http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: NARAYAN RAO

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/07/1957

BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. IMAM, SYED JAFFER KAPUR, J.L.

CITATION:  1957 AIR  737            1957 SCR  283

ACT: Sessions  Trial-Proceeding  on  Police  Report-Omission   of Police  Officer to furnish necessary copies to the  accused- Duty  of  inquiring Magistrate-Validity  of  Proceeding  and trial-Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898), as amended by  the amending Act of 1955 (26 of 955), ss.  173(4),  207A (3), 537.

HEADNOTE: The word ’shall’ occurring in sub-s. (4) Of s. 173 and  sub- s.  (3) Of S. 207A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is  not mandatory  but  directory  and  a  non-compliance  with  the provisions  of those subsections, unless it can be shown  to have  prejudiced the accused person in his  defence,  cannot invalidate  the  commitment proceedings  or  the  subsequent trial. Magistrates  holding inquiries under s. 207A(3) Of the  Code of Criminal Procedure must, however, be circumspect and  see that an accused person is not handicapped in his defence  by any  omission on the part of the Police Officer  to  furnish him with necessary copies. Where such non-compliance is found to cause any prejudice to the  accused,  the Court should in the interest  of  justice reopen the proceedings and insist on a full compliance  with the  provisions.  When it causes no prejudice, it is a  mere irregularity curable under S. 537 Of the Code. Abdul  Rahman v. The King-Emperor, (1929) L.R. 55  I.A.  96, Pulukuri Kolayya v. King-Emperor, (1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 65 and Gurbachan  Singh v. The State of Punjab, Cr.  A. NO.  48  of 1957 applied. 284 Consequently,  in  a case where an accused person  was  com- mitted  to the Court of Session on a charge under s. 302  of the  Indian  Penal Code and found guilty thereunder  by  the Sessions  judge  and awarded the capital  sentence  and  the order of conviction and sentence was unassailable on merits, but the Police Officer had omitted to furnish him copies  as required by s. 173(4) and the inquiring Magistrate to  cause such  copies to be furnished to him under S. 207A(3) of  the Code  of Criminal Procedure and such omission could  not  be shown  to have in any way prejudiced the accused  person  in

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

his defence, it was a mere irregularity that did not vitiate either the commitment proceedings or the trial and was cured by S. 537 Of the Code.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 97  of 1957. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated November  20,1956,  of  the Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  at Hyderabad  in Criminal Confirmation Case No. 18 of 1956  and Criminal Appeal No. 240 of 1956 arising out of the  judgment and order dated April 25, 1956, of the Court of the Sessions Judge at Karimnagar in Criminal Case No. 9/8 of 1956. R.   C. Prasad, for the appellant. R.   H. Dhebar and T. M. Sen, for the respondent. 1957.  July 15.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA J.-The main question for determination in this  appeal by  special  leave  is  whether and, if  so,  how  far  non- compliance with the provisions of ss. 173(4) and 207A(3)  of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has affected the legality of the proceedings and the trial resulting in the conviction of the  appellant.   The  appellant was tried  by  the  learned Sessions Judge of Karimnagar in what used to be the State of Hyderabad  (now part of the State of Andhra Pradesh),  under s.  302  of  the Indian Penal Code, for the  murder  of  his brother  Baga Rao, and sentenced to death.   The  conviction and  the  sentence  were  affirmed  by  the  High  Court  of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, on appeal and on a  reference by the learned Sessions Judge.  Along with  the appellant,   three  other  persons,  named   Lingarao,   the appellant’s brother, Narsingrao, the nephew of the appellant and son of Lingarao 285 aforesaid, and Mahboob Ali, said to be a close friend of the other  accused, were also tried under s. 302, read with  ss. 34  and  109  of the Indian Penal Code,  and  convicted  and sentenced to imprisonment for life.  Their appeals also were heard  along with the appeal preferred by the appellant  and by  a  common  judgment, the High Court  dismissed  all  the appeals  and confirmed the convictions and sentences  passed against all the four accused persons.  This appeal  concerns only  Narayan  Rao who has been sentenced to  death  by  the courts below. The  facts of the case are short and simple.   The  murdered man  Baga Rao, who was an excise contractor,  had  separated from  his other brothers aforesaid, and had partitioned  the family  lands.  There were differences amongst the  brothers which  had  led  to arbitration  proceedings  a  few  months earlier,  which did not satisfy Baga Rao.  On  the  Saturday previous to the Monday, December 26, 1955, which was the day of  the occurrence, there was a quarrel between Baga Rao  on one  side  and Lingarao and Narsingrao on the other  in  the field  said  to belong to Baga Rao.  The parties  reside  in village Kollamaddi taluk Sircilla, district Karimnagar.   At about 7 a.m. "on the morning of December 26, 1955, Baga  Rao had  been proceeding from his village towards  Nirmal  side. The accused, who appears to have been lying in wait for Baga Rao,  came running from behind and the appellant  fell  upon Baga  Rao with his knife.  The other accused persons  caught hold  of  Baga  Rao  and  the  appellant  inflicted  several injuries on his person with his knife (M.O. 13).  At  first, Baga  Rao got himself released from the grip  of  Narsingrao but the latter chased him and overtook him.  All the accused

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

overpowered  him by catching hold of the different parts  of his  body, and the appellant stabbed him in the  regions  of the  neck, abdomen, thigh and other parts of his  body,  the fatal  injuries being in the neck and the abdomen.   At  the time  of  the occurrence, P.W. 1, father’s  brother  of  the appellant, who also was proceeding towards Nirmal, saw  most of  the occurrence and then, out of fear, hid himself  in  a hut nearby.  P.W. 2-a boy of about 12 286 years-a student of 4th standard in a Government school,  was also proceeding in that direction that morning, and saw  the whole occurrence from beginning to end from a short distance of  a few yards.  This young boy claimed the  murdered  Baga Rao  as his maternal uncle, stating that his mother  is  the sister of Baga Rao.  But the wife of the murdered man,  P.W. 6, stated in cross-examination that P.W. 2-Ramchander Rao-is distantly related to her husband and that he is not the  son of  her husband’s sister.  The father of the  murdered  man, Chatriah,  aged  about 85 years, who has  been  examined  as defence witness No. 1, disclaimed all relationship with  the said P.W. 2, but stated that he is related to Dharmiah, P.W. 1,  who  is no other than his full brother.   Chatriah,  the father, had been examined to support the defence  suggestion that  it was P.W. 1, Dharmiah Rao and his son who  got  Baga Rao  murdered  and falsely implicated the  accused  persons. That evidence has naturally not been accepted by the  courts below because such a case was never sought to be made out at any previous stage of the proceedings until his  examination in court.  D.W. 2 who claims to be the son-in-law of P.W. 1, was  examined  only to prove that there had been  a  rivalry between  P.W. I and the accused persons for the purchase  of some  land.   His evidence was rejected as vague and  of  no relevance. The  case  against  the appellant,  as  also  against  other accused persons not before this Court, rested mainly on  the evidence of Dharmiah P.W. I and Ramchander Rao, P.W. 2,  who figure as the eye-witnesses.  Besides their testimony, there is  the  evidence  of  the  recovery  of  the  blood-stained garments  from  the houses of the accused  persons  and  the blood-stained knife found near the dead body, and identified in court as belonging to the appellant, which were all found by  the  chemical examiner, to have stains of  human  blood. The  courts below have relied upon the evidence of the  eye- witnesses,  corroborated by the incriminating  circumstances aforesaid, and have agreed in convicting and sentencing  the accused as stated above. 287 We  have  been taken through the evidence in this  case  and after having heard counsel for the appellant, we do not  see any  reasons  to  differ  from the  courts  below  in  their estimate  of  the  evidence adduced by  the  prosecution  in support  of the case against the appellant.  Hence,  in  our opinion,  there  is  no ground  for  interference  with  the conclusions of the courts below on the merits of the case. It  now  remains to consider the question of law  which  has been seriously pressed upon us.  It has been argued, as  was admitted by the learned Government Advocate before the  High Court, that the provisions of ss. 173(4) and 207A(3) of  the Code of Criminal Procedure, have not been complied with, and that,  as  a necessary consequence of those  omissions,  the entire  proceedings  and  the trial  are  vitiated.   It  is convenient  at  this stage to set out the  course,  in  some respects  rather  unusual,  of the  proceedings  before  the police  and the committing magistrate as also at  the  trial before  the learned Sessions Judge.  When P. W. 1  aforesaid

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

informed  Gopal  Rao  (P.   W.  8)-Police  Patel-about   the occurrence, he drew up the first information report at about 11 a.m., on December 26.  All the four accused were named as the  culprits  in the first information report.   He  issued that  report  to the station house,  Gambhiraopet,  about  5 miles  from the place of occurrence.  The  Sub-Inspector  of police,  P.W.  11, proceeded to the spot  and  prepared  the inquest  report.  He found the throat of the  deceased  cut, besides  other injuries on the left side of the stomach  and right thigh and three wounds on the left hand.  Two panchas, Lachmayya  and Ramayya (P.W. 10), were called by the  police officer and in their presence and under their signatures, he entered a long note as to what the panchas saw on the  spot, and then follows the substance of the statements of the eye- witnesses,  P.Ws.  1 and 2, aforesaid.  This record  of  the statements  of  the two eye-witnesses, aforesaid,  made  the same  day when the occurrence took place, has been  made  to serve the double purpose of what the police officer and  the panchas  aforesaid  saw and heard at the spot, as  also  the record of the substance of the 288 two   main   witnesses  for  the  prosecution   before   the investigating police officer.  The post mortem report,  made the  next day, December 27, corroborated the nature  of  the injuries  stated  above, and added that  the  incised  wound across the lower part of the neck, had cut the vital  organs like   trachea,  oesophagus  and  the  jugular  vein.    The prosecution  also  proved,  as exhibit  P-5,  the  panchnama prepared the same day and signed not only by the panchas but purporting to have been signed also by the accused  persons. This document is a record which is a complete confession  of the  crime from the beginning to the end by all the  accused persons.  This was highly irregular, but fortunately, it was not  a jury trial and has not, therefore, done much harm  to the  accused  persons, but certainly the provisions  of  the Evidence Act and of the-Code of Criminal Procedure have  not been  observed.   On January 10 and 11,  1956,  the  learned Munsiff-Magistrate  recorded the full length  statements  of Ramchander Rao as P.W. 1, and of Dharmiah Rao, P.W. 2, under s.  164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Apparently,  the police, apprehending that those two persons were related  to three out of the four accused, took the precaution of having their statement so recorded.  The police report under s. 173 of  Criminal  Procedure Code was made by  the  investigating police  officer on January 11, 1956, and was  placed  before the  Munsiff-Magistrate  on  January 12.  It  gives  a  very complete statement of the prosecution case and the names and full description ’of the witnesses to be examined in support of  the  prosecution case.  The  learned  Munsiff-Magistrate appears to have examined the investigating police officer as P.W.  1, and the two eye-witnesses, Dharmiah and  Ramchander Rao, as P.Ws. 2 and 3, and the medical officer as P.W. 4, on or about February 15, 1956.  The record of the statement  of the  medical  officer  appears in the paper  book,  but  the evidence of the other three witnesses does not appear in the paper  book.   On  February 16,1956,  the  learned  Munsiff- Magistrate  put very detailed questions to each one  of  the accused persons and placed the evidence of all the witnesses examined by him in detail, to the 289 accused  persons  who have denied their  complicity  in  the crime  and  who  alleged enmity with  the  two  eyewitnesses aforesaid.   The committal order, if any, is not before  us. The  learned Munsiff-Magistrate framed a charge  for  murder under s. 302, against the appellant, and’ for  participation

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

in the crime, against the other three accused, under s. 302, read with ss. 34 and 109 of Indian Penal Code.  He again put a number of questions to each one of the accused persons  as to what they had to say against the charges framed and as to what they had to say in their defence. It  does  not  appear  that  before  the  learned   Munsiff- Magistrate  who was holding his inquiries under  s.  207A(3) and  (4), any grievance was made that the provisions  of  s. 173(4) had not been complied with by the police officer  in- charge  of the investigation.  Nor does it appear  that  any request was made, to call upon the police officer concerned, to furnish to the accused, copies referred to in sub-s.  (4) of s. 173 of the Code.  There is no indication in the record that  even  when the accused persons were  placed  on  their trial before the learned Sessions Judge, any such  grievance or  any  such request was made to that  court.   The  cross- examination of the eye-witnesses aforesaid has been done  at some  length,  and there are also references to  the  record made by the police officer during the investigation.  It was only  after  the  conviction and sentences  of  the  accused persons by the learned Sessions Judge, when the appeals were preferred to the High Court, that the ground is raised,  for the first time, in the memoranda of appeal in these terms: "The  lower  court  has  lost sight of  the  fact  that  the mandatory provisions of ss. 173, 207A and other sections  of the Code of Criminal Procedure have not been complied  with, and this fact has caused a complete failure of justice." The  High Court, while dealing with this ground  of  appeal, has  observed  that the learned Government  Advocate,  while conceding  that the committing court had not  complied  with the  provisions  of  those  sections,  had  urged  that  the omission was not sufficient to 37 290 vitiate  the trial unless the accused succeeded  in  showing that  they  had  been prejudiced  in  their  defence.   They further observed that when the accused got the copies in the Sessions Court before the recording of the statement of  the witnesses, it could not be said that the accused had been so prejudiced.   The  High  Court finds, as a  fact,  that  the accused  got the necessary copies of the depositions of  the witnesses in the Sessions Court before the statements of the prosecution witnesses were recorded by that court.  The High Court  also remarked that it was not denied that the  copies were  supplied a day earlier, but that there was nothing  to show  that the accused made any grievance that the  time  at their disposal was too short to enable them to cross-examine the  prosecution  witnesses,  or that  they  prayed  for  an adjournment  of  the  case  in  order  to  enable  them   to effectively cross-examine those witnesses.  In view of these considerations,  the  High Court held that the  accused  had failed to show any prejudice. Before  us,  no  attempt  was made to  show  that  the  non- compliance with the provisions of ss. 173(4) and 207A(3) had caused  any prejudice to the accused.  The  learned  counsel for the appellant sought to argue that the omission had  the effect  of  vitiating the entire proceedings ending  in  the trial  of  the accused, and that, therefore, ipso  facto,  a fresh trial became necessary irrespective of whether or  not the  accused  had shown any prejudice.  In other  words,  he contended  that these illegalities rendered the  proceedings null  and void and that the Court need not stop to  consider the question of prejudice.  Section 173, sub-s. (4), of  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure was amended  by  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure Amendment Act, 26 of 1955, by adding  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

following: "(4)  After  forwarding  a report under  this  section,  the officer  in charge of the police station shall,  before  the commencement of the inquiry or trial, furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused, free of cost, a copy of the report forwarded under sub-section (1) and of the first information report recorded under section 154 and of all other documents or relevant extracts 291 thereof,   on  which  the  prosecution  proposes  to   rely, including  the statements and confessions, if any,  recorded under  section  164 and the statements recorded  under  sub- section  (3)  of  section 161 of all the  persons  whom  the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (5)Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (4),  if the  police  officer  is of opinion that  any  part  of  any statement  recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161  is not  relevant to the subject-matter of the inquiry or  trial or  that its disclosure to the accused is not  essential  in the  interests of justice and is inexpedient in  the  public interests,  he shall exclude such part from the copy of  the statement furnished to the accused and, in such a, case,  he shall  make a report to the Magistrate starting his  reasons for excluding such part : Provided  that at the commencement of the inquiry or  trial, the  Magistrate shall, after perusing the part  so  excluded and considering the report of the police, officer, pass such orders as he thinks fit and if he so directs, a copy of  the part  so  excluded  or such portion thereof,  as  he  thinks proper, shall be furnished to the accused." In  order to simplify commitment proceedings  preceding  the trial of accused persons by a court of Session,s. 207A   was added by way of amendment of the Code at     the same  time. In the added s. 207A, sub-ss. 3 and 4,  which  are  material portions of that section, are in these terms : "  (3)  At the commencement of the inquiry,  the  Magistrate shall,  when the accused appears or is brought  before  him, satisfy  himself that the documents referred to  in  section 173 have been furnished to the accused and if he finds  that the  accused has not been furnished with such  documents  or any of them, he shall cause the same to be so furnished. (4)The Magistrate shall then proceed to take the evidence of such persons, if any, as may be produced by the  prosecution as  witnesses  to  the  actual  commission  of  the  offence alleged;  and  if the Magistrate is of opinion  that  it  is necessary in the interests of justice 292 to  take  the  evidence  of any one or  more  of  the  other witnesses  for  the prosecution, he may take  such  evidence also." It  will thus appear that in cases exclusively triable by  a court  of Session, it is the duty of the  magistrate,  while holding  a preliminary inquiry, to satisfy himself that  the documents  referred  in  s.173 have been  furnished  to  the accused  and if he found that the police  officer  concerned had not carried out his duty in that behalf, the  magistrate should see to it that is done.  After the accused have  been furnished  with the necessary documents, it is now  required to   record  evidence  of  only  such  witnesses   for   the prosecution  as had witnessed the actual commission  of  the offence  charged  against  the accused  and  of  such  other witnesses  as he may consider necessary in the interests  of justice.   From what has been said above, it is  clear  that the  Munsiff-Magistrate did record the evidence as  required by sub-s. (4) of s. 207A.  But it has been found by the High

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

Court, on the admission of the Government Advocate, that the provisions  of  sub-s. 3 of s. 207A had  not  been  complied with.   It  is  not clear as to whether  all  the  documents contemplated  by  s.  173(4), quoted  above,  had  not  been furnished  to  the  accused  or  documents  other  than  the statements  of  witnesses  had not been  so  supplied.   The judgment  of  the High Court would appear  to  indicate  the latter,  but we shall proceed on the assumption  that  there was, an entire omission to carry out the provisions of subs. (4) of s. 173, read with sub-s. 3 of s. 207A.  Does such  an omission  necessarily render the entire proceedings and  the trial  null and void; or is it only an irregularity  curable with reference of the provisions of s. 537 (a) of the Code ? In  other words, are the provisions of S. 173(4), read  with s.  207A(3) mandatory or only directory ? There is no  doubt that  those provisions have been introduced by the  amending Act  of 1955, in order to simplify the procedure in  respect of inquiries leading upto a Sessions trial, and at the  same time  to  safeguard  the interests  of  accused  persons  by enjoining  upon police officers concerned  and  magistrates, before whom such proceedings are brought, to 293 see  that all the documents, necessary to give  the  accused persons all the information for the proper conduct of  their defence,  are furnished.  It has rightly been  contended  on behalf  of  the  appellant  that it  was  the  duty  of  the magistrate to see that the provisions aforesaid of the  Code have been fully complied with.  Magistrates, therefore, have to be circumspect, while conducting such proceedings, to see to  it  that accused persons are not  handicapped  in  their defence  by  any  omission on the part  of  police  officers concerned,  to supply the necessary copies.  But we are  not prepared  to hold that non-compliance with those  provisions has, necessarily, the result of vitiating those  proceedings and  subsequent trial.  The word "shall" occurring  both  in sub-s.  (4)  of  s. 173 and sub-s. (3) of  s.  207A  is  not mandatory  but  only  directory, because an  omission  by  a police  officer, to fully comply with the provisions  of  s. 173,  should  not  be allowed to have  such  a  far-reaching effect  as  to render the proceedings  including  the  trial before the court of Session wholly ineffective.  Instead  of simplifying  the procedure, as was intended by the  amending Act, as indicated above, the result contended for on  behalf of  the appellant, will, necessarily, result  in  re-opening the  proceedings  and trials which may have  been  concluded long  ago.   Such  a result will  be  neither  conducive  to expeditious  justice nor in the interest of accused  persons themselves.   Certainly,  if it is shown,  in  a  particular case, on behalf of the accused persons that the omission  on the  part of police officers concerned or of the  magistrate before whom the committal proceedings had fended, has caused prejudice  to the accused, in the interest of  justice,  the court  may  reopen the proceedings by  insisting  upon  full compliance with the provisions of the Code.  In our opinion, the  omission complained of in the instant case  should  not have  a more farreaching effect than the omission  to  carry out the provisions of s. 162 or s. 360 of the Code.   Courts in  India,  before such matters were taken  to  their  Lord. ships  of the Judicial Committee of the Privy  Council,  had taken  conflicting views on the scope of section 537 of  the Code in curing such omissions as aforesaid.  In the 294 case of Abdul Rahman v. The King-Emperor(1), their Lordships of the Judicial Committee had to consider the effect of non- compliance with the provisions of s. 360 of the Code.  After

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

considering  the  relevant  provisions of  the  Code,  their Lordships  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  mere irregularity  which could be cured by the provisions  of  s. 537.   In the case of Pulukuri Kotayya and others  v.  King- Emperor  (2),  the Judicial Committee had  to  consider  the effect  of breach of the statutory provisions of s.  162  of the Code.  The following observations of their Lordships, at pages 75-76, are a complete answer to the arguments advanced on  behalf of the appellant before us, and  we  respectfully adopt them: " When a trial is conducted in a, manner different from that prescribed  by the Code (as in N. A. Subramania Iyer’s  case (3)),  the  trial  is  bad, and no  question  of  curing  an irregularity   arises;  but  if  the  trial   is   conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity  occurs  in  the course of  such  conduct,  the irregularity can be cured under s. 537, and none the less so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always  be the case, a breach of one or more of the very  comprehensive provisions  of the Code.  The distinction drawn in  many  of the cases in India between an illegality and an irregularity is  one  of  degree rather than of kind.   This  view  finds support  in the decision of their Lordships’ Board in  Abdul Rahman v. The King-Emperor (1), where failure to comply with s.  360  of the Code of Criminal Procedure was  held  to  be cured  by ss. 535 and 537.  The present case falls under  s. 537, and their Lordships hold the trial valid  notwithstand- ing the breach of s. 162." In the instant case, the facts as stated above are extremely simple.  It was a case of a day-light murder by four persons acting  in concert and way-laying the deceased when lie  was out  on  business that morning.  Two persons, more  or  less related to three of the accused (1)(1929) L.R. 55 I.A. 96. (2)(1947) L.R. 74 I.A. 65, 75-76. (3) (1901) L.R. 28 I.A. 257. 295 persons,  gave evidence as eye-witnesses to the  occurrence. Their statements were recorded by the police in some  detail in  the  inquest  report  itself on  the  very  day  of  the occurrence.   There  was not much scope  for  variations  in their  statements  during  police  investigation  and  those before the court.  It was a simple case of either  believing or   disbelieving  those  two  eye-witnesses.   As   already indicated,  all  the  four  accused  persons  including  the appellant  were  named at the earliest  opportunity  in  the first  information  report  which  was  lodged  without  any avoidable  delay  within a few hours after  the  occurrence. Both  the  courts  below have preferred  to  rely  upon  the testimony  of  the two eye-witnesses,  corroborated  by  the circumstantial  evidence  referred  to  above.   They   have rejected  the defence suggestions supported as they  are  by the two defence witnesses, one of whom is a common  ancestor of  three  of  the four accused persons.  It  has  not  been argued,  and  there is no scope for the argument,  that  the accused  persons  have been prejudiced in any way  in  their defence.  They had to meet a straightforward case which they failed to do. After carefully considering the arguments advanced on behalf of  the appellant, we have come to the conclusion  that  the proceedings  and  the trial have not been  vitiated  by  the admitted non-compliance with the provisions aforesaid of the Code,  and that the irregularity is curable by reference  to s.  537 of the Code, as no case of prejudice has  been  made out.   This  Court, in the case of Gurbachan  Singh  v.  The

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

State of Punjab (1), was inclined to take a similar view  of the  provisions aforesaid of the Code, though it  ultimately held  that those provisions did not apply to the  case  then before them.  The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed. (1)  Criminal  Appeal No. 48 of 1957, decided on  April  24, 1957. 296