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PETITIONER: NARAYAN BHONDOO PIMPUTKAR & ANOTHER .

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: LAXMAN PURSHOTTAM PIMPUTKAR & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/10/1973

BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH

CITATION:  1974 AIR  111            1974 SCR  (2) 116  1974 SCC  (1)  11

ACT: Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961 (Gujarat Act 48  of 1961).  s. 4 Abolition of ’Patel watans’- Right of  watandar to execute decree for possession of land, it affected.

HEADNOTE: On  the question whether, the right to execute a decree  for the possession of watan land which has been obtained by  the watandar  came  to an end, because of the abolition  by  the Gujarat  Patel Watans Abolition Act. 1961, of  patel  watans and the extinguishment of all incidents appertaining to them under s. 4 of, the Act, HELD  : (1) There is nothing in the language of s.  4  which renders  such  decrees for possession to be  in  executable. Had the legislature intended that such decrees should become in-executable,  the legislature would have  indicated  .such intention  by incorporating some provision to  that  effect. [121B] (2)  The  words  "any  decree or order of a  Court"  in  the opening  clause  of  the section do not  indicate  that  the decree  or order of court could not be executed with  effect from  the appointed day.  The opening clause of the  section only indicates that irrespective of any usage or custom  and irrespective  of any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad  or decree or order of a court or the existing watan law.  which might  have defined and declared the incidents  appertaining to  patel  watans, the results contemplated by  the  various clauses of the section would follow and nothing contained in such  settlement  etc. would prevent the operation  of  that section. [122E-123A] (3)  If  the fact that patel watans have been abolished  and incidents appertaining to them have, been extinguished does, not  lead to the conclusion that the right of the  erstwhile watandar to the possession of the watan lands also comes  to an   end.   Section  4(iv)  expressly  provides   that   the resumption  of watan land consequent upon the  abolition  of patel watans would be subject to the provisions of  sections 6,  7 and 10, According to s. 6, the watan land. subject  to the conditions mentioned in that section, shall be regranted to  the watandar.  He shall be deemed to be occupant of  the said  land,  and  he  would  be  entitled  to  continue   in

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possession  if  he  complies with  the  provisions  of  that section.   That  is,  so far as the  quondam  watandars  are concerned,  they  are entitled to be in  possession  of  the watan  lands, though not in their capacity as watandars  but by  virtue  of  the operation of s. 6 of the  Act.   If  the respondent would be entitled to be in possession of the land under  s. 6, the right to execute the decree for  possession of land cannot be denied to him. [121C-122] (4)  If the respondent is entitled to execute the decree for possession  of the land obtained against the appellants  the question  whether  the appellants, if allowed to  remain  in possession, could have applied for regrant to them under  s. 10 is not relevant. [122C-E]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.  1573(N)  of 1972. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated the  3rd  February,  1971  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  at Ahmedabad in Second Appeal No.639 of 1968. V.   S.  Desai,  P. C. Bhartari and A. G. Meneses,  for  the appellants. D.   V.  Patel,  P.  H. Parekh  and  Sunanda  Bhandare,  for respondent No. 1. S.   K. Dholakia and M. N. Shroff, for respondent No. 2. D.   N. Mishra, for respondents Nos. 3a to 3d. 117 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHANNA, J.-Whether the decree for the possession of the land in dispute awarded in favour of Laxman Purshottam  Pimputkar respondent  No. 1 (hereinafter described as  the  respondent has  become inexecutable after the coming into force of  the Gujarat Patel Watans Abolition Act, 1961 (Gujarat Act 48  of 1961)  (hereinafter  referred to as the Act)  is  the  short question  which  arises  for determination  in  this  appeal brought by special leave against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The appellants and the respondent belong to one family.  The respondent  represents the seniormost branch of the  family. The  family  was  granted  Patilki  Watan  in  a  number  of villages, including Solsumbha, in district Thana.  The watan land  situated  in Solsumbha is the subject  matter  of  the present  dispute.  Under the Bombay Hereditary Offices  Act, 1874  the  person  who  actually  performs  the  duty  of  a hereditary   office  for  the  time  being  is   called   an officiator.   Purshottam, father of the respondent, was  the officiator  till  1921 when, because of  a  disqualification incurred  by  him,  a  deputy  was  appointed  in  place  of Purshottam.   After  the death of Purshottam  in  1940,  the respondent   became  the  officiator  the  branch   of   the appellants claimed to be ill possession of the watan land in dispute  and some other lands under a partition effected  in 1914.   In  1944  the respondent moved  the  government  for resumption  of  the,  watan land in  dispute  which  was  in possession of the branch of the appellants.  Prayer was also made by the respondent that he might be delivered possession of the land.  The government after some enquiry resumed that land  by  order  dated October 9,  1946  and  directed  that possession  of the same be restored to the respondent.   The appellants    thereafter    moved   the    government    for reconsideration  of  that order.  The government on  May  2, 1947  modified  its previous order by  directing  that  the. appellants  could continue to retain the possession  of  the

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land in dispute subject to payment of rent as might be fixed by  the  government  from  time  to  time.   The  respondent thereupon  instituted suit for a declaration that the  order of  the government dated May 2,1947 and an  ancillary  order dated March 1, 1949 were null, void and inoperative.  Prayer was  also  made  that  the  appellants  should  remove   all obstructions  and  hindrances from the land in  dispute  and should  hand  over  the  possession  of  the  same  to   the respondent.   It  was  further prayed  that  the  appellants should  render  account of the income, of the  land  to  the respondent.  The suit was resisted by the appellants on  the ground  that the impugned orders were administrative  orders and  no  suit could lie for setting them aside.   The  suits were  also  stated to be barred by  limitation.   The  trial court  decreed  the suit in favour of  the  respondent.   On appeal the District Judge set aside the decreed in favour of the  respondent.   The decision of the  District  Judge  was affirmed on second appeal by the High Court.  The respondent then came up in appeal to this Court by special leave.  This Court as per its judgment dated December 13, 1962,  reported in,  (1964)  1  S.C.R.  200,  accepted  the  appeal  of  the respondent and set aside the judgment of the High Court  and the  District  Judge and restored that of  the  trial  court whereby  decree  for possession of the land in  dispute  had been  awarded  in  favour  of  the  respondent  against  the appellants. 118 In the meanwhile in 1960 the State of Bombay was  bifurcated and  the  land in dispute which was earlier part  of  Bombay State became part of the State of Gujarat.  On April 1, 1963 the  Act came into force.  On July 19, 1966  the  respondent filed  an application to execute the, decree for  possession of the land which-had been awarded in his favour.  Objection was then taken by the appellants that the decree awarded  in favour of the respondent had become inexecutable because  of the  coming  into force of the Act.   This  objection  found favour with the executing court which consequently dismissed the  execution application.  Appeal filed by the  respondent against  the order of the executing court was  dismissed  by the District Judge Bulsar.  The respondent thereafter  filed second appeal before the Gujarat High Court.  The High Court came  to the conclusion that the respondent was entitled  to execute  the decree for possession of the land  obtained  by him  against the appellants.  Appeal of the  respondent  was accordingly allowed.  The appellants have thereafter come up in appeal to this Court by special leave. The  question  which  arises for  determination,  as  stated earlier, is whether the decree for possession of the land in dispute  which was awarded in favour of the  respondent  has become inexecutable because of the coming into force of  the Act.   It  would, therefore, been to refer to  the  relevant provisions of the Act.  Section 2 contains the  definitions. According  to  section 2(7),  "hereditary  patelship"  means every  village  office  of a revenue or  police  patel  held hereditarily   under   the  existing  watan  law   for   the performance  of duties connected with the administration  or collection  of the public revenue of a village or  with  the village  police,  or with the settlement  of  boundaries  or other  matters  of  civil administration of  a  village  and includes  such  office even where  the  services  originally appertaining  to  it have ceased to  be  demanded.   Section 2(11)  defines "patel watan" to mean a watan held under  the existing   watan   law  for  the   performance   of   duties appertaining   to  the  hereditary  patelship  whether   any commutation settlement in respect of such patel watan has or

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has  not  been  effected.  "Unauthorised  holder"  has  been defined  in section 2(14) to mean a person in session  of  a watan  land  without any right or under  a  lease,  mortgage sale,  gift or any other kind of transfer thereof, which  is null  and  void  under the  existing  watan  law.   "Watan", according  to section 2(15), means watan property,  if  any, together  with  the  hereditary office and  the  rights  and privileges attached ’to it. Section 2(16) defines "watandar" to mean a person having hereditary interest in a patel watan under  the existing watan law and includes a matadar and  ’a representative watandar.  Section 2(17) defines "watan land" to  mean  the  land  forming part  of  the  watan  property. According  to  section 2(18).  "watan  property"  means  the movable  or  immovable property held, acquired  or  assigned under the existing watan law for providing remuneration  for the  performance  of the duty appertaining to  a  hereditary patelship and includes a right under the existing watan  law to  levy customary fees or perquisites in money or in  kind, whether  at fixed times or otherwise and also includes  cash payments  in  addition to the original watan  property  made voluntarily   by   the   State   Government and   subject periodically,to motion or withdrawal. 119 Section 3 gives, powers to the Collector, to decide  various questions  arising  under  the Act  including  the  question whether  any  land is watan land and whether  a  person  is, watandar or authorised holder or unauthorised holder.  Right is  also  given to a person aggrieved by the  order  of  the Collector  to file appeal to the State Government Section  4 has material bearing and reads as under :               "4.  Notwithstanding  any usage or  custom  or               anything  contained in any settlement,  grant,               agreement, sanad, or any decree or order of  a               court or the existing watan law, with  ,effect               on and from the appointed day,-               (i)   all patel watans shall be and are hereby               abolished;               (ii)  all  incidents (including the  right  to               hold office and  watan  property, the right to levy  customary               fees  or perquisites in money or in kind,  and               the liability to render service)  appertaining               to  the said watans shall be, and  are  hereby               extinguished;               (iii) no office of patel shall be, hereditary;               and               (iv)  subject to the provisions of sections 6,               7 and 10 all watan land shall be and is hereby               resumed and shall be subject to the payment of               land revenue under the provisions of the  Code               and the rules made thereunder as if it were an               unalienated land :               Provided that such resumption shall not affect               the  validity of any alienation of such  watan               land made in accordance with the provisions of               the existing watan law or of the rights of  an               alienee  thereof or any person claiming  under               or through him." Section 5 deals with resumption of watan land which is not a grant  of  soil and is held subject to a  total  or  partial exemption from payment of land revenue thereof.  We are,  in the  present  case  not  concerned  with  such  watan  land. According  to section 6, watan land to which the  provisions of section 5 do not apply shall, in cases not falling  under section 7 or section 10 be regranted to the watandar of  the

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watan to which it appertained on payment by or on behalf  of the watandar to the State Government of the occupancy  price equal to six times the amount of the full assessment of such land  within  the prescribed period and  in  the  prescribed manner  and  the  watandar shall be deemed  to  be  occupant within  the meaning of the Code in respect of such land  and shall  primarily be liable to pay land revenue to the  State Government in accordance with the provisions of the Code and the  rules  made thereunder; and all the provisions  of  the Code  and the said rules relating to unalienated land  shall subject  to  the provisions of this Act, apply to  the  said land.   Section  7  deals  with  the  regrant  of  watan  land  to authorised  holders.   According to the section,  any  watan land  other than land to which the provisions of section 5 apply held by an authorised holder shall be regranted to him on payment by him or on his behalf 120 to  the State Government of the occupany price mentioned  in section   6   and  subject  to  the  like   conditions   and consequences and all the provisions of section 6 shall apply mutatis  mutandis  in relation to the regrant of  the,  land under  this section to the authorised holder as if were  the watandar.  Section 10 provides that where any watan land  is in  possession  of  an  unauthorised  holder,  he  shall  be summarily  evicted therefrom by the Collector in  accordance with the provisions of the Code : Provided that if the State Government is of opinion that in view of the investment made by such bolder in the development of the land or in the non- agricultural use of the land or otherwise, his eviction will cause undue hardship to him, it may direct the Collector  to regrant  the land to such holder on payment of  such  amount and  subject  to  such terms and  conditions  as  the  State Government may determine and the Collector shall regrant the land  accordingly.   It is further provided in  the  section that watan land unless regranted under the section shall  be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the  Bombay Land  Revenue  Code  applicable to  disposal  of  unoccupied unalienated land.  Section 22 contains the saving clause and reads as under               "22.  Nothing contained in this Act shall affect               (i)   any  obligation  or  liability   already               incurred  under an incident of a  patel  watan               before the appointed by, or               (ii)  any  proceeding or remedy in respect  of               such  obligation  or liability, and  any  such               proceeding may be continued or any such remedy               may  be enforced as if this Act had  not  been               passed." Mr.  Dasai on behalf of the appellants has contended  before us that in view     of the provisions contained in section 4 of the Act, the decree for the     possession of the land in dispute  awarded  in  favour of the  respondent  has  become inexecutable. it is submitted that as the decree was awarded in  favour of the respondent in his capacity as  a  watandar and  as  patel watans have been  abolished,  the  respondent cannot  obtain  the possession of the land to which  he  was entitled as a watandar’ This stand has been controverted  by Mr.  Patel on behalf of the respondent and he  submits  that there is nothing in the language of section 4 which  renders the  decree  for  the  possession of  the  land  in  dispute inexecutable.   In  any case, according to  Mr.  Patel,  the right  of  the  respondent to execute  the  decree  and  the liability  of the appellants to hand over possession of  the land  to  the  respondent under the decree  have  been  kept

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intact by section 22 of the Act. The provisions of section 4 of the Act have been  reproduced above and it is manifest therefrom that with effect from the appointed  day,  viz,  April 1, 1963 all  patel  watans  are abolished and all incidents appertaining to the said  watans are  extinguished.  It is further provided that as from  the appointed  day  no office of patel shall be  hereditary  and that  subject to the provisions of section 6, 7 and 1 0  all watan lands are resumed and would be subject to the, payment of  land revenue.  The question with which we are  concerned is whether the 121 right to execute the decree for the possession of watam land which  has  been  obtained by  the  watandar  against  other persons  comes to an end because of the abolition  of  patel watans and the extinguishment of all incidents  appertaining to  the  said watans.  The answer to this question,  in  our opinion, should be in the negative.  There is nothing in the language  of  section  4  which  renders  Such  decrees  for possession to be inexecutable.  Had the legislature intended that the decrees for possession of the watan lands which had been obtained by the watandars against third persons  should become  inexecutable, the legislature would  have  indicated such  an intention by incorporating some provision  to  that effect.   In  the absence of any such provision, it  is  not permissible  to read ’a prohibition in section 4 of the  Act ’On  the execution of a decree for possession of  the  watan land obtained in favour of the watandar. The  fact  that  patel  watans  have  been  abolished   ’and incidents. appertaining to the watans have been extinguished does  not  lead  to the conclusion that  the  right  of  the erstwhile watandar to the possession of the watan lands also comes  to an end.  Indeed, clause (iv) of section 4  of  the Act  expressly  provides that the resumption of  watan  land consequent  upon  the  abolition of  patel  watans  and  the extinguishment of incidents appertaining to the said  watans would be subject to the provisions of sections 6, 7 and  10. According  to  section  6, the watan land,  subject  to  the conditions mentioned in that section,’shall be regranted  to the  watandar  of  the watan and he shall be  deemed  to  be occupant  of the said land.  The watandar would be  entitled to  continue to be in possession of the watan lands,  if  he complies  with  the provisions of that section  despite  the abolition   of  patel  watans  and  the  extinguishment   of incidents  appertaining to the said watans.  The  object  of the  Act  as would appear from its preamble was  to  abolish patel  watans  because its hereditary character  smacked  of some  kind of feudalism.  At the same time, the  legislature made  it  clear  that it was not  intended  to  deprive  the watandar  of the possession of the land if he complied  with the  conditions  laid  down in section 6 of  the  Act.   It, therefore, cannot be said that there was a severance of  all connections between the watandar and the watan land  because of  the abolition of patel watans and the extinguishment  of incidents appertaining to such watans.  A residual right was still there in the erstwhile watandar and that included  the right  to retain possession of watan land if the  conditions mentioned in section 6 were complied with.  Section 7 of the Act  contains  provisions  for regrant  of  watan  lands  to authorised  holders. while section 10 provides for  eviction of unauthorised, holders. Provision is also made for regrant of the land by the State Government to unauthorised  holders if the Government forms the opinion that his eviction  would cause undue hardship to him. It  would follow from a combined reading of sections 4, 6  7

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and 10 of the Act that a watandar on the abolition of patel watans  and extinguishment-of the incidents appertaining  to the  watans  does  not  automatically  lose  his  right   to possession  of  the watan lands.  The same is.  true  of  an authorised holder.  Their right to retain possession of 122 watan  land  as  long as they  comply  with  the  prescribed conditions  is .statutorily recognised.  The position  of  a watandar  and an authorised holder is in marked contrast  to that of an unauthorised holder who can be summarily  evicted from  the watan lands by the Collector under section  10  of the  Act.  So far as quondam watandars are  concerned,  they are  entitled to be in possession of the watan lands not  in their  capacity as watandars but by virtue of the  operation of  section 6 of the Act.  Likewise, the authorised  holders are  entitled to be in possession by virtue of section 7  of the Act.  If the respondent is entitled to be in  possession of the land in dispute under section 6 of the Act, the right to execute the decree for possession of the land can plainly be  not  denied to him on account of the provisions  of  the Act. According to   Mr.   Desai,  if  the  appellants   are   not dispossessed from the land    in dispute in execution of the decree obtained by the respondent  against     them,     the appellants can ’approach the State Government for regrant of the  land  in dispute to them because their  eviction  would cause  undue hardship to them.  It is, in our  opinion,  not necessary  for the purpose, of the present case to  go  into the question whether the appellants can claim regrant of the land under section 10 of the Act because this question  does not materially affect the right of the respondent to execute the decree for possession of the land in dispute obtained by him  against the appellants.  If the respondent is  entitled to  execute the decree for possession of the  land  obtained against  the appellants, in that event the question  whether the  appellants, if allowed to remain in  possession,  could have  applied for regrant of the land to them, is hardly  of any relevance. Reference  has  been  made by Mr. Desai to  the  words  "any decree or order of a court" in the opening clause of section 4  of the Act.  It is urged that those words  indicate  that the decree or order of a court can also be not executed with effect  from  the appointed day.  This ,contention,  in  our opinion,  is not well-founded.  What is contemplated by  the opening  clause  of  section  4 of the,  Act  is  that  not- withstanding  any usage or custom or anything  contained  in any  settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or any  decree  or order  of a court or the existing law with effect  from  the appointed day, the results mentioned in the various  clauses of  that  section would follow.  The words  "any  decree  or order  of  a  court" are preceded  by  the  words  "anything conta ined in any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad".   It is a well established rule in construction of statutes  that general  terms following particular ones apply only to  such perso ns  or  things  as  are  ejusdem  generis  with  those comprehended ’in the language of the Legislature,.  In other words, the general expression is to be read as comprehending only,things  of  the  same kind as that  designated  by  the preceding particular expressions, unless there is  something to  show  that a under -sense was intended.(see p.  297  of Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes Twelfth  Edition). In  our opinion, the opening clause of section  4  indicates that irrespective of any usage or custom and irrespective of any settlement, grant, agreement, sanad, or decree or ,order of  a  court or the, existing watan  law,  which-might  have

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defined  ,and declared the incidents appertaining  to  patel watans. the results contemplated by the various clauses  of section 4 would follow and 123 nothing  contained  in  the  settlement,  grant,  agreement, sanad, or decree or order of the court or the existing watan law would prevent the operation of that section. In view of what has been held above, it is, in our  opinion, not  necessary to deal with the alternative argument of  Mr. Patel   that  the  execution  proceedings  taken   by   the. respondent  to  recover  possession of the  land  were  also protected by section 22 of the Act. Reference  has  been  made  by Mr. Desai  to  a  Full  Bench decision of Nagpur High Court in the case of Chhote Khan  v. Mohammad  Obedulla Khan(1).  It was held by the majority  in that  case  that  after the coming into force  of  the  M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals,  Alienated Lands)   Act,  1950  the  preemption  decrees  obtained   by landlords  are  no  longer executable  because  the  persons seeking   to  enforce  them  have  lost  their   proprietary interest.  The aforesaid case cannot be of any help to  the, appellants  because it has been conceded by Mr.  Desai  that there  were  no  provisions in the  above  mentioned  Madhya Pradesh Act corresponding to sections 6, 7 and 10 of the Act with  which we are concerned.  It is also  consequently  not necessary  to express any opinion about the  correctness  of the  view taken by the majority in the above mentioned  Full Bench decision. There  is, in our opinion, no merit in this appeal which  is accordingly dismissed with costs. V.P.S.                        Appeal dismissed. (1) A.I.R. 1953,Nag. 361. 124