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 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4578 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2156 of 2007)

Nand Kishore                   …Appellant

VERSUS

Yashpal Singh                       …Respondent

J U D G M E N T  

TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.

1.1. Leave granted.Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  orderThis  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order   

dated 1dated 1stst of November, 2006 passed in Civil Revision Case of November, 2006 passed in Civil Revision Case   

No. 4735 of 2001 by the High Court of Punjab and HaryanaNo. 4735 of 2001 by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana   

at  Chandigarh  wherein  the  High  Court  had  allowed  theat  Chandigarh  wherein  the  High  Court  had  allowed  the   

revision petition and set aside the judgment passed by therevision petition and set aside the judgment passed by the   

Appellate Authority,  Chandigarh which had set aside theAppellate Authority,  Chandigarh which had set aside the   

judgment  and  order  of  the  Rent  Controller,  Chandigarhjudgment  and  order  of  the  Rent  Controller,  Chandigarh   

rejecting  the  application  for  eviction  filed  by  therejecting  the  application  for  eviction  filed  by  the  

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landlord/appellant  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  thelandlord/appellant  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the   

‘appellant’)   ‘appellant’)    

3. 3. The appellant, who had purchased the House No. 189,The appellant, who had purchased the House No. 189,   

Sector 11-A, Chandigarh (which is in a residential area) in anSector 11-A, Chandigarh (which is in a residential area) in an   

auction in 1990, raised a construction on that plot which isauction in 1990, raised a construction on that plot which is   

500  Sq.  Yds.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  demised500  Sq.  Yds.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  demised   

premises”).  As the appellant has settled in U.K., his fatherpremises”).  As the appellant has settled in U.K., his father   

Shri Mange Ram, who is a permanent resident of India, hadShri Mange Ram, who is a permanent resident of India, had   

inducted  the  respondent  as  a  tenant  in  a  part  of  theinducted  the  respondent  as  a  tenant  in  a  part  of  the   

residential premises for residential use in the month of April,residential premises for residential use in the month of April,   

1994.  The tenant/respondent (hereinafter referred to as the1994.  The tenant/respondent (hereinafter referred to as the   

‘respondent’), according to the appellant, without the consent‘respondent’), according to the appellant, without the consent   

and permission of the appellant, started commercial activitiesand permission of the appellant, started commercial activities   

in the demised premises from December 1994. The appellantin the demised premises from December 1994. The appellant   

filed  an  application  under  Section  13  of  the  East  Punjabfiled  an  application  under  Section  13  of  the  East  Punjab   

Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to asUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as   

“the  Act”),  for  eviction of  the  respondent  from the demised“the Act”),  for  eviction of  the  respondent  from the demised   

premises on the ground that although the demised premisespremises on the ground that although the demised premises   

was  let  out  for  residential  purposes,  the  respondent  had,was  let  out  for  residential  purposes,  the  respondent  had,   

without the consent and permission of the appellant, startedwithout the consent and permission of the appellant, started   

using  it  for  commercial  use.   The  eviction  application  wasusing  it  for  commercial  use.   The  eviction  application  was  

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dismissed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, against whichdismissed by the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, against which   

an  appeal  was  taken  before  the  Appellate  Authority,an  appeal  was  taken  before  the  Appellate  Authority,   

Chandigarh,  which  was  allowed  by  its  order  dated  14Chandigarh,  which  was  allowed  by  its  order  dated  14thth of of   

August, 2001.  Against this order of the Appellate Authority,August, 2001.  Against this order of the Appellate Authority,   

the respondent filed a revision petition before the High Courtthe respondent filed a revision petition before the High Court   

and  by  the  impugned  Judgment  of  the  High  Court,  theand  by  the  impugned  Judgment  of  the  High  Court,  the   

eviction petition of the appellant was dismissed and the ordereviction petition of the appellant was dismissed and the order   

of the Rent Controller, Chandigarh was restored.  of the Rent Controller, Chandigarh was restored.   

4.4. Feeling  aggrieved,  the  appellant  has  filed  this  SpecialFeeling  aggrieved,  the  appellant  has  filed  this  Special   

Leave Petition, which on grant of leave, was heard in presenceLeave Petition, which on grant of leave, was heard in presence   

of the learned counsel for the parties.  of the learned counsel for the parties.   

5.5. We have  heard  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  theWe have  heard  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the   

parties and examined the impugned judgment as well as theparties and examined the impugned judgment as well as the   

judgment of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller,judgment of the Appellate Authority and the Rent Controller,   

Chandigarh and other materials on record. Chandigarh and other materials on record.  

6.6. The questions  that  need to  be  decided in  the  presentThe questions  that  need to  be  decided in  the  present   

appeal are whether : appeal are whether :  

(i)(i) the  demised  premises  which  is  situated  in  athe  demised  premises  which  is  situated  in  a   

residential area and in a residential building canresidential area and in a residential building can   

be  used  for  commercial  purposes  even  bybe  used  for  commercial  purposes  even  by   

consent of the appellant in view of Section 11 ofconsent of the appellant in view of Section 11 of  

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the Act and the provisions of the Developmentthe Act and the provisions of the Development   

and Regulation Act; and and Regulation Act; and  

(ii)(ii)  if  the  residential  premises  is  let  out  for if  the  residential  premises  is  let  out  for   

commercial  purposes,  by  a  mutual  agreementcommercial  purposes,  by  a  mutual  agreement   

between the  landlord  and the  tenant,  can thebetween the  landlord  and the  tenant,  can the   

landlord still seek eviction of the tenant on thelandlord still seek eviction of the tenant on the   

ground that using of such residential premisesground that using of such residential premises   

for commercial purposes entails the tenant to befor commercial purposes entails the tenant to be   

evicted from the demised premises?evicted from the demised premises?

7. Before  we  deal  with  question  No.1  as  posed  herein  

earlier, let us first decide the question No.2.

8. In our view, this question must be decided in favour of  

the appellant. In Vinod Kumar Arora vs. Surjit Kaur [1987  

(3) SCC 711], this Court has dealt with this question. At page  

719, this court observed that -  

“  Even if  the landlord and tenant had converted a residential    building into a non residential one by mutual consent, it would   still  be  violative  of  Section  11  of  the  East  Punjab  Rent  Restriction  Act and,  therefore, the landlord cannot be barred  from seeking recovery of possession of the leased building for  his residential  needs. We are  therefore, of  the view that  the   findings  of  the  Rent  Controller  and  the  Appellate  Authority   about  the  appellant  having  taken  the  hall  on  lease  only  for  running a clinic and that he had not changed the user of the  premises  have  been  rendered  without  reference  to  the  pleadings and without examining the legality of the appellant’s

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contentions in the  light  of  Section  11 of  the  Act.  We do not,   therefore, think the High Court has committed any error in law  in ignoring the findings rendered by the statutory authorities  about the purpose for which the hall had been taken on lease.”   (Emphasis supplied).   

9.9. Again in  Again in  Kamal Arora vs. Amar Singh & Ors.  Kamal Arora vs. Amar Singh & Ors.  [1986[1986   

Suppl.  SCC  481]  this  Court  in  paragraph  3  observed  asSuppl.  SCC  481]  this  Court  in  paragraph  3  observed  as   

follows :follows :

“The High Court after examining the provisions of the Capital of   Punjab  (Development  and  Regulation)  Act,  1951  read  with   Section 11 of the Rent Act held that statute prohibits conversion   of residential building into non-residential by act inter vivos. It   was  said  that  the  landlord  and  the  tenant  by  their  mutual   consent  cannot  convert  a  residential  building  into  a  non- residential  building  because  that  would  be  violative  of  the   provision  of  Section  11.  And  it  is  admitted  that  building  is   situated  in  a  sector  falling  within  the  residential  zone.”  (Emphasis supplied)

10. In view of the above two decisions of this Court and after  

considering the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, it must be  

held  that  the  landlord  cannot  permit  a  tenant  to  use  the  

premises  which  is  situated  in  a  residential  area  for  

commercial purposes as it would be violative of Section 11 of  

the Act which is mandatory in nature.  Accordingly, we are of  

the view that question No. 2 must be answered in favour of  

the appellant.        

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11. Let  us  now  come  back  to  question  No.1  formulated  

earlier.  

12. Before we deal with this question, we may refer to the  

relevant provisions of the Act.  Section 13(2)(ii)(b) and Section  

11 of the Act are such sections which would be required to be  

considered first to decide this appeal. Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the  

Act runs as under :-

13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to13(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to    the Controller  for a direction in that  behalf. If  the Controller,the Controller  for a direction in that  behalf. If  the Controller,    after  giving  the  tenant  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  showingafter  giving  the  tenant  a  reasonable  opportunity  of  showing    cause against the applicant, is satisfied-cause against the applicant, is satisfied-

(i)(i) x x x x x x x x x x     x x x x x x x x x x      (ii)(ii) that  the tenant has after the commencement ofthat  the tenant has after the commencement of    

this  Act  without  the  written  consent  of  thethis  Act  without  the  written  consent  of  the    landlord-landlord-

(a)         x x x x x x x x x x (a)         x x x x x x x x x x  (b)(b) used the building or rented land for a  purposeused the building or rented land for a  purpose    

other than that for which it has been leased, other than that for which it has been leased,  (iii)(iii)  x x x x x x x x x x. x x x x x x x x x x. (iv)(iv) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  (v)(v) x x x x x x x x xx.x x x x x x x x xx.

     The Controller may make an order directing the tenant toThe Controller may make an order directing the tenant to    put the landlord in possession of the building or rented landput the landlord in possession of the building or rented land    and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an orderand if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order    rejecting the application:  rejecting the application:   

Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonableProvided that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable    time for putting the landlord in possession of the building ortime for putting the landlord in possession of the building or    rented land and may extend such time  so as  not to  exceedrented land and may extend such time  so as  not to  exceed    three months in the aggregate.three months in the aggregate.

Section 11 of the Act runs as under :- Section 11 of the Act runs as under :-

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“Conversation  of  a residential  building into a non-residential“Conversation  of  a residential  building into a non-residential    building – building –  No  person  shall  convert  a  residential  building  into  a  non-No  person  shall  convert  a  residential  building  into  a  non- residential building except with the permission in writing of theresidential building except with the permission in writing of the    Controller.”Controller.”      

13.13. From a  bare  reading  of  the  provision  under   SectionFrom a  bare  reading  of  the  provision  under   Section   

13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, it would be evident that if a tenanted13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, it would be evident that if a tenanted   

premises is let out for residential purposes, but is being usedpremises is let out for residential purposes, but is being used   

other  than  that  for  which  it  has  been  leased  out,  i.e.,  forother  than  that  for  which  it  has  been  leased  out,  i.e.,  for   

commercial purposes, the tenant is liable for eviction from thecommercial purposes, the tenant is liable for eviction from the   

tenanted  premises.  In  the  application  for  eviction  thetenanted  premises.  In  the  application  for  eviction  the   

appellant pleaded that the demised premises was let out toappellant pleaded that the demised premises was let out to   

the respondent for  a period of  11 months in the month ofthe respondent for  a period of  11 months in the month of   

April,  1994 at a monthly rental of Rs.1000/- for residentialApril,  1994 at a monthly rental of Rs.1000/- for residential   

use. Therefore, the appellant pleaded that since the purposeuse. Therefore, the appellant pleaded that since the purpose   

for which the demised premises was let out was violated as itfor which the demised premises was let out was violated as it   

was brought into commercial use, the respondent was liablewas brought into commercial use, the respondent was liable   

for  eviction  under  Section  13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the  Act  from  thefor  eviction  under  Section  13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the  Act  from  the   

demised premises. demised premises.  

14.14. The  eviction  application  was  hotly  contested  by  theThe  eviction  application  was  hotly  contested  by  the   

respondent  by  filing  a  written  objection  in  which  therespondent  by  filing  a  written  objection  in  which  the   

respondent disputed the very purpose of tenancy for whichrespondent disputed the very purpose of tenancy for which  

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the tenancy was taken. The respondent, inter alia, made out athe tenancy was taken. The respondent, inter alia, made out a   

case in his defence that the eviction application filed by thecase in his defence that the eviction application filed by the   

appellant  under  Section  13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the  Act  was  notappellant  under  Section  13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the  Act  was  not   

maintainable  as  the  demised  premises  was  let  out  formaintainable  as  the  demised  premises  was  let  out  for   

commercial purposes from the very inception of the tenancycommercial purposes from the very inception of the tenancy   

and,  accordingly,  the  use  of  the  demised  premises  forand,  accordingly,  the  use  of  the  demised  premises  for   

commercial purposes from the very inception of the tenancycommercial purposes from the very inception of the tenancy   

even in a residential building and also in a residential areaeven in a residential building and also in a residential area   

can  not  give  any  right  to  the  landlord  to  get  an  order  ofcan  not  give  any  right  to  the  landlord  to  get  an  order  of   

eviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act and in view of theeviction under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act and in view of the   

above, the respondent contended that the eviction applicationabove, the respondent contended that the eviction application   

filed by the appellant must be rejected. filed by the appellant must be rejected.  

15.15. In  support  of  their  respective  case  before  the  RentIn  support  of  their  respective  case  before  the  Rent   

Controller, parties adduced evidence and went into trial. AsController, parties adduced evidence and went into trial. As   

noted herein earlier, the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, by itsnoted herein earlier, the Rent Controller, Chandigarh, by its   

judgment and order rejected the eviction application on thejudgment and order rejected the eviction application on the   

ground  that  since  the  appellant  had  not  appeared  in  theground  that  since  the  appellant  had  not  appeared  in  the   

witness box to support the contents of the eviction applicationwitness box to support the contents of the eviction application   

an adverse  inference  must  be  drawn against  him for  non-an adverse  inference  must  be  drawn against  him for  non-

production of the Rent Note,  no order for eviction could beproduction of the Rent Note,  no order for eviction could be   

passed against the respondent. As noted herein earlier, thispassed against the respondent. As noted herein earlier, this  

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order  of  the  Rent  Controller  was reversed by the Appellateorder  of  the  Rent  Controller  was reversed by the Appellate   

Authority, Chandigarh, inter alia, on the findings that non-Authority, Chandigarh, inter alia, on the findings that non-

production  of  “Rent  Note”  and  non-appearance  of  theproduction  of  “Rent  Note”  and  non-appearance  of  the   

landlord/appellant in the witness box could not be taken tolandlord/appellant in the witness box could not be taken to   

be a ground for rejecting the eviction application. Relying onbe a ground for rejecting the eviction application. Relying on   

two decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, namely,two decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, namely,   

Sudarshan Kumari vs. Anand Kumar Khemka  Sudarshan Kumari vs. Anand Kumar Khemka  [1985 (2)[1985 (2)   

RCJ 590] and RCJ 590] and Ms. Kamla Khanna Vs. Lal Chand Palta 1989Ms. Kamla Khanna Vs. Lal Chand Palta 1989   

(2)  RCR 67,(2)  RCR 67, the  Appellate  Authority  held  that  even  if  the the  Appellate  Authority  held  that  even  if  the   

building  was  let  out  for  commercial  purposes,  still  thebuilding  was  let  out  for  commercial  purposes,  still  the   

respondent could not be allowed to continue to occupy therespondent could not be allowed to continue to occupy the   

demised premises  for  commercial  purposes  in  a  residentialdemised premises  for  commercial  purposes  in  a  residential   

area  and  also  in  a  residential  building  in  view  of  thearea  and  also  in  a  residential  building  in  view  of  the   

provisions of the Development and Regulation Act and Sectionprovisions of the Development and Regulation Act and Section   

11 of the Act.11 of the Act.

16.16. As noted herein earlier, the High Court, in Revision, hadAs noted herein earlier, the High Court, in Revision, had   

set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and restored theset aside the order of the Appellate Authority and restored the   

order  of  the  Rent  Controller,  Chandigarh,  rejecting  theorder  of  the  Rent  Controller,  Chandigarh,  rejecting  the   

application for eviction filed by the appellant.    application for eviction filed by the appellant.    

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17.17. A reading of the impugned judgment of the High CourtA reading of the impugned judgment of the High Court   

would clearly show that the judgment of the High Court waswould clearly show that the judgment of the High Court was   

based only on the ground that the building was let out forbased only on the ground that the building was let out for   

commercial  purposes  from  the  time  of  induction  of  thecommercial  purposes  from  the  time  of  induction  of  the   

respondent in the demised premises and the respondent hadrespondent in the demised premises and the respondent had   

been  using  the  same  as  such  since  the  inception  of  thebeen  using  the  same  as  such  since  the  inception  of  the   

tenancy and, therefore, the provision of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) oftenancy and, therefore, the provision of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of   

the Act could not be attracted because the respondent hadthe Act could not be attracted because the respondent had   

not used the demised premises for a purpose other than thatnot used the demised premises for a purpose other than that   

for which it was leased out to him and accordingly, no orderfor which it was leased out to him and accordingly, no order   

of eviction could be passed against the respondent.  of eviction could be passed against the respondent.       

18.18. Before we proceed further,  as noted herein earlier,  weBefore we proceed further,  as noted herein earlier,  we   

may  keep  it  on  record  that  neither  the  appellant  nor  themay  keep  it  on  record  that  neither  the  appellant  nor  the   

respondent  had brought the  “Rent Note”  on record,  on therespondent  had brought the  “Rent Note”  on record,  on the   

basis of which, the Court could straight away determine andbasis of which, the Court could straight away determine and   

adjudge the purpose for which the demised premises was letadjudge the purpose for which the demised premises was let   

out. out.  

19. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in19. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in   

the first instance, contended that in fact the respondent wasthe first instance, contended that in fact the respondent was   

inducted as a tenant in respect of the demised premises forinducted as a tenant in respect of the demised premises for   

residential  use  as  the  appellant  could  not  induct  him  forresidential  use  as  the  appellant  could  not  induct  him  for  

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commercial use in view of Section 11 of the Act as well as incommercial use in view of Section 11 of the Act as well as in   

view  of  the  bar  imposed  under  the  Development  andview  of  the  bar  imposed  under  the  Development  and   

Regulation  Act.  It  was  further  contended  by  the  learnedRegulation  Act.  It  was  further  contended  by  the  learned   

counsel  for  the  appellant  that  even  if  the  respondent  wascounsel  for  the  appellant  that  even  if  the  respondent  was   

inducted as a tenant in respect of the demised premises forinducted as a tenant in respect of the demised premises for   

commercial purposes in a residential area and in a residentialcommercial purposes in a residential area and in a residential   

building, still  in view of Section 11 of the Act and also thebuilding, still  in view of Section 11 of the Act and also the   

relevant provisions of  the Development and Regulation Act,relevant provisions of  the Development and Regulation Act,   

the tenant was liable to be evicted from the demised premises,the tenant was liable to be evicted from the demised premises,   

as  it  satisfied  the  conditions  for  eviction  enumerated  inas  it  satisfied  the  conditions  for  eviction  enumerated  in   

Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.  In support of this contention,Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.  In support of this contention,   

reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the case ofreliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the case of   

Rajinder Singh vs. Jatinder Dev Nanda Rajinder Singh vs. Jatinder Dev Nanda [1999 (9) SCC 18][1999 (9) SCC 18]   

and also on the decisions of this Court in the cases of and also on the decisions of this Court in the cases of VinodVinod   

Kumar Arora vs. Surjit KaurKumar Arora vs. Surjit Kaur [1987 (3) SCC 711],   [1987 (3) SCC 711],  KamalKamal    

Arora vs. Amar Singh & Ors.Arora vs. Amar Singh & Ors. [1986 Suppl. SCC 481] and [1986 Suppl. SCC 481] and   

Rai Chand Jain vs. Miss Chandra Kanta KhoslaRai Chand Jain vs. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla [1991 (1) [1991 (1)   

SCC  422].   Relying  on  these  decisions,  it  was,  therefore,SCC  422].   Relying  on  these  decisions,  it  was,  therefore,   

contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that thecontended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the   

High Court was in error in rejecting the eviction application ofHigh Court was in error in rejecting the eviction application of  

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the appellant.    the appellant.     

20.20. The submissions so made by the learned counsel for theThe submissions so made by the learned counsel for the   

appellant  were  seriously  contested  by  Mr.  V.  C.  Mahajan,appellant  were  seriously  contested  by  Mr.  V.  C.  Mahajan,   

learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent.   

After  taking  us  to  Section  13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the  Act  as  well  asAfter  taking  us  to  Section  13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the  Act  as  well  as   

Sections  11 and 19 of  the  Act,  the  learned  senior  counselSections  11 and 19 of  the  Act,  the  learned  senior  counsel   

contended that if there was any violation of Section 11 of thecontended that if there was any violation of Section 11 of the   

Act  either  by  the  landlord  or  by  the  tenant,  the  Act  onlyAct  either  by  the  landlord  or  by  the  tenant,  the  Act  only   

empowers the authority to impose fine which may extend toempowers the authority to impose fine which may extend to   

one thousand rupees on the landlord or the tenant  as theone thousand rupees on the landlord or the tenant  as the   

case  may  be.  In  this  connection,  attention  was  drawn  tocase  may  be.  In  this  connection,  attention  was  drawn  to   

Section 19 of the Act, which runs as under :- Section 19 of the Act, which runs as under :-  

“Section 19 of the Act confers powers of the authority to“Section 19 of the Act confers powers of the authority to    impose  penalties  –  if  any  person  contravenes  any  of  theimpose  penalties  –  if  any  person  contravenes  any  of  the    provisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  9,  sub-section  (1)  ofprovisions  of  sub-section  (2)  of  Section  9,  sub-section  (1)  of    Section 10,  Section 10,  Section 11Section 11 or Section 18, he shall be punishable or Section 18, he shall be punishable    with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (emphasiswith fine which may extend to one thousand rupees. (emphasis    supplied). supplied).  

21.21. Relying  on  Section  19  of  the  Act,  Mr.  Mahajan  has,Relying  on  Section  19  of  the  Act,  Mr.  Mahajan  has,   

therefore, contended that when statute confers only the powertherefore, contended that when statute confers only the power   

to impose penalty for contravention of Section 11, it cannot beto impose penalty for contravention of Section 11, it cannot be   

held that for such contravention the tenant can be evicted byheld that for such contravention the tenant can be evicted by   

the landlord under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. So far as thethe landlord under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act. So far as the  

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decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant aredecisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant are   

concerned,  Mr.  Mahajan  appearing  on  behalf  of  theconcerned,  Mr.  Mahajan  appearing  on  behalf  of  the   

respondent  sought  to  contend  that  those  decisions  wererespondent  sought  to  contend  that  those  decisions  were   

clearly  distinguishable  on  facts.  Accordingly,  Mr.  Mahajanclearly  distinguishable  on  facts.  Accordingly,  Mr.  Mahajan   

contended that the High Court was not in error in rejectingcontended that the High Court was not in error in rejecting   

the eviction application. Finally, Mr. Mahajan submitted thatthe eviction application. Finally, Mr. Mahajan submitted that   

this  was  not  a  fit  case  to  interfere  with  the  impugnedthis  was  not  a  fit  case  to  interfere  with  the  impugned   

judgment of the High Court in the exercise of discretionaryjudgment of the High Court in the exercise of discretionary   

power under Article 136 of the Constitution.  power under Article 136 of the Constitution.   

22.22. We have carefully examined the rival submissions of theWe have carefully examined the rival submissions of the   

learned counsel for the parties, as noted hereinabove. Afterlearned counsel for the parties, as noted hereinabove. After   

examining  the  respective  submissions,  we  are  of  theexamining  the  respective  submissions,  we  are  of  the   

considered opinion that this appeal must succeed.  Reasonsconsidered opinion that this appeal must succeed.  Reasons   

are as follows:  are as follows:   

23.23. Before  we  deal  with  the  submissions  of  the  learnedBefore  we  deal  with  the  submissions  of  the  learned   

counsel  for  the  parties,  as  noted  hereinabove,  let  us  firstcounsel  for  the  parties,  as  noted  hereinabove,  let  us  first   

decide  an  allied  question  that  has  cropped  up  during  thedecide  an  allied  question  that  has  cropped  up  during  the   

arguments.  This question is whether the tenant was inductedarguments.  This question is whether the tenant was inducted   

in the demised premises for residential use or for commercialin the demised premises for residential use or for commercial   

use or was he inducted for residential use but he converteduse or was he inducted for residential use but he converted   

such tenancy to be used for commercial use at a later date.such tenancy to be used for commercial use at a later date.  

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To answer this question appropriately, we have to look intoTo answer this question appropriately, we have to look into   

Section 11 of the Act and the materials on record.  We haveSection 11 of the Act and the materials on record.  We have   

already quoted this section earlier.  It is quite clear from aalready quoted this section earlier.  It is quite clear from a   

bare  reading  of  Section  11  of  the  Act  that  a  tenant  or  abare  reading  of  Section  11  of  the  Act  that  a  tenant  or  a   

landlord  would  not  be  permitted  to  convert  a  residentiallandlord  would  not  be  permitted  to  convert  a  residential   

premises situated in a residential area for a commercial use.premises situated in a residential area for a commercial use.   

In this connection an admission made by the respondent inIn this connection an admission made by the respondent in   

his evidence would be necessary to be extracted:-his evidence would be necessary to be extracted:-

“ “It  is  correct  that  demised  premises  are  situated  in  theIt  is  correct  that  demised  premises  are  situated  in  the    residential  vicinity.  It  is  incorrect  to  suggest  that  I  have notresidential  vicinity.  It  is  incorrect  to  suggest  that  I  have not    taken  any  permission  from  my  landlady  to  carry  on  thetaken  any  permission  from  my  landlady  to  carry  on  the    commercial  activity.  It  is  correct  that  I  have  not  taken  anycommercial  activity.  It  is  correct  that  I  have  not  taken  any    permission  from  the  Rent  Controller  for  carrying  on  thepermission  from  the  Rent  Controller  for  carrying  on  the    commercial activity. It is correct that the demised premises cancommercial activity. It is correct that the demised premises can    be resumed at any time because of carrying on the commercialbe resumed at any time because of carrying on the commercial    activity.”activity.”(Emphasis supplied).(Emphasis supplied).

24.24. From  the  above  admission  of  the  respondent,  it  isFrom  the  above  admission  of  the  respondent,  it  is   

evidently  clear  that  the  demised  premises  is  situated  in  aevidently  clear  that  the  demised  premises  is  situated  in  a   

residential  area  and  the  building  in  which  the  demisedresidential  area  and  the  building  in  which  the  demised   

premises is situated is also a residential building and he hadpremises is situated is also a residential building and he had   

also not taken any permission from the Rent Controller foralso not taken any permission from the Rent Controller for   

carrying  on  commercial  activities  and  that  the  demisedcarrying  on  commercial  activities  and  that  the  demised   

premises can be resumed at any time because of carrying onpremises can be resumed at any time because of carrying on   

commercial activity.  Such being the position, it can be safelycommercial activity.  Such being the position, it can be safely  

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concluded that the demised premises being in a residentialconcluded that the demised premises being in a residential   

area and in a residential  building in which the commercialarea and in a residential  building in which the commercial   

activity was being carried out by the respondent without theactivity was being carried out by the respondent without the   

permission of the Rent Controller, the production of the Rent-permission of the Rent Controller, the production of the Rent-

Note  to  find  out  the  purpose  for  which  the  tenancy  wasNote  to  find  out  the  purpose  for  which  the  tenancy  was   

created shall not be decisive.created shall not be decisive.

25.25. It is also clear from such admission of the respondentIt is also clear from such admission of the respondent   

himself that the appellant can resume the demised premiseshimself that the appellant can resume the demised premises   

at  any time because of  carrying on the commercial  activityat any time because of  carrying on the commercial  activity   

and that the demised premises is in a residential  area andand that the demised premises is in a residential  area and   

also in a residential building. That apart, Section 11 of the Actalso in a residential building. That apart, Section 11 of the Act   

clearly prohibits a landlord or a tenant to convert the purposeclearly prohibits a landlord or a tenant to convert the purpose   

of tenancy without the permission of the Rent Controller.of tenancy without the permission of the Rent Controller.

26.26. Such  being  the  position,  we  must  conclude  that  theSuch  being  the  position,  we  must  conclude  that  the   

respondent was inducted by the appellant at the initial stagerespondent was inducted by the appellant at the initial stage   

in the demised premises for residential purposes but later onin the demised premises for residential purposes but later on   

converted  the  tenancy  for  commercial  use.  In  the  evictionconverted  the  tenancy  for  commercial  use.  In  the  eviction   

application  as  well  as  in  evidence,  it  was  the  case  of  theapplication  as  well  as  in  evidence,  it  was  the  case  of  the   

appellant that in the month of April,  1994, the respondentappellant that in the month of April,  1994, the respondent   

was inducted for residential use and the commercial activitieswas inducted for residential use and the commercial activities   

were  started  by  him  in  the  month  of  December,  1994were  started  by  him  in  the  month  of  December,  1994  

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onwards.  In view of our discussions made hereinabove, weonwards.  In view of our discussions made hereinabove, we   

must hold that the respondent was inducted in the demisedmust hold that the respondent was inducted in the demised   

premises for residential use and not for commercial purposespremises for residential use and not for commercial purposes   

but  the  respondent  converted  the  tenancy  later  on  frombut  the  respondent  converted  the  tenancy  later  on  from   

residential to commercial use. residential to commercial use.  

27.27. For this purpose, we may safely rely on the observationFor this purpose, we may safely rely on the observation   

of this Court in Rajinder Singh’s Case (Supra) as under :-of this Court in Rajinder Singh’s Case (Supra) as under :-

“Section 11 of the Act prohibits an owner and occupier of the“Section 11 of the Act prohibits an owner and occupier of the    premises to convert a residential building into a non-residentialpremises to convert a residential building into a non-residential    building except with the permission in writing by the Controller.building except with the permission in writing by the Controller.    Therefore, a residential premises could not be used forTherefore, a residential premises could not be used for    non-residential  purpose, namelynon-residential  purpose, namely,  for running a school.  In,  for running a school.  In    view thereof, we  are of the opinion that  the judgment of theview thereof, we  are of the opinion that  the judgment of the    High Court suffers from serious infirmity and deserves to be setHigh Court suffers from serious infirmity and deserves to be set    aside.” [Emphasis supplied]aside.” [Emphasis supplied]

28.28. In view of the findings made hereinabove, we are inIn view of the findings made hereinabove, we are in   

agreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for theagreement with the submissions of the learned counsel for the   

appellant  that  the  respondent  had  clearly  violated  theappellant  that  the  respondent  had  clearly  violated  the   

provisions of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.    provisions of Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act.     

29.29. At this stage, we may deal with the submission of Mr.At this stage, we may deal with the submission of Mr.   

Mahajan, learned senior counsel for the respondent. As notedMahajan, learned senior counsel for the respondent. As noted   

hereinabove, Mr. Mahajan, argued that in view of Section 19hereinabove, Mr. Mahajan, argued that in view of Section 19  

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of  the  Act,  which  clearly  says  that  the  Court  or  the  Rentof  the  Act,  which  clearly  says  that  the  Court  or  the  Rent   

Controller  is  conferred  with  power  to  impose  penalty  forController  is  conferred  with  power  to  impose  penalty  for   

violation of the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and sinceviolation of the provisions of Section 11 of the Act and since   

the Act is a beneficial legislation and benefits the tenant, itthe Act is a beneficial legislation and benefits the tenant, it   

would  be  difficult  to  conceive  that  for  the  same offence,  awould  be  difficult  to  conceive  that  for  the  same offence,  a   

tenant can also be evicted from the demised premises.  In ourtenant can also be evicted from the demised premises.  In our   

view,  this  submission  of  Mr.  Mahajan  has  no  substance.view,  this  submission  of  Mr.  Mahajan  has  no  substance.   

Section 11 speaks about conversion of a residential buildingSection 11 speaks about conversion of a residential building   

into a non-residential building and also prohibits an owner orinto a non-residential building and also prohibits an owner or   

an  occupier  to  convert  the  residential  building  into  a  nonan  occupier  to  convert  the  residential  building  into  a  non   

residential building.residential building.

30.30. Section  13  speaks  about  the  ground  on  the  basis  ofSection  13  speaks  about  the  ground  on  the  basis  of   

which a  tenant  can be  evicted.   In  our  view,  the  scope  ofwhich a  tenant  can be  evicted.   In  our  view,  the  scope  of   

Sections 11 and 13 are quite different.  From a reading ofSections 11 and 13 are quite different.  From a reading of   

Section  19 of  the  Act,  it  is  clear  that  Section  19  gives  anSection  19 of  the  Act,  it  is  clear  that  Section  19  gives  an   

additional  right  to  the  authorities  to  impose  penalty  if  aadditional  right  to  the  authorities  to  impose  penalty  if  a   

person has contravened the provisions of Section 11 of theperson has contravened the provisions of Section 11 of the   

Act.  Therefore, it would not be difficult to hold that SectionAct.  Therefore, it would not be difficult to hold that Section   

13 gives only a right to a landlord to bring action against a13 gives only a right to a landlord to bring action against a   

tenant  who  has  used  the  demised  premises  for  a  purposetenant  who  has  used  the  demised  premises  for  a  purpose  

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other than for which it was leased out, whereas for conversionother than for which it was leased out, whereas for conversion   

of residential premises into a commercial premises would alsoof residential premises into a commercial premises would also   

entail a tenant to be punished with fine under Section 19 ofentail a tenant to be punished with fine under Section 19 of   

the Act.  That apart, from a bare reading of the Act and objectthe Act.  That apart, from a bare reading of the Act and object   

for which the Act was introduced and also after looking intofor which the Act was introduced and also after looking into   

the scope and on consideration of the entire provisions of thethe scope and on consideration of the entire provisions of the   

Act, it cannot be said that for violation of Section 11 of theAct, it cannot be said that for violation of Section 11 of the   

Act, that is to say, a person uses a particular premises whichAct, that is to say, a person uses a particular premises which   

can only be used for residential purposes but is being usedcan only be used for residential purposes but is being used   

for other purposes which entails imposition of penalty underfor other purposes which entails imposition of penalty under   

Section 19 of the Act, would not mean that Section 13(2)(ii)(b)Section 19 of the Act, would not mean that Section 13(2)(ii)(b)   

and Section 19 cannot go hand in hand. Therefore, the onlyand Section 19 cannot go hand in hand. Therefore, the only   

question that remains to be seen is whether a person who hasquestion that remains to be seen is whether a person who has   

converted  the  purpose  for  which  the  premises  was  let  outconverted  the  purpose  for  which  the  premises  was  let  out   

without  the  permission  of  the  Rent  Controller,  can  bewithout  the  permission  of  the  Rent  Controller,  can  be   

punished only with fine under Section 19 or can he also bepunished only with fine under Section 19 or can he also be   

evicted under  Section 13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the Act.  Looking at  theevicted under  Section 13(2)(ii)(b)  of  the Act.  Looking at  the   

object  of  the  Act  and  the  provisions  made  therein,  andobject  of  the  Act  and  the  provisions  made  therein,  and   

considering the fact that the Act is a beneficial legislation notconsidering the fact that the Act is a beneficial legislation not   

only for the tenant but also for the tenant, it can safely beonly for the tenant but also for the tenant, it can safely be   

inferred  that  both  the  sections  namely,  Section  13  andinferred  that  both  the  sections  namely,  Section  13  and  

19

Section  19  can  be  applied  when  there  is  a  violation  ofSection  19  can  be  applied  when  there  is  a  violation  of   

Section11. Therefore, in our view, reading of Section 13 andSection11. Therefore, in our view, reading of Section 13 and   

Section 19 together, we can safely come to the conclusion thatSection 19 together, we can safely come to the conclusion that   

the tenant or the landlord can be punished with fine underthe tenant or the landlord can be punished with fine under   

Section 19 of the Act and at the same time the tenant can beSection 19 of the Act and at the same time the tenant can be   

evicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act if the conditionsevicted under Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act if the conditions   

laid  down  in  the  said  sections  are  satisfied.  That  apart  iflaid  down  in  the  said  sections  are  satisfied.  That  apart  if   

violation of Section 11 of the Act results in fine under Sectionviolation of Section 11 of the Act results in fine under Section   

19 of the Act, in that case the tenants who have violated the19 of the Act, in that case the tenants who have violated the   

provisions  of  Section  11  of  the  Act  could  get  away  fromprovisions  of  Section  11  of  the  Act  could  get  away  from   

eviction only by paying fine that may be imposed upon themeviction only by paying fine that may be imposed upon them   

[tenants].  If this can be accepted, the purpose and object of[tenants].  If this can be accepted, the purpose and object of   

the Act for which this Act was introduced would be frustratedthe Act for which this Act was introduced would be frustrated   

as the residential area would be converted into commercial-as the residential area would be converted into commercial-

cum-residential  area  or  vice-versa,  which  was  not  thecum-residential  area  or  vice-versa,  which  was  not  the   

intention of the Legislature and therefore, it cannot be saidintention of the Legislature and therefore, it cannot be said   

that for violation of Section 11 of the Act,  the only remedythat for violation of Section 11 of the Act,  the only remedy   

available was under Section 19 of the Act i.e. imposition ofavailable was under Section 19 of the Act i.e. imposition of   

fine.  In view of our discussions made herein above, we are offine.  In view of our discussions made herein above, we are of   

the view that the appellant had successfully made out a casethe view that the appellant had successfully made out a case   

for eviction of the respondent on the ground mentioned hereinfor eviction of the respondent on the ground mentioned herein  

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above. above.  

31.31. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of theFor the reasons aforesaid, the impugned judgment of the   

High Court is set aside and that of the Appellate Authority isHigh Court is set aside and that of the Appellate Authority is   

restored and the application for eviction filed by the appellantrestored and the application for eviction filed by the appellant   

is thus allowed. is thus allowed.  

32.32. Considering the facts and circumstances of the presentConsidering the facts and circumstances of the present   

case, we grant six months time to the respondent to vacatecase, we grant six months time to the respondent to vacate   

the premises subject to filing of a usual undertaking in thisthe premises subject to filing of a usual undertaking in this   

Court within a month from this date.Court within a month from this date.

33.33. The appeal is thus allowed. There will be no order as toThe appeal is thus allowed. There will be no order as to   

costs.costs.

   ………………………J.    ………………………J.         [Tarun Chatterjee]        [Tarun Chatterjee]

New Delhi;New Delhi;                                ……………                               …………… …………J.…………J. July 21, 2009.July 21, 2009.                                              [Aftab                                             [Aftab    Alam]Alam]

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