to  the contrary,  contained  in  the affidavit in  support  of  the petition,  and he undertook to produce the original  records in  the Court at the hearing.  Allegations of  victimisation on  political grounds, and that the order of  detention  was mala  fide and in infringement of the fundamental rights  of the petitioner, were specifically denied. The  matter  was heard by a Division Bench of  the  Calcutta High  Court  (Guha Roy and H. K. Sen, JJ.),  which,  by  its order  dated January 8, 1958, discharged the Rule.   In  the course  of its judgment, the High Court made  the  following observations:-                On  a  reading of the order  however,  it  is               quite clear to us that paragraphs 1, 2, 3  and               4  do  not  state the grounds  of  the  order.               There is only one ground of the order and that               is that the petitioner was acting in a  manner               prejudicial to the maintenance of public order               and the remaining paragraphs of the order make               it quite clear that what are stated               419               in  paragraphs  1,  2,  3  and  4   constitute               different  pieces  of evidence  by  which  the               authority   making  the  order  came  to   the               conclusion that the petitioner was acting in a               manner  prejudicial  to  the  maintenance   of               public order and therefore should be  detained               under the Act." Hence, the High Court, on a construction of s. 3 of the Act, came  to  the conclusion that the grounds  of  detention  in respect  of  the petitioner, were not vague,  and  that  the statement  in  para. 4 of the detention order No.  85  dated October  8, 1958, quoted above, was not a ground but only  a piece of evidence out of several such pieces of evidence  on which  the  ground of detention was based.  It  was  further

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

pointed  out  that para. 4 aforesaid, was not  by  itself  a ground  of the order, but merely an inference of fact  which had some bearing on the ground of the order.  The High Court also  pointed  out  that  there  was  no  ambiguity  in  the recitals,  including  these in para. 4 aforesaid.   In  that view of the matter, the order of detention of the petitioner was  upheld,  and the Court further held that  the  question whether  the whole’ order was bad on the ground that one  of the grounds was too vague, did not arise in the case.   The  petitioner  moved  the  Calcutta  High  Court  for  a certificate  that the case was a fit one for appeal to  this Court.  The Chief Justice of the High Court, delivering  the order  of  the Division Bench of that  Court,  granting  the necessary  certificate, observed that the view of  the  High Court that para. 4 aforesaid, was not a ground of  detention but  only  one of the items of evidence in  support  of  the ground,  raised a serious question to be determined by  this Court, particularly because a view contrary to the one taken by the High Court in the instant case, appeared to have been taken by this Court and by the Calcutta High Court itself in a number of decisions.  That is how this appeal has come  to this  Court.  Besides preferring the aforesaid  appeal,  the petitioner   moved   this  Court  under  Art.  32   of   the Constitution,  praying  for a writ in the nature  of  habeas corpus,  and a Constitution Bench, by its order dated  April 20, 1959, directed that this appeal be posted for 420 hearing  by  a  Constitution Bench, on May 11,  1959,  on  a cyclostyled paper book, and that the filing of the  petition of  appeal  and the statements of cases be  dispensed  with. The Court further ordered that the application under Art. 32 of the Constitution, be posted for hearing immediately after the criminal appeal.  That is how both the matters have been placed one after the other for hearing before us.  The  order  under appeal takes the view  that  the  various grounds  of  detention, are stated in s. 3 (1)(a)  (i)  (ii) (iii)  and (b) of the Act, and that there can be no  grounds apart from those.  The High Court then, on a reading of  the Order No. 85, set out above, has held that paragraphs 1,  2, 3 and 4 are not the grounds of detention, as contemplated by s.  3  of the Act, but that they only  constitute  different pieces  of evidence by which the authority making the  order came  to the conclusion that the petitioner was acting in  a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, which was  the  only  ground on which the order  of  detention  in question  was  founded.   The High Court was  right  in  its literal  construction  of the order impugned in  this  case, which  proceeds  to  recite the  four  numbered  paragraphs, preceded  by the introductory clause " as evidenced  by  the particulars  given  below."  But the case of  The  State  of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1), has laid it down that cl (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution, confers two  distinct though  interrelated rights on the petitioner,  namely,  (1) the  right to be informed of the grounds on which the  order of detention has been made, and (2) the right to be enabled, at  the  earliest  opportunity,  to  make  a  representation against  the order.  This Court further pointed out in  that case, that the grounds which have a rational connection with the objects mentioned in s. 3, have to be supplied.  As soon as that is done, the first condition of a valid detention is complied with.  The second condition of such a detention  is fulfilled only after the detenu has been supplied with  such information as will enable him to make a representation.  If the information supplied in order to enable a detenu (1)  (1951) S.C.R. 167.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

421 to  make  a  representation,  does  not  contain  sufficient particulars,  the  detenu  is entitled to  ask  for  further particulars which will enable him to make a  representation. Therefore, if there is an infringement of either of the  two rights,  and  any one of the two conditions precedent  to  a valid  detention, as aforesaid, has not been fulfilled,  the detenu has a right to approach this Court for a writ in  the nature  of habeas corpus.  In other words, the  grounds  for making an order of detention, which have to be  communicated to  the  detenu as soon as practicable, are  conclusions  of facts,  and are not a complete recital of all  the  relevant facts.   Therefore,  the  grounds, that  is  to  say,  those conclusions of facts, must be in existence when the order of detention is made, and those conclusions of facts have to be communicated to the detenu as soon as may be. This Court, and naturally, the High Courts, have treated the recitals  in  the  orders  of  detention,  with   particular reference to the several clauses and sub-clauses of s. 3 (1) (a) and (b) of the Act, as stating the object to be achieved in  making the order of detention.  The order  of  detention may  also contain recitals of facts upon which it is  based. If  the  order of detention also contains  the  recitals  of facts upon which it is founded, no further question  arises, but if it does not contain the recitals of facts which  form the  basis of the conclusions of fact, justifying the  order of  detention,  then, as soon as may be (now,  under  s.  7, within  a  maximum  period of five days  from  the  date  of detention), the person detained has to be informed of  those facts which are the basic facts or the reasons on which  the order  of  detention has been made.  Section 3  of  the  Act requires  the  authority making an order  of  detention,  to state  the fact of its satisfaction that it is necessary  to make  the order of detention of a particular person, with  a view  to preventing him from acting in a manner  prejudicial to one or more of the objects contained in clauses and  sub- clauses  of  s.  3 (1) (a) and (b) of the  Act.   Section  7 requires that the person detained should be communicated the grounds  on which the order of detention has been  made,  so a,-, to afford him the earliest opportunity to make a 422 representation   against  the  order,  to  the   appropriate Government.   The statement of facts contemplated by  s.  7, would,  thus,  constitute the grounds, and not  the  matters contained  in  one or more of the  clauses  and  sub-clauses under  s.  3  (1) (a) and (b) of the Act.   Section  3  also requires that when an order of detention has been made,  the State  Government concerned has to be apprised of the  order of  detention as also of the grounds on which the  order  of detention   has   been  made,  together  with   such   other particulars as have a bearing on the order and the  grounds. And finally,, after the order has been approved by the State Government,  that Government, in its turn, has to report  to the  Central Government the fact of the detention,  together with  the grounds on which the order of detention  had  been made;  and such other particulars as, in the opinion of  the State  Government, have a bearing on the necessity  for  the order.  Thus, on a consideration of the provisions of ss.  3 and 7 of the Act, it may be observed that the detenu has  to be  served with a copy of the order passed by the  authority contemplated  by  sub-s. (2) of s. 3,  containing,  firstly, recitals  in terms of one or more of the subclauses  of  cl. (a)  and (b) of s. 3(1), which we may call  the  ’Preamble’, and secondly, the grounds contemplated by s. 7, namely,  the conclusions  of  fact which have led to the passing  of  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

order  of detention, informing the detenu as to why  he  was being  detained.  lf  the grounds do  not  contain  all  the particulars  necessary for enabling the detenu to  make  his representation  against the order of his detention,  he  may ask for further particulars of the facts, and the  authority which  passed the order of detention is expected to  furnish all that information, subject, of course, to the  provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 7 ; that is to say, the person  detained shall not be entitled to the disclosure of such facts as the authority   making  the  order,  considers  against   public interest  to disclose.  Thus, the order of detention  to  be served upon the person detained would usually consist of the first  two parts, namely, the preamble and the grounds,  but it may also consist of the third part, namely, the 423 particulars,  if and when they are required or found  to  be necessary.   But  it has to be noted that  the  particular,, referred  to  in sub-ss. (3) and (4) of s. 3, would  not  be identical  with  the particulars which we  have  called  the third part of the order.  The State Government, as also  the Central   Government,   would,  naturally,  be   placed   in possession  of  all the relevant facts  and  particulars  on which  the  order of detention has been passed.   But  those particulars may contain such details of facts as may not  be communicated, in public interest, to the person detained. From  what  has been said above, it is clear that  the  High Court  was  in error in so far as it treated  what  we  have called   the   preamble’  as  the   grounds   of   detention contemplated  by s. 7 of the Act.  But this error,  as  will presently  appear, has not affected the legality,  propriety or correctness of the order passed by the High Court in  the habeas  corpus  proceedings before it.  The High  Court,  as already indicated, after making those observations which  we have  held  to be erroneous, proceeded further to  say  that there was no ambiguity in the recitals of facts, as the High Court  characterised  them  and which  we  have  called  the grounds. The  contention  raised  before  the  High  Court  has  been repeated  before us, that the grounds contained in para.  4, are  vague and indefinite, not enabling the person  detained to  make  his  representation.   It  will  appear  from  the paragraph aforesaid that the petitioner intended to  proceed to Delhi on October 9,1958, with a view to instigating plans against the personal security of the Prime Minister.  It  is clear  that  the  place, date and  purpose  of  the  planned nefarious activity, have all been stated as clearly as could be  expected.  But it was argued that it was also  necessary to  state  the details of the plan to be hatched  in  Delhi. There  are several answers to this contention.  Paragraph  4 has reference to something which was apprehended but lay  in the womb of the future.  From the nature of the fact that it was  not  an event which had already happened but  what  was apprehended to be in the contemplation of the detenu and his associates,  if  any, no further details of the  plan  could possibly be 424 disclosed.  As was observed in the decision of this Court in The  State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya (1) (at  pp. 184  and 185), vagueness is a -relative term.   Its  meaning must  vary  with the facts and circumstances of  each  case. What  may be said to be vague in one case, may not be so  in another, and it could not be asserted as a general rule that a  ground  is necessarily vague if the only  answer  of  the detained  person  can be to deny it.  If  the  statement  of facts  is  capable  of  being  clearly  understood  and   is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to  make his  representation,  it cannot be said that  it  is  vague. Further,  it cannot be denied that particulars of  what  has taken  place,  can be more definitely stated than  those  of events  which are yet in the offing.  In the very nature  of things,  the  main object of the Act is to  prevent  persons from  doing something which comes within the purview of  any one of the sub-clauses of cl. (a) of s. 3(1) of the Act.  It was next contended that some of the grounds at least are irrelevant.  This was not said of the first paragraph of the grounds, set out above.  It was said of paragraphs 2, 3  and 4  that they are irrelevant to the main object of the  order of detention, namely, the "maintenance of public order".  In our  opinion,  there  is no  substance  in  this  contention either.   All the statements in the four paragraphs  of  the grounds, which have to be read together as being parts of  a connected  whole, calling upon persons to " build up  strong movement against the implementation of Nehru-Noon Pact", and to  "rouse  passions  by  alleging  that  the  Indian  Prime Minister had no sympathy for West Bengal", cannot be said to be wholly unconnected with the maintenance of public  order. Similarly,  denouncing the agreement between the  two  Prime Ministers  and stressing the need of forming a militia  with the  youths  of  the  country, cannot be  said  to  have  no repercussions  on  the  maintenance of  public  order.   And lastly,  any instigation against the personal safety of  the Prime Minister of India cannot but have a deleterious effect on the maintenance of public order, (1)  (1951) S.C.R. 167. 425 It  was sought to be argued that any weak link in the  chain of  facts and circumstances, said to have been the basis  of the  order  of detention, would affect the legality  of  the whole  order.  This argument postulates that there are  many grounds  which  are  either vague or  irrelevant.   In  this connection,   particular   reliance  was   placed   on   the observations  of  this Court in Dwarka Dass  Bhatia  v.  The State  of Jammu and Kashmir (1), to the effect that if  some of  the  reasons on which the order of  detention  had  been based, are found to be non-existent or irrelevant, the Court ought to quash the order, because it is not in a position to know  which of the reasons or the grounds, had  operated  on the mind of the authorities concerned, when they decided the pass  the impugned order.  As already pointed out,  no  such situation arises in this case, because, in our opinion, none of  the grounds is either vague or irrelevant.  It may  also be pointed out that the ground of irrelevance wag not  urged before  the  High  Court,  but  even  so,  we  allowed   the petitioner’s  counsel  to urge that ground  before  us,  and having  heard him on that aspect of the matter, we  have  no doubt that there is no justification for the contention that any   of  the  matters  taken  into  consideration  by   the authorities concerned in the matter of the detention of  the petitioner, was irrelevant.  For the reasons given above, it must be held that there  is no merit in this appeal or in the application under Art.  32 of the Constitution.  They are, accordingly, dismissed. Appeal and application dismissed. (1)  (1956) S.C.R. 948. 54 426