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PETITIONER: NARCOTICS CONTROL BUREAU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KRISHAN LAL AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT29/01/1991

BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) BENCH: PANDIAN, S.R. (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:  1991 AIR  558            1991 SCR  (1) 139  1991 SCC  (1) 705        JT 1991 (1)   258  1991 SCALE  (1)97

ACT:      Narcotic   Drugs  and  Psychotropic   Substances   Act, 1985:Sections  36 and 37(2)-Special Courts-Powers  to  grant bail-Restrictions- Whether to be treated as fetters on  High Court to grant bail under s. 439, Cr. P.C.      Code of Criminal Procedure 1973: Section  439-Bail-High Court’s   power-Whether  restricted  by  s.  37(2)  of   the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

HEADNOTE:      The  respondents in the appeals who were  arrested  for offences  under various sections of the narcotic  Drugs  and Psychotropic  Substances Act, 1985, were refused  bail,  and were  remanded  to judicial custody.  On the  basis  of  the report the Magistrate took cognizance, and remanded them  to judicial custody.      The  respondents  filed  writ  petition  and   criminal miscellaneous  petition before the High Court  seeking  bail under  s. 167(2), Criminal Procedure Code on the grounds  of belated  submission  of the chargesheet, and on  account  of illness.   The matter was referred to a Division Bench  held that the limitations placed on the Special Court under s. 37 (2)  of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic  Substances  Act could  not be read as fetters on the High Court in  exercise of its power under s. 439, Cr.P.C. to grant bail.      Aggreieved,  the Narcotics Control Bureau  appealed  to this  Court,  and  contended  that the  High  Court  had  no untremelled  powers in the matter of granting bail,  as  the provisions  of  s. 37 of the NDPS Act override those  of  s. 439, Cr. P.C.      On  the question: whether the limitation placed on  the Special  Court  under  s. 37(2) of the NDPS  Act  is  to  be treated  as fetters on the powers of the High Court also  in granting bail under s. 439, Cr. P.C.      Disposing of the appeals, this Court,                                                        140      HELD:   1. The powers of the High Court to  grant  bail under  s.  439,  Cr. p.C. are  subject  to  the  limitations contained  in  the amended s.37 of the  Narcotic  Drugs  and Psychotropic  Substances  Act, 1985,  and  the  restrictions placed on the powers of the Court under the said section are

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applicable to the High Court also in the matter of  granting bail. [151E]      2. When there is a special enactment in force  relating to the manner of investigation, enquiry or otherwise dealing with  offences, the other powers under the Code of  Criminal Procedure  should be subject to such special enactment.   In interpreting  the  scope  of such  a  statute  the  dominant purpose  underlying  the statute has to be  borne  in  mind. [145C]      3.1   The  Narcotic Drugs and  Psychotropic  Substances Act,  1985  is a special enactment, enacted with a  view  to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation  of operations  relating  to  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic substances.    That   being  the   underlying   object   and particularly when the provisions of s.37 of the NDPS Act are in   negative terms limiting the scope of the  applicability of  the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code  regarding bail, it cannot be said that the High Court’s power to grant bail  under  s.  439,  cr.  P.C.  are  not  subject  to  the limitation mentioned under s. 37 of the NDPS Act. [144E-G]      3.2   Section  37 of the NDPS Act starts  with  a  non- obstinate   clause  stating  that  notwithstanding   anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no  person accused of an offence prescribed therein shall be released on bail   unless   the  conditions   contained   therein   were satisfied/[144E; 145F]      3.3   The non-obstante clause with which s. 37  of  the NDPS Act starts should be given its due meaning and  clearly it is intended to restrict the powers to grant bail [144G]      3.4  In case of inconsistency between s. 439, Cr.  P.C. and S.37 of the NDPS Act, s. 37 prevails.      3.5  Consequently the power to grant bail under any  of the  provisions  of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure  should necessarily be subject to the conditions mentioned in s.  37 of the NDPS Act. [145F,G]      Lt. Col. Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc. v. Union of India & Others,  [1983]  1  SCR 393 and Balchand Jain  v.  State  of Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR page 52, relied on.                                                        141      Usmanbhai  Dawoodbhai  Memon  and Others  v.  State  of Gujarat, [1988] 2 SCC 271, referred to.      4.  The  two accused-respondents being on bail   for  a long  time  under  the  orders of the  High  Court  and  the Narcotics  Control  Bureau not passing the  cancellation  of bail, the matter need not be remitted to the High Court, and the respondents would continue to be on bail. [151F]

JUDGMENT:      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  Criminal Appeal  Nos. 810-811 of 1989.      From  the  Judgement and Order dated 22.9.1989  of  the Delhi High Court in Crl. W.P. No. 622 of 1988 and Crl. Misc. Main Petition No. 1132 of 1988.      J.S.  Arora, Sudhansu S. Das, Satish Agrawal  and  N.P. Kaushik for the  Appellant.      V.C.  Mahajan, A.K. Ganguli Ashok Bhan, A.  Subhashini, P.P.. Tripathi and S.K. Sabharwal for the Respondents.      The Judgement of the Court was delivered by      K. JAYACHANDRA REDDY, J.  The High Court of Delhi by  a common order in two petitions filed under The Narcotic Drugs &  Psychtropic Substances Act, 1985 (‘NDPS Act’  for  short) held that the restrictions placed on the powers of the Court to grant bail in certain offences under the amended  Section

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37  of  the NDPS Act are not applicable to the  High  Court. Aggrieved by the said order, the Narcotic Control Bureau has filed these two appeals.      The peritioners before the High Court in two  different cases  were arrested for offences under various Sections  of the  NDPS  Act.   They were refused  bail  and  remanded  to judicial custody.  On the basis of the report the Magistrate concerned  took  cognizance and remanded  them  to  judicial custody.  The petitioners filed a writ petition as well as a criminal miscellaneous petition seeking bail firstly on  the ground  that  they are entitled to be released  on  bail  as required  under  Section  167(2) of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure  as the charge-sheet was filed at a belated  stage and  secondly  on the ground of illness.  A  learned  Single Judge  referred  this  matter to a Division  Bench  and  the Division   Bench  by  the  impugned  order  held  that   the limitations placed on the Special Court under Section  37(2) of the NDPS Act cannot be read as                                                        142 fetters  on  the  High Court in  exercise  of  powers  under Section  439 Cr. P.C. for granting bail.  The  only  limited question to be decided in these appeals is whether the  view taken  by the High Court is right or wrong and we  may  also mention that leave was granted only to this limited extent.      The   learned  counsel  appearing  for,the   appellants submitted   that  the  High  Court  has   misconstrued   the provisions of Section 36-A and 37 of the  NDPS Act and  that latter  Section  as  amended starts  with  the  non-obstante clause  limiting the scope of provisions of the  Cr.P.C.  in the  matter of granting bail and as such the High Court  has no  untremelled  powers  to  grant  bail  inasmuch  as   the provisions  of  the  amended  Section 37  of  the  NDPS  Act override the provisions of Section 439 Cr. P.C.      We  may at this stage note the relevant  provisions  of NDPS  Act.   The  preamble to the NDPS Act  shows  that  the object  of  the  Act is to consolidate  and  amend  the  law relating to narcotic drugs and to make stringent  provisions for  the  control and regulation of operations  relating  to narcotic  drugs and psychotrophic substances etc.   Sections 15 to 35 deal with various offences and penalties.   Section 36  provides for constitution of Special Courts and  empower the  Government  to constitute Special Courts and  a  person shall  not  be qualified for appointment as a Judge  of  the Special   Court  unless  he  is  immediately   before   such appointment,  a  Sessions Judge or  an  Additional  Sessions Judge.  Section  36-A  enumerates the  offences  triable  by Special  Courts and also deals with the procedure  regarding the  detention  of  the  accused  when  produced  before   a Magistrate.  Sub-section (b) of Section 36-A lays down  that if  the  Magistrate to whom an accused  is  forwarded  under Section  167 Cr. P.C., considers that the detention of  such person for fifteen days is unnecessary he shall forward  him to  the  Special Court having jurisdiction  who  shall  take cognizance  and proceed with the trial.  Sub-section (3)  of Section 36-A reads thus:          "Nothing   contained  in  this  section  shall   be          deemed  to  affect the special powers of  the  High          Court regarding bail under Section 439 of the  Code          of  Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),  and  the          High  Court may exercise such powers including  the          power  under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of  that          section as if the reference to "magistrate" in that          section  included  also a reference to  a  "Special          Court" constituted under Section 36."                                                        143

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Now  let us note Section 37 as amended in the year 1989  and the same is in the following terms:          "37.   Offences to be cognizable and  non-bailable-          (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code          of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-      (a)  every offence punishable under this Act  shall  be cognizable;      (b)  no person accused of an offence punishable  for  a term  of imprisonment of five years or more under  this  Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-      (i)  The   Public  Prosecutor  has  been   given   an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and      (ii)   where   the   Public   Prosecutor   oppose   the application,   the  court  is  satisfied  that   there   are reasonable  grounds for believing that he is not  guilty  of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.      (2)  The ,limitations on granting of bail  specified  in clause  (b)  of  sub-section  (1) are  in  addition  to  the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),  or  any  other law for the law  being  in  force  on granting of bail."  Now it becomes necessary to extract Section 439 Cr.  P..C. which reads as under:           "439. Special powers of the High Court or Court of          Section regarding bail--(1) A High Court or  Court          of Session may direct--           (a)  that any person accused of an offence and  in          custody be released on bail, and if the offence  is          of  the  nature  specified in  sub-section  (3)  of          Section  437  , may impose any condition  which  it          considers  necessary for the purposes mentioned  in          that sub-section;           (b)  that  any condition imposed by  a  magistrate          when  releasing any person on bail be set aside  or          modified;           Provided  that  the  High Court or  the  Court  of          Session shall,                                                        144           before granting bail to a person who is accused on          anoffence which is triable exclusively by the Court          of  Session  or which, though not  so  triable,  is          punishable with imprisonment for life, give  notice          of   the  application  for  bail  to   the   Public          prosecutor unless it is, for reason to be recorded          in writing , of opinion that it is not  practicable          to give such notice.           (2)  A High Court or Court of Session  may  direct          that any person who has been released on bail under          this   Chapter  be  arrested  and  commit  him   to          custody."      The  High  Court having taken into  consideration  sub- section  (3)  of  Section  36-A  took  the  view  that   the limitations  placed on the Special Courts cannot be read  as fetters in its exercise of the powers under Section 439  Cr. P.C. In this context, the Division Bench referred to to sub- sections(8)  and  (9)  of Section 20 of  the  Terrorist  and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (’TADA Act’ for short) which are similar to Section 37 of NDPS Act and  also relied  on a judgment of this Court in  Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon  and  Others v. State of Gujarat, [1988] 2 SCC  271  a case which arose under the TADA Act.  We shall refer to this judgment  at  a later stage after analysing  the  scope  and effect of Section 37 of NDPS Act.      Section 37 as amended starts with a non-obstante clause

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stating that notwithstanding anything contained in the  Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 no person accused of an  offence prescribed  therein  shall be released on  bail  unless  the conditions  contained therein were satisfied.  The nDPS  Act is a special enactment as already noted it was enacted  with a  view  to  make stringent provision for  the  control  and regulation  of  operations relating to  narcotic  drugs  and psychotropic  substances.  The being the  underlying  object and  particularly when the provisions of Section 37  of  NDPS Act  are  in  negative  terms  limiting  the  scope  of  the applicability of the provisions of Cr. P.C. regarding  bail, in our view, it cannot be held that the High Court’s  powers to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. are not subject  to the  limitation mentioned under Section 37 of NDPS Act.  The non-obstante clause with which the Section starts should  be given its due meaning and clearly it is intended to  restrict the  powers to grant bail.  In case of inconistency  between Section 439 Cr. P.C. and Section 37 of the NDPS Act, Section 37  prevails.   In this context Section 4 Cr.  P.C.  may  be noted which read thus:                                                   145           "(4) Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code          and  other laws--(1) All offences under the  Indian          Penal  Code  (45 of 1860)  shall  be  investigated,          inquired  into,  tried, and  otherwise  dealt  with          according to the provision hereinafter contained.           (2)  All  offences under any other  law  shall  be          investigated,  inquired into, tried, and  otherwise          dealt  with  according to the same  provision,  but          subject  to  any enactment for the  time  being  in          force   regulating   the   manner   or   place   of          investigating, inquiring into, trying or  otherwise          dealing with such offences."  It can thus be seen that when there is a special  enactment in  force relating to  the manner of investigation,  enquiry or  otherwise dealing with such offences, the  other  powers under Cr. P.C. should be subject to such special  enactment. In  interpretating the scope of such a statute the  dominant purpose underlying the statute has to be borne in mind.   In Lt.  Col.  Prithi Pal Singh Bedi etc. v. Union  of  India  & Others,   [1983]   1   SCR  393  regarding   the   mode   of interpretation the Supreme Court observed as follows:           "The  dominant purpose in construing a statute  is          to  ascertain the intention of Parliament.  One  of          the well recognised canons of construction is  that          the  legislature speaks its mind by use of  correct          expression and unless there is any ambiguity in the          language  of the provision, the Court should  adopt          literal  construction  if it does not  lead  to  an          absurdity." As  already noted, Section 37 of the nDPS Act starts with  a non-obstante  clause stating that  notwithstanding  anything contained  in  the  Conde of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  no personaccused  of  an offence prescribed  therein  shall  be released on bail unless the conditions contained therein are satisfied.   Consequently the power to grant bail under  any of the provisions of Cr. P.C. should necessarily be  subject to the conditions mentioned in Section 37 of the NDPS Act.      We  shall  now refer to some of the  decisions  of  the Court dealing with the analogous provision in other  special enactments.   Rule 184 of the Defence and Internal  Security of  India Rules, 1971 which is analogous to Sec. 37  of  the NDPS Act runs as follows:                                                        146           "Rule  184. Notwithstanding anything contained  in

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        the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) no          person  accused or convicted of a contravention  of          these Rules or orders made thereunder shall, if  in          custody,  be  released  on bail  or  his  own  bond          unless--           (a) the prosecution has been given an  opportunity          to opposed the application for such release, and           (b) where the prosecution opposes the  application          and the contravention  is of any such provision  of          these Rules or orders made thereunder as the Central          Government or the State Government may be  notified          order   specify  in  this  behalf,  the  Court   is          satisfied  that  there are reasonable  grounds  for          believing   that   he  is  not   guilty   of   such          contravention." The  Rule  commences with a non-obstante clause and  in  its operative part imposes a ban on release on bail of a  person accused  or convicted of a contravention of the  Rules.   it imposes  fetters  on the exercise of the power  of  granting bail  in certain kinds of cases.  In Balchand Jain v.  State of Madhya Pradesh, [1977] 2 SCR 52 a question arose  whether the  power to grant anticipatory bail under Section 438  can stand side by side with Rule 184 of whether former provision is  overridden by the latter.  This Court held that Rule  184 does not stand in the way of Court of Session or High  Court granting  anticipatory  bail  on the  ground  that  the  two provision  operate at two different stages.  Of  course,  in the instant case, we are not concerned with Section 438  but the observation regarding the scope of Rule 184 are relevant which read thus:           "But  even  if Rule 184 does not apply in  such  a          case, the policy behind this Rule would have to  be          borne  in  mind by the Court while  exercising  its          power  to grant ’anticipatory bail’  under  Section          438.   The Rule making authority  obviously  though          offences arising out of contravention of Rules  and          orders  made there-under were serious  offences  as          they  might imperil the defence of India  or  civil          defence  or internal security or public  safety  or          maintenance  of public order or hamper  maintenance          of  supplies  and  services  to  the  life  of  the          community and hence it provided in Rule 184 that no          person accused or convicted or contravention of any          Rule or order made under the Rules, shall be-                                                        147           released  on bail unless the prosecution is  given          an  opportunity to oppose the application for  such          release and in case the contravention is of a  Rule          or  order  specified in this behalf in  a  notified          order,    there   are   reasonable   grounds    for          believing  that the person concerned is not  guilty          of such contravention.  If these are the conditions          provided by the Rule making authority for releasing          on  bail  a  person arrested on  an  accusation  of          having committed contravention of any Rule or order          made  under  the Rules, it must follow  a  fortiori          that   the   same  conditions  must   provide   the          guidelines while exercising  the  power  to   grant          ’anticipatory bail’to a person apprehending  arrest          on  such  accusation, though they  would  not  be          strictly applicable."                                         (emphasis supplied) Fazal Ali, J. in his concurring judgment also held thus:           "(4)_that in cases covered by r. 184 of the  Rules          the  Court exercising power under s. 436 or s.  438

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        of  the Code has go to comply with  the  conditions          mentioned  in clauses (a) & (b) of r. 184 and  only          after the Court has complied with those  conditions          that  an  order under any of these section  of  the          Code in respect of such offences could be passed." In  Usmanbhai’s  case a question whether the  provisions  of sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the TADA Act limit the   scope   of  Sections  437  and  439,   came   up   for consideration.  The language of sub-sections (8) and (9)  of section  20 is analogous to Section 37 of NDPS Act and  they read thus:           "(8)  Notwithstanding  anything contained  in  the          Code,  no person accused on an  offence  punishable          under this Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if          in  custody, if in custody, be released on bail  or          on his own bond unless--           (a)  the  Public  Prosecutor  has  been  given  an          opportunity  to  oppose the  application  for  such          release, and           (b)  where  the  Public  Prosecutor  opposes   the          application, the court is satisfied that there  are          reasonable  grounds  for believing that  he  is  not          guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to          commit any offence while on bail.           (9)  The limitation on granting of bail  specified          in   sub-section  (8)  are  in  addition   to   the          limitations under the Code or any other law for the          time being in force or granting of bail." It  may  be noted at this stage that the power of  the  High Court  or the Sessions Court to grant anticipatory bail  has been  completely taken away under Section 20(7) of the  TADA Act.   The  contention was that the sources of  power  of  a designated court to grant bail is under Section 437  subject to some limitations under Section 20(8) and that it does not in   any  manner  affect  the  power  of  the   High   Court independently  under Section 439 to grant bail.  It is  also contended  that  to take away the power of  the  High  Court would  tantamount to strike at the very  foundation  of  an independent  judiciary free from executive  control.   After considering these submissions this Court held that:           "Though  there is no express  provision  excluding          the  applicability  of  Section  439  of  the  Code          similar  to the one contained in Section  20(7)  of          the Act in relation to a case involving the  arrest          of any person on an accusation of having  committed          an  offence  punishable under the Act or  any  rule          made   thereunder,   but  that  result   must,   by          necessary implication, follow.  it is true that the          source of powerof a Designated Court to grant  bail          is  no Section 20(8) of the Act as it  only  places          limitations  on such power.  This is made  explicit          by Section 20(9) which enacts that the  limitations          on granting of bail specified in Section 20(8)  are          ’in  addition to the limitations under the Code  or          any  other  law law for the time being  in  force’.          But  it does not necessarily follow that the  power          of a Designated Court to grant bail is relatable to          Section 439 of the Code.  it cannot be doubted that          a Designated Court is ’a court other than the  High          Court  or the Court of Session’ within the  meaning          of of section 437 of the Code.  The exercise of the          power  to grant bail by a Designated Court  is  not          only subject to the limitations contained  therein,          but  is also subject to the limitations  placed  by          Section 20(8) of the Act."

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                                        (emphasis supplied) Having held so, the learned Judge proceeded to consider  the controversy as to the power of the High Court to grant  bail under  Section 439 Cr. P.C. Act excluding the  jurisdiction of the High Court entertain an                                                        149 appeal  or  revision against the judgment of  the  designated court, it is held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain  an  application  for bail under  Section  439  or Section  482  of the Code of Criminal  procedure.   however, regarding  the construction of non-obstante clause in   Sec. 20(8) of the Act, this Court held as under:           "The controversy as to the power of the High Court          to  grant bail under Section 439 of the  Code  must          also  turn on the construction of Section 20(8)  of          the  Act.  It commences with a non-obstante  clause          and  in its operative part by the use  of  negative          language  prohibits the enlargement on bail of  any          person  accused of commission of an  offence  under          the  Act, if in custody, unless two conditions  are          satisfied.    The  first  condition  is  that   the          prosecution must be given an opportunity to  oppose          the  application  for such release and  the  second          condition  is that where there is such  opposition,          the   court  must  be  satisfied  that   there   are          reasonable  grounds  for believing that he  is  not          guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to          commit  any  offence while on bail.  If  either  of          these  two  conditions is not  satisfied,  the  ban          operates  and the person under detention cannot  be          released  on  bail.  it is quite obvious  that  the          source of power of a Designated Court to grant bail          is not section 20(8) of the Act but it only  places          limitations  on such powers.  This is  implicit  by          Section  20(9)  which in terms  provides  that  the          limitations  or granting of bail specified in  sub-          section  (8)  are in addition  to  the  limitations          under the Code or any other law for the time  being          in force on granting of bail.  it therefore follows          that  the  power derived by a Designated  Court  to          grant bail to a person accused of an offence  under          the  Act, if in custody, is derived from  the  Code          and not from section 20(8) of the Act. It can thus be seen that even in Usmanbhai’s case also there is  no  observation supporting the view taken  by  the  High Court  in  the impugned judgment.  As a matter  of  fact  in Usmanbhai’s  case  Sen, J. who spoke for  the  Bench,  after referring  to  the ratio laid down in Balchand  Jain’s  case observed thus:           "The  view expressed in Balchand Jain case is  not          applicable at all for more than one reason.   There          was nothing in the defence and Internal Security of          India  Act  or the Rules framed  there-under  which          would exclude the jurisdiction                                                        150           and  power of the High Court altogether.   On  the          contrary,  Section  12(2)  of  that  Act  expressly          vested in the High Court the appellate jurisdiction          in  certain  specified  cases.   In  view  of   the          explicit bar in Section 19(2), there is exclusion          of   the  jurisdiction  of  the  High   Court.   It          interdicts that no appeal or revision shall lie  to          any  court, including the High Court,  against  any          judgment,   sentence   or  order,  not   being   an          interlocutory  order, of a Designated  Court.   The

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        Act  by Section 16(1) confers the right  of  appeal          both  on  facts as well as on law  to  the  Supreme          Court.   Further  while  it is  true  that  Chapter          XXXIII of the Code is still preserved as  otherwise          the  Designated Court would have no power to  grant          bail, still the source of power is not Section  439          of  the  Code but Section 437 being a  court  other          than  the High Court or the Court of Session.   Any          other  view would lead to an  anomalous  situation.          If  it  were  to  be  held  that  the  power  of  a          Designated  Court  to grant bail was  relatable  to          Section  439 it would imply that not only the  High          Court  but also the High Court of Session would  be          entitled  to grant bail on such terms as they  deem          fit.  The power to grant bail under Section 439  is          unfettered  by any conditions and limitations  like          Section  437.  It would run counter to the  express          prohibition  contained in Section 20(8) of the  Act          which enjoins that notwithstanding anything in  the          code,  no person accused of an  offence  punishable          under   the Act or any rule made thereunder  shall,          if  in  custody,  be released on  bail  unless  the          conditions  set  forth in clauses (a) and  (b)  are          satisfied."                                          (emphasis supplied)      The  High  Court  in the  impugned  judgment,  however, referred  to Usmanbhai’s case and held that the  limitations placed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act are exactly  similar to the ones in sub-section (8) and (9) of Section 20 of  the TADA  Act  and they are applicable only to  special  courts. But  we  may point out that in paragraph 16  in  Usmanbhai’s case it is observed:           "As  a murder of construction, we must accept  the          contention  advanced by learned counsel  appearing          for  the  State  Government that the  Act  being  a          special   Act  must  prevail  in  respect  of   the          jurisdiction  and  power  of  the  High  Court   to          entertain an application for bail under section 439          of  the Code or by recourse to its inherent  powers          under section 482."                                                        151 However, as already mentioned, the learned Judges held  that the view expressed in Balchand Jain’s case is not applicable to the facts in Usmanbhai’s case and the same is clear  from the  observations  made in Usmanbhai’s case  which  read  as under:          "Lastly both the decision in Balchand Jain and that          in  Ishwar Chand turn on the scheme of the  Defence          and  Internal  Security of India Act,  1971.   They          proceed  on the well recognised principle  that  an          outer of jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is not          to be readily inferred, except by express provision          or by necessary implication.  It all depends on the          scheme  of  the particular Act as  to  whether  the          power of the High Court and the Court of Session to          grant  bail under Sections 438 and 439 exists.   We          must  accordingly uphold the view expressed by  the          High Court that it had no jurisdiction to entertain          an application for bail under Section 439 or  under          Section 482 of the Code" From  the  above discussion it emerges that  in  Usmanbhai’s case the Supreme Court did not express anything contrary  to what  has been observed in Balchand Jain’s case and  on  the other  hand  at  more  than one  place  observed  that  such enactments should prevail over the general enactment and the

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non-obstante  clause  must be powers of the  High  Court  to grant bail under Section 439 are subject to the  limitations contained in the amended Section 37 of the NDPS Act and  the restrictions  placed  on the powers of the Court  under  the said  section are applicable to the High Court also  in  the matter  of  granting  bail.  The point  of  law  is  ordered accordingly.      The  two accused respondents in these two appeals  have been on bail pursuant to the order of the High Court, for  a long time.  The learned counsel appearing for the  Narcotics Control  Bureau, the appellant herein, is also not  pressing cancellation  of the bail.  Therefore, we are not  remitting the  matters  of  the High Court  for  fresh  consideration. Pending the proceedings, they would continue to be on  bail. Subject  to the above clarification of law, the appeals  are disposed of. R.P.                                    Appeals disposed of.                                                        152