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PETITIONER: NARAIN KHAMMAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: PARDUMAN KUMAR JAIN

DATE OF JUDGMENT19/10/1984

BENCH: MADON, D.P. BENCH: MADON, D.P. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1985 AIR    4            1985 SCR  (1)1025  1985 SCC  (1)   1        1984 SCALE  (2)650  CITATOR INFO :  R          1987 SC 222  (23)

ACT:      Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 Section 14A(1) Scope of.      Landlord-Government servant-Required  by general  order to vacate  Government  accommodation  on  ground  of  owning residential accommodation  recover possession of residential premises under  Section 14A(1)  landlord to be in occupation of  allotted   accommodation  on  date  of  filing  eviction petition-If landlord owns other premises which are available for residential accommodation petition under section 14A (1) not maintainable.

HEADNOTE:      The Appellant  was a  tenant  of  the  Respondent.  The Respondent  was   in  Central  Government  service  and  was allotted Government  residential accommodation. By a general order, the  Government directed that all Government servants who had  their own  dwelling houses  at the place of posting should vacate  the Government accommodation allotted to them or in  default to  pay market  rent in  respect thereof. The Respondent therefore  vacated tho  Government  accommodation allotted to  him and resided in another premise belonging to him  which  was  adjoining  the  premises  let  out  to  the Appellant.      The Respondent later filed an application under section 25B of  the Delhi  Rent Control  Act,  1958  on  the  ground specified in  section 14A(1)  thereof for  possession of the premises occupied  by the Appellant which was contested. The Rent Controller  after considering  the accommodation in the respective occupation  of the parties held that it could not be  said  that  the  premises  occupied  by  the  Respondent constituted reasonably  suitable residential  accommodation. He further  held, that  section 14A(1)  of the  Act did  not contain a  condition that the Government servant who made an application under section 14A(1) should not be in possession of reasonably  suitable alternative accommodation as was the case under  clause (e)  of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14,  and that even if such a factor were to be taken into consideration  it could not be said that the Respondent was  in   occupation  of   reasonably  suitable  alternative accommodation. The Rent Controller therefore passed an order

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of eviction  against the Appellant and directed it not to be executed  for  a  period  of  two  months.  This  order  was confirmed by  the High  Court in the revision petition filed by the Appellant under section 25B(8).      In tho  Appeal to this Court tho maintainability of the eviction petition was impugned on behalf of the Appellant on two ground-: (1) the Respon- 1026 dent was  not in  occupation of the government accommodation allotted to  him on  the date when be filed his application, and (2)  on the  date when  he filed  his  application,  the Respondent was  already residing  in premises  belonging  to him.      Allowing the Appeal, ^      HELD: A.  (1) It  is not  necessary that  a  person  in occupation of  residential premises  allotted to  him by the Central Government  or a  local authority who is required by or in  pursuance of  a general or special order made by that Government or  authority to vacate such accommodation or, in default, to  incur certain  obligations, such  as payment of market rent,  on the  ground  that  he  owns  in  the  Union Territory of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his own name  or in  the name  of his  wife or  dependent  child should be in occupation of the accommodation allotted to him on the  date when  he files  an eviction  application  under section 14A(1)  of the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  to recover possession  of the  residential premises which he so owns and which has been let by him. [1038 G-H, 1039 A]      (2) If  such person  has, however, other premises which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent  child   which  are   available  to  him  for  his residential accommodation  or  into  which  he  has  already moved, he  cannot  maintain  an  application  under  section 14A(1) of the Act. [1039 B]      (3) Even  if the  other premises  owned by him their in his own  name or  in the name of his wife or dependent child are reasonably  suitable for  his  accommodation  he  cannot maintain an  application under  section 14A(1) but must file an application  on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to  sub-section (1)  of section 14 of the Act. [1039 C]      B. (1)  Though the  Statement of  Objects  and  Reasons accompanying a  legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of a statute,  it is  permissible to  refer to the Statement of Objects and  Reasons accompanying  a Bill for the purpose of understanding  the   background,  the  antecedent  state  of affairs, the  surrounding circumstances  in relation  to the statute, and  the evil  which the  statute sought to remedy. [1033 H; 1034 A]      (2) The object underlying section 14A introduced by the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act 1976 is that a person who is compelled to vacate residential accommodation allotted to him on the ground that he owns other residential premises in the Union  Territory of  Delhi either  in his own name or in the name  of his  wife or dependent child should not be left without a  roof over his head or should not be made to incur heavy financial  obligation by  continuing to  reside in the accommodation allotted  to him  by  paying  market  rent  in respect thereof  to the  Central  Government  or  the  local authority, as the case may be. [1035 C-D]      In the  instant case,  the Rent Controller was in error in considering  the respective  needs of the parties and the suitability of accommodation

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1027 occupied by  the Respondent.  The order  of the  High  Court dismissing  the   revision  petition  is  reversed  and  the eviction suit  filed by  respondent in the Court of the Rent Controller is dismissed. [1038 F; 1039 D]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeal No. 626 of 1982.      Appeal by  Special leave  from the  Judgment and  Order dated the  24th November,  1981 of  the Delhi  High Court in Civil Revision No. 854 of 1981.      A. Subba Rao for the Appellant.      R.K. Jain and P.K Jain for the Respondent.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MADON, J.  This Appeal by Special Leave granted by this Court is directed against the judgment and order of the High Court  of  Delhi  dismissing  the  revision  petition  under section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (Act No. 59 of 1958) (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as ’the  Act’), filed  by the  Appellant against an order of eviction passed  against him  by the Rent Controller, Delhi, on an  application filed  by the  Respondent on  the  ground specified in  section 14A  (1) of the Act. The Appellant was the tenant  of the Respondent in respect of premises situate at 3474,  Gali‘ Kartar Singh, Subzi Mandi, Delhi, consisting of one room and two tin shedsata rent of Rs. 10.50 per month excluding water,  electricity and  other  charges  Prior  to January 1975,  the Respondent  was an  employee in the Posts and  Telegraphs.   Audit  and  Accounts  Department  of  the Government of  India, and  in January  1975 he  was sent  on deputation  to  the  Union  Public  Service  Commission.  He retired on  May 1, 1978 During the course of his service, in October,  1972,   the  Respondent  was  allotted  Government residential  accommodation   at  Timarpur,   Delhi,  by  the Directorate of  Estates, Government of India. The Respondent occupied the  said accommodation from November 1, 1972. By a general order issued by the Ministry of Works and Housing in the form of an office memorandum, namely, O.M No, 12031 (1)/ 74-Pol.  II   dated  September  9,  1975,  and  subsequently clarified by  another order,  namely, O.M. No. 12031 (1)/74- Pol. II  dated December  12, 1975,  the Government  of India directed that  all Government  servants who  had  their  own dwelling houses at the place of posting within the limits of any local or adjoining muni- 1028 cipality should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them  within three  months from  October 1,  1975, or  in default to  pay market rent in respect thereof. Consequently the  Respondent   was  required  to  vacate  the  Government accommodation allotted  to him  by December  31, 1975, or to pay the  market rent  in respect  thereof with  effect  from January 1,  1976. The  Respondent,  therefore,  vacated  the Government accommodation  in his  occupation on December 27, 1975, and  went to reside in other premises belonging to him adjoining the  premises let to the Appellant. Thereafter, on May 17,  1976, the  Respondent filed  an  application  under section 25B  of the  Act on  the ground specified in section 14A (1)  thereof, being  Suit No.  E-798 of 1976. During the pendency of  the said  eviction application,  by  a  special order dated  December 24,  1975, but signed on September 25, 1976, the  Respondent was  given notice that if he failed to vacate the  said Government  accommodation in his occupation

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by December  31, 1975,  he would be charged market rent with effect from  January 1,  1976, at  the  rate  fixed  by  the Government from  time to  time. After  the summons  had been duly served on him, the Appellant filed an affidavit stating the grounds  on which he sought to contest the said eviction application and  obtained leave  from the  Rent  Controller, Delhi, to contest the said application. A number of defences were taken  by the Appellant, all of which were negatived by the Rent  Controller. The  Rent  Controller  considered  the accommodation in  the respective  occupation of  the parties and held  that the Respondent’s family consisted of himself, his wife,  his, married  sons and  their wives,  eight grand children and  two married  daughters with their children and that it  could not be said that the premises occupied by the Respondent  constituted   reasonably  suitable   residential accommodation. The Rent Controller further held that section 14A (1)  of the  Act did  not contain  a condition  that the Government servant who made an application under section 14A (1) should  not be  in  possession  of  reasonably  suitable alternative accommodation  as was  the case under clause (e) of the  proviso to  sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act and that  even if  such a  factor  were  to  be  taken  into consideration, it could not be said that the Respondent, was in   occupation    of   reasonably    suitable   alternative accommodation. Accordingly,  on August  1,  1981,  the  Rent Controller passed an order of eviction against the Appellant and directed  it not  to be  executed for  a period  of  two months. The  Rent Controller  directed the  parties to  bear their own costs of the said eviction application.      The Appellant  thereupon filed  in the  High  Court  of Delhi a 1029 revision petition  under section 25B (8) of the Act The said revision petition  was dismissed on November 24, 1981. It is against this judgment and order of the Delhi High Court that the present  Appeal by  Special Leave  has been filed by the Appellant.      The first  contention raised on behalf of the Appellant at the  hearing of  this Appeal  was that the Respondent was not entitled  to rely  upon the  said  special  order  dated December 25,  1975, inasmuch  as it  was signed on September 25, 1976,  and the fact that it was signed nine months later than the  date it  bears clearly  showed that the Respondent had manoeuvred  to obtain  this order.  In our  opinion, the said special  order dated  December 24,  1975, is irrelevant inasmuch as the foundation of the Respondent’s said eviction application was  not the  said special  order but  the  said general order  dated September  9, 1975, as clarified by the said order dated December 12, 1975. We may also mention here that the  Government policy  as embodied in the said general order and  its clarification  has been modified from time to time. We are, however, not concerned in this Appeal with any of the subsequent modifications of the said policy.      The next  point which  was urged  before us  and  which requires our  serious consideration is that the Respondent’s said  eviction   application  was   not  maintainable.   The maintainability  of   the  said   eviction  application  was impugned on  two grounds:  (1) the  Respondent  was  not  in occupation of  the Government  accommodation allotted to him on the  date when  he filed  his application, and (2) on the date when  he filed  his  application,  the  Respondent  was already residing in premises belonging to him.      In order  to test the correctness of these contentions, it is  necessary to  refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. As  the long  title of the Act shows that it is "An Act

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to provide  for the  control of  rents and  evictions and of rates of  hotels and  lodging houses,  and for  the lease of vacant premises to Government, in certain areas in the Union Territory of  Delhi. ’  Under section  14 (1)  of the  Act a landlord is  disentitled from  obtaining possession  of  any premises let out by him except on one of the grounds set out in the  proviso to that sub-section. The relevant provisions of the said section 14 (1) are as follows:      " 14. Protection of tenant against eviction.      (1)  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contain- 1030      ed in any other law or contract, no order or decree for      the recovery  of possession  of any  premises shall  be      made by  any court  or  Controller  in  favour  of  the      landlord against a tenant:           Provided  that   the   Controller   may,   on   an      application made  to him in the prescribed manner, make      an order for the recovery of possession of the premises      on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-      x        x      x        x         x           (e) that the premises let for residential purposes      are required  bona fide  by the landlord for occupation      as a  residence for  himself or  for any  member of his      family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or      for any  person for whose benefit the premises are held      and that  the land  lord or  such person  has no  other      reasonably suitable residential accommodation;      x        x      x        x          x           (6) Where  a landlord has acquired any premises by      transfer, no application for the recovery of possession      of such premises shall lie under sub-section (l) on the      ground specified  in clause (e) of the proviso thereto,      unless a period of five years has elapsed from the date      of the acquisition.       x      x       x        x          x           (7) Where  an order for the recovery of possession      of any  premises is  made on  the ground  specified  in      clause (e)  of the  proviso  to  sub-section  (1),  the      landlord shall  not be  entitled to  obtain  possession      thereof before the expiration of a period of six months      from the date of the order.      The right  of a  landlord to  recover possession on the ground specified  in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14 (1) of  tho Act is thus circumscribed by three restrictions: (1) the  landlord  of  the  person  for  whose  benefit  the premises are  held should not have other reasonably suitable residential accommodation;  (2) if the premises of which the landlord desires to recover possession have been acquired by him by transfer, no application for the recovery 1031 of such  premises can be filed unless a period of five years has elapsed  from  the  date  of  the  acquisition  of  such premises; and  (3) if  the landlord obtains an order for the recovery of  possession of  the premises, he is not entitled to obtain  possession of such premises before the expiration of a  period of six months from the date of the order or, in other words, the tenant is statutorily given a period of six months to vacate the premises.      Section 35  of the  Act  provides  for  appointment  of Controllers and  Additional Controllers.  Section 37  of the Act  prescribes   the  procedure   to  be  followed  by  the Controller which  expression, under clause (b) of section 2, includes an Additional Controller. Under section 37 no order which prejudicially  affects any person is to be made by the Controller without  giving him  a reasonable  opportunity of

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showing cause  against the  order proposed  to be  made  and until his  objections, if  any,  and  any  evidence  he  may produce in  support of  the same have been considered by the Controller. The Controller is to follow as far as may be the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording  of evidence,  while holding an inquiry in any proceeding before  him. Under  section 38  an appeal lies to the Rent  Control Tribunal  from every  order  made  by  the Controller under  the Act, and a second appeal from an order made by  the Tribunal  lies to  the High Court if the appeal involves a substantial question of law.      On December 1, 1975, the President of India promulgated the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 (Ord. No. 24 of 1975). The said Ordinance was repealed and replaced by the Delhi  Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No. 18 of 1976).  The   said  Amendment   Act  came  into  force  with retrospective effect  from December  1, 1975, being the date of the  said Ordinance.  By the  said Ordinance and the said Amendment Act  which replaced it, the definition of ’tenant’ in clause  (1) of  section  2  was  substituted  and  a  new section, namely,  section 14A,  and a new Chapter IIIA, were inserted in the Act. Section 14A(1) provides as follows:-           14"A(1) Right  to recover  immediate possession of      premises to accrue to certain persons.           (1) Where  a  landlord  who,  being  a  person  in      occupation of  any residential premises allotted to him      by the  Central Government  or any  local authority  is      required, by,  or  in  pursuance  of,  any  general  or      special order  made by that Government or authority, to      vacate such residential 1032      accommodation,  or   in  default,   to  incur   certain      obligations, on  the ground  that he owns, in the Union      Territory of  Delhi, a residential accommodation either      in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent      child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such      order, to  such  land  lord,  notwithstanding  anything      contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for      the time  being in  force or  in any  contract (whether      express or implied), custom or usage to the contrary, a      right to recover immediately possession of any premises      let out by him:           Provided that  nothing in  this section  shall  be      construed as  conferring a  right on a landlord owning,      in the  Union territory  of Delhi, two or more dwelling      houses, whether  in his  own name or in the name of his      wife or  dependent child,  to recover the possession of      more than one dwelling house and it shall be lawful for      such  landlord   to  indicate   the   dwelling   house,      possession of which he intends to recover."      Chapter IIIA  is entitled  ’Summary  Trial  of  Certain Applications’.  It   consists  of   three  sections,  namely sections 25A,  25B and  25C. Section  25A provides  that the provisions of Chapter IIlA or any rule made thereunder shall have effect  notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained elsewhere  in the  Act or in any other law for the time being in force. Section 25B prescribes, as its marginal heading shows,  a special  procedure  for  the  disposal  of applications  for  eviction  on  the  ground  of  bona  fide requirement’. Under  section  25B  every  application  by  a landlord for  the recovery  of possession of and premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1), or  under  section  14A,  is  to  be  dealt  with  in accordance with  the special  procedure prescribed  by  that section. The special procedure which has been prescribed for

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these cases  is that on an application being filed on either of these  two grounds,  the Controller is to issue a summons in the form specified in the Third Schedule to the Act. This summons is  to call  upon the  tenant to  appear before  the Controller within fifteen days of the service of the summons and to  obtain  leave  of  the  Controller  to  contest  the application for  eviction, and  it intimates  to him that in default of  his doing  so the  applicant would  be  entitled after expiry of the said period of fifteen days to obtain an order for  his eviction.  Leave to appear and to contest the application  is   to  be   obtained  by  the  tenant  on  an application made to the Controller 1033 supported by  an affidavit.  This affidavit  is to  disclose such facts A as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order  for the  recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to section 14(1) or  under section  14A. When  leave is granted, to the tenant to  contest the  application, the  Controller  is  to commence  the   hearing  of  the  application  as  early  as practicable. In  holding such  an inquiry, the Controller is to follow  the practice  and procedure  of a  Court of Small Causes, including  the recording  of evidence.  No appeal or second appeal is to lie against an order for the recovery of possession  of  any  premises  made  by  the  Controller  in accordance with  this special  procedure. The High Court is, however, given the right to call for the records of the case for the  purpose of  satisfying itself that an order made by the Controller under this section is according to law and to pass such order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.      Section 25C provides as follows:-           "25C. Act  to have  effect in  a modified  form in      relation to certain persons:-           (1)  Nothing   contained  in  sub-section  (6)  of      section 14  shall apply  to a  landlord  who,  being  a      person  in   occupation  of  any  residential  premises      allotted to  him by the Central Government or any local      authority is  required by, or in pursuance of, an order      made by  that Government  or authority  to vacate  such      residential accommodation,  or, in  default,  to  incur      certain obligations,  on the  ground  that  he  owns  a      residential accommodation  either in his own name or in      the name  of his  wife or  dependent child in the Union      Territory of Delhi.           (2) In  the case of a landlord who, being a person      of the  category  specified  in  sub-section  (1),  has      obtained, on  the ground specified in clause (e) of the      proviso to  sub-section (1)  of section  14,  or  under      section 14A, an order for the eviction of a tenant from      any premises,  the provisions  of  sub-section  (7)  of      section 14  shall have  affect as if for the words "six      months," occurring therein, the words "two months" were      substituted."      It is  now well  settled that  though the  Statement of Objects and  Reasons accompanying  a legislative Bill cannot be used  to determine  the true  meaning and  effect of  the substantive provisions of 1034 a statute,  it is  permissible to  refer to the Statement of Objects and  Reasons accompanying  a Bill for the purpose of understanding  the   background,  the  antecedent  state  of affairs, the  surrounding circumstances  in relation  to the statute, and the evil which the statute sought to remedy. It will, therefore,  be convenient  to reproduce  at this stage the Statement  of Objects  and reasons accompanying Bill No.

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XII of 1976 which when enacted became the Delhi Rent Control (Amendment) Act,  1976. The  said Statement  of Objects  and Reasons is as follows:-           "There has been a persistent demand for amendments      to the  Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958 with  a view  to      confer   ring   a   right   of   tenancy   on   certain      heirs/successors of a deceased statutory tenant so that      they may  be protected  from eviction  by landlords and      also for  simplifying the  procedure  for  eviction  of      tenants in  case the  landlord  requires  the  premises      bonafide  for   his   personal   occupation.   Further,      Government decided  on the  9th September,  1975 that a      person who  owns his  own house  in his  place of  work      should vacate  the Government accommodation allotted to      him  before   the  31st   December,  1975.   Government      considered that  in the circumstances, the Act required      to be amended urgently.           2. As the Parliament was not in session, the Delhi      Rent   Control    (Amendment)   Ordinance,   1975   was      promulgated on  the 1st  December, 1975. The Bill seeks      to replace the said Ordinance."      The aforesaid  general  order  of  the  Government  was issued  on   September  9,  1975.  The  said  Ordinance  was promulgated on December 1, 1975. This proximity of dates and the provisions  of section  14A(1) make  it clear that a new ground of  eviction was  provided by section 14A(1) in order to  enable  a  person  who  has  to  vacate  the  Government accommodation allotted  to him  by  December  31,  1975,  to recover possession  of premises  let by  him. The  fact that section 14A  was inserted  in view  of the  said  Government order dated  September 9,  1975,  has  also  been  expressly stated in  the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the said  Bill No.  XII of  1976.  This  object  is  further brought out by the provisions 1035 of section  25B which  was inserted  in the  Act by the said Ordinance and  re-enacted by  the  said  Amendment  Act.  As mentioned earlier,  by section  25B a  special procedure has been  prescribed   for  applications   made  on  the  ground specified in  clause (e)  of the proviso to section 14(1) or under section  14A. By  the special  procedure  provided  in section 25B  the delay  normally involved  in following  the procedure under  section 37  of the Act, is sought co be cut down and  the tenant  is made  to apply  and obtain leave to contest the  eviction  application.  Further,  the  tenant’s right of  appeal and  second appeal have been taken away and the only  remedy left  to him  against an  order of eviction passed by  the Controller  under section  25B is to approach the High  Court in  revision. Thus,  the  object  underlying section 14A  is that  a person  who is  compelled to  vacate residential accommodation allotted to him on the ground that he owns other residential premises in the Union Territory of Delhi either  in his  own name  or in  the name  of wife  or dependent child  should not  be left without a roof over his or should not be made to incur heavy financial obligation by continuing to reside in the accommodation allotted to him by paying  market  rent  in  respect  thereof  to  tho  Central Government or the local authority, as the case may be.      Turning now  to the merits of tho present Appeal, it is not disputed  that the premises let to the Appellant and the premises belonging  to the  Respondent which  the Respondent occupied  after  giving  up  the  Government  ’accommodation allotted  to   him  are  separate  premises  and  that  each constitutes a  dwelling house  under the  proviso to section 14A(1). It  is also not disputed that the Central Government

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issued the  said general  order dated September 9, 1975, and subsequently clarified  it by  another order  dated December 12, 1975. It is equally not in dispute that on the date when the respondent  filed his  said eviction  application he was residing in premises belonging to him. It is in the light of these admitted  facts and  the statutory provisions referred to  above   that  we  must  now  consider  the  question  of maintainability of  tho eviction  application filed  by  the Respondent.      The first ground of challenge to the maintainability of the said  eviction application is that a landlord who is not in occupation  of the  residential accommodation allotted to him either by the Central Government or a local authority on the date  when he files an application under section 14A (1) is not  entitled to  maintain it. It was submitted on behalf of the Appellant that though such a 1036 condition was  not expressly  provided in  section  14A,  it should be read into that section as being implicit in it. We find no  merit in  this submission.  Admittedly, the section does not  contain any  such condition. The object of section 14A (1)  is to provide an additional ground of eviction to a landlord who  had been allotted residential accommodation by the Central  Government or  a local  authority  and  who  is required by a general or special order of that Government or authority to  vacate that  accommodation or  in default,  to incur certain  obligations, for  example, payment  of market rent, on  the ground  that he owns in the Union Territory of Delhi a  residential accommodation either in his own name or in the  name of  his wife or dependent child. Being asked to vacate on  the ground  that  he  owns  his  own  residential accommodation, he  must be  in a  position to move into such accommodation  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  section expressly states  that ’ There shall accrue, on and from the date of  such order,  to such  landlord-a right  to  recover immediately possession  of any  premises let out by him". To accept the  contention of the Appellant would be to postpone the accrual of the right given by section 14A to the date of the  filing   of  the   application.  In  order  to  recover possession of  residential accommodation  let out  by him, a landlord to whom residential accommodation had been allotted by the  Central Government  or any local authority cannot be obliged to  continue to  reside  in  such  accommodation  by paying market  rent in  respect thereof. On the passing of a general or  special order of the nature specified in section 14A (1)  the landlord  may vacate the accommodation allotted to him  and find accommodation for himself elsewhere, either by renting  premises or  in a  hostel, hotel, lodging house, boarding house  or  with  a  relative.  He  is  not  thereby debarred from filing an application under section 14A(1).      Does the  same position,  however, prevail  when on the passing of  such  general  or  special  order  the  landlord vacates the  accommodation allotted  to him  and moves  into other premises owned by him either in his own name or in the name of  his wife  or dependent child ? The consideration of this question brings us to the second ground of challenge to the  maintainability   of  the  Respondent’s  said  eviction application. This  is a more formidable challenge and in our opinion, it  must succeed.  It was urged by Mr. R.K. Jain on behalf of  the Respondent that there was no such restriction provided in  section 14A  (1). We  are unable to accept this submission. The object underlying the Act and the subsequent enactment  of   section  14A  would  be  defeated,  if  this contention were  to be  accepted. The  Act, like  other Rent Acts, has been passed to secure tenants

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1037 in  their  accommodation  at  a  reasonable  rent.  This  is apparent from  the long title and the provisions of the Act. Various States  had enacted  Rent Acts  in order  to prevent landlords from profiteering from the situation brought about as a  result of  increase  in  population  and  shortage  of accommodation.  By  these  Rent  Acts,  the  right  which  a landlord has  under the  Transfer of  Property Act, 1882, to recover possession of the property let by him to a tenant on the expiry  of the  lease or on determination of the tenancy has been  taken away and the landlord can recover possession of such  premises only on one of the grounds provided by the particular Rent  Act. To  permit an  allottee of residential accommodation belonging to the Central Government or a local authority who owns a residential accommodation either in his own name  or in  the name  of his wife or dependent child to file an  application to  evict a  tenant from other premises belonging to him which he has let out would be to permit him to move into one of the premises owned by him and to let out the other premises and thus to profiteer from the general or special order mentioned in section l4A(1). That he cannot do so is  clear from  the proviso to section 14A (1). Under the said proviso,  if an  allottee of such accommodation owns in the Union  Territory of  Delhi two  or more dwelling houses, either in  his own  name or  in the  name  of  his  wife  or dependent child,  which he  has let  out, he  cannot recover possession of  more than one of these dwelling houses but he has to  select one  of them  and file  an application  under section 14A  (1) in respect thereof only. If such a landlord cannot file  an application  under section  14A (1)  when he owns two  dwelling houses which have been let out by him, to recover possession  of both these dwelling houses but can do so only in respect of one of them, he equally cannot file an application under  section 14A(1) when he has let out one of such  dwelling  houses  and  the  other  dwelling  house  is available to  him for  his residence  or when he has already moved into the other dwelling house.      Can such  a person,  however, file an application under section 14A (1) on the ground that a dwelling house owned by him either  in his  own name  or in  the name of his wife or dependent child  and available  for  his  residence  is  not reasonably suitable  for his  residential accommodation? The answer to  this question  must  also  be  in  the  negative. Section 14A  does not  contain a condition that a person who has or  had to  vacate the  accommodation allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority by reason of a general or  special order  mentioned in  section 14A (1) has "no other  reasonably suitable residential accommodation" as clause 1038 (e) of the proviso to section 14 (1) does. Under section 14A (1) such  allottee should have no other dwelling house which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child for him to move into. If such dwelling house is not  adequate or  suitable for  his  residence,  he  must proceed under  clause (e)  of the proviso to section 14 (1). That this  is the  only remedy open to him is clear from the provisions of  section 25C.  As we have seen, a landlord who desires to  recover possession  of premises  on  the  ground specified in  the said  clause (e), which premises have been acquired by  him by  transfer, he cannot under clause (6) of section 14 file an application under the said clause (e) for a period  of five  years from the date of the acquisition of those premises  by him.  Further, such  an applicant  if  he succeeds in  getting an order of eviction is not entitled to

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obtain possession of the premises for a period of six months from the  date of  the eviction  order. In  the  case  of  a landlord referred to in section 14A (1) these two conditions have been  relaxed by section 25C. Under section 25C(1) even though the premises which have been let out by such landlord have been acquired by him by transfer, clause (6) of section 14 does  not apply to him and he does not have to wait for a period of five years or for any length of time before filing an application  for  the  recovery  of  possession  of  such premises Further,  the period of six months during which the order of  eviction cannot  be executed under sub-section (7) of section  14 is  reduced by section 25C (2) in the case of such a landlord to two months. These provisions clearly show that if  a landlord  referred to in section 14A(1) has other residential accommodation  of his own either in his own name or in  the  name  of  his  wife  or  dependent  child  which accommodation is  not reasonably  suitable for his residence cannot proceed  under section  14A  (1)  but  must  file  an application on  the ground  specified in  clause (e)  of the proviso  to   section  14  (1).  The  Rent  Controller  was, therefore, in  error in  considering the respective needs of the parties and the suitability of accommodation occupied by the Respondent.      To summarize our conclusions:      (1) It  is not necessary that a person in occupation of residential  premises   allotted  to   him  by  the  Central Government or  a local  authority who  is required  by or in pursuance of a general or special order made by that by that Government or  authority to vacate such accommodation or, in default, to  incur certain  obligations, such  as payment of market rent, on the ground that he owns in the 1039 Union Territory  of Delhi a residential accommodation either in his  own name  or in  the name  of his  wife or dependent child should  be in occupation of the accommodation allotted to him  on the  date when  he files  an eviction application under section  14A (1)  of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, to recover  possession of  the residential premises which he so own and which has been let by him.      (2) If  such person  has, however, other premises which he owns either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent  child   which  are   available  to  him  for  his residential accommodation  or  into  which  he  has  already moved, he  cannot maintain  an application under section 14A (1) of the Act.      (3) Even  if the  other premises owned by him either in his own  name or  in the name of his wife or dependent child are not reasonably suitable for his accommodation, he cannot maintain an  application under section 14A (1) but must file an application  on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act.      In the result, this Appeal must succeed. We accordingly allow this  Appeal and  reverse the  order of the Delhi High Court dismissing  Civil Revision  Petition No.  854 of  1981 filed by  the Appellant and allow the said revision petition and dismiss  the Eviction  Suit No. 798 of 1976 filed by the Respondent in the Court of the Rent Controller, Delhi.      The Respondent  will pay  to the Appellant the costs if this Appeal which we quantify at Rs. 800. N.V.K.                                       Appeal allowed. 1040