REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 12981 OF 2008

NAHAR SINGH YADAV & ANR. — PETITIONERS  

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS. — RESPONDENTS

O R D E R

D.K. JAIN, J.:

1. The short  question  raised  by  the  Central  Bureau of  Investigation  (for  

short “the CBI”), Anti Corruption Branch, Ghaziabad in their affidavit  

dated  15th  July  2010,  for  our  consideration  is  whether  or  not  the  trial  

arising  out  of  the  chargesheet  filed  by  the  CBI  in  Case  RC-

1(A)/2008/CBI/ACB/Ghaziabad and the local police, Ghaziabad in Case  

Crime No.152/2008 PS Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad deserves to be transferred  

from the Court of Special Judge, CBI at Ghaziabad to some other court of  

competent jurisdiction, preferably at Delhi under the jurisdiction of the  

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High Court of Delhi, with a direction to the Trial Court to conduct the  

trial of the case on a day to day basis, and to complete it within a period  

of two years.

2. Since the case, commonly known as “the Ghaziabad P.F. Scam”, giving  

rise  to  the  afore-stated  prayer,  involves  violation  of  the  standards  of  

judicial behaviour, which is expected to be of the highest order, be it on  

or off the Bench, we feel concerned by the alleged events and have given  

our anxious consideration to the issue raised.  In order to appreciate the  

controversy, a few material facts may be noticed.  These are:

Pursuant  to  and  in  furtherance  of  the  findings  of  the  Vigilance  

Department of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and subsequent  

authorisation  given  by  the  High  Court,  Case  Crime  No.152/2008  under  

Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 477-A, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code,  

1860  (for  short  “the  IPC”)  and  Sections  8,  9,  13(2)  read  with  Sections  

13(1)(d) and 14 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the  

Act”) was registered at PS Kavi Nagar, Ghaziabad on the written complaint  

of  Smt.  Rama Jain,  Special  Judge  and Vigilance  Officer,  District  Court,  

Ghaziabad on 15th February 2008 against  one late Ashutosh Asthana, the  

then Central Nazir, District Court, Ghaziabad and 82 other accused persons  

which included 13 Class-III employees, 30 Class-IV employees of District  

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Court,  Ghaziabad  and  39  outsiders.   It  was  alleged  that  late  Ashutosh  

Asthana  in  collusion  with  other  accused  named  in  the  FIR  fraudulently  

withdrew huge sums of money in the name of GPF of Class-IV employees  

of District Court, Ghaziabad.

Subsequently,  the  present  special  leave  petition  was  filed  with  a  

request to transfer the investigation of Case Crime No.152 of 2008, PS Kavi  

Nagar,  Ghaziabad  to  the  CBI.   During  pendency  of  the  proceedings,  

Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh  issued a  Notification  dated  10th September  

2008, under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946  

(for short “the DSPE Act”) for the transfer of above mentioned case to the  

CBI, which was also placed before this Court for consideration.  Vide order  

dated 23rd September 2008, this Court transferred the investigation in the  

said case to CBI, inter alia, observing that “It is made clear that though we  

have directed the matters to be listed after three months, the CBI, shall be  

free to file the final report or chargesheet, as the case may be at an earlier  

point of time and to proceed thereafter in accordance with law.  The court  

before which the final report or chargesheet is filed shall deal with the report  

or chargesheet,  as the case may be, as required in law.”  In view of the  

aforesaid order of this  Court,  the instant  case was registered by the Anti  

Corruption  Branch,  CBI,  Ghaziabad  as  Case  RC-

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1(A)/2008/CBI/ACB/Ghaziabad against late Ashutosh Asthana and 82 other  

accused persons on 1st October 2008.

3. The CBI filed periodical status reports in this Court with regard to the  

progress made in the investigations from time to time.  Ultimately, the  

final report was filed by the CBI on 30th July 2010.  According to the  

final report, the investigations had revealed that during the period 2001-

2008, late Ashutosh Asthana while working as Bill  Clerk and Central  

Nazir,  District  Court,  Ghaziabad,  by  abusing  his  official  position  as  

public  servant  entered  into  a  criminal  conspiracy  with  6  District  

Judges/Incharge District Judge and 71 others with the intent to cheat the  

District  Courts,  Ghaziabad/Government  of  U.P.,  fraudulently  and  

dishonestly withdrew over  `6 Crores from the District Treasury as GPF  

withdrawals, creating fake/forged documents for withdrawing money in  

the name of GPF of Class-IV employees using them as genuine, thereby  

causing  a  loss  of  over  `6  Crores  to  the  Government  Exchequer  and  

corresponding  gains  to  themselves.   According  to  the  report,  a  

chargesheet under Section 120-B read with Sections 420, 467, 468 and  

471 of the IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act  

against accused persons, as named in the chargesheet, has been filed in  

the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad on 3rd July 2010.

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4. In the affidavit  under consideration,  filed by the CBI,  it  is  stated that  

there is an immediate need to transfer the trial of the case to any other  

place  outside  the  State  of  U.P.,  preferably  Delhi,  for  the  following  

reasons:

(i) Chargesheet  has  been  filed  against  6  former  District  

Judges of Ghaziabad, 3 of whom were later elevated as Judges  

of  the  Allahabad  High  Court  and  48  Class-III  and  Class-IV  

employees of District Court, Ghaziabad.  All these persons and  

their close associates have been working in the District Court,  

Ghaziabad for many years and have close contacts with various  

Judges and Magistrates, who remained posted in Ghaziabad and  

other Districts of U.P.;  

(ii) The Special Judge, CBI, in whose court, chargesheet has  

been  filed,  had  also  worked  with/under  some  of  the  

chargesheeted judicial officers in the past;

(iii) Smt. Rama Jain, former Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad  

is  the  complainant  in  the  case  and  is  currently  serving  as  

Additional District Judge, District Farrukhabad, U.P.;

(iv) 13  Judicial  Officers  and  more  than  25  employees  of  

District  Court,  Ghaziabad  have  been  cited  as  prosecution  

witnesses  in  the  case,  whose  testimony  would  be  crucial  to  

establish the criminal cases against the chargesheeted accused  

persons.

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(v) The court  of Special  Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad is  already  

over-burdened with the trial of about 175 cases including the  

sensitive Nithari killings cases, which are being tried on a day  

to day basis on the directions of Allahabad High Court.

5. Subsequently, another affidavit was filed by the CBI, pointing out certain  

subsequent  developments,  warranting  transfer  of  the  trial  from  

Ghaziabad.  

6. Vide order dated 4th August 2010, notice was issued to all the accused  

named in the chargesheet to show cause as to why the trial should not be  

transferred from the Court of Special Judge, CBI at Ghaziabad to some  

other competent court, preferably under the jurisdiction of the Delhi High  

Court.   In  response,  affidavits  have  been  filed  on  behalf  of  accused  

Nos.1,4,5,6,8,15,19,20,55  and  some  other  accused.   All  the  named  

accused have objected to the transfer of the trial from Ghaziabad to any  

other place on diverse grounds.     

7. We have heard Mr. G.E. Vahanvati, learned Attorney General appearing  

for the CBI and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the objectors –  

accused at some length.  

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8. Mr.  G.E.  Vahanvati,  learned  Attorney  General,  submitted  that  it  is  a  

settled principle that justice should not just be done, but should also be  

seen  as  being done,  and in  view of  the  fact  that  some of  the  named  

accused happen to  be ex-judges/administrative  judges,  there  would be  

reasonable apprehension in the mind of the public at large that the trial  

judge,  being  their  former  colleague,  may  be  biased  in  favour  of  the  

accused and,  therefore,  the peculiar circumstances of the case warrant  

that  in  the  interests  of  justice  the  trial  be  shifted  to  a  neutral  venue.  

Learned  counsel  further  submitted  that  the  paramount  consideration  

which should weigh with the Court while considering an application for  

transfer is that public’s faith in the judiciary should be maintained, and  

given  the  gravity  of  the  allegations,  in  the  present  case,  it  would  be  

expedient to transfer the trial to a Special Judge in Delhi.

9. Mr.  Prashant  Bhushan,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

petitioners  (in  SLP  (C)  No.  12981  of  2008),  contended  that  mere  

inconvenience  of  the  accused  cannot  be  the  ground  for  rejecting  the  

application for transfer, especially in a case like the present one, where  

there is  a serious apprehension that  the trial  may not be free and fair  

because of the past association between the accused, witnesses and the  

trial judge.

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10. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of some of the accused  

contended that Section 406(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  

(for short “the Cr.P.C.”) provides that an application for transfer can be  

moved only by an interested party, and therefore, the CBI which is the  

investigating agency cannot be said to be an interested party within the  

meaning of the said provision and entitled to move such an application  

for transfer of the trial. Commending us to the decision of this Court in  

A.R. Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak & Anr.1, learned counsel contended that the  

power to enlarge the jurisdiction of a Special Judge under Section 4 of  

the  Act  is  legislative  in  nature,  and  therefore,  an  application  under  

Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. is misconceived. It was next contended that  

none of the named accused are holding a judicial office, and therefore,  

there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  they  will  influence  the  witnesses,  

especially  when 13 witnesses  are  themselves  judicial  officers.   It  was  

argued that if the sole ground for transfer is the fact that the witnesses  

might be influenced because of the past status of some of the accused, the  

location of the trial  has no bearing in that regard. It  was stressed that  

transfer of trial would cause great hardship to the accused persons, as  

they  would  have  to  re-locate  themselves  to  Delhi,  far  away  from  

1 (1988) 2 SCC 602  

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Lucknow  or  Allahabad,  where  they  are  residing  after  retirement  and  

engage new counsel for their defence.

11.Mr. Vishwajit Singh, learned counsel, appearing for 34 Class III and IV  

employees who have been named as accused, contended that the transfer  

of trial would cause immense hardship to the accused, who would not  

only have to travel long distances but will also have to engage expensive  

lawyers in Delhi. Learned counsel also contended that the CBI has not  

produced  any  evidence,  much  less  credible  material  in  support  of  its  

apprehension that there would be a miscarriage of justice if the trial is  

held at Ghaziabad.  

12. Before adverting to the main issue, viz. whether it would be desirable to  

transfer  the  trial  from Ghaziabad,  we  shall  deal  with  the  preliminary  

objection raised on behalf of some of the accused about the locus standi  

of the CBI in preferring the application for transfer of trial.  In order to  

appreciate the contention of the objectors-accused persons, in relation to  

the capacity of the CBI to move an application for transfer of the instant  

case, it would be expedient to refer to Section 6 of the DSPE Act, which  

reads as:

“6. Consent of State Government to exercise of powers and  jurisdiction. Nothing contained in Section 5 shall be deemed to  

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enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment  to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, not  being a Union Territory or Railway area, without the consent of  the Government of that State.”

13.It is manifest that by operation of Section 6 of the DSPE Act, once a  

State Government issues notification transferring the investigation to the  

CBI, for all intents and purposes, the CBI is entitled to exercise the same  

powers as the State police, in relation to the investigation transferred to it.  

As a necessary corollary, in light of the current structure and status of the  

CBI, it is manifest that the CBI steps into and assumes the role of the  

prosecuting agency for that particular case.

14.Section  406(2)  of  the  Cr.P.C.  provides  that  the  Supreme  Court  may  

exercise power under sub-section (1) thereof only on an application in  

that  behalf  by  either  the  Attorney  General  for  India  or  the  Advocate  

General of a State or a party interested.  

15.A criminal trial is a judicial examination of evidence with the object of  

punishing  the  offenders  on  a  proper  proof  of  relevant  facts,  the  core  

question being the guilt or innocence of the accused. Given the pivotal  

role accorded to the prosecuting agency in a criminal trial, we are unable  

to hold that the CBI is not an interested party for the purposes of Section  

406(2) of the Cr.P.C.

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16.We are of the opinion that once a notification has been issued by a State  

Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, the CBI assumes the role  

of an investigating agency and as afore-stated the CBI is also invested  

with the role of the prosecuting agency in relation to that particular case,  

and therefore, it is entitled to move an application under Section 406(2)  

of the Cr.P.C.  Accordingly, the preliminary objection is rejected.  

17. Reverting to the main issue, a true and fair trial is sine qua non of Article  

21 of the Constitution, which declares that no person shall be deprived of  

his  “life”  or  “personal  liberty”  except  according  to  the  procedure  

established by law.  It needs no emphasis that a criminal trial, which may  

result in depriving a person of not only his personal liberty but also his  

life  has  to  be  unbiased,  and  without  any  prejudice  for  or  against  the  

accused.  An  impartial  and  uninfluenced  trial  is  the  fundamental  

requirement of a fair trial,  the first and the foremost imperative of the  

criminal justice delivery system.  If a criminal trial is not free and fair,  

the criminal justice system would undoubtedly be at stake, eroding the  

confidence of a common man in the system, which would not augur well  

for the society at large. Therefore, as and when it is shown that the public  

confidence in the fairness of a particular  trial  is likely to be seriously  

undermined,  for  any  reason  whatsoever,  Section  406  of  the  Cr.P.C.  

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empowers this Court to transfer any case or appeal from one High Court  

to another High Court or from one criminal court subordinate to one High  

Court  to  another  criminal  court  of  equal  or  superior  jurisdiction  

subordinate to another  High Court,  to meet  the ends of justice.   It  is,  

however, the trite law that power under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. has to  

be  construed  strictly  and  is  to  be  exercised  sparingly  and  with  great  

circumspection. It needs little emphasis that a prayer for transfer should  

be  allowed  only  when  there  is  a  well-substantiated  apprehension  that  

justice  will  not  be  dispensed  impartially,  objectively  and without  any  

bias.  In the absence of any material demonstrating such apprehension,  

this  Court  will  not  entertain  application  for  transfer  of  a  trial,  as  any  

transfer  of  trial  from one State  to another  implicitly reflects  upon the  

credibility of not only the entire State judiciary but also the prosecuting  

agency, which would include the public prosecutors as well.  

18. In  Zahira  Habibulla  H.  Sheikh  Vs. State  of  Gujarat  & Ors.2,  while  

explaining  the  import  of  the  expression  “fair  trial”,  this  Court  had  

observed that:

“Fair  trial  obviously  would  mean  a  trial  before  an  impartial  judge, a fair prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair  trial means a trial in which bias or prejudice for or against the  accused,  the  witnesses,  or  the  cause  which  is  being  tried  is  

2 (2004) 4 SCC 158

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eliminated. If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to give  false  evidence  that  also  would  not  result  in  a  fair  trial.  The  failure  to  hear  material  witnesses  is  certainly  denial  of  fair  trial.”

19. In Maneka Sanjay Gandhi & Anr. Vs. Rani Jethmalani3, speaking for a  

bench of three learned Judges of this Court, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. said:

“Assurance  of  a  fair  trial  is  the  first  imperative  of  the  dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court to  consider  when  a  motion  for  transfer  is  made  is  not  the  hypersensitivity  or  relative  convenience  of  a  party  or  easy  availability of legal services or like mini-grievances. Something  more substantial, more compelling, more imperilling, from the  point of view of public justice and its attendant environment, is  necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This  is  the  cardinal  principle  although  the  circumstances  may  be  myriad  and  vary  from  case  to  case.  We  have  to  test  the  petitioner’s grounds on this touchstone bearing in mind the rule  that normally the complainant has the right to choose any court  having jurisdiction  and the accused  cannot  dictate  where  the  case against him should be tried. Even so, the process of justice  should not harass the parties and from that angle the court may  weigh the circumstances.”

20. In Abdul Nazar Madani Vs. State of T.N. & Anr.4, dealing with a similar  

application, this Court had echoed the following views:  

“The apprehension of not getting a fair and impartial inquiry or  trial is required to be reasonable and not imaginary, based upon  conjectures and surmises. If it appears that the dispensation of  criminal justice is not possible impartially and objectively and  without  any bias,  before any court  or  even at  any place,  the  

3 (1979) 4 SCC 167 4 (2000) 6 SCC 204

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appropriate court may transfer the case to another court where it  feels  that  holding  of  fair  and  proper  trial  is  conducive.  No  universal or hard and fast rules can be prescribed for deciding a  transfer petition which has always to be decided on the basis of  the facts of each case. Convenience of the parties including the  witnesses  to  be  produced  at  the  trial  is  also  a  relevant  consideration  for  deciding  the  transfer  petition.  The  convenience  of  the  parties  does  not  necessarily  mean  the  convenience of the petitioners alone who approached the court  on misconceived notions of apprehension. Convenience for the  purposes of transfer means the convenience of the prosecution,  other  accused,  the  witnesses  and  the  larger  interest  of  the  society.”

21. In K. Anbazhagan Vs. Superintendent of Police & Ors.5, this Court had  

an occasion to deal with the prayer for transfer of a criminal trial from  

Tamil Nadu to another State mainly on the ground of apprehension of  

political interference in the trial.  While finally directing the transfer of  

the case to the State of Karnataka, the Court observed thus:

“Free  and  fair  trial  is  sine  qua  non  of  Article  21  of  the  Constitution. It is trite law that justice should not only be done  but it should be seen to have been done. If the criminal trial is  not free and fair and not free from bias, judicial fairness and the  criminal  justice  system  would  be  at  stake  shaking  the  confidence of the public in the system and woe would be the  rule  of  law.  It  is  important  to  note  that  in  such  a  case  the  question is not whether the petitioner is actually biased but the  question is whether the circumstances are such that there is a  reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner.”

5 (2004) 3 SCC 767

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22. Recently,  in  Captain  Amarinder  Singh  Vs. Parkash  Singh  Badal  &  

Ors.6, while  dealing  with  two  transfer  applications  preferred  under  

Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. on the ground that with the change in State  

Government, the trial was suffering setback due to the influence of the  

new Chief Minister as also the lack of interest by the Public Prosecutor,  

P. Sathasivam, J., speaking for a three-judge Bench has observed thus:  

“18. For  a  transfer  of  a  criminal  case,  there  must  be  a  reasonable apprehension on the part of the party to a case that  justice  will  not  be  done.  It  is  one  of  the  principles  of  administration of justice that justice should not only be done  but  it  should  be  seen  to  be  done.  On  the  other  hand,  mere  allegations  that  there is  apprehension that  justice  will  not  be  done in a given case does not suffice. In other words, the court  has  further  to  see  whether  the  apprehension  alleged  is  reasonable  or  not.  The  apprehension  must  not  only  be  entertained  but  must  appear  to  the  court  to  be  a  reasonable  apprehension.

19. Assurance  of  a  fair  trial  is  the  first  imperative  of  the  dispensation of justice. The purpose of the criminal trial is to  dispense fair and impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous  considerations. When it is shown that the public confidence in  the  fairness  of  a  trial  would  be  seriously  undermined,  the  aggrieved party can seek the transfer of a case within the State  under Section 407 and anywhere in the country under Section  406 CrPC.  

20. However,  the  apprehension  of  not  getting  a  fair  and  impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not  imaginary. Free and fair trial is sine qua non of Article 21 of the  Constitution. If the criminal trial is not free and fair and if it is  biased, judicial fairness and the criminal justice system would  be at stake, shaking the confidence of the public in the system.  

6 (2009) 6 SCC 260

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The apprehension must appear to the court to be a reasonable  one.”

23. In R. Balakrishna Pillai Vs. State of Kerala7, while rejecting a prayer for  

transfer which was made on the ground that one of the Judges hearing the  

appeal  had  previously  appeared  as  an  advocate  in  a  commission  

enquiring  into  an  allegation  of  misconduct  against  the  petitioner  in  

another matter, this had Court observed as under:

“The charges against him are altogether for a different case not  connected with the rectification  work of  Edamalayar Project.  Secondly, a Judge while practising as an advocate might have  appeared in a number of cases, but that would not mean that he  would have any personal interest or connection with the said  matters or with persons involved therein and would be biased  towards them. Therefore, it would be difficult to presume or to  draw an inference that the learned Judge, because of assisting  the Commission of Inquiry as an advocate in a different matter,  would have bias or prejudice against the petitioner and would  not render justice in accordance with law. Acceptance of such  contention  would  seriously  undermine  the  independence  and  stern stuff of the Judges.”

24.Thus, although no rigid and inflexible rule or test could be laid down to  

decide whether or not power under Section 406 of the Cr.P.C. should be  

exercised, it is manifest from a bare reading of sub-sections (2) and (3) of  

the said Section and on an analysis of the decisions of this Court that an  

order of transfer of trial  is  not  to be passed as a matter  of routine or  

7 (2000) 7 SCC 129

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merely  because  an  interested  party  has  expressed  some  apprehension  

about  the  proper  conduct  of  a  trial.   This  power  has  to  be  exercised  

cautiously and in exceptional situations, where it becomes necessary to  

do so to provide credibility to the trial.  Some of the broad factors which  

could be kept in mind while considering an application for transfer of the  

trial are:-

(i) when it appears that the State machinery or prosecution is  

acting hand in glove with the accused, and there is likelihood of  

miscarriage  of  justice  due to the lackadaisical  attitude of the  

prosecution;  

(ii) when  there  is  material  to  show that  the  accused  may  

influence the prosecution witnesses or cause physical harm to  

the complainant;

(iii) comparative  inconvenience  and  hardships  likely  to  be  

caused to the accused, the complainant/the prosecution and the  

witnesses,  besides  the  burden  to  be  borne  by  the  State  

Exchequer in making payment of travelling and other expenses  

of the official and non-official witnesses;  

(iv) a  communally  surcharged  atmosphere,  indicating  some  

proof of inability of holding fair and impartial trial because of  

the accusations made and the nature of the crime committed by  

the accused; and

(v) existence of some material from which it can be inferred  

that the some persons are so hostile that they are interfering or  

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are  likely  to  interfere  either  directly  or  indirectly  with  the  

course of justice.  

25.Having considered the rival claims of both the parties on the touchstone  

of  the  afore-stated  broad  parameters,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  

apprehension  entertained  by  the  CBI  that  the  trial  of  the  case  at  

Ghaziabad  may  not  be  fair,  resulting  in  miscarriage  of  justice,  is  

misplaced and cannot be accepted.  From the material on record, we are  

unable to draw any inference of a reasonable apprehension of bias nor do  

we think that an apprehension based on a bald allegation that since the  

trial judge and some of the named accused had been close associates at  

some point of time and that some of the witnesses are judicial officers,  

the  trial  at  Ghaziabad would be biased and not  fair,  undermining the  

confidence of the public in the system.  While it is true that judges are  

human beings, not automatons but it is imperative for a judicial officer, in  

whatever capacity he may be functioning, that he must act with the belief  

that he is not to be guided by any factor other than to ensure that he shall  

render a free and fair decision, which according to his conscience is the  

right  one  on  the  basis  of  materials  placed  before  him.  There  is  no  

exception to this imperative.  Therefore, we are not disposed to believe  

that either the witnesses or the Special Judge will get influenced in favour  

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of the accused merely because some of them happen to be their former  

colleagues.   As already  stated,  acceptance  of  such allegation,  without  

something more substantial, seriously undermines the credibility and the  

independence  of  the  entire  judiciary  of  a  State.   Accordingly,  we  

outrightly reject this ground urged in support of the prayer for transfer of  

trial from Ghaziabad.   

26. As regards the plea that the Court of Special Judge, CBI, Ghaziabad is  

already heavily over-burdened, in our opinion, that is again not a ground  

for transfer of trial.  If at all the said Court is over burdened, it will be  

open to the High Court to request the State Government to create another  

Court of a Special Judge at Ghaziabad and we are confident that having  

regard to the nature of the case and the serious concern already shown by  

the State Government by issuing Notification dated 10th September 2008  

promptly and expeditiously, the State Government will take appropriate  

steps in that behalf so that the guilty are brought to book at the earliest  

not only in this case but in other sensitive trials, stated to be pending in  

that Court, as well.

27.For the afore-stated reasons, as at present, we do not find any merit in the  

request of the CBI for transfer of the trial from Ghaziabad to any other  

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place. Accordingly, the prayer is declined.  The Trial Court is directed to  

proceed with the case expeditiously.

.……………………………..…..….. (D.K. JAIN, J.)  

.……………………………..…..….  (V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.)

.……………………………..…..….. (G.S. SINGHVI, J.)

NEW DELHI; NOVEMBER 19, 2010.  

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