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PETITIONER: NANDINI SATPATHY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: DANI (P.L.) AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/04/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. SINGH, JASWANT TULZAPURKAR, V.D.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1025            1978 SCR  (3) 608  1978 SCC  (2) 424  CITATOR INFO :  R          1979 SC 447  (7)  RF         1981 SC 379  (62)  RF         1992 SC 604  (58)  D          1992 SC1795  (7)

ACT: Penal  Code,  (Act V). 1860-S.179-Whether mens rea  forms  a necessary  component of S. 179-Defences open  under  Section 179 I.P.C. r/w Section 161 Criminal Procedure Code. Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973,  S.  161(2)-Parameters  of Section  161(2), what are-Whether the tendency to  expose  a person  to a criminal charge embrance answers which have  an inculpatory  impact in other criminal cases in posse  or  in esse elsewhere,-"Any person supposed to be acquainted" in S. 161  (1)  Whether  includes  an accused  person  or  only  a witness-When  does  an answer  acquire  confessional  status within the meaning of S. 27 of Evidence Act. "Right  to  silence", when  applicable-Constitutional  right under  Art.  20(3) examined, explained  and  made  explicit- Meaning  of  the  word "accused"  occurring  in  Art.  20(3) whether it includes a suspect-accused-Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 20(3). Examination  of a witness by Police under S.  161-Effect  of proviso and marginal note, Crl.  P C., 1973.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant,  a former Chief Minister of Orissa  and  one time  Minister at the National level was directed to  appear at the Vigilance Police Station, Cuttack, in September, 1977 for  being  examined in connection with  a  case  registered against   her  by  the  Deputy  Superintendent  of   Police, Vigilance, Cuttack u/s 5 (2) read with s. 5 (1) (d) and  (e) of  the Prevention of Corruption Act and u/s. 161/165,  120B and 109 I.P.C. On the strength of the first information,  in which  the  appellant,  her son and  others  were  shown  as accused  persons  investigation was commenced.   During  the course of the investigation it was that she was interrogated with  reference to a long string of questions, given to  her in  writing.   The  gravamen of the accusation  was  one  of acquisition  of assets disproportionate to the known,  licit sources  of income and probable resources over the years  of

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the  accused, who occupied a public position  and  exercised public power for a long spell during which the appellant  by receipt   of  illegal  gratification  aggrandised   herself. Exercising  her right of guaranteed under Art. 20(3) of  the Constitution,  the  appellant refused to  answer,  with  the result a complaint was filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,   Vigilance  (Directorate  of  Vigilance)   Cuttack, against  the appellant, under s. 179 I.P.C. before the  Sub- Divisional   Judicial  Magistrate,  Sadar,   Cuttack.    The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued summons of  appearance against the appellant-accused.  Aggrieved  by the  action of the Magistrate and urging that the  complaint did  not  and could not disclose an  offence,  the  accused- appellant  removed  the  High Court under Art.  226  of  the Constitution  as well as under s. 401 of the Cr.   P.  Code, challenging the validity of the Magisterial proceeding.  The broad submission, unsuccessfully made before the High Court, was  that  the  charge  rested  upon  a  failure  to  answer interrogations   by   the  police  but   this   charge   was unsustainable  because  the umbrella of Art.  20(3)  of  the Constitution  and the immunity under Section 161(2)  of  the Cr. P. Code were wide enough, to shield her in her  refusal. The plea of unconstitutionality and illegality, put  forward by  this  preemptive  proceeding was  rebuffed  and  so  the appellant  appealed  to this Court  by  certificate  granted under Art. 132(1) resulting in two appeals. Allowing   the   appeals  and   quashing   the   prosecution proceedings the Court 609 HELD  : 1. When a woman is commanded into a  police  station violating the commandment of Section 160 of the Code when  a heavy  load of questions is handed in some permissible  some not,  where  the area of constitutional  protection  against self-crimination  is (until this decision) blurred  in  some aspects,  when,  in  this Court,  counsel  for  the  accused unreservedly  undertakes to answer in the light of  the  law herein  laid down, when the object of the prosecution is  to compel  contrite  compliance  with  Section  161  Cr.   P.C. abandoning  all  contumacy  and  this  is  achieved  by  the undertaking,  when  the  pragmatic issues  involved  are  so complex that effective barricades against police pressure to secure  self-incrimination need more steps as  indicated  in this judgment that persistence in the prosecution is seeming homage  to  the  rule of law and  quashing  the  prosecution secures the ends of justice and the right thing to do is  to quash  the prosecution as it stands at present.   That  this dimension  of  the  problem  has  escaped  the   Executive’s attention for reasons best left unexplored is regrettable. [650 H, 651 A-C] It is quite probable that the very act of directing a  woman to come to the police station in violation of section 160(1) Cr.  P.C. may make for tension and negate voluntariness.  It is  likely that some of the questions are  self-criminatory. More  importantly, the admitted circumstances are such  that the trying magistrate may have to hold an elaborate  enquiry about other investigations, potential and actual, to  decide about  the self-accusatory character of the  answers.   And, finally,   the  process  of  proving  proneness  for   self- incrimination  will  itself  strike  a  below  on  the  very protection under Art. 20(3). [649 G-H, 650 A] (a)  S. 161 enables the police to examine the accused during investigation; [644 C] (b)  The  prohibitive sweep of Art. 20(3) goes back  to  the stage  of police interrogation not, as contended  commencing in Court only;              [644-C].

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(c)  The  provisions  of  Art.  20(3)  and  section   161(1) substantially   cover  the  same  area  so  far  as   police investigations are concerned; [644-C] (d)  The  ban on self-accusation and the right  to  silence, while  on investigation or trial is under way,  goes  beyond that  case  and  protects the accused  in  regard  to  other offences  pending  or  imminent, which may  deter  him  from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter,, [644 C-D] (e)  Compelled testimony’ must be read as evidence  procured not  merely by physical threats or violence but  by  psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion tiring interrogative   prolixity,  overbearing   and   intimidatory methods  and the like not legal penalty for  violation.   So the legal perils following upon refusal to answer or  answer truthfully  cannot  be  regarded as  compulsion  within  the meaning of Art. 20(3).  The prospect of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a constitutional  right, but then, a stance of silence is running a calculated  risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of pressure,  subtle or  crude,  mental  or physical,  direct  or  indirect,  but sufficiently  substantial,  applied  by  the  policeman  for obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt  it  becomes  compelled testimony  violative  of  Art. 20(3); [644 D-F] (f)  A  police  officer is clearly a  person  in  authority. Insistence on answering is a form of pressure especially  in the  atmosphere  of the police station unless  certain  safe guards  erasing duress are adhered to.  Frequent threats  of prosecution  if there is failure to answer may take  on  the complexion  of undue pressure violating Art.  20(3).   Legal penalty  may  by itself does not amount to  duress  but  the manner  of mentioning it to the victim of interrogation  may introduce  an  element  of  tension  and  tone  of   command perilously hovering near compulsion; [644 F-G] (g)  Self  incrimination or tendency to expose oneself to  a criminal  charge  is  less than  ’relevant’  and  more  than ’confessional’.    Irrelevance   is   impermissible;   while relevance is licit if the relevant questions are loaded with guilty  inference in the event of an answer  being  supplied the tendency to incriminate springs into existence; [644  G- H] 610 (h)  The   accused  Person  cannot  be  forced   to   answer questions.  merely  because  the  answers  thereto  are  not implicative  when viewed in isolation and confined  to  that particular  case.  He is entitled to keep his mouth shut  if the answer sought has a reasonable prospect of exposing  him to  guilt in some other accusation actual or imminent,  even though the investigation under way is not with reference  to that.   In  determining the incriminatory  character  of  an answer  ,the accused is entitled to consider and  the  Court while adjudging will take note of the setting, the  totality of  circumstances, the equation, personal and  social  which have  a bearing on making an answer  substantially  innocent but in effect guilty     in   import.    However,   fanciful claims, unreasonable apprehensions, and vague  possibilities cannot  be the hiding ground for an accused person.   He  is bound     to  answer  where there is no  clear  tendency  to criminate. [644 H, 645 A-B] (i)  Section  179  I.P.C. has a component of  mens  rea  and where there is no wilful refusal but only unwitting omission or innocent warding off, the offence is not  made out. [645- C] (j)  Where  there  is  reasonable  doubt  indicated  by  the accused’s  explanation  he is entitled to  its  benefit  and

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cannot  be forced to substantiate his ground lest,  by  this process,  he is constrained to surrender the very  privilege for  which he is fighting.  What may apparently be  innocent information may really be innocent or noxious viewed in  the wider setting. [645 C-D] (k)  The  right to consult an advocate of this choice  shall not be denied to any person who is arrested.  This does  not mean that persons who are not under arrest or custody can be denied  that right.  The spirit and sense of Art.  22(1)  is that  it is fundamental to the rule of law that the  service of  a  lawyer  shall be available for  consultation  to  any accused   person  tinder  circumstances  of   near-custodial interrogation.   Moreover,  the  observance  of  the   right against self-incrimination is best promoted by conceding  to the accused the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice.  Lawyer’s presence is a constitutional claim in some circumstances  in our country also, and, in the  context  of Art.  20(3), is an assurance of awareness and observance  of the  right to silence.  Art. 20(3) and Art. 22(1) may  in  a way  be  telescoped by making it prudent for the  police  to permit  the advocate of the accused, if there be one, to  be present  at  the time he is  examined.   Over-reaching  Art. 20(3)  and S. 161(2) will be obviated by  this  requirement. It  is  not that the police must secure the  services  of  a lawyer.  That will lead to police-station-lawyer system,  an abuse  which breeds other vices.  But if an  accused  person expresses  the wish to have his lawyer by his side when  his examination  goes  on, this facility shall  not  be  denied, without   being   exposed  to  the  serious   reproof   that involuntary  self-crimination  secured  in  secrecy  and  by coercing the will was the project lawyer cannot harangue the police  but may help his client and complain on  his  behalf although  his  very  presence  will  ordinarily  remove  the implicit menace of a police station.  No doubt the  presence of  a  lawyer is asking for the moon in many cases  until  a public defender system becomes ubiquitous.  The police  need not wait more than for a reasonable while for an  advocate’s arrival.  But they must invariably warn and record that fact about  the right to silence against self-incrimination;  and where  the  accused  is literate take  his  written  acknow- ledgment. [645 G-H, 646 A-E] (1)  ’Third degree’ is an easy temptation where the pressure to detect is heavy, the cerebration involved is hard and the resort to torture may yield high dividends. [646 F] [Keeping in view the symbiotic need to preserve the immunity without   stifling   legitimate   investigation   after   an examination of the accused, where a lawyer of his choice  is not  available,  the police official should take  him  to  a magistrate,  doctor  or other willing and  responsible  non- partisan  official  or  non-official and  allow  a  secluded audience  where he may unburden himself beyond the  view  of the  police and tell whether he has suffered  duress,  which should be followed by judicial or some other custody for him where  the  police cannot teach him.   That  collocutor  may briefly record the relevant conversation and communicate  it not  to  the  police but to  the  nearest  magistrate  Pilot projects  on this pattern may yield experience to guide  the practical  processes of implementing Art. 20(3).  These  are not mandates but strong suggestions.] [64 D-E] 611 (m)  Many of the questions put by the police are not.  self- incriminatory, remote apprehensions being wholly irrelevant. To   answer  is  citizen’s  duty;  failure  is  asking   for conviction.   The  appellant shall undertake to  answer  all questions put to her which do not materially incriminate her

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in  the pending or imminent investigations or  prosecutions. If  she  claims immunity regarding any questions  she  will, without  disclosing details, briefly state in which case  or offence  in the offing makes her reasonably apprehend  self- incrimination  by her refused answers.  If, after the  whole examination  is  over,  the  officer  concerned   reasonably regards  any refusal to answer to be wilful violation  under pretence  of  immunity from self-incrimination, he  will  be free  to prosecute the alleged offender after  studying  the refusal to answer in the light of the principles earlier set out,  Section  179  I.P.C.  should  not  be  unsheathed  too promiscuously  and teasingly to tense lay people into  vague consternation  and  covert compulsion  although  the  proper office  of  Section  179  I.P.C.  is  perfectly  within  the constitutional limits of Art. 20(3). [651 C-F] 2.   The  rule, of law becomes a rope of sand if the  lawful authority of public servants can be defined or disdained  by those  bound  to obey.  The might of the law,  in  the  last resort guarantees the right of the citizen and no one, be he minister  or higher, has the discretion to  disobey  without running a punitive risk.  Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code is  designed  to penalise disobedience  of  public  servants exercising   lawful  authority.   S.  179  is  one  of   the provisions  to  enforce  compliance when  a  public  servant legally  demands  truthful  answers but is  met  with  blank refusal or plain mendacity. [620 F-G] 3.   A  break  down by S. 179 I.P.C.  yields  the  following pieces (a) the demanding authority must be a public servant; a  police officer is obviously one; (b) the demand, must  be to  state the truth- on a subject in the exercise  of  legal powers;  and, indubitably, an investigating  officer  enjoys such powers under the Cr. P. Code, and, in the instant case, requisition  was  precisely  to tell the  truth  on  matters supposedly pertinent to the offence under investigation.  S. 161 of the Cr. P. Code obligates "any person supposed to  be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case"  to answer truthfully "all questions relating to such case other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge". [621 A-B] In  the  present case, admittedly oral  answers  to  written interrogations  were sought, although not honest speech  but ’constitutional’  silence greated the public  servant.   And this  refuge  by  the accused under  Art.  20(3)  drove  the disenchanted  officer  to seek the sanction of  section  179 I.P.C. If the literal force of the text governs the  complex of  facts, the Court must convict, lest the long arm of  the investigatory  law should hang limp when challenged  by  the negative attitude of inscrutability worn by the  interrogate unless  within the text and texture of the  section-built-in defences exist. [621 B-C] 4.   The area covered by Art. 20(3) of the Constitution  and section   161(2)   of  the  Criminal   Procedure   Code   is substantially   the  same.   So  much   so,   terminological expansion apart, sec. 161(2) is a parliamentary gloss on the constitutional clause. [623D] A constitutional provision receives its full semantic  range and so it follows that a wider connotation must be  imparted to  the  expressions  ’accused of any offence’  and  ’to  be witness  against himself’.  Art. 20(3) of  the  Constitution warrants no such truncation as argued by Counsel but, as  in Miranda  v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ruling extends  the embargo to police investigation, also.  A narrow meaning may emasculate  a  necessary  protection.  There  are  only  two primary queries involved in this clause that seals the  lips into  permissible silence (i) Is the person called  upon  to

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testify  ’accused  of  any offence’ and  (ii)  is  he  being compelled to the witness against himself ? [623 E-F] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); referred to. A  wider construction viz. that s. 161(2) of the Code  might cover  not merely accusations already registered  in  police stations but those which are likely to be basis for exposing a person to a criminal charge, if applicable to Art.  20(3), approximates  the  constitutional  clause  to  the  explicit statement of 612 the  Prohibition in s. 161(2).  S. 161(2) meaningfully  uses the  expression  ’expose  himself  to  a  criminal  charge’. Obviously, these words mean, not only cases Where the person is  already exposed to a criminal charge but also  instances which  Will imminently expose him to criminal  charges.   In Art. 20(3) the expression (accused of any offence’ must mean formally  accused  in  praesenti  not  in  futuro-not   even imminently  as decisions now stand.  The expression  "to  be witness against himself" means more than the court  process, Any  giving of evidence, any furnishing of  information,  if likely   to  have  an  incriminating  impact   ensures   the description  of  being witness against himself.   Not  being limited  to  the forensic stage by express words  in  Art. 20(3)  the  expression must be construed to apply  to  every stage  where  furnishing of information  and  collection  of materials   takes   place.   That  is  to  say,   even   the investigation at the police level is embraced by Art. 20(3). This is precisely what s. 161(2) means. [623 G-H, 624 A-B] Sub-section  (2)  of  S.  161 Cr.  P.  C.  relates  to  oral examination  by police officers and grants immunity at  that stage.    Briefly,  the  Constitution  and  them  Code   are coterminous  in the protective area.  While the Code may  be changed, the Constitution is more enduring. [624 B-C] 6.   Under the Indian Evidence Act the Miranda  exclusionary rule  that custodial interrogations are inherently  coercive finds  expression  (s. 26), although  the  Indian  provision confines  it to confession which is a narrower concept  than self-incrimination. [624 D] 7.   Speaking pragmatically, there exists a rivalry  between societal   interest   in  effecting  crime   detection   and constitutional  rights  which accused  individuals  possess. Emphasis may shift, depending on circumstances, in balancing these  interests  as  has been happening  in  America.   Our constitutional  perspective has, therefore, to  be  relative and cannot afford to be absolutist, especially when  torture technology,  crime  escalation and  other  social  variables affect  the  application of principles in  producing  humane justice. [624 E-G] Couch  v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336  (1972)  referred to. 8.   Two  important  considerations must be  placed  at  the forefront before sizing up the importance and impregnability of the anti-self-incrimination guarantee.  They are (i)  not to  write off the fear of police torture leading  to  forced self incrimination as a thing of the past and (ii) never  to forget that crimes, in India and internationally are growing and criminals are out writing the detectives. [625 C, G] The  first obligation of the criminal justice system  is  to secure  justice by seeking and substantiating truth  through proof.   The  means  must be as good as  the  ends  and  the dignity  of  the  individual and the freedom  of  the  human person  cannot  be sacrificed by resort to  improper  means, however worthy the ends.  Therefore.  ’Third degree’ has  to be out-lawed and indeed has been. [626 F-G] The  cherished  principle  behind the  Maxim  ‘nemo  tenetur

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sceipsum tenetur’ meaning "a man cannot represent himself as guilty" which proscribes compulsory self-accusation,  should not be dangerously over broad nor illusorily whittled  down. And it must openly work in practice and not be a  talismanic symbol.   If  Art.  20(3)  is not  to  prove  a  promise  of unreality  the  Court must clothe it with flesh  and  blood. [626 H, 627 B-C] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Brown v. Walker, 40 L. Ed. 819 referred to. A moral from the Miranda reasoning is the burning  relevance of erecting protective fenders and to make their  observance a police obligation so that the angelic Art. 20(3) may  face upto Satanic situations. [630 F-G] 9.   The  framers of our Constitution have cognised  certain pessimistic   poignancies  and  mellow  life  meanings   and obligated  Judges  to  maintain  a  ’fair   state-individual balance’ and to broaden the fundamental right to fulfil  its purpose,  lest frequent martyrdoms reduce the article to  a mock formula.  Even silent approaches, furtive moves, slight deviations and subtle ingenuities 613 may  erode  the article’s validity unless  the  law  outlaws illegitimate  and  unconstitutional procedures  before  they find  their  first firm footing.  The silent  cause  of  the final  fall of the tall tower is the first  stone  obliquely and obliviously removed from the base. [631 E-F] And  Art. 20(3) is a human article, a guarantee  of  dignity and integrity and of inviolability of the person and refusal to convert an adversary system into an inquisitorial  scheme in  the antagonistic ante-chamber of a police station.   And in  the  long  run, that investigation is  best  which  uses stratagems least, that policeman deserves respect who  gives his fists rest and his wits restlessness. 10.  Sec.  161(2) is a sort of parliamentary  commentary  on Art.  20(3) of the Constitution.  The scope of s.  161  does include actual accused and suspects and therefore the police have  power under sections 160 and 161 of the Cr.   P.C.  to question  a  person  who  then was  or  in  the  future  may incarnate as an accused person.  ’Any person’ in s. 161  Cr. P.C. would include persons then or ultimately accused.  [632 E-F] Any  person  supposed to be acquainted with  the  facts  and circumstances  of  the case includes an accused  person  who fills  that  role  because the police suppose  him  to  have committed  the crime and must, therefore, be  familiar  with the  facts.  The supposition may later prove a  fiction  but that does not repel the section.  Nor does the marginal note ’examination  of witnesses by police’ clinch the matter.   A marginal  note  clears’  ambiguity  but  does  not   control meaning.    Moreover,  the  suppositions   accused   figures functionally as a witness.  To be a witness, from functional angle, is to impart knowledge in respect of a relevant fact, and that is precisely the purpose of questioning the accused under   section   161  Cr.   P.C.  The   dichotomy   between ’witnesses’  and  ,accused’ used as terms of art.  does  not hold  good here.  The amendment, by Act XV of 1941, of  Sec. 161(2)  of the Cr.  P. Code is a legislative  acceptance  of the  Pakala  Narayana Swami reasoning and guards  against  a possible   repercussion  of  that  ruling.   The   appellant squarely  fell  within the interrogational  ring.   To  hold otherwise  is  to  fold  up  investigative  exercise,  since questioning suspect is desirable for detection of crime  and even  protection  of the accused.   ’Extreme  positions  may boomerang in law as in politics. [633 F H, 634 A-B] M.   P.  Sharma v. Satish Chandra, Dist,  Magistrate,  Delhi

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[1954]1 S.C.R. 1077, Jakala   Narayanaswami   v.    Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 PC 47, Mahabir Mandal and Ors. v.     State   of Bihar, [1972] 3 SCR 639, 657; followed. 11.  Suspects,  not yet formally charged  but  embryonically are accused on record,   also  may swim into the harbour  of Art. 20(3) and therefore a person formally brought into the police  diary  as  an accused person  is  eligible  for  the prophylactic  benefits  of Art. 20(3) of  the  Constitution. [635 B-G] State  of  Bombay  v.  Kathi Kalu Oghad,  [1962]  3  SCR  10 reiterated. Raja  Narayan Lal Bansilal v. Manek Phiroz Mistry  and  Ors. [1961] 1 S.C.R. 417; Ramesh Chandra Mehta v. State of W.  B. [1969] 2 S.C.R. 461 and Bhagwandas Goenka v. Union of India, Crl.  A. 131-132 of 1961 S.C. dated 20-9-63; referred to. 12.  It  is  plausible  that  where  realism  prevails  over formalism  and probability over possibility.  the  enquiries under  criminal statutes with quasi-criminal  investigations are  of  an  accusatory  nature  and  are  sure  to  end  in prosecution  when  the  offence is grave  and  the  evidence gathered   good.    And  to  deny  the   protection   of   a constitutional  shield designed to defend a suspect  because the  enquiry is preliminary and may possibly not  reach  the Court  is to erode the substance while paying hollow  homage to the holy verbalism of the Article. [637 H, 638A] Ramesh  Chandra Mehta v. State of W.B. [1961] 2  S.C.R.  461 and  Raja  Narayan Lal Bansilal v. Manak Phiroz  Mistry  and Ors.,[1961] I S.C.R. 417, referred to. 13.  The view that the bar in Art. 20(3) operates only  when the evidence previously procured from the accused is  sought to be introduced into the case 614 at  the  trial by the Court will be sapping  the  juice  and retaining  the  rind  of  Art.  20(3)  doing  interpretative violence  to the humanist justice of the proscription.   The text of the clause contains no such clue, its intendment  is stultified  by  such a judicial amendment and  an  expansive construction  has  the  merit  of  natural  meaning,   self- fulfilment  of  the ’silence zone’ and  the  advancement  of human  rights.  The plea for narrowing down the play of  the sub-article  to  the  forensic  phase  of  trial  cannot  be accepted.  It works where the mischief is, in the womb, i.e. the police process. [638 B-D] 14.  Both precedent procurement and subsequent exhibition of self  criminatting  testimony are  obviated  by  intelligent constitutional anticipation.  If the police can  interrogate to the point of self-accusation, the subsequent exclusion of that evidence at the trial hardly helps because the harm has been  already  done.  The police will  prove  through  other evidence what they have procured through forced. confession. So  it  is that the foresight of the framers  has  preempted self-incrimination at the incipient stages by not  expressly restricting it to the trial stage in Court.  True, compelled testimony   previously  obtained  is  excluded.    But   the preventive blow falls also on pre-court testimonial  compul- sion.  The condition is that the person compelled must be an accused. [639 B-D] 15.  Not  all  relevant  answers are  criminatory;  not  all criminatory answers are confessions.  Tendency to expose  to a  criminal  charge is wider than actual  exposure  to  such charge.   The  spirit  of  the  American  rulings  and   the substance of this Court’s observations justify this  ’wheels within   wheels’   conceptualization   of    self-accusatory statements.   The orbit of relevancy is large.   Every  fact which has a nexus with the case does not make it noxious  to

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the  accused.   Relevance may co-exist  with  innocence  and constitutional  censure is attracted only when inference  of nascence  exists.   And an incriminatory  inference  is  not enough for a confession.  Only if, without more, the  answer established guilt, does it amount to a confession. [639 E-G] Answers that would, in themselves, support a conviction  are confessions  but  answers which have a  reasonable  tendency strongly  to  point  out to the guilt  of  the  accused  are incriminatory.   Relevant replies which furnish a  real  and clear link in the chain of evidence indeed to bind down  the accused with the crime become incriminatory and offend  Art. 20(3) if elicited by pressure from the mouth of the accused. An answer acquires confessional status only if, in terms  of substantially,  all the facts which constitute  the  offence are  admitted  by  the  offender.   If  his  statement  also contains   self-exculpatory  matter  it  ceases  to   be   a confession.  Article 20(3) strikes at confessions and  self- incriminations  but leaves untouched other  relevant  facts. [640 A-C] 16.  The  claim  of  a witness of  privilege  against  self- incrimination has to be tested on a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case and where it is clear that the  claim  is unjustified, the protection  is  unavailable. [640C] Merely  because  he  fancied that by such  answer  he  would incriminate  himself  he could not claim  the  privilege  of silence.  It must appear to the court that the  implications of  the question, in the setting in which it is asked,  make it evident that a responsive answer or an explanation of why it  cannot be answered might be dangerous because  injurious disclosure could result.  The apprehension of  incrimination from  the  answer  sought must be substantial  and  real  as distinguished   from  danger  of  remote  possibilities   or fanciful flow of inference.  Two things need emphasis.   The setting  of  the  particular  case,  the  context  and   the environment i.e. the totality of circumstances, must  inform the  perspective  of the Court adjudging  the  incriminatory injury, and where reasonable doubt exists, the benefit  must go  in  favour  of the right to silence by  a  liberal  con- struction of the Article. [640 D-F] But  the  true  test is; could the  witness  (accused)  have reasonably  sensed the peril of prosecution from his  answer in the conspectus of circumstances ?  The perception of  the peculiarities  of  the case cannot be irrelevant  in  proper appraisal of self-incriminatory potentiality. [640G] Hoffman  v. United States 341 U.S. 479 and Malloy v.  Bagan, 12 L.Ed. 2d. 653 quoted with approval. 615 17.  The policy behind the privilege under our scheme,  does not  swing  so  wide  as  to  sweep  out  of   admissibility statements  neither  confessional  per  se  nor  guilty   in tendency  but  merely  relevant facts which  viewed  in  any setting, does not have a sinister import.  To spread the net so  wide  is  to make a mockery of the  examination  of  the suspect,  so  necessitous  in the search  for  truth.  Over- breadth  undermines,  and  such  morbid  exaggeration  of  a wholesome protection must be demurred. [640 H, 641 A-B] On  the  bounds  between  constitutional  proscription   and testimonial  permission  Art. 20(3) could  be  invoked  only against  statements  which  had a material  bearing  on  the criminality of the maker of the statement._ "By itself  does not exclude the setting or other integral circumstances  but means something in the fact disclosed a guilt element.   The setting  of  the  case  is  an  implied  component  of   the statement. [641 B-D]

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State  of  Bombay  v. Kathikalu Oghad, [1962] 3  SCR  P.  10 referred to. 18.  Relevancy   is  tendency  to  make  a  fact   probable. Crimination   is   a  tendency  to  make   guilt   probable. Confession is a potency to make crime conclusive.  The taint of tendency, under Art. 20(3) and s. 161 (1) is more or less the same.  It is not a remote, recondite, freak or  fanciful inference  but  a  reasonable, real,  material  or  probable deduction.  This governing test holds good, it is pragmatic, for one feels the effect, its guilty portent fairly clearly. [641 E-F] 19.  There is need for regard to the impact of the plurality of  other  investigations  in  the  offing  or  prosecutions pending  on the amplitude of the immunity.  ’To  be  witness against  oneself’  is  not confined  to  particular  offence regarding which the questioning is made but extends to other offences about which the accused has reasonable apprehension of implication from his answer.  This conclusion also  flows from  tendency  to  be exposed to  a  criminal  charge.   ’A criminal  charge’  covers  any criminal  charge  than  under investigation or trial or imminently threatens the  accused. [641 G-H, 642 A] 20.  The setting of the case or cases is also of the  utmost significance  in pronouncing on the guilty tendency  of  the question and answer.  What in one milieu may be  colourless, may,  in  another be criminal.  While  subjectivism  of  the accused  may  exaggeratedly apprehend  a  guilty  inference lingering  behind every non-committal question,  objectivism reasonably   screens   innocent   from   innocent   answers. Therefore,  making a fair margin for the accused’s  credible apprehension  of implication from his own mouth,  the  Court will   view  the  interrogation  objectively  to   hold   it criminatory   or  otherwise  without  surrendering  to   the haunting  subjectivism  of  the accused.   The  dynamics  of constitutional  silence cover many interacting  factors  and repercussions from speech. [642 A, C-D] 21.  The  policy of the law is that each individual  accused included, by virtue of his guaranteed dignity has a right to a  private  enclave where he may lead a  free  life  without over-bearing investigatory invasion or even crypto-coercion. The protean forms gendarme duress assumes. the environmental pressures  of police presence, compounded  by  incommunicado confinement    and    psychic    exhaustion,     torturesome interrogation  and  physical menances and  other  ingenious, sophisticated  procedures-the condition,  mental,  physical, cultural  and  social  of the accused,  the  length  of  the interrogation and the manner of its conduct and a variety of like  circumstances, will go into the pathology  of  coerced para  confessional  answers.   The benefit  of  doubt  where reasonable  doubt exists, must go in favour of the  accused. [643 C-D] State  of  Bombay  v.  Kathikalu Oghad,  [1962]  3  SCR  10, referred to. Observation [Such  deviance as in this case where a higher level  police officer,  ignorantly  insisted on a woman appearing  at  the police  station, in fragrant contravention of the  wholesome proviso  to Section 160(1) of the Cr.  P.C. must be  visited with  prompt  punishment, since policemen may not be  a  law unto themselves expecting others to obey the law.  The wages of indifference is reprimand, of intransigence  disciplinary action.   If  the  alibi  is that  the  Sessions  Court  had directed 616 the  accused  to appear at the police station,  that  is  no

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absolution  for  a police officer from disobedience  of  the law.   There  is  public policy, not  complimentary  to  the police personnel, behind this legislative proscription which keeps,  juveniles and females from police company except  at the  former’s  safe  residence.  May  be,  in  later  years, community  confidence  and  consciousness  will  regard  the police  force  as entitled to better trust  and  soften  the stigmatising  or suspicious provisions now writ  across  the Code].

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 315 of 1978. From  the Judgment and Order dated 30-1-1978 of  the  Orissa High Court in C.D.C. No. 961/77.                             AND               CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 101 of 1978 From  the Judgment and Order dated 30-1-1978 of  the  Orissa High Court in Criminal Revision No. 397 of 1977. G.   Rath, S. K. Bagga, (Mrs.) S. Bagga and Indu Talwar  for the Appellant. B.   M. Patnaik, A. G.. Orissa, Vinoo Bhagat and R. K. Mehta for Respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A pensive preface KRISHNA  IYER,  J.-Every  litigation has a  touch  of  human crises and, as here, it is but a legal projection of  life’s vicissitudes. A  complaint  was  filed by  the  Deputy  Superintendent  of Police,  Vigilance  (Directorate  of  Vigilance),   Cuttack, against  the appellant, the former Chief Minister of  Orissa under section 179 I.P.C., before the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate Sadar, Cuttack, alleging offending facts which we will  presently  explain.   Thereupon  the  Magistrate  took cognizance of the offence and issued summons for  appearance against  the accused (Smt.  Nandini Satpathy). Aggrieved  by the  action of the Magistrate and urging that the  complaint did  not  and could not disclose an offence,  the   agitated accuse appellant moved the High Court under Art. 226 of  the Constitution  as  well as under section 401 of the  Cr.   P. Code,   challenging  the  validity   of  the  Magis   terial proceeding.   The  broad  submissions,  unsuccessfully  made before  the  High Court, was that the charge rested  upon  a failure  to  answer interrogations by the  police  but  this charge  was unsustainable, because the umbrella  of  Article 20(3)  of  the Constitution and the immunity  under  section 161(2) of the Cr.  P. Code were wide enough to shield her in her refusal.  The plea of unconstitutionality and illegality put  forward by this preemptive proceeding was  rebuffed  by the  High  Court  and  so she  appealed  to  this  Court  by certificate  granted under Article 132(1), resulting in  the above  two appeals, their by taking a calculated risk  which might boomerang on the litigant if she failed  because  what this Court now decides finally binds. Every appeal to this court transcends the particular lis  to incarnate  as an appeal to the future by the invisible  many whose legal lot we 617 decide, by laying down the law for the nation under  Article 141;  and, so, we are filled with humility in  essaying  the task of unravelling the sense and sensibility, the,  breadth and  depth,  of  the  principle  against  self-incrimination enshrined  in  Art. 20(3) of our Constitution  and  embraced with   specificity  by Section 161(2) of the Cr.   P.  Code. Here we must remember, concerned as we, are in expounding an

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aspect  of  the Constitution bearing on social  defense  and individual  freedom, that humanism is the highest law  which enlivens  the printed legislative text with the  life-breath of civilized values.  The judge who forgets this rule of law any day regrets his nescient verdict some day. Now,  we move on to the riddle of Art. 20(3), the  range  of the  ’right  to  silence and the insulation  of  an  accused Person from police interrogation under section 161(2) of the Cr.   P.  Code.  Counsel on both sides  have  presented  the rival  viewpoints with utmost fairness some scholarship  and we  have listened to them, not as an  abstract  intellectual exercises peppered by lexical and precedential erudition but as deeper dives into the meaning of meanings and the exalted adventures   in  translation  of  twinkling  symbols.    Our Constitutional guarantees are phrased like the great sutras- pregnant brevities enwombing founding faiths. The  basic facts which have given rise to this case need  to be narrated but the law we have to settle reminds us, not of a  quondam  minister,  the appellant, but  of  the  numerous indigents,  illiterates  and agrestics who  are  tensed  and perplexed,  by police processes in station  recesses,  being unversed in the arcame implications of Art. 20(3) and unable to stand up to rough handling despite section 161(2).   Law- in-action is tested by its restless barks and bites ’in  the streets and its sting in hostile camps, especially when  the consumers  are  unaware  of the essential  contents  of  the protective  provisions,-and not by its polished manners  and sweet  reasonableness in forensic precincts.  The  pulse  of the agitated accused, hand-cuffed and interrogated, the rude voice  and ready rod of the head constable and  the  psychic strain,  verging on consternation, sobbing into  involuntary incriminations,   are  part  of  the  scenario   of   police investigation which must educate the Court as it unveils the nuances  of  Art. 20(3) and its  inherited  phraseology.   A people  whose consciousness of rights is poor, a land  where legal  services  at-the incipient stages are,  rare  and  an investigative personnel whose random resort to third  degree technology  has  ancient  roots-these and a  host  of  other realistic  factors  must  come into  the  Court’s  ken  when interpreting  and effectuating the constitutional  right  of the  suspect  accused to remain silent.  That is  why  quick surgery, when constitutional questions affecting the  weaker numbers  are  involved, can be successful failure.   We  are cognizant  of the improved methods and refined processes  of the  police  forces,  especially  be,  Vigilance  wings  and Intelligence   squads  with  special  training   in   expert investigation  and  use of brains as  against  brawn.   This remarkable  improvement, in Free India, in police  practices has  not unfortunately. been consistent and torture  tactics have  not  been transported for life from our land  as  some recent happenings have regrettably revealed. 5-315SCI/78 618 Necessarily,   the  Court  must  be  guided  by   principled pragmatism,  not cloud-cuckoo-land idealism.  This sets  our perspective. The facts Back  to the facts.  Smt.  Nandini Satpathy, a former  Chief Minister  of  Orissa and one time minister at  the  national level  was  directed  to appear  at  the  Vigilance,  Police Station, Cuttack, in September last year, for being examined in  connection  with a case registered against  her  by  the Deputy  Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Cuttack,  under section  5 (2) read with section’ 5 ( 1 ) (d) & (e)  of  the Prevention  of Corruption Act and under section 161/165  and

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120-B  and  109  I.P.C.  On  the  strength  of  this   first information, in which the appellant, her son and others were shown  as  accused  persons,  investigation  was  commenced. During  the course of the investigation it was that she  was interrogated   with reference to a long string of questions, given to her in writing.      Skipping  the details  of  the dates and forgetting the niceties of the     provisions, the gravamen of the accusation was one of acquisition of  assets disproportionate  to the known, licit sources of income  and probable  resources  over  the years  of  the  accused,  who occupied a public position and exercised public power for  a long spell during which, the police version runs, the  lady by  receipt of illegal gratification aggranaised  herself--a pattern of accusation tragically and traumatically so common against  public persons who have exercised and  exited  from public power, and a phenomenon so suggestive of Lord Acton’s famous  dictum.  The charge, it is so obvious, has  a  wide- ranging  ’scope  and considerable temporal  sweep,  covering activities and acquisitions, sources and resources  private and public dealings and nexus with finances, personal and of relatives.    The  dimensions  of  the  offences   naturally broadened  the area of investigation, and to do  justice  to such investigation, the net of interrogation had to be  cast wide.  Inevitably, a police officer who is not too  precise, too sensitive and too constitutionally conscientious is  apt to  trample under foot the guaranteed right  of  testimonial tacitness.    This  is  precisely  the  grievance   of   the appellant, and the defence of the respondent is the  absence of  the  ’right of silence, to use the familiar  phrase  of 20th century vintage. Our Approach Counsel’s   submissions  have  zeroed  in  on   some   basic questions.  Speaking broadly, there are two competing social interests  a  reconciliation of which gives the  clue  to  a balance  between the curtailed or expanded meaning  for  the sententious   clause  against  self-incrimination   in   our Constitution.   Section 161(2) Cr.  P.C. is  more  concrete. We may read both before venturing a bhashyam on their text :               "Art.  20(3)-No person accused of any  offence               shall  be  compelled to be a  witness  against               himself".               "Section 161(2) Cr.  P.C. enjoins :               "such  person shall be bound to  answer  truly               all questions relating to such ease put to him               by such officer, other than               619               questions  the answers to which would  have  a               tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or               to a penalty or forfeiture." The elucidation and application of these provisions will  be better  appreciated  in the specific setting of  the  points formulated  in the course of the arguments.  And so  we  now set  down the pivotal issues on which the  submissions  were focussed,  reminding ourselves that we cannot travel  beyond the Atlantic to lay down Indian law although counsel invited us, with a few citations, to embark on that journey.   India is  Indian, not alien. and jurisprudence is neither  eternal nor  universal  but moulded by the national  genius,  life’s realities,  culture  and ethos of each  country.   Even  so, humanist  jurists will agree that in this indivisible  human planet  certain values, though divergently  expressed,  have cosmic status, spreading out with the march of  civilization in space and time.  To understand ourselves, we must  listen to  voices from afar, without forsaking our  identity.   The Gandhian  guideline  has  a golden lesson  for  judges  when

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rulings and text books outside one’s jurisdiction are  cited :               "I do not want my house to be walled in on all               sides  and my windows to be stuffed.   I  want               the cultures of all lands to be blown about my               house as freely, as possible.  But I refuse to               be blown off my feet by any."                         (Young India 1-6-1921)". To build bridges of juridical understanding based on  higher values,  is  good; to don imported  legal  haberdashery,  on meretricious appeal, is clumsy. The Issues The points in controversy may flexibly be formulated thus 1.   Is  a  person  likely to be accused of  crimes  i.e.  a suspect accused, entitled to the sanctuary of silence as one ’accused  of any offence’ ?  Is it sufficient that he  is  a potential-of course, not distant-candidate for accusation by the police ? 2.   Does  the  bar against self-incrimination  operate  not merely  with reference to a particular accusation in  regard to  which the police investigator interrogates, or  does  it extend  also  to  other  pending  or  potential  accusations outside  the  specific investigation which has  led  to  the questioning ? That is to say, can an accused person, who  is being  questioned  by a police officer in  a  certain  case, refuse to answer questions plainly non-criminatory so far as that  case  is  concerned but probably exposes  him  to  the perils  of  inculpation in other cases in posse or  in  esse elsewhere ? 3.   Does  the constitutional shield of silence  swing  into action  only  in  Court or can it  barricade  the  ’accused’ against incriminating interrogation at the stages of  police investigation ? 4.   What is the ambit of the cryptic expression  ’compelled to be a witness against himself’ occurring in Article  20(3) of the Constitution ? 620 Does  ’compulsion’  involve  physical or  like  pressure  or duress  of  an unlawful texture or does it  cover  also  the crypto-compulsion   or  psychic  coercion,  given  a   tense situation  or officer in authority interrogating an  accused person, armed with power to insist on an answer ? 5.   Does   being  ’a  witness  against   oneself’   include testimonial tendency to incriminate or probative probability of guilt flowing from the answer ? 6.   What  are the parameters of Section 161(2) of  the  Cr. Procedure  Cod-.  ? Does tendency to expose a  person  to  a criminal  charge embrace answers which have  an  inculpatory impact  in  other  criminal cases actually or  about  to  be investigated or tried ? 7.   Does  ’any person’ in Section 161 Cr.   Procedure  Code include an accused person or only a witness ? 8.   When does an answer self-incriminate or tend to  expose one  to  a charge ? What distinguishing  features  mark  off nocent   and   innocent,   permissible   and   impermissible interrogations  and  answers ? Is. the setting  relevant  or should  the  answer, in vacuo, bear a guilty  badge  on  its bosom ? 9.   Does mens rea form a necessary component of section 179 I.P.C., and, if so, what is its precise nature ? Can a  mere apprehension that any answer has a guilty potential  salvage the accused or bring into play the exclusionary rule ? 10.  Where  do  we demarcate the boundaries  of  benefit  of doubt  in  the setting of section 161(2) Cr.   P.  Code  and Section 179 I.P.C. ?

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Section 179 I.P.C. This  formulation  does focus our attention  on  the  plural range  of jural concerns when a court is confronted with  an issue  of testimonial compulsion followed by  a  prosecution for  recusancy.  Preliminarily, let us see the  requirements of  section  179 I.P.C. since the appeals directly  turn  on them.  The rule of law becomes a rope of sand if the  lawful authority  of public servants can be defied or disdained  by those  bound  to obey.  The might of the law,  in  the  last resort, guarantees the right of the citizen, and no one,  be he minister or higher, has the discretion to disobey without running a punitive risk.  Chapter X of the Indian Penal Code is  designed  to penalise disobedience  of  public  servants exercising lawful authority.  Section 179 is one of the pro- visions to enforce compliance when a public servant  legally demands  truthful answers but is met, with blank refusal  or plain mendacity.  The section reads :               "  179  whoever, being legally bound  to state               the truth on any subject to any public servant               refuses to answer any question demanded of him               touching  that subject by such public  servant               in  the exercise of the legal powers  of  such               public servant, shall be punished with  simple               imprisonment  for a term which may  extend  to               six  months, or with fine which may extend  to               one thousand rupees, or with both." 621     A  break-down  of  the provision  yields  the  following pieces  :  (a)  the demanding authority  must  be  a  public servant;  a police officer-is obviously one, (b) The  demand must  be to state the truth on a subject in the exercise  of legal  powers;  and, indubitably, an  investigating  officer enjoys  ’such powers under the Cr.  P. Code, and  here,  the requisition  was  precisely  to tell the  truth  on  matters supposedly  pertinent to the offences  under  investigation. Section 161 of the Cr.  P.C. obligates ’any person  supposed to  be  acquainted with the facts and circumstances  of  the case  to answer truthfully ’all questions relating  to  such case  .... other than questions the answers to  which  would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge’.  In the present   case,   admittedly,  oral   answers   to   written interrogatories were sought, although not honest ’speech but ’constitutional’  silence greeted the public  servant.   And this  refuge  by  the accused under  Art.  20(3)  drove  the disenchanted  officer  to seek the sanction of  section  179 I.P.C. If the literal force of the text governs the  complex of facts. the court must convict, lest the- long arm of  the investigatory  law should hang limp when challenged  by  the negative   attitude   of   inscrutability,   worn   by   the ’interrogatee’-unless  within  the text and texture  of  the section   built-in   defences  exist.   They  do,   is   the appellant’s  plea;  and this stance is the  subject  of  the debate before us. What  are  the defences open under Section 179  I.P.C.  read with  section 161 (1) Cr.  P. C. ? Two exculpatory  channels are  pointed  out  by  Sri Rath,  supplemented  by  a  third paramount  right founded on constitutional immunity  against testimonial  self-incrimination.  To itemise them for  ready reference,  the  arguments  are that  (a),  ’any  person  in section 161(1) excludes an accused person (b) that questions which form links in the chain of the prosecution  case-these include  all except irrelevant ones-are prone to expose  the accused to a criminal charge or charges since several  other cases are in the offing or have been charge-sheeted  against the  appellant  and  (c)  the  expansive  operation  of  the

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benignant    shield   against    self-accusation    inhibits elicitation of any answers which the accused apprehends  may throw  inculpatory glow.  This wide vindication,  if  valid, will be the biggest interpretative bonus the court can award to criminals as it foredooms to failure of criminal  justice and  police  truth  tracking,  says  the  learned   Advocate General.   True,  courts self-criminate themselves  if  they keep  the gates ajar for culprits to flee justice under  the guise  of  interpretative  enlargement of  golden  rules  of criminal jurisprudence. The Constitution and the criminal The inherent quandary of the penal law in this area  springs from  the  implanted  dilemma  of  exacting  solicitude  for possible innocents forced to convict themselves out of their own lips by police tantrums and the social obligation of the limbs  of  the law and agencies of justice to  garner  truth from every quarter, to discover guilt, wherever hidden,  and to  fulfill  the  final tryst of  the  justice  system  with society.    Which  is  to  shield  the   community   against criminality  by relentless pursuit of the culprit, by  proof of  guilt and punishment of crime, not facilitation  of  the fleeing criminal from the chase of the appointed authorities of the State 622 charged with the task of investigating, testing, proving and getting  punished  those  whose  anti-social  exploits  make citizens’ life vulnerable. The  paradox  has  been put sharply by Lewis  Mayers  :  "To strike  the balance between the needs of law enforcement  on the  one  hand  and  the  protection  of  the  citizen  from oppression and injustice at the hands of the law-enforcement machinery  on  the  other is a perennial  problem  of  state craft.  The pendulum over the years has swung to the  right. Even  as long ago as the opening of the  twentieth  century, Justice  Holmes declared that ’at the present time  in  this country  there  is more danger that  criminals  will  escape justice  than that they will be subject to tyranny.  As  the century has unfolded, the danger has increased. Conspiracies  to  defeat the law have,  in  recent  decades, become widely and powerfully organized and have been able to use  modern advances in communication and movement  to  make detection  more difficult.  Lawbreaking tends  to  increase. During  the  same  period, an increasing  awareness  of  the potentialities   of  abuse  of  power  by  law   enforcement officials  has  resulted,  in  both  the  judicial  and  the legislative  spheres, in a tendency to tighten  restrictions on such officials, and to safeguard even more jealously  the rights of the accused, the suspect, and the witness.  It  is not  too much to say that at mid-century we confront a  real dilemma in law enforcement. In  consequence, there is clearly discernible a tendency  to reexamine the assumptions on which rest our complex of rules and doctrines which offer obstacles, perhaps wisely, to  the discovery  and  proof of violations of law.  In such  a  re- examination,  the cluster of rules commonly  grounded  under the  term ’privilege against self-incrimination’, which  has for  many  decades been under attack, peculiarly  calls  for restudy.   In the words of Wigmore, ’Neither the history  of the  privilege, nor its firm constitutional  anchorage  need deter  us  from  discussing at this day its  policy.   As  a bequest  of the 1600’s, it is but a relic of  controversies, and convulsions which have long since ceased...... Nor  does its constitutional sanction, embodied in a clause of half  a dozen words, relieve, us of the necessity of considering its policy..........  A  sound and intelligent opinion  must  be

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formed upon the merits of the policy." Justice Douglas made this telling comment:               "As  an original matter it might be  debatable               whether  the provision of the Fifth  Amendment               that  no  person "shall be  compelled  in  any               criminal case to be a witness against himself’               serves the ends of justice" (1952). These  prologuic  lines serve as background  to  a  balanced approach to the crucial question posed before us. A police lapse Before  discussing  the  core issues, we wish  to  note  our regret,  in  this case, at a higher  level  police  officer, ignorantly  insisting  on a woman appearing  at  the  police station  in flagrant contravention of the wholesome  proviso to Section 160(1) 623 of  the  Cr.P.C. Such deviance must be visited  with  prompt punishment since policemen may not be a law unto  themselves expecting others to obey the law.  The wages of indifference is reprimand, of intransigence disciplinary action.  If  the alibi is that the Sessions Court had directed the accused to appear  at  the police station that is no absolution  for  a police  officer  from  disobedience of the  law.   There  is public  policy,  not complimentary to  the  police  personal behind  this legislative proscription which keeps  juveniles and females from police company, except at the former’s safe residence.  May be, in later years, community confidence and consciousness  will regard the police force as  entitled  to better  trust  and  soften the  stigmatising  or  suspicious provisions now writ across the Code. It is necessary, to appreciate the submissions, to  remember the  admitted  fact  that  this is  not  the  only  case  or investigation  against the appellant and her mind  may  move around these many investigations, born and unborn, as she is confronted  with  questions.  The relevance of  this  factor will be adverted to later. Setting the perspective of Art. 20(3) and Sec. 161 (2). Back to the constitutional quintessence invigorating the ban on self-incrimination.  The area cove-red by Art. 20(3)  and Section  161(2) is substantially the same.  So much  so,  we are  inclined to the view, terminological  expansion  apart, that Section 161(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a parliamentary  gloss on the constitutional clause.  The learned Advocate  General argued  that  Art.  20(3), unlike Section  161(1),  did  not operate at the anterior stages before the case came to court and   the  accused’s  incriminating  utterance,   previously recorded, was attempted to be introduced.  He relied on some passages  in American decisions but, in  our  understanding, those  passages  do not so circumscribe and,  on  the  other hand, the land mark Miranda v. Arizona(1) ruling did  extend the embargo to police investigation also.  Moreover, Art. 20 (3),  which is our provision, warrants no  such  truncation. Such a narrow meaning may emasculate a necessary protection. There  are only two primary queries involved in this  clause that  seals  the lips into permissible silence, (i)  Is  the person called upon to testify ,accused of any offence’, (ii) Is  he  being compelled to be witness against  himself  ?  A constitutional  provision receives its full  semantic  range and so it follows that a wider connotation must be  imparted to  the  expressions  ’accused of any offense’  and  ’to  be witness  against  himself.  The  learned  Advocate  General, influenced  by  American decisions rightly  agreed  that  in express  terms            Section 161(2) of the  Code  might cover  not merely accusations already registered  in  police stations  but  those which are likely to be  the  basis  for

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exposing a person to a criminal charge.  Indeed, this  wider construction, if applicable to Art. 20(3), approximates  the constitutional  clause  to  the explicit  statement  of  the prohibition  in  section  161(2).   This  latter   provision meaningfully  uses  the  expression  ’expose  himself  to  a criminal  charge.   Obviously, these words  mean,  not  only cases  where  the person is already exposed  to  a  criminal charge  but also instances which will imminently expose  him to criminal charges.  In Art. (1)384 U.S 436 (1966). 624 20(3),  the  expression ’accused of any offence,  must  mean formally  accused  in  praesenti  not  in  futuro-not   even imminently  as decisions now stand.  The- expression ’to  be witness against himself’ means more than the court  process. Any.  give  of evidence, any furnishing of  information,  if likely to have an incriminating impact. answers the descrip- tion of being witness against oneself.  Not being limited to the forensic stage by express words in Art. 20 (3), we  have to  construe  the expression to apply to every  stage  where furnishing of information and collection of materials  takes place.  That is to say, even the investigation at the police level  is  embraced by Art. 20(3).  This is  precisely  what Section  161(2)  means.  That sub-section  relates  to  oral examination  by police officers and grants immunity at  that stage.    Briefly,  the  Constitution  and  the   Code   are coterminous  in the protective area.  While the Code may  be changed  the Constitution is more enduring.   Therefore,  we have to base our conclusion not merely upon Section 1 61 (2) but  on the more fundamental protection, although  equal  in ambit, contained in Art. 20(3). In  a  way  this position brings us nearer  to  the  Miranda mantle  of exclusion which extends the right  against  self- incrimination,   to   police   examination   and   custodial interrogation  and  takes  in suspects as  much  as  regular accused persons.  Under the Indian Evidence Act, the Miranda exclusionary   rule   that  custodial   interrogations   are inherently coercive finds expression (section 26),  although the  Indian provision confines it to confession which  is  a narrower concept than self-crimination. We halve earlier spoken of the conflicting claims  requiring reconciliation.   Speaking  pragmatically,  there  exists  a rivalry   between  societal  interest  in  effecting   crime detection   and   constitutional   rights   which    accused individuals  possess.   Emphasis  may  shift,  depending  on circumstances,  in  balancing these interests  as  has  been happening  in America, Since Miranda there has been  retreat from  stress  on protection of the accused  and  gravitation towards   society’s  interest  in  convicting   lawbreakers. Currently, the trend in the American jurisdiction  according to  legal  journals, is that ’respect  for  (constitutional) principles  is eroded when they leap their proper bounds  to interfere  with  the  legitimate interests  of  ’society  in enforcement of its laws........ (78) Couch v. United States, 409  U.S.322,  336 (1972).  Our  constitutional  perspective has, therefore, to be relative and cannot afford to be abso- lutist, especially when fortune technology crime  escalation and  other  social  variables  affect  the  application   of principles in producing humane justice. Whether we consider the Talmudic law or the Magna Carta, the Fifth  Amendment, the provisions of other  constitutions  or Article  20(3),  the driving force- behind  the  refusal  to permit  forced self-crimination is the system of torture  by investigators and Courts from medieval times to modern days. Law  is  a  response to life and the  English  rule  of  the

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accused’s  privilege  of silence may easily be traced  as  a sharp  reaction  to  the court of  Star-Chamber  when  self- incrimina- 625 tion  was not regarded wrongful.  Indeed, then  the  central feature  of  the  criminal proceedings,  as  Holdsworth  has noted, was the examination of the accused. The horror and terror that then prevailed did, as a reaction give  rise  to the reverential principle  of  immunity  from interrogation  for  the  accused.   Sir  James  Stephen  has observed :               "For  at  least  a  century  and  a  half  the               (English)   Courts   have   acted   upon   the               supposition  that  to question a  prisoner  is               illegal This opinion arose from a peculiar and               accidental  state  of things  which  has  long               since-  passed  away and our modem law  is  in               fact derived from somewhat questionable source               though it may no doubt be defended (Sir  James               Stephen (1857)." Two important considerations must be placed at the forefront before  sizing up the importance and impregnability  of  the anti-self-incrimination  guarantee.   The first is  that  we cannot  afford  to  write off the  fear  of  police  torture leading to forced self-incrimination as a thing of the past. Recent  Indian  history  does not  permit  it,  contemporary world  histor y  does  not condone  it.   A  recent  article entitled  ’Minds  behind Bars’, published in  the  December, 1977  issue of the Listener, tells an awesome story  :  "The technology  of  torture all over the world is  growing  ever more sophisticated-new devises can destroy a prisoner’s will in a matter of hours-but leave no visible marks or signs of brutality.  And government-inflicted terror has evolved  its own dark sub-culture.  All over the world, torturers seem to feel  a desire to appear respectable to their victims  There is an endlessly inventive list of new methods of  inflicting pain and suffering on fellow human beings that quickly cross continents  and  ideological barriers through some  kind  of international secret-police net work. that  we  feel that public opinion in several  countries  is much  more aware of our general line than before.  And  that is  positive.  I think, in the long run, governments  can’t ignore  that.   We  are also encouraged by  the  fact  that, today,  human rights are discussed between governments  they are now on the international political agenda.  But, in  the end,  what matters is the pain and suffering the  individual endures in police station or cell." Many  police  officers, Indian and foreign, may  be  perfect gentlemen, many police stations, here and elsewhere, may  be wholesome.   Even so the law is made for the generality  and Gresham’s Law does not spare the Police force. On  the  other hand, we must never forget  that  crimes,  in India  and  internationally, are growing and  criminals  are outwitting the detectives. What holds good in the cities  of the  United States is infecting other ’countries,  including our own.  An American author in a recent book(1) has  stated : "What do you think the city of tomorrow will (1) Roger Lamphear, J.D.’s book entitled ’To Solve the  Age- Old problem of Crime. 626 be  ?  In  1969 the National Commission on  the  Causes  and Prevention of Violence made alarming predictions.  You  will Eve  in  a  city  where everyone has  guns  Houses  will  be protected by grils and spy equipment.  Armed citizen patrols will  be  necessary.  The political extremes will  be  small

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armies.  Busses will have to carry armed guards.  There will be  hatred and war between the races, and between  the  rich and the poor. (63, Pg. 44) In other words, your city win  be a place of terror. "From  1969  to 1974 the number of crimes for  each  hundred thousand people is up 38%. (48, pg. 12) Violent crimes  rose 47%.  (48,  pg.  23) Robbery increased  48%.  (48,  pg.  25) Burglary  went  up a whopping 53%. (48, pg. 29)  Theft  rose 35%. (48, pg. 32) The chances are becoming better and better that  you  or  someone dear to you will be  a  victim.   The chances  are  also  better that a  close  relative  will  be involved in crime as criminal. ". . . In only 12% of the serious crimes is there a  suspect arrested.   Half  of  those are  convicted.  (Serious  crime includes  homicide,  burglary, aggravated  assault,  larceny over $ 50, forcible rape, robbery, and auto theft.) (63  pg. XVIH). "The situation is so discouraging that only half the  people bother to report serious crime. ( 63, pg.  XVIII) Even then, in 1974, 82% of the known burglaries went unsolved. (48, pg. 42) That means only 18% of the half known to the police were solved. "......  President  Johnson’s message to Congress  March  8, 1965 is as true today as it was then               ’Crime   has  become  a  malignant  enemy   in               America’s  midst......  We  must  arrest   and               reverse the trend towards lawlessness ....  We               cannot  tolerate  an  endless,  self-defeating               cycle    of   imprisonment,    release,    and               reimprisonment    which   fails    to    alter               undesirable attitudes and behaviour.  We  must               find  ways to help the first offender avoid  a               continuing career to crime."’ The  first obligation of the criminal justice system  is  to secure  justice by seeking and substantiating truth  through proof.  Of course, the means must be as good as the ends and the  dignity of the individual and the freedom of the  human person  cannot  be sacrificed by resort to  improper  means, however worthy the ends.  Therefore, ’Third degree has to be outlawed  and  indeed has been.  We have to  draw  up  clear lines between the whirlpool and the rock where the safety of society  and the worth of the human person may  co-exist  in peace. We now move down to the role of the Latin Maxim ’nemo  tene- tur  sciepsum tenetur’ which, literally translated means,  a man cannot represent himself as guilty.  This rule prevailed in  the Rabbinic courts and found a place in the Talmud  (no one can incriminate, himself).  Later came the Star  Chamber history  and  Anglo-American  revulsion.   Imperial  Britain transplanted part of it into India in the 627 Cr.  P.C. Our Constitution was inspired by  the  high-minded inhibition  against self-incrimination  from  Anglo-American sources.   Thus  we have a broad review of the  origins  and bearings  of  the  fundamental  right  to  silence  and  the procedural embargo on testimonial compulsion.  The  American cases  need  not  detain us,  although  Miranda  V.  Arizona (supra)  being the Lodestar on the subject, may be  referred to for grasping the basics of the Fifth Amendment bearing on oral incrimination by accused persons. We have said sufficient to drive home the anxious point that this  cherished principle which proscribes compulsory  self- accusation,   should  not  be  dangerously  over-broad   nor illusorily  whittled  down.   And it  must  openly  work  in practice and not be a talismatic symbol. The Miranda  ruling

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clothed the Fifth Amendment with flesh and blood and so must we,  if Art. 20(3) is not to prove a promise  of  unreality. Aware  that the questions raised go to the root of  criminal jurisprudence we seek light from Miranda for interpretation, not  innovation,  for  principles  in  their  settings,  not borrowings for our conditions.  The spiritual thrust of  the two  provisions is the same and it is best expressed in  the words of Brown v. Walker.(1) "Over   70  years  ago,  our  predecessors  on  this   Court eloquently stated The maxim nemo tenetur sceipsum accusare had its origin in a protest  against  the inquisitorial  and  manifestly  unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which (have)  long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of  the  Stuarts from the British throne in  1688,  and  the erection  of additional barriers for the protection  of  the people  against the exercise of arbitrary power, (were)  not uncommon   even  in  England.   While  the   admissions   or confessions  of  the prisoner when  voluntarily  and  freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of  incriminating evidence,  if  an  accused person be asked  to  explain  his apparent  connection with a crime under  investigation,  the case  with which the questions (384 US 443) put to  him  may assume  an inquisitorial character, the temptation to  press the  witness  unduly,  to browbeat him if  he  be  timid  or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painful evident in many of the  earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir  Nicholas Throckmorton,  and  Udal,  the Puritan  Minister,  made  the system  so odious as to give rise to a demand for its  total abolition.  The change in the English criminal procedure  in that  particular seems to be founded upon no statute and  no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand.  But, however adopted, it has  become  firmly  embedded  in English,  as  well  as  in American jurisprudence.  So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient  system  impress themselves upon the  minds  of  the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made  a denial of the right to question an accused person a part  of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." (1)  40 L.Ed. 819. 628 Chief  Justice Warren mentioned the setting of the case  and of  the times such as official overbearing, ’third  degree’, sustained  and protracted questioning  incommunicado,  rooms cut off from the outside world, methods which flourished but were becoming exceptions.  ’But’,, noted the Chief  Justice, ’they  are  sufficiently  widespread to  be  the  object  of concern’.   The Miranda court quoted from the conclusion  of the Wickersham Commission Report made nearly half a  century ago, and continued words which ring a bell in Indian bosoms and  so we think it relevant to our consideration  and  read it;               "To  the contention that the third  degree  is               necessary  to  get the  facts,  the  reporters               aptly  reply  in the language of  the  present               Lord Chancellor of England (Lord Sankey) : ’It               is not admissible to do a great right by doing               a  little wrong ........ It is not  sufficient               to do justice by obtaining a proper result  by               irregular  or improper means.’ Not  only  does               the use of the third degree involve a flagrant               violation  of Law by the officers of the  law,

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             but  it  involves also the  dangers  of  false               confessions,  and it tends to make police  and               prosecutors  less  zealous in the  search  for               objective   evidence.    As   the   New   York               prosecutor quoted in the report said, ’It is a               short  cut  and  makes  the  police  lazy  and               unenterprising.’   Or,  as  another   official               quoted remarked : ’If you use your fists,  you               are  not so likely to use your wits.  (384  US               448)’  We agree with the conclusion  expressed               in   the  report,  that  ’The   third   degree               brutalizes  the police, hardens  the  prisoner               against  society,  and lowers  the  esteem  in               which the administration of justice is held by               the public.’ " [IV  National Commission on Law Observance and  Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 5(1931).]               (7)   ’Again   we  stress  that   the   modern               practice   of  in  custody  interrogation   is               psychologically    rather   than    physically               oriented,  As  we have stated  before,  "Since               Chambers  v.  Florida, 309 US  227  (84  L.Ed.               716), this Court has recognized that  coercion               can be mental as well as physical and that the               blood of the accused is not the only  hallmark               of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn               v.  Alabama,  4 L.Ed. 2d  242.   Interrogation               still takes place in privacy.  Privacy results               in  secrecy and this in turn results in a  gap               in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on in               the interrogation rooms.  A valuable source of               information  about present  police  practises,               however,  may  be  found  in  various   police               manuals  and texts which  document  procedures               employed  with success in the past, and  which               recommend  various  other  effective  tactics.               These  texts  (384  US 449) are  used  by  law               enforcement agencies themselves as guides.  it               should  be noted that these texts  professedly               present  the  most enlightened  and  effective               means  presently  used  to  obtain  statements               through    custodial    interrogation.      By               considering these texts and other data, it  is               possible  to describe procedures observed  and               noted around the country."               629               The officers are told by the manuals that  the               ’principal  psychological factor  contributing               to successful interrogation is privacy being               alone  with the person  under  interrogation.’               (Inbau  &  Reid,-Criminal  Interrogation   and               Confessions (1962, at 1.) The efficacy of this               tactic has. been explained as follows : ’If at all practicable, the interrogation should take  place in  the investigator’s office or at least in a room  of  his own  choice.   The  subject  should  be  deprived  of  every psychological  advantage.   In  his  own  home  he  may   be confident,  indignant, or recalcitrant.  He is  more  keenly aware of his rights and more (384 US 450) reluctant to  tell of his indiscretions or criminal behaviour within the  walls of  his  home.. Moreover his family and  other  friends  are nearby,  their presence lending moral support.  In  his  own office,  the investigator possesses all the  advantages  The atmosphere  suggests the invincibility of the forces of  the law.’ [O’Hara, Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation (1956)

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at 99]. To highlight the isolation and unfamiliar surroundings,  the manuals instruct the police to display an air of  confidence in  the  suspects  guilt  and  from  outward  appearance  to maintain  only  an interest in confirming  certain  details. The  guilt of the subject is to be posited as a  fact.   The interrogator  should direct his comments toward the  reasons ,why the subject committed the act rather than court failure by  asking the subject whether he did it.  Like  other  men, perhaps  the  subject  has had a bad  family  life,  had  an unhappy childhood, had too much to drink, had an  unrequited desire  for women.  The officers are instructed to  minimise the  moral seriousness of the offense, (Inbau & Reid,  supra at  34-43,  87) to cast blame on the victim or  on  society. These  tactics  are  designed  to  put  the  subject  in   a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to know already that he is  guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed and discouraged. The   texts  thus  stress  that  the  major   qualities   an interrogator  should possess are patience and  perseverance. One  writer  (384 US 451) describes the  efficacy  of  these characteristics in this manner : ’In  the  preceding paragraphs emphasis has been  placed  on kindness  and stratagems.  The investigator  will,  however, encounter  many  situations where the sheer  weight  of  his personality  will be the deciding factor.   Where  emotional appeals and tricks are employed to no avail, he must rely on an  oppressive  atmosphere of dogged persistence.   He  must interrogate steadly and without relent, leaving the  subject no  prospect of surcease.  He must dominate his subject  and overwhelm him with his inexorable will to obtain the  truth. He  should interrogate for a spell of several hours  pausing only for the subject’s necessities in acknowledgment of  the need  to  avoid a charge of duress that can  be  technically substantiated.   In  a serious case, the  interrogation  may continue for days, with the required intervals for food  and sleep,   but  with  no  respite  from  the   atmosphere   of domination.  It is possible in 630 this way to induce the subject to talk without resorting  to duress or coercion.  The method should be used only when the guilt of the subject appears highly probable. (O’Hara, Supra at 112) The  manuals  suggest  that the, suspect  be  offered  legal excuses  for  his  actions in order  to  obtain  an  initial admission  of  guilt.  Where there is a  suspected  revenge- killing, for example, the interrogator may say : ’Joe,  you probably did not go out looking for  this  fellow with  the purpose of shooting him.  My guess  is,  how-ever, that  you  expected something from him and  that’s  why  you carried  a  gun-for your own protection.  You know  him  for what  he  was, no good.  Then when you met him  he  probably started  using  foul,  abusive, language and  he  gave  some indication  that (384 US 452) he was about to pull a gun  on you,  and that’s when you had to act to save your own  life. That’s  about it, isn’t it, Joe ?’ (Inbau & Reid, supra,  at 40).               Having   then   obtained  the   admission   of               shooting, the interrogator is advised to refer               to  circumstantial evidence which negates  the               self-defense explanation.  This should  enable               him  to  secure the entire  story.   One  text               notes  that  "Even if he fails to do  so,  the               inconsistency  between the subject’s  original               denial   of  the  shooting  and  his   present

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             admission of at least doing the shooting  will               serve to, deprive him of a self-defense  ’out’               at the time of trial." (Ibid).               When  the  techniques  described  above  prove               unavailing,   the  texts  recommend  they   be               alternated with a show of some hostility.  One               ploy often used has been termed the "friendly-               unfriendly" or the "mutt and Jeff" act. A thorough and intimate sketch is made of the versatility of the arts of torture developed officially in American country calculated  to break, by physical or  psychological  crafts, the morale of the suspect and make him cough up confessional answers.    Police  sops  and  syrups  of  many  types   are prescribed to wheedle unwitting words of guilt from tough or gentle   subjects.    The   end   product   is   involuntary incrimination, subtly secured, not crudely traditional.  Our police processes are less ’scholarly’ and sophisticated, but ? Another  moral  from the Miranda reasoning  is  the  burning relevance  of erecting protective fenders and to make  their observance  a police obligation so that the angelic  article [20(3)]  may  face  upto  satanic  situations.   Says  Chief Justice Warren               "In  these  cases,  we  might  not  find   the               defendants’    statements   to    have    been               involuntary in traditional terms.  Our concern               for  adequate safeguards to  protect  precious               Fifth  Amendment  right  is,  of  course,  not               lessened  in  the slightest.  In each  of  the               cases,  the defendant was thrust into  an  un-               familiar  atmosphere and run through  menacing               police    interrogation    procedures.     The               potentiality  for  compulsion  is   forcefully               apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the               631               indigent  Mexican  defendant wag  a  seriously               disturbed  individual with  pronounced  sexual               fantasies,  and  in  Stewart,  in  which   the               defendant  was an indigent Los  Angeles  Negro               who  had  dropped out of school in  the  sixth               grade.  To be sure, the records do not  evince               overt    physical    coercion    or     patent               psychological ploys.  The fact remains that in               none of these cases did the officers undertake               to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset               of  the  interrogation  to  insure  that   the               statements  were  truly the  product  of  free               choice.  (8,9).   It is obvious that  such  an               interrogation  environment is created  for  no               purpose other than to subjugate the individual               to the will of his examiner.  This  atmosphere               carried its own badge of intimidation.  To  be               sure,  this is not physical intimidation,  but               it  is equally destructive of  human  dignity.               [Professor  Sutherland recent  article,  Crime               and Confession, 79 Hary 1 Rev 21, 37  (1965)].               The   current   practice   of    incommunicado               interrogation  is  at  odds with  one  of  our               Nation’s   (384   US   458)   most   cherished               principles-that  the  individual  may  not  be               compelled  to  incriminate  himself.    Unless               adequate  protective devices are  employed  to               dispel  the compulsion inherent  in  custodial               surroundings,  no statement obtained from  the               defendant can truly be the product of his free

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             choice." We feel that by successful interpretation judge-centred  law must catalyze community-centred legality. There is one touch of nature which makes the judicial  world kin the love of justice-in-action and concern  for  human values.  So, regardless of historical origins and  political borrowings,  the framers of our Constitution  have  cognised certain pessimistic poignancies and mellow life meanings and obligated  judges  to  maintain  a  ’fair  state  individual balance’ and to broaden the fundamental right to fulfil  its purpose,  lest frequent martyrdoms reduce the article  to  a mock formula.  Even silent approaches, furtive moves, slight deviations  and subtle ingenuities may erode  the  article’s validity   unless   the   law   outlaws   illegitimate   and unconstitutional  procedures  before they find  their  first firm footing.  The silent cause of the final fan of the tall tower  is the first stone obliquely and obliviously  removed from  the  base.   And  Art. 20(3) is  a  human  article,  a guarantee  of dignity and integrity and of inviolability  of the  person and refusal to convert an adversary system  into an inquisitorial scheme in the antagonistic antechamber of a police station.  And in the long run, that investigation  is best  which uses stratagems least, that  policeman  deserves respect who gives his fists rest and his wits  restlessness. The  police are part of us and must rise in peoples’  esteem through  firm  and friendly, not foul and  sneaky  strategy. The police reflect the State, the State society.  The Indian legal situation has led to judicial concern over the,  State v.  individual  balance.   After  tracing  the  English  and American developments in the law against self-incrimination, Jagannadhadas, J., in M.  P. Sharma’s(1) case observed (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 1077, at 1085, 1086. 632               "Since   the  time  when  the   principle   of               protection  against self-incrimination  became               established  in  English  law  and  in   other               systems  of law which have followed it,  there               has been considerable debate as to the utility               thereof  and serious doubts were held in  some               quarters that this principle has a tendency to               defeat  justice.  In support of the  principle               it  is claimed that the protection of  accused               against  self-incrimination  promotes   active               investigation  from external sources  to  find               out   the  truth  and  proof  of  alleged   or               suspected   crime  instead  of  extortion   of               confessions on unverified suspicion.... On the               other hand, the opinion has been strongly held               in  some  quarters  that  this  rule  has   an               undesirable  effect  an social  interests  and               that  in the detection of crime, the State  is               confronted with overwhelming difficulties as a               result of this privilege.  It is said this has               become  a  hiding  place  of  crime  and   has               outlived  its usefulness and that the-  rights               of accused persons are amply protected without               this privilege and that no innocent person  is               in need of it. . . . "               "In view of the above background, there is  no               inherent reason to construe the ambit of  this               fundamental  right as comprising a  very  wide               range.  Nor would it be legitimate to  confine               it to the barely literal meaning of the  words               used,  since it is a recognised doctrine  that               when  appropriate a  constitutional  provision

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             has  to  be  liberally  construed,  so  as  to               advance the intendment thereof and to  prevent               its circumvention......               Issues  Answered.’Any  person’  in  Sec.   161               Cr.P.C. We will now answer the questions suggested at the  beginning and advert to the decisions of our Court which set the  tone and temper of the ’silence’ clause and bind us willy  nilly. We have earlier explained why we regard Section 161 (2) as a sort of parliamentary commentary on Article 20(3).  So,  the first point to decide is whether the police have power under Sections  160 and 161 of the Cr.  P.C. to question a  person who, then was or, in the future may incarnate as, an accused person.  The Privy Council and this Court have held that the scope  of  section  161  does  include  actual  accused  and suspects  and we deferentially agree without  repeating  the detailed reasons urged before us by counsel. The  Privy Council, in Pakala Narayana Swami  v.  Emperor(1) reasoned at p. 51 :               "  If one had to guess at the intention of the               Legislature  it,,   framing a Section  in  the               words used, one would suppose that they had in               mind  to  encourage  the  free  disclosure  of               information  or to protect the  person  making               the statement from a supposed unreliability of               police  testimony as to alleged statements  or               both.  In any case the reasons would apply as (1)  A.I.R. 1939 P.C. 47. 633               might  be  thought a fortiori  to  an  alleged               statement made by a person ultimately accused.               But  in  truth when the meaning  or  words  is               plain it is not the duty of the Courts to busy               themselves with supposed intentions.               I have been long and deeply impressed with the               wisdom of the rule, none  believe  universally               adopted,  at  least in the Courts  of  law  in               Westminster Hall, that in construing wills and               indeed statutes, and all written  instruments,               the  grammatical  and ordinary  sense  of  the               words  is to be adhered to, unless that  would               lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance  or               inconsistency    with   the   rest   of    the               instruments, in which case the grammatical and               ordinary  sense of the words may be  modified,               so  as  to  avoid that  absurdity  and  incon-               sistency, but no farther : Lord Wensleydale in               (1875) 6 HLC 613 at p. 106.               My Lords, to quote from the language of Tindal               C.J. when delivering the opinion of the Judges               in (1844) 11 CL & F 85 at page 143, ’The  only               rule   for   the  construction  of   Acts   of               Parliament  is that they should  be  construed               according  to  the intent  of  the  Parliament               which  passed  the Act.  If the words  of  the               statute   are   in  themselves   precise   and               unambiguous,  then  no more can  be  necessary               than  to expound those words in their  natural               and  ordinary  sense.   The  words  themselves               alone  do  in  such  case  best  declare   the               intention of the law-giver.  But if any  doubt               arises   from’  the  terms  employed  by   the               Legislature,  it has always been held  a  safe               means of collecting the intention, to call  in               aid  the  ground  and  cause  of  making   the

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             statute, and to have recourse to the  preamble               which  according to Dyer C.J. (1562)  1  Plowd               353  at p. 369 is a key to open the  minds  of               the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which               they are intended to redress. : Lord  Halsbury               LC in (1891) AC 531 at p. 542.’ They reached the conclusion that ’any person’ in s. 161  Cr. P.C.; would include persons then or ultimately accused.  The view was approved in Mahabir Mandal v. State of Bihar.(1) We hold  that  ’any person supposed to be acquainted  with  the facts  and  circumstances of the case’ includes  an  accused person who fills that role because the police suppose him to have  committed the crime and must, therefore,  be  familiar with  the facts.  The supposition may later prove a  fiction but that does not repel the section.  Nor does the  marginal note ’examination of witnesses by police’ clinch the matter. A  marginal  note  clears ambiguity  but  does  not  control meaning.    Moreover,  the  suppositions   accused   figures functionally  as  a  witness.  ’To be  a  witness’,  from  a functional  angle,  is to impart knowledge in respect  of  a relevant  fact,  and  that  is  precisely  the  purpose   of questioning  the  accused under section 161, Cr.   P.C.  The dichotomy between ’witnesses’ and ’accused’ used as terms of art, does not hold good here.  The (1) [1972] 3 S.C.R. 639 at p. 657. 6-315 SCI/78. 634 amendment,  by  Act  XV  of 1941,  of  sec.  162(2)  of  the Cr.P.Code is a legislative acceptance of the Pakala Narayana Swamy  reasoning and guards against a possible  repercussion of  the  ruling.   The appellant squarely  fell  within  the interrogational  ring.   To  hold otherwise is  to  fold  up investigative   exercise,  since  questioning  suspects   is desirable for detection of crime and even protection of  the accused.   Extreme  positions  may boomerang in  law  as  in politics.  Moreover, as the Miranda decision states (p. 725, 726) :               "It  is an act of responsible citizenship  for               individuals to give whatever information  they               may have to aid in law enforcement.               Confessions  remain  a proper element  in  law               enforcement.  Any statement given  freely  and               voluntarily without any compelling  influences               is.  of course, admissible in  evidence.   The               fundamental  import of the privilege while               an individual is in custody is not whether  he               is  allowed to talk to the police without  the               benefit of warnings and counsel but whether he               can be interrogated.  There is no  requirement               that police stop a person who enters a  police               station  and states that he wishes to  confess               to  a crime, or a person who calls the  police               to  offer a confession or any other  statement               he desires to make.  Volunteered statements of               any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment               and their admissibility is not affected by our               holding today. (emphasis added) A recurrent argument, made in these cases is that  society’s need  for  interrogation  outweighs  the  privilege.    This argument  is  not  unfamiliar to  this  Court.   See.  e.g., Chambers  v. Florida, 309 US 227, 240-241, 84 Led 716,  724, 60  S  Ct  472 (1940).  The whole thrust  of  our  foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the  power of  Government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment  that

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an  individual cannot be compelled to be ;A witness  against himself.   That  right cannot be abridged.  As  Mr.  Justice Brandeis once observed               "Decency,  security and liberty  alike  demand               that  government officials shall be  subjected               to the same rules of conduct that are commands               to  the  citizens.  In a  government  of  laws               existence of the government will be  imperiled               if  it fails to observe the law  scrupulously.               Our Government is the potent, the  omnipresent               teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches  the               whole   people  by  its  example.   Crime   is               contagious.  If the Government becomes a  law-               breaker,  it  breeds  contempt  for  law;   it               invites  every  man  to  become  a  law   unto               himself, it invites anarchy.  To declare  that               in the administration of the criminal law  the               end justified the means   would bring  terrible               retribution.  Against that pernicious doctrine               this               635               Court   should  resolutely  set   its   face."               Olmstead v. United               States, 277 US 438, 485, 72 L ed 944, 959,  48               S  Ct  564,  66  ALR  376  (1928)  (dissenting               opinion)." In  this  connection,  one of  our  country’s  distinguished jurists  has  pointed  out  : "The  quality  of  a  nation’s civilization can be largely measured by the methods it  uses in the enforcement of the criminal law.  "(emphasis added) Art. 20(3) ’Accused of an offence’ It is idle to-day to ply the query whether a person formally brought  into  the  police diary as  an  accused  person  is eligible  for the prophylactic benefits of Art.  20(3).   He is,   and  the  learned  Advocate  General  fairly   stated, remembering  the  American  cases and the  rule  of  liberal construction,  that suspects, not yet formally  charged  but embryonically are accused on record, also may swim into  the harbour  of Art. 20 (3 ). We note this position but  do  not have  to pronounce upon it because certain  observations  in Oghad’s  case [1962 (3) SCR 10] conclude the issue.  And  in Bansilal’s  case  [1961 (1) SCR 417] at p. 438,  this  Court observed               "Similarly,  for invoking  the  constitutional               rights    against    testimonial     compusion               guaranteed  under  Art. 20(3) it  must  appear               that a formal accusation has been made against               the  party pleading the guarantee and that  it               relates to the commission of an offence  which               in   the   normal   course   may   result   in               prosecution.   Here  again the nature  of  the               accusation   and   its  probable   sequel   or               consequence are regarded as important.               Thus we go back to the question which we  have               already  posed, was the appellant  accused  of               any  offence  at the time  when  the  impugned               notices were served on him ? In answering this               question in the light of the tests to which we               have  just  referred it will be  necessary  to               determine the scope and nature of the  enquiry               which  the inspector undertakes under s.  240;               for, unless it is shown that an accusation  of               a  crime can be made in such an  enquiry,  the               appellant’s  plea  under  Art.  20(3)   cannot               succeed.   Section 240 shows that the  enquiry

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             which the inspector undertakes is in substance               an  enquiry  into the affairs of  the  company               concerned.               If,  after receiving the report,  the  Central               Government  is  satisfied that any  person  is               guilty   of  an  offence  for  which   be   is               criminally liable, it may, after taking  legal               advice, institute criminal proceedings against               the offending person under s. 242(1); but  the               fact  that  a prosecution  may  ultimately  be               launched against the alleged offender will not               retrospectively   change  the  complexion   or               character  of  the  proceedings  held  by  the               inspector  when  he makes  the  investigation.               Have irregularities been committed in managing               the affairs of the               636               company;  if  yes, what is the nature  of  the               irregularities   ?  Do  they  amount  to   the               commission of an offence punishable under  the               criminal  law?  If they do who is  liable  for               the  said  offence  ?  These  and  such  other               questions  fall  within  the  purview  of  the               inspector’s investigation.  The scheme of  the               relevant  sections is that  the  investigation               begins  broadly  ,with a view to  examine  the               management  of the affairs of the  company  to               find out whether any irregularities have  been               committed or not.  In such a case there is  no               accusation,   either  formal   or   otherwise,               against any specified individual; there may be               a  general  allegation that  the  affairs  are               irregularly, improperly or illegally  managed;               but  who would be responsible for the  affairs               which  are reported to be irregularly  managed               is  a matter which would be determined at  the               end  of the enquiry.  At the  commencement  of               the   enquiry   and  indeed   throughout   its               proceedings  there  is no accused  person,  no               accuser and no accusation against anyone  that               he has committed an offence.  In our opinion a               general  enquiry  and investigation  into  the               affairs  of  the  company  thus   contemplated               cannot  be regarded as in investigation  which               starts with an accusation contemplated in Art.               20(3) of the Constitution.  In this connection               it is necessary to remember that the  relevant               sections  of the Act appear in Part  VI  which               generally    deals   with    management    and               administration of the companies."               In  Raja Narayanlal Bansilal v. Maneck  Phiroz               Mistry and Anr. (supra), the admissibility  of               a statement made before an Inspector appointed               by  the Government of India under  the  Indian               Companies   Act,  1923,  to  investigate   the               affairs of a Company and to report thereon was               canvassed.  It was observed at p. 43 6 :               "..........  one of the  essential  conditions               for  invoking  the  constitutional   guarantee               enshrined  in  Art. 20(3) is  that   a  formal               accusation  relating to the, commission of  an               offence,  which  would normally  lead  to  his               prosecution,  must have been levelled  against               the  party  who  is being  compelled  to  give               evidence against him."

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Sinha,  C.  J., speaking for the majority of  the  Court  in Kathi Kalu Oghad’s case,(1) stated thus :               "To bring the statement in question within the               prohibition of Art. 20(3), the person  accused               must have stood in the character of an accused               person  at the time he made the statement.  it               is  not  enough  that  he  ’should  become  an               accused, any time after the statement has been               made." Further  observations in Bansilars case make it out that  in an enquiry undertaken by a Inspector to investigate into the affairs  of a company, the statement of a person not yet  an accused, is not hit by Art. 20(3). (1)  [1962] 3 S.C.R. 10 at 37. 637 Such a general enquiry has no specific accusation before  it and,  therefore,  no specific accused whose guilt is  to  be investigated.  Therefore,, Art. 20(3) stands excluded. In  R.  C. Mehta v. State of West Bengal(1) also  the  Court observed               "........  Normally  a person  stands  in  the               character   of   an  accused  when   a   First               Information  Report is lodged against  him  in               respect  of  an  offence  before  an   Officer               competent   to  investigate  it,  or  when   a               complaint  is made relating to the  commission               of an offence before a Magistrate competent to               try or send to another Magistrate for trial of               the offence.  Where a Custom Officer arrests a               person and informs that person of the  grounds               of his arrest, (which he is bound to do  under               Art.  22(1)  of  the  Constitution)  for   the               purpose   of  holding  an  enquiry  into   the               infringement  of  the provisions  of  the  Sea               Customs Act which he has reason to believe has               taken place, there is no formal accusation  of               an  offence:  In  the case of  an  offence  by               infringement  of  the  Sea  Customs  Act   and               punishable  at the trial before  a  Magistrate               there  is  an accusation when a  complaint  is               lodged by an officer competent in that  behalf               before the Magistrate." Reliance  was  placed  on  Ghagwandas  Goenka  v.  Union  of India(2) where this Court has said :               "The information collected under s. 19 is  for               the  purpose of seeing whether  a  prosecution               should be launched or not.  At that stage when               information  is  being collected there  is  no               accusation   against  the  person  from   whom               information  is  being collected.  It  may  be               that after the information has been  collected               the Central Government or the Reserve Bank may               come  to the conclusion that there is no  case               for  prosecution and the person concerned  may               never  be  accused.  It  cannot  therefore  be               predicted   that   the   person   from    whom               information is being collected under s. 19  is               necessarily  in  the position of  an  accused.               The  question  whether he should  be  made  an               accused is generally decided after information               is  collected  and  it is when  a  show  cause               notice is issued, as was done in this case  on               July  4,  1955,  that it can be  said  that  a               formal  accusation has been made  against  the               person  concerned.   We are therefore  of  the

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             opinion that the appellant is not entitled  to               the  protection of Art. 20(3) with respect  to               the information that might have been collected               from him under, s. 19 before July 4, 1955." It  is plausible to argue that, where realism prevails  over formalism  and probability over possibility,  the  enquiries under  criminal statutes with quasi-criminal  investigations are of an accusatory nature and are, (1)  [1969] 2 S.C.R. 461. (2)  Crl.  Appeals Nos. 131 & 132/61 dt. 20-9-63 (Unreported judgement). 638 sure to end in prosecution, if the offence is grave and  the evidence  gathered  good.  And to deny the protection  of  a constitutional  shield designed to defend a suspect  because the  enquiry is preliminary and may possibly not  reach  the court  is to erode the substance while paying hollow  homage to  the holy verbalism of the article.  We are not  directly concerned with this facet of Art. 20(3); nor are we free  to go against the settled view of this Court.  There it is. At what stage of the justice process does Art. 20(3) operate ? Another  fatuous  opposition  to  the  application  of   the constitutional inhibition may be noted and negatived.   Does the  ban  in  Art.  20(3) operate  only  when  the  evidence previously  procured  from  the  accused  is  sought  to  be introduced  into the case at the trial by the  court?   This submission,  if approved, may sap the juice and  retain  the rind  of  Art. 20(3) doing interpretative  violence  to  the humanist justice of the proscription. The text of the clause contains no such clue, its intendment is  stultified  by  such  a  judicial  ’amendment’  and   an expensive  construction  has the merit of  natural  meaning, self-fulfilment of the ’silence zone’ and the advancement of human rights.  We over-rule the plea for narrowing down  the play of the sub-article to the forensic phase of trial.   It works  where the mischief is, in the womb, i.e.  the  police process.  In the language of Miranda.               "Today,  then, there can be no doubt that  the               Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside               of  criminal court proceedings and  serves  to               protect persons in all settings in which their               freedom   of  action  is  curtailed   in   any               significant   way  from  being  compelled   to               incriminate themselves." The   constitutional  shield  must  be  as  broad   as   the contemplated danger. The Court in M.P. Sharma’s (supra) case took this extended view.               "Indeed,  every positive volitional act  which               furnishes   evidence.   is   testimoney,   and               testimonial compulsion connotes coercion which               procures  the positive volitional  evidentiary               acts of the person, as opposed to the negative               attitude of silence or submission on his part.               Nor  is  there any reason to  think  that  the               protection  in  respect  of  the  evidence  so               procured is confined to what transpires at the               trial  in the court room.  The phrase used  in               article 20(3) is "to be a witness" and not  to               "appear  as  a witness": It follows  that  the               protection  afford to an accused in so far  as               it is related to the phrase "to be a  witness"               is  not  merely  in  respect  of   testimonial               compulsion  in  the court room  but  may  well               extend   to  compelled  testimony   previously

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             obtained from him.  It is available  therefore               to  a person against whom a formal  accusation               relating  to the commission of an offence  has               been  levelled which in the normal course  may               result   in   prosecution.   Whether   it   is               available to other persons in other situations               does  not  call  for decision  in  this  case.               (emphasis, added)               639               Considered in this light, the guarantee  under               article  20(3)  would  be  available  in   the               present  cases  to these  petitioners  against               whom  a  First  Information  Report  has  been               recorded as accused therein.  It would  extend               to  any compulsory Process for  production  of               evidentary  documents  which  are   reasonably               likely to support a prosecution against them."               [P. 1088] We have to apply this rule of construction, an off-shoot  of the  Heydon’s case doctrinre, while demarcating the  suspect and the sensitive area of self-crimination and the protected sphere of defensive. silence.  If the police can interrogate to the point of self-accusation, the subsequent exclusion of that evidence at the trial hardly helps because the harm has been  already  done.  The police will  prove  through  other evidence what they have procured through forced  confession. So,  it is that the foresight of the framers  has  preempted self-incrimination at the incipient stages by not  expressly restricting it to the trial stage in court.  True, compelled testimony   previously  obtained  is  excluded.    But   the preventive   blow  falls  also  on   pre-court   testimonial compulsion.  The condition, as the decisions now go, is that the  person  compelled must be an accused.   Both  precedent procurement  and subsequent exhibition  of  self-criminating testimony   are  obviated  by   intelligent   constitutional anticipation. (i)  What is an incriminatory statement ? (ii) What is compelled testimony ? Two  vital,  yet knotty, problems demand  solution  at  this stage.  What is ’being witness against oneself’?  Or, in the annotational  language  of sec. 161 (2),  when  are  answers tainted  with  the  tendency  to expose  an  accused,  to  a criminal  charge  ?  When can  testimony  be  castigated  as ’compelled’  ?  The answer to the first has  been  generally outlined  by  us  earlier.  Not  all  relevant  answers  are criminatory;  not- all criminatory answers are  confessions. Tendency to expose to a criminal charge is wider than actual exposure to such charge.  The spirit of the American rulings and the substance of this Court’s observations justify  this ’wheels within wheels’ conceptualization of self,-accusatory statements.   The orbit of relevancy is large.   Every  fact which  has  a nexus to any part of a case is  relevant,  but such  nexus  with the case does not make it noxious  to  the accused.  Relevance may co-exist with innocence and  consti- tutional censure is attracted only when inference of nocence exists.  And an incriminatory inference is not enough for  a confession.   Only if, without more, the answer  establishes guilt, does it amount to a confession.  An illustration will explicate our proposition. Let us hypothesize a homicidal episode in which A dies and B is  suspected of murder; the scene of the crime  being  ’C’. In such a case a bunch of questions may be relevant and  yet be innocent.  Any one who describes the scene as well-wooded or dark or near a stream may be giving relevant evidence  of the landscape.  Likewise, the medical evidence of the wounds

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on  the deceased and the police evidence of the spots  where blood  pools were noticed are relevant but vis-a-vis  B  may have no incriminatory force.  But an answer that B was  seen at or near 640 the  scene,  at or about the time of the occurrence  or  had blood  on his clothes will be criminatory, is the hazard  of inculpatory implication.  In this sense, answers that would, in  themselves,  support a conviction  are  confessions  but answers  which have a reasonable tendency strongly to  point out to the guilt of the accused are incriminatory.  Relevant replies which furnish a real and clear link in the chain  of evidence  indeed  to bind down the accused  with  the  crime become  incriminatory and offend Art. 20(3) if  elicited  by pressure  from the mouth of the accused.  If the,  statement goes  further to spell in terms that B killed A, it  amounts to confession.  An answer acquires confessional status  only if,   in  terms  or  substantially,  all  the  facts   which constitute  the, offence ate admitted by the  offender.   If his  statement  also  contains  self-exculpatory  matter  it ceases  to,  be  a confession.   Article  20(3)  strikes  at confessions  and  self-incriminations but  leaves  untouched other relevant facts. In  Hoffman v. United States (341 US 479) the Supreme  Court of  the United States considered the scope of the  privilege against self-incrimination and held that it would extend not only   to  answers  that  would  in  themselves  support   a conviction but likewise embrace those which would furnish  a link  in  the  chain of evidence  needed  to  prosecute  the claimant.   However, it was clarified that the link must  be reasonably strong to make the accused apprehend danger  from such answer.  Merely because he fancied that by such  answer he  would  incriminate  himself  he  could  not  claim   the privilege of silence.  It must appear to the court that  the implications of the question, in the setting in which it  is asked,  make  it  evident that a  responsive  answer  or  an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be  dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.  The apprehension of incrimination from the answer sought must be  substantial and   real   as   distinguished  from   danger   of   remote possibilities  or  fanciful flow of inference.   Two  things need  emphasis.   The setting of the  particular  case,  the context   and   the  environment  i.e.,  the   totality   of circumstances,  must  inform the perspective  of  the  Court adjudging  the  incriminatory injury, and  where  reasonable doubt exists, the benefit must go in favour of the right  to silence by a liberal construction of the Article.  In Malloy v.  Bogan, (12 L.Ed. 2d 653), the Court unhesitatingly  held that  the  claim  of a witness of  privilege  against  self- incrimination has to be tested on a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case and where it is clear that the claim is unjustified, the protection is unavailable.  We have  summarised the Hoffman standard and the  Malloy  test. Could the witness (accused) have reasonably sensed the peril of  prosecution  from  his  answer  in  the  conspectus   of circumstances?   That is the true test.  The  perception  of the peculiarities of the case cannot be irrelevant in proper appraisal of self-incriminatory potentiality.  The cases  of this  Court  have used different phraseology  but  set  down substantially the same guidelines. Phipson, it is true, has this to say on self-incrimination : ’The  rule  applies  to  questions not  only  as  to  direct criminal acts, but as to perfectly innocent matters  forming merely  links  in  the  chain  of  proof’.   We  think  this statement  too widely drawn if applied to  Indian  Statutory

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and  Constitutional Law.  Cross also has overstated the  law going  by Indian provisions by including in the  prohibition even  those answers ’which might be used as a  step  towards obtaining evidence against him’. (The 641 policy  behind  the privilege, under our  scheme,  does  not swing  so wide as to sweep out of  admissibility  statements neither  confessional  per  se nor guilty  in  tendency  but merely relevant facts which, viewed in any setting, does not have  a  sinister import.  To spread the net so wide  is  to make  a  mockery  of the examination of  the  suspected,  so necessitous   in   the  search   for   truth.    Overbreadth undermines,  and we demur to such morbid exaggeration  of  a wholesome protection.  Neither Hoffman nor Malloy nor  Manes (42  L.Ed.  2s  574) drives us to this  devaluation  of  the police  process.  And we are supported by  meaningful  hints from  prior decisions.  In Kathi Kalu Oghad’s(1) case,  this Court  authoritatively  observed,  on  the  bounds   between constitutional proscription and testimonial permission :               "In  order  that  a testimony  by  an  accused               person   may  be  said  to  have  been   self-               incriminatory,  the compulsion of which  comes               within  the prohibition of the  constitutional               provisions,  it  must be of such  a  character               that by itself it should have the tendency  of               incrimination  the  accused, if  not  also  of               actually doing so.  In other words, it  should               be  a statement, which makes the case  against               the   accused   person  at   least   probable,               considered by itself". Again, the court indicated that Art. 20(3) could be  invoked only against statements which ’had a material bearing on the criminality  of  the maker of the statement’.   ’By  itself’ does not exclude the setting or other integral circumstances but  means something in the fact disclosed a guilt  element. Blood  on  clothes,  gold  bars  with  notorious  marks  and presence on the scene or possession of the lethal weapon  or corrupt  currency  have a tale to tell,  beyond  red  fluid, precious metal, gazing at the stars of testing sharpness  or value  of the rupee.  The setting of the case is an  implied component of the statement. The  problem  that confronts us is  amenable  to  reasonable solution.   Relevancy is tendency to make a  fact  probable. Crimination   is   a  tendency  to  make   guilt   probable. Confession is a potency to make crime conclusive.  The taint of  tendency, under Art. 20(3) and section 161 (1), is  more or less the same.  It is not a remote, recondite, freak  ,or fanciful  inference  but  a reasonable,  real,  material  or probable  deduction.  This governing test holds good, it  is pragmatic,  for  you feel the effect,  its  guilty  portent, fairly clearly. We,  however,  underscore  the importance  of  the  specific setting  of  a given case for judging the  tendency  towards guilt.  Equally emphatically, we stress the need for  regard to  the impact of the plurality of other  investigations  in the  offing or prosecutions pending on the amplitude of  the immunity.   ’To be witness against oneself’ is not  confined to  particular  offence regarding which the  questioning  is made  but extends to other offences about which the  accused has reasonable apprehension of implication from his  answer. This conclusion also flows (1)  [1962] (3) S.C.R. 10 at P. 32. 642 from  ’tendency  to be exposed to a  criminal  charge’.   ’A criminal  charge’  covers  any criminal  charge  than  under

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investigation or trial or imminently threatens the accused. The  setting  of  the case or cases is also  of  the  utmost significance  in pronouncing on the guilty tendency  of  the question and answer.  What in one milieu may be  colourless, may, in another be criminal.  ’Have you fifty rupees in your pocket  ?’ asks a police officer of a P.W.D.  engineer.   He may  have.   It  spells no hint of  crime.   But  if,  after setting  a  trap,  if the same  policeman,  on  getting  the signal,  moves  in and challenges the  engineer,  ’have  you fifty  rupees  in  your  pocket?’  The  answer,  if   ’yes’, virtually proves the guilt.  ’Were you in a particular house at  a particular time?’ is an innocent question; but in  the setting  of a murder at that time in that house, where  none else   was  present,  an  affirmative  answer  may   be   an affirmation of guilt.  While subjectivism of the accused may exaggeratedly apprehend a guilty inference lingering  behind every non-committal question, objectivism reasonably screens nocent  from  innocent answers.  Therefore,  making  a  fair margin   for   the  accused’s   credible   apprehension   of implication  from  his own mouth. the court  will  view  the interrogation   objectively  to  hold  it   criminatory   or otherwise, without surrendering to the haunting subjectivism of  the accused.  The dynamics of  constitutional  ’silence’ cover  many  interacting  factors  and  repercussions   from ’speech’. The  next  serious  question debated before  us  is  to  the connotation  of  ’compulsion’  under  Art.  20(3)  and   its reflection  in  Section 161(2). In Kathi Kalu  Oghad’s  case (supra), Sinha, C.J., explained :               "In  order  to bring the evidence  within  the               inhibition  of cl. (3) of Art. 20 it  must  be               shown  not  only that the  person  making  the               statement  was an accused at the time he  made               it  and that it had a material bearing on  the               criminality of the maker of the statement, but               also  that  he  was  compelled  to  make  that               statement.   ’Compulsion in the context,  must               mean  what in law is called ’duress’.  In  the               Dictionary  of  English Law  by  Earl  Jowitt,               ’duress’ is explained as follows :               ’Duress  is where a man is compelled to do  an               act    by   injury,   beating   or    unlawful               imprisonment   (sometimes  called  duress   in               strict  sense)  or  by  the  threat  of  being               killed,  suffering some grevious bodily  harm,               or  being  unlawfully  imprisoned   (sometimes               called  menace, or duress per minas).   Duress               also   includes   threatening,   beating    or               imprisonment of the wife, parent or child of a               person.               The  compulsion  in this sense is  a  physical               objective act and not the state of mind of the               person making the statement, except where  the               mind  has been so conditioned by  some  extra-               neous  process as to render the making of  the               statement involuntary and therefore  extorted.               Hence,  the  mere asking by a  police  officer               investigating   a  crime  against  a   certain               individual  to  do  a  certain  thing  is  not               compulsion  within the meaning of Art.  20(3).               Hence, the mere fact that the accused person,               643               when he made the statement in question was  in               police  custody would not, by itself, be  the-               foundation  for an inference of law  that  the

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             accused  was compelled to make the  statement.               Of course, it is open to an accused person  to               show  that while he was in police  custody  at               the  relevant  time,  he  was  subjected   to.               treatment  which, in the circumstances of  the               case, would lend itself to the inference  that               compulsion was, in fact, exercised.  In  other               words,  it will be a question of fact in  each               case to be determined by the Court on weighing               the  facts and circumstances disclosed in  the               evidence before it." This question of fact has to be carefully considered against the background of the circumstances disclosed in each case. The  policy  of  the law is that  each  individual,  accused included,  by virtue of his guaranteed dignity, has a  right to  a private enclave where he may lead a free life  without overbearing investigatory invasion or even  crypto-coercion. The protean forms gendarme duress assumes. the environmental pressures  of police presence, compounded  by  incommunicado confinement    and    psychic    exhaustion,     torturesome interrogation  and  physical menaces  and  other  ingenious, sophisticated  procedures the condition,  mental,  physical, cultural  and  social,  of the accused, the  length  of  the interrogation  and the manner of its; conduct and a  variety of like circumstances, will go into the pathology of coerced para-confessional  answers.   The benefit  of  doubt,  where reasonable  doubt exists, must go in favour of the  accused. The  U.S.  Supreme  Court declared, and we  agree  with  it, that.........  our contemplation cannot be only of what  has been  of what may be.  Under any other rule  a  constitution would  indeed  be  as easy of application  as  it  would  be deficient  in  efficacy and power.  Its  general  principles would  have little value and be converted by precedent  into impotent  and lifeless formulas.  Rights declared  in  words might  be  lost in reality.  And this has  been  recognized. The  meaning (384 US 444) and vitality of  the  Constitution have developed against narrow and restrictive construction.’ (54 L.Ed. 793, 810). Making Art. 20(3) effective in action Impregnability  of the constitutional fortress built  around Art. 20(3) is the careful concern of the Court and, for this purpose,  concrete directives must be spelt out.   To  leave the   situation  fluid,  after  a  general  discussion   and statement  of  broad conclusions, may not  be  proper  where glittering  phrases pale into gloomy realities in  the  dark recesses where the law has to perform.  Law is what law does and   tot what law says.  This realisation obligates  us  to set  down,  concrete guidelines to make the  law  a  working companion  of  life.  In this context we must  certainly  be aware  of the burdens which law enforcement officials  bear, often  under  trying circumstances and public  ballyhoo  and amidst escalating as well as novel crime proliferation.  Our conclusions  are, therefore, based upon an  appreciation  of the difficulties of the police and the necessitities of  the Constitution. 644 The  functional  role and practical sense of the law  is  of crucial moment.  "An acre in Middle sex," said Macaulay, "is better than a principality in Utopia." (Introduction of ’Law in  America’  by Bernard Schwartz.) This realism  has  great relevance  when dealing with  interrogation,  incrimination, police station, the Constitution and the code. Now  we  will first formulate our findings  on  the  various matters argued before us and discussed above.  Then, we will fortify  the  observance of the legal  requirements  by  the

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police through practical prescriptions and proscriptions. We  hold that section 161 enables the police to examine  the accused during investigation.  The prohibitive sweep of Art. 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation-not, as contended,  commencing in court only.  In our judgment,  the provisions   of  Art.  20(3)  and  section  1  61  (   1   ) substantially  cover  the same area, so far  as  police  in- vestigations are concerned.  The ban on self-accusation  and the  right to silence, while one investigation or trial  is- under way, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard  to  other offences pending or  imminent,  which  may deter  him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory  matter. We  are disposed to read ’compelled testimony’  as  evidence procured  not merely by physical threats or violence but  by psychic   torture,   atmospheric   pressure,   environmental coercion,  tiring interrogative prolixity,  overbearing  and intimidatory  methods  and the like-not  legal  penalty  for violation. So, the legal perils following upon refusal  to answer,   or  answer  truthfully,  cannot  be  regarded   as compulsion  within the meaning of Art. 20(3).  The  prospect of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise  of a  constitutional  right, but then, a stance of  silence  is running  a calculated risk.  On the other hand, if there  is any mode of pressure, subtle or crude, mental or  physical, direct or indirect, but sufficiently substantial, applied by the  policeman  for obtaining information  from  an  accused strongly   suggestive  of  guilt,  it   becomes   ’compelled testimony’, violative of Art. 20(3). A   police  officer  is  clearly  a  person  in   authority. Insistence on answering is a form of pressure especially  in the   atmosphere  of  the  police  station  unless   certain safeguards erasing duress are adhered to.  Frequent  threats of prosecution if there is failure to answer may take on the complexion  of undue pressure violating Art.  20(3).   Legal penalty may by itself not amount to duress but the manner of mentioning  it to the victim of interrogation may  introduce an  element  of  tension  and  tone  of  command  perilously hovering near compulsion-. We  have explained elaborately and summed up, in  substance, what is self-incrimination or tendency to expose oneself  to a criminal charge.  It is less than ’relevant’ and more than ’confessional.   Irrelevance is impermissible but  relevance is licit but when relevant questions are loaded with  guilty inference  in  the event of an answer  being  supplied,  the tendency  to  incriminate springs into existence.   We  hold further  that the accused person cannot be forced to  answer ques-  645 tions merely because the answers thereto are not implicative when  viewed in isolation and confirmed to  that  particular case.   He is entitled to keep his mouth shut if the  answer sought has a reasonable prospect of exposing him to guilt in some  other accusation actual or imminent, even  though  the investigation  underway is not with reference to  that.   We have already explained that in determining the incriminatory character  of  an  answer the accused is  entitled  to  con- sider--and  the Court while adjudging will take note  of-the setting,  the  totality  of  circumstances,  the   equation, personal  and  social,  which have a bearing  on  making  an answer  substantially  innocent  but  in  effect  guilty  in import.  However, fanciful claims, unreasonable  prehensions and  vague possibilities cannot be the hiding ground for  an accused  person.   He is bound to answer where there  is  no clear tendency to criminate. We have no doubt that section 179 I.P.C. has a component  of

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mens  rea  and  where there is no wilful  refusal  but  only unwitting  omission or innocent warding off, the offence  is not  made out, When there is reasonable doubt  indicated  by the accused’s explanation he is entitled to its benefit  and cannot  be forced to substantiate his ground lest,  by  this process,  he is constrained to surrender the very  privilege for  which he is fighting.  What may apparently be  innocent information  may really be nocent or noxious viewed  in  the wider setting. It  may  not  be sufficient merely to  state  the  rules  of jurisprudence  in  a branch like this.  The man who  has  to work  it is the average police head constable in the  Indian countryside.   The  man who has to defend himself  with  the constitutional  shield  is  the little  individual,  by  and large.   The place where these-principles have to have  play is  the unpleasant police station, unused to  constitutional nuances  and  habituated to  other  strategies.   Naturally, practical  points which lend themselves to adoption  without much sophistication must be indicated if this judgment is to have full social relevance.  In this perspective we  address ourselves to the further task of concretising guidelines. Right at the beginning we must notice Art. 22(1) of the Con- stitution, which reads :               "No  person who is arrested shall be  detained               in custody without being informed, as soon  as               may  be,  of the grounds for such  arrest  nor               shall he be denied the right to consult ,  and               to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his               choice." The right to consult an advocate of his choice shall not  be denied  to any person who is arrested.  This does  not  mean that  persons  who are not under arrest or  custody  can  be denied that right.  The spirit and sense of Art. 22 (1 )  is that it is fundamental to the rule of law that the services of  a  lawyer  shall be available for  consultation  to  any accused   person  under  circumstances  of   ’near-custodial interrogation.   Moreover,  the  observance  of  the   right against self-incrimination is best promoted by conceding  to the accused the right to consult a legal practitioner of his choice. 646 Lawyer’s   presence  is  a  constitutional  claim  in   some circumstances  in our country also, and, in the  context  of Art.  20(3), is an assurance of awareness and observance  of the  right  to silence.  The Miranda decision  has  insisted that  if an accused person asks for lawyer’s assistance,  at the stage of interrogation, it shall be granted before  Com- mencing  or continuing with the questioning.  We think  that Art.  20 (3) and Art. 22(1) may, in a way, be telescoped  by making  it prudent for the Police to permit the advocate  of the  accused, if there be one, to be present at the time  be is  examined.  Over-reaching Art. 20(3) and  section  161(2) will  be obviated by this requirement.  We do not  lay  down that the Police must secure the services of a lawyer.   That will lead to ’police-station-lawyer’ system, an abuse  which breeds  other  vices.  But all that we mean is  that  if  an accused person expresses the wish to have his lawyer by  his side  when his examination goes on, this facility shall  not be denied, without being exposed to the serious reproof that involuntary  self-crimination  secured  in  secrecy  and  by coercing the will, was the project. Not  that a lawyer’s presence is a panacea for all  problems of  involuntary  self-crimination,  for  he  cannot   supply answers  or  whisper hints or otherwise interfere  with  the course of questioning except to intercept where intimidatory

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tactics are tried, caution his client where incrimination is attempted  and insist on questions and answers  being  noted where  objections are not otherwise fully  appreciated.  lie cannot  harangue  the  police but may help  his  client  and complain  on  his behalf, although his  very  presence  will ordinarily remove the implicit menace of a police station. We  realize that the presence of a lawyer is asking for  the moon  in many cases until a public defender  system  becomes ubiquitous.   The  police  need not wait  more  than  for  a reasonable  while for an advocate’s arrival.  But they  must invariably  warn--and record that fact about the  right  to silence against self-incrimination; and where the accused is literate take his written acknowledgement. ’Third  degree’ is an easy temptation where the pressure  to detect  is heavy, the cerebration involved is hard and  the resort  to torture may yield high dividends.  Das  Gupta  J, dissenting for the minority on the Bench, drove home a point which    deserves   attention   while   on    constitutional construction               "It is sufficient to remember that long before               our Constitution came to be framed the  wisdom               of the policy underlying these rules had  been               well  recognised.  Not that there was no  view               to  the  contrary; but for long  it  has  been               generally agreed among those who have  devoted               serious  thought  to these problems  that  few               things could be more harmful to the  detection               of  crime or conviction of the  real  culprit,               few   things   more  likely  to   hamper   the               disclosure    of   truth   than    to    allow               investigators or prosecutors to slide down the               easy   path   of  producing   by   compulsion,               evidence, whether oral or documentary, from an               accused person.  It has been felt that               647               the  existence of such an easy way would  tend               to dissuade persons in charge of investigation               or prosecution from conducting diligent search               for  reliable independent evidence,  and  from               sifting  of available materials with the  care               necessary  for ascertainment of truth.  If  it               is permissible in law to obtain evidence  from               the  accused person by compulsion,  why  tread               the  hard path of laborious investigation  and               prolonged examination of other men,  materials               and documents ? It has been well said that  an               abolition  of  this  privilege  would  be   an               incentive  for those in charge of  enforcement               of law to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing               red  pepper  into a poor devil’s  eyes  rather               than  to  go  about  in  the  sun  hunting  up               evidence’. (Stephen, History of Criminal  Law,               p.  442).  No less serious is the danger  that               some accused persons at least, may be  induced               to  furnish evidence against themselves  which               is totally false--out of sheer despair and  an               anxiety  to avoid an unpleasant  present.   Of               all these dangers the Constitution makers were               clearly  well aware and it was to  avoid  them               that Art. 20(3) was put in the Constitution."               The  symbiotic need to preserve  the  immunity               without   stifling  legitimate   investigation               persuades  us  to,  indicate  that  after   an               examination  of the accused, where  lawyer  of               his  choice  is  not  available,  the   police

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             official must take him to a magistrate, doctor               or other willing and responsible  non-partisan               official or non-official and allow a  secluded               audience where he may unburden himself  beyond               the view of the police and tell whether he has               suffered  duress, which should be followed  by               judicial  or some other custody for him  where               the police cannot teach him.  That  collocutor               may  briefly record the relevant  conversation               and  communicate it-not to the  police-but  to               the  nearest  magistrate.  Pilot  projects  on               this pattern may yield experience to guide the               practical   processes  of  implementing   Art.               20(3).    We  do  not  mandate  but   strongly               suggest.               The statement of the accused, if voluntary, is               admissible,  indeed,  invaluable.   To   erase               involuntariness we must erect safeguards which               will  not  ’kill the goose’.  To  ensure  this               free will by inbuilt structural changes is the               desideratum.   Short-run remedies apart  long-               run  recipes must be innovated  whereby  fists               are replaced by wits, ignorance by  awareness,               ’third   degree’   by  civilized   tools   and               technology.   The factotum policeman who  does               everything  from a guard of honour to  traffic               patrol  to subtle detection is an  obsolescent               survival   Special  training,  special   legal               courses, technological and other detective up-               dating, are important.  An aware police man is               the  best social asset towards  crimelessness.               The consciousness of the official as much  as               of  the  community is the healing hope  for  a               crime-ridden society.  Judge-centred  remedies               don’t   work  in  the  absence  of   community               centered   rights.   All  these  add   up   to               separation of investigatory personnel from the               general mass and in-service specialisation  of               many lines on a scientific basis.  This should               be  done  vertically and  horizontally.   More               importantly,  the policeman must  be  released               from  addiction to coercion and be  sensitized               to constitutional values.               648               The  Indian Republic cannot fulfil its  social               justice  tryst without a serious  strategy  of               cultural and organisational transformation  of               police    intelligence   and    investigation,               abjuring  fists and emphasizing wits,  setting               apart  a  separate, sophisticated  force  with               special   skills,   drills,   techniques   and               technology  and  aloof from  the  fossilising,               sometimes marginally feudal,  assignments-like               V.I.P.  duty, sentry duty, traffic  duty,  law               and    order   functions,   border    security               operations.   They must develop an  ethos  and               ethic  and professionalism and  probity  which               can effectively meet the challenge of criminal               cunning, the menace of macabre intricacies and               the subtle machinations of white collar crimi-               nals in politics, business and professions and               can   do  so  without  resort  to   vulgarity,               violence or other vice.  The methods,  manners               and morals of the police force are the measure               of  a  society’s  cultural  tolerable  and   a

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             government’s real refinement.               Such    a    broad   project    is    overdue.               Constitutions are not self-working.   Judicial               fire-fighting  does not prevent fires.  So  it               is that we stress hopefully the larger changes               now  needed especially because  the  recurrent               theme  of  police role in a Welfare  State  is               reportedly   engaging  the  attention   of   a               national  commission.   Our  observations  are               fragmentary    being    confined    to     the               constitutional  imperative of Art.  20(3).   A               holistic perspective informs our  suggestions.               Our purpose is not to sterilise the police but               to clothe the accused with his proper right of               silence.  Art. 20(3) is not a paper tiger  but               a  provision  to  police  the  police  and  to               silence  coerced crimination.  The  dissenting               words of Mr. Justice White bear quotation  in               this context :               "   ....  The  Courts  duty  to   assess   the               consequences of its action is not satisfied by               the  utterance of the truth that a   value  of               our system of criminal justice is ’to  respect               the  inviolability of the  human  personality’               and  to  require  government  to  produce  the               evidence  against  the  accused  by  its   own               independent labours. (Ante, at 715.) More than               the human dignity of the accused is  involved;               the human personality of others in the society               must  also  be preserved.   Thus  the,  values               reflected  by the privilege are not  the  sole               desideratum; society’s interest in the general               security is of equal weight."               "The  obvious  underpinning  of  the   Court’s               decision  is  a deep-seated  distrust  of  all               confessions.   As the Court declares that  the               accused  not be interrogated  without  counsel               present,  absent  a  waiver of  the  right  to               counsel,  and as the Court all but  admonishes               the lawyer to advise the (384 US 538)  accused               to  remain  silent, the. result adds up  to  a               judicial  judgment  that  evidence  from   the               accused should not be used against him in  any               way,  whether compelled or not.  This  is  the               not so subtle overtone of the opinion-that  it               is  inherently wrong for the police to  gather               evidence  from the accused himself.  And  this               is  precisely the nub of this dissent.  I  see               nothing wrong or immoral and certainly nothing               unconstitutional  in  the  police’s  asking  a               suspect  whom  they have reasonable  cause  to               arrest whether or not               649               lie killed his wife or in confronting him with               the evidence on which the arrest was based, at               least  where he has been plainly advised  that               he may remain completely silent. (see Escobedo               v.  Illinois, 12 L.Ed. 2d 977).  Until  today,               ’the   admissions   or  confessions   of   the               prisoner,  when voluntarily and  freely  made,               have  always  ranked  high  in  the  scale  of               incriminating evidence’.  Brown v. Walker,  40               L.  Ed. 819, see also Hopt v. Utah 28  L.  Ed.               262.  Particularly when corroborated, as where               the   police  have  confirmed  the   accused’s

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             disclosure  of the hiding place of  implements               or fruits of the crime, such confessions  have               the  highest  reliability  and   significantly               contribute to the certitude with which we  may               believe  the accused is guilty.  Moreover,  it               is  by  no means certain that the  process  of               confessing  is injurious to The  accused.   To               the  contrary  it  may  provide  psychological               relief   and   enhance   the   prospects   for               rehabilitation.               This  is not to say that the value of  respect               for   the  inviolability  of   the   accused’s               individual  personality should be accorded  no               weight  or  that  all  confessions  should  be               indiscriminately  admitted.   This  Court  has               long   read  the  Constitution  to   proscribe               compelled  confessions, a salutary  rule  from               which there should be no retreat." The law will only limp along until the tools are tuned.   We have proposed the first stone, not the last step. A final note on the actual case on hand.  While some aspects of  Art.  20(3) have been authoritatively  expounded,  other aspects have remained obscure and unexplored.  A flash flood of  demands  against  self-incriminatory  interrogation  has risen now when very important persons of yesterday have  got caught  in the criminal investigations coils of today.   And when  the big fight forensic battles the small gain  by  the victory, if any.  The fact that the scope of the  protection against  self-accusation  has not been clarified  before  in this  area makes it necessary for us to take a gentler  view in  this case, in the interest of justice.  Moreover on  our interpretation,  the  magistrate,  trying  the  case   under section  179  I.P.C.  and in a  setting  where  the  accused allegedly has a number of other offenses to answer for, will be  thrown  into a larger enquiry than  the  simplistic  one ordinarily needed We have declared the law on a thorny constitutional question where the amber light from American rulings and beacon beams from Indian precedents have aided us in our decision.  It is quite  probable  that the very act of directing a  woman  to come  to the police station in violation of  section  160(1) Cr.P.C. may make for tension and relate voluntaries.  It  is likely that some of the questions are selfcriminatory.  More importantly,  the admitted circumstances are such  that  the trying  magistrate  may have to hold  an  elaborate  enquiry about other investigations, potential and actual, to  decide about  the self accusatory character of the  answers.   And, finally,  the  process  of   proving  proneness  for   self- incrimination will itself strike a blow on the 7-315SCI/78 650 very protection under Art. 20(3).  We have more reasons than one to conclude that the ends of justice will be  ill-served by  an  endless  magisterial chase of  a  charge  the  legal clarity of which is, by this judgment, being authoritatively unveiled  and the factual foundation of which may have  some infirmities.   An the consequences of refusal to answer,  if most  of the questions are self-condemning and a few  formal ones innocuous, were not gone into by us.  So, we  suggested to  counsel that the authority of the law be  vindicated  by the   accused  undertaking  to  answer  all  relevant,   not criminatory,   interrogations   and,  on  this   pledge   of compliance,  the State withdraw the prosecution  protempore. If  the accused went back on the undertaking  a  prosecution could again be launched and the party proceeded against  for

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breach of the plighted word.  The response from the State is a remarkable assertion of legal rectitude and exposition  of the  principles for exercise of the power to withdraw,  and, finally. a conclusion couched thus               "After  careful consideration from all  angles               and in the facts and circumstances on  record,               Government  have come to the conclusion,  that               there   are   no  circumstances   to   justify               withdrawal by the State Government." We,  think that a litigant, be he the highest or  lowest  in the  State, should not lecture to the court but  listen  and explain  its  difficulties.  We do not  draw  any  inference about   the   prosecution  as  motivated,  which   was   the appellant’s  recurrent  theme;  for that  is  irrelevant  in court.  But we confess that the statement of the State calls to  mind the words of Hamlet : "The lady protests too  much, methinks." We  must  record  our appreciation of the  services  of  the Advocate  General but in the statement put in,  the  State’s counsel perhaps, bad to ’speak the speech’.  Maybe. To  conclude.  We have bestowed some thought on the law  and consider  this case preeminently one where  the  Government, acting without ill-will or affection, should have  withdrawn the  prosecution.   By Government we mean  the  complainant- public servant who is the party respondent.  We do not  need the   Government  to  exercise  its  power  to  direct   its subordinate  to withdraw and know that it is not  eo  nomine party  before  us--a public servant is not  a  benamidar  of Government  but an officer, in his own right,  saddled  with statutory  behests  to execute.  We note  with  satisfaction that this Government is moved only by legal, not extraneous, considerations  in  launching and refusing to  withdraw  the prosecution  against the appellant.  We have indicated  some (not  all)  reasons,  pertinent  in  law,  for  legitimately withdrawing a prosecution and the very fact that this  Court suggested it is ordinarily sufficient to rule out the charge of  improper grounds and yet the State argues  overzealously about  the  proper  criteria.   We  could  have  given  more relevant reasons but do not do so since the correct  course, at  this stage, is to quash the prosecution as it stands  at present. Why  do we ? To serve the ends of justice.  When a woman  is commanded  into a police station, violating the  commandment of  Section 160 of the Code, when a heavy load of  questions is handed in, 651 some permissible, some not, where the area of constitutional protection against self-crimination is (until this decision) blurred  ill some aspects, when, in this court, counsel  for the  accused unreservedly undertakes to answer in the  light of  the  law  we  here lay down,  when  the  object  of  the prosecution  is to compel contrite compliance  with  Section 161 Cr.P.C. abandoning all contumacy and this is achieved by the  undertaking, when the pragmatic issues involved are  so complex that effective barricades against police pressure to secure  self-incrimination need more steps as  indicated  in our  judgement, we hold that persistence in the  prosecution is  seeming  homage  to the rule of  law  and  quashing  the prosecution  secures the ends of justice-the right thing  to do is to quash the prosecution as it stands at present.   We regret  that this dimension of the problem has  escaped  the Executive’s attention. for reasons best left unexplored. The conspectus of circumstances persuades us to exercise our power  under Art. 266 read with Art. 136 and section 401  of Cr.P.C.  to make the following direction.  We are  satisfied

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that  many of the questions put by the police are not  self- incriminatory, remote apprehensions being wholly irrelevant. To   answer  is  citizen’s  duty;  failure  is  asking   for conviction.   The  appellant shall undertake to  answer  all questions put to her which do not materially incriminate her in  the pending or imminent investigations or  prosecutions. If  she  claims immunity regarding any questions  she  will, without  disclosing details, briefly state in which case  or offence  in the offing makes her reasonably apprehend  self- incrimination  by her refused answers.  If, after the  whole examination  is over, the officer concerned  reasonably  re- gards  any refusal to answer to be a wilful violation  under pretense  of  immunity from self-incrimination, be  will  be free  to prosecute the alleged offender after  studying  the refusal to answer in the light of the principles we have set out.   Section  179  I.P.C. should  not  be  unsheathed  too promiscuously  and teasingly to tense lay people into  vague consternation  and  covert compulsion although  the  proper, office  of  Section  179  I.P.C.  is  perfectly  within  the constitutional limits of Art. 20(3) The  appellant, through her counsel, undertakes to abide  by the  above  directions to answer all  police  interrogations relevant but not self-incriminatory (as explained earlier). The  police  Officer  shall not summon  her  to  the  police station  but examine her in terms of the proviso to  section 160(1)  of  the Cr.P.Code. The appellant shall,  Within  ten days  from  today, file a written undertaking on  the  lines directed  above, although, regardless thereof her  counsel’s undertaking will bind her.  Indeed, we direct her to  answer in accordance with the law we have just clarified. The  prosecution proceedings in complaint case No. 2(c)  388 of 1977 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate  Sadar, Cuttack, are hereby quashed and the appeals allowed. S.R.                        Appeals allowed. 652