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PETITIONER: NARAYANIBAI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/10/1969

BENCH:

ACT: Maharashtra  Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on  Holdings)  Act (27 of 1961)-Act included in Ninth Schedule to  Constitution by  the Sevententh Amendment--Action taken under  Act  after the  date  of judgment in Golaknath’s  case-If  validity  of action can be questioned.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner was called upon to show cause why land  held by  her  in excess of the ceiling area shall not  be  deemed surplus  land  and  shall not vest in the  State  under  the Maharashtra  Agricultural Lands (Ceilings on Holdings)  Act, 1961.   The petitioner thereupon challenged the validity  of the  Act  on  the ground that it  violated  the  fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the  Constitution. It   was  contended  that  though  the  Act  was,   by   the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, incorporated in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and protected from challenge  by  Art.  31B,  action  sought  to  be  taken  in pursuance  of such an Act infringing the fundamental  rights was  liable  to be declared void, if that action  was  taken subsequent to February 27, 1967, the date -on which judgment of  this Court in Golaknath’s case, [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762  was delivered. HELD : The petition must fail. (1)  In  Golaknath’s  case  five of the  Judges  upheld  the Seventeenth  Amendment  on  the basis of  the  ’doctrine  of prospective  overruling  : five -relied upon  the  power  of Parliament to exclude, from the pale of challenge, the  Acts and Regulations in the Ninth Schedule, and one Judge was  of the view that the Acts impugned in that case were  protected by  Arts.  31(1),  (2)  (2A)  and  31A(1).   Therefore,  the majority  of ten Judges of the Court expressly held that  by virtue  of  Art.  31B the Acts  incorporated  in  the  Ninth Schedule  were not exposed to challenge on the  ground  that they infringed the fundamental rights, [175 D-E, G-H] (2)  Those   judges  who  relied  upon  the   ’doctrine   of prospective  of overruling’, did not accept the doctrine  in all its implications as understood by the U.S. Courts.  They merely  denied to Parliament power after February 27,  1967, to amend the Constitution so as to take away or abridge. any of the fundamental rights of the people, but amendments made prior  to  that  date  and  action  taken  pursuant  to  the amendments,, both before and after that date were not to  be deemed  invalid on the ground that fundamental  rights  were infringed. [176 C-E] (3)  This  Court  had  upheld the validity  of  the  Act  as amended  by  Act  13 of 1962, in  State  of  Maharashtra  v. Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand, [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712. [176 F-G]

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JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 256 of 1968.  Petition  under Art. 32 of the Constitution of   India  for enforcement of the fundamental rights. 173 M.   C.  Setalvad, S. L. Khanna and R.  Gopalakrishnan,  for the petitioner. B.   Sen,  M.  S.  K.  Sastri  and  S.  P.  Nayar,  for  the respondents. K.   Jayaram, for the intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah,  J.-Narayanibai  is  the holder of  142  acres  and  8 gunthas  of  "dry  crop" land  in  village  Teosa,  District Amravati in the State of Maharashtra.  By notice dated March 12,  1968,  under s. 17(1) of the  Maharashtra  Agricultural Lands  (Ceiling  on  Holdings)  Act 27  of  1961,  the  Sub- Divisional  Officer, Chanduri, called upon  Narayanibai  to, show  cause why land held by her in excess of the "  ceiling area  " shall not be deemed surplus land and shall not  vest in  the State.  Narayanibai filed a petition in  this  Court claiming  a declaration that Maharashtra Act 27 of  1961  is ultia  vires the State Legislature in that it  violated  the fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 14, 19(1)(f) & (g) and  31  in Part III of the Constitution, and for  an  order restraining the State of Maharashtra and the  Sub-Divisional Officer,  Chanduri, from dispossessing the petitioner.  from the land in question or any part thereof. Maharashtra  Act 27 of 1961 is by the  Constitution  (Seven- teenth Amendment) Act, 1964, incorporated in the Ninth Sche- dule  to the Constitution.  Article 31B of the  Constitution enacts  that the Acts and Regulations in the Ninth  Schedule and the provisions thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever  to  have  become  void on the  ground  that  the  Act, Regulation or any provision thereof is inconsistent with  or takes  away or abridges any of the rights conferred by  Part III of the Constitution.  Articles 14, 19(1)(f) & (g) and 31 fall  in Part III of the Constitution and guarantee  certain fundamental  rights, but by virtue of incorporation  of  the Act   in  the  Ninth  Schedule  protection  in  respect   of infringement  of any of the fundamental rights by the  Maha- rashtra  Act  27 of 1961 ’or any provision  thereof  is  not claimable. Mr. Setalvad for the petitioner contends that in view of the judgment of this Court in I. C. Golaknath & Ors. v. State of Punjab  & Anr.(1) action sought to be taken in pursuance  of an Act in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution  infringing any  fundamental  rights is liable to be declared  void,  if that  action  is taken subsequent to the date on  which  the judgment of this Court in that case was delivered.   Counsel submitted  that  in I. C. Golak Nath’s case(1) it  was  held that  all  Acts  in  the Ninth  Schedule  and  action  taken pursuant thereto were to be regarded as valid only (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762. 174 till  February  27, 1967, by the declaration  made  by  this Court,  and  that  actions taken  after  February  27,  1967 pursuant to any of the Acts in the Ninth Schedule, must,  to the  extent they infringe any of the fundamental rights,  be deemed void.  Counsel said that the effect of the  "doctrine of  prospective  overruling’ as understood by  the  American Courts  and  adopted  by this Court in 1.  C.  Golak  Nath’s case(1) is to regard as valid acts done prior to the date on

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which the Court delivered the judgment in I. C. Golak Nath’s case(1),  but  acts done after that date  which  are  incon- sistent with the law declared by this Court are invalid. In  our  judgment,  that is not the effect of  I.  C.  Golak Nath’s case(1).  In that case Wanchoo, Bhargava and  Mitter, JJ.,  held  that  the word ’law’ in Art.  13  (1)  does  not include any law in the nature of a constitutional provision, and Art. 13 (2) when it speaks of the State making any  law, refers to the law made under the provisions contained in Ch. 1  of Part XI of the Constitution : it has no  reference  to the constituent power of amendment under Art. 368.  Bachawat and  Ramaswami,  JJ., substantially agreed with  that  view. They  therefore regarded all the Acts in the Ninth  Schedule as beyond challenge on the plea that the Acts or  provisions infringed  any of the fundamental rights under Part  III  of the Constitution. Subba Rao, C.J., who spoke for himself and four of his  col- leagues   observed  that  Art.  13(3)  gives  an   inclusive definition  of  "law" which does not, prima  facie,  exclude "constitutional  law’,  and proceeded to  enunciate  certain propositions,  of which the following are, for the  purposes of the present case,, relevant               "(2) Amendment is ’law’ within the meaning  of               Art, 13 of the Constitution and, therefore, if               it takes away or abridges the rights conferred               by Part III thereof. it is void.               (3)   The Constitution (First Amendment)  Act,               1951,  Constitution  (Fourth  Amendment)  Act,               1955,   and  the   Constitution   (Seventeenth               Amendment) Act, 1964, abridge the scope of the               fundamental  rights.   But, on  the  basis  of               earlier  decisions  of this Court,  they  were               valid.               (4)   On  the application of the  doctrine  of               ’prospective over-ruling’ , . . . our decision               will  have  only  prospective  operation  and,               therefore,  the said amendments will  continue               to be valid.               (5)   .  . . that the Parliament will have  no               power from the  date of this decision to amend               any of the pro-               (1) [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762.               175               visions of Part III of the Constitution so  as               to take away or abridge the fundamental rights               enshrined therein." Applying   those  propositions  he  held  that   since   the Constitution  (Seventeenth  Amendment)  Act  could  not   be declared  void,  validity  of the Punjab  Security  of  Land Tenures Act X of 1953, and the, Mysore Land Reforms Act X of 1962, as amended by Act XIV of 1965, challenged in that case could  not  be  questioned on the  ground  that  those  Acts offended Arts. 13, 14 or 31 of the Constitution. Hidayatullah,  J.,  also held that the expression  "law"  in Art.  13(2)  did include within itself  constitutional  law. But  he  held that though the  Seventeenth  Amendment  which extended the definition of ’estate’ to include ryotwari  and agricultural  lands  was  an  inroad  upon  the  fundamental rights,  the Acts were protected from challenge  under  Art. 31A (1) (a) of the Constitution. It  is  clear  from this analysis  that  the  Court  (except Hidayatullah,  J.,)  opined, though for  different  reasons, that  the Acts incorporate in Seventeenth Amendment  to  the Constitution were not liable to be challenged as  infringing the  fundamental rights.  Hidayatullah, J., was of the  view

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that  the challenge to the two Act-, which were impugned  in that  case  was unsuccessful, because of the  provisions  of Arts. 31(1), (2), (2A), 31A(1) of the Constitution, Mr. Setalvad contended that this interpretation of the judg- ment  of  the  Court in I. C. Golak  Nath’s  case(1)  is  in consistent  with  the  basic concept  of  the  "doctrine  of prospective over-ruling" as enunciated in the Courts of  its origin,  and  it must - on that account be  held  that,  the Court intended to give effect to the traditional concept  of the doctrine in all its implications.  But Subba Rao,  C.J., used the expression "doctrine of prospective overruling"  as a  convenient mode of describing the power which  the  Court exercised  in  I.  C.  Golak Nath’s  case(1).   He  has  not expressly  or  by implication sought to incorporate  in  the stream  of our jurisprudence, "the doctrine  of  prospective overruling"  in all its manifold implications as  understood by the American Courts.  Again, the ten Judges who agreed in upholding  the Seventeenth Amendment were equally divided  : five relied upon the "doctrine of prospective overruling"  : five  upon the power of the Parliament to exclude  from  the pale  of  challenge the Acts and Regulations  in  the  Ninth Schedule,  notwithstanding  that they infringe  any  of  the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. Mr.  Setalvad contended that to uphold the validity  of  the Acts  in the Ninth Schedule, and action taken thereon  after February 27, (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762. 176 1967,  involves  a basic inconsistency.   Counsel  submitted that  an  Act cannot be both valid and invalid at  the  same time.   He submitted that with a view to avoid chaos in  the body  politic  the wheel of time was not reversed  till  the date  of the Constitution First Amendment, but the  majority of  the  Court  still  denied to  the  Parliament  power  to incorporate  in  the  Ninth Schedule  Acts  and  Regulations removed from the pale of judicial scrutiny on the plea  that the fundamental rights of the people were infringed thereby. If  that  be  the  true effect of  the  judgment,  said  Mr. Setalwad,  it must logically follow from the judgment in  I. C.  Golak Nath’s case(1) that the Seventeenth Amendment  has no validity after February 27, 1967.  We are unable to agree with  that  interpretation for more reasons than  one.   The first and the most obvious is that the majority of the Court expressly  held  that  by  virtue of  Art.  31(B)  the  Acts incorporated  in  the  Ninth Schedule were  not  exposed  to challenge on the ground that they infringed the  fundamental rights  of the people.  The second is that even  the  Judges for whom Subba Rao, C.J. spoke did not accept the  "doctrine of  prospective  overruling"  in all  its  implications-  as understood  by the American Courts.  They merely  denied  to the  Parliament power after February 27, 1967 to  amend  the Constitution  so  as  to take away any  of  the  fundamental rights of the people, but amendments made prior to that date and action taken pursuant to the amendments, both before and after  February 27, 1967, were not to be deemed invalid,  on the ground that they infringed the guarantee of  fundamental rights.  That being the true effect of the judgment in I. C. Golak Nath’s case(1), the petitioner cannot be permitted  to challenge  the  validity  of  the  action  taken  under  the provisions of the Maharashtra Act of 1961 on the ground that the action had been taken after February 27, 1967. In  a later judgment of this Court in State  of  Maharashtra etc.  v.  Madhavrao Damodar Patilchand &  Ors.  etc.(1)  the validity of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961 as amended by Act 13 of 1962 was challenged and this Court upheld the validity

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of the Maharashtra Act 27 of 1961 as originally enacted -and also the amendment made by Act 13 of 1962. The petition fails and is dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs. V.P.S. Petition dismissed. (1)  [1967] 2 S.C.R. 762. (2) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 712 177